Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/biblicalcommenta0000drhe

William Jessup University
Library
333 Sunset Blvd.
Rocklin, Ca 95765

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY

ON

THE NEW TESTAMENT,

BY

DR. HERMANN OLSHAUSEN,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN.

CONTINUED AFTER HIS DEATH

BY

DR. JOHN HENRY AUGUSTUS EBRARD

AND

LIC. AUGUSTUS WIESINGER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

FOR CLARK'S FOREIGN AND THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.

REVISED AFTER THE LATEST GERMAN EDITION,

BY

A. C. KENDRICK, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER.

[redacted]

NEW YORK:
SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,
115 NASSAU STREET.

1858.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1858, by
SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

STEREOTYPED BY
THOMAS B. SMITH,
82 & 84 Beekman-street, N. Y.

PRINTED BY
PUDNEY & RUSSELL,
79 John-street.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THE present volume brings down the Commentary continuously to the close of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It completes—and more than completes—the original plan of the Publishers, which was merely to republish the work so far as it had already appeared in English. It embraces in addition to that, Wiesinger's Exposition of the Second Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Philemon, translated by the Editor. It leaves the Catholic Epistles of James, Peter, John and Jude, and the Revelation, which will be comprised in another volume when the German work shall be completed. The Editor cannot forbear to add his belief that the present volume will not be found inferior in interest and value to any of its predecessors. Wiesinger is throughout thorough, exact and judicious, displaying most of the best features, with few of the faults, of German exegesis: is clear in his views, and hearty in the defence, both of the divine authority and the evangelical teachings of the works which he expounds. Ebrard, with higher genius and greater breadth of view, is, indeed, sometimes over confident and bold, yet in the main trustworthy, and often extremely happy in his interpretations. He has the art, to which few Germans aspire, of developing his views with clearness, spirit and elegance. In his translation of Wiesinger, the Editor has found it necessary to study brevity, and has occasionally omitted a very few of the numerous and sometimes scarcely necessary references to other commentators. May the work thus far completed be made, in the hands of the Divine Spirit, the means of abundant blessing to the Church.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

PAGE

§ 1. Timothy 9
§ 2. Occasion, Design, and Contents of the Epistle 10
§ 3. The Time and Place of Composition 11
§ 4. Genuineness 17

EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

§ 1. Inscription and Charge given to Timothy, in Opposition to those who Teach otherwise 21
§ 2. Directions to Timothy with regard to the Regulation of the Church. A. Regarding Public Worship 48
§ 3. Directions to Timothy with regard to the Regulation of the Church. B. Regarding the Offices of Presbyter and Deacon 63
§ 4. Admonitions addressed to Timothy as Teacher in the Prospect of the future Falling Away 80
§ 5. Directions to Timothy with respect to his Conduct towards the Members of the Church, according to the Distinctions of Age, Sex, and Position within the Church 115
§ 6. Instructions to Timothy with regard to Slaves. Warning against the Desire to become Rich after the Manner of those who Teach otherwise. Charge to be addressed to the Rich. Concluding Exhortation 146

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Contents 169
§ 2. Occasion and Object 171
§ 3. The Place, Time, and other Historical Relations in the Composition of the Epistle 172
§ 4. Genuineness 179

EXPOSITION OF THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

PAGE
§ 1. Introductory 183
§ 2. Summons to Timothy not to Shrink from the Toils and Sufferings of his Calling. 200
§ 3. Duty of Timothy in Reference to the prevailing Tendency towards empty Logomachy 210
§ 4. Reference to the Phenomena of the Last Time, already disclosing themselves, for the Purpose of Instructing Timothy in relation to them 219
§ 5. Concluding and Earnest Admonition to Timothy to Zealous, Faithful Fulfilment of his Calling 231
§ 6. Directions for Timothy's speedy Coming—Salutations 238

THE EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

INTRODUCTION.

EXPOSITION OF THE EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

Ver. 1, 2. Address and Salutation 257
Ver. 4–7. Introductory Thanksgiving for Philemon's Love and Faith 258
Ver. 21–25. Conclusion of the Epistle 269

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

INTRODUCTION 273
THE EXORDIUM 279

PART FIRST.

The Son and the Angels 295
§ 1. The Son is in Himself superior to the Angels 297
A Practical Intermediate Part 323
§ 2. In the Son Man is raised above the Angels 328

PART SECOND.

The Son and Moses 364
§ 1. The New Testament Messiah is in himself, as Son, superior to Moses 365
Intermediate Passage of a Hortatory Kind 378
§ 2. In the Son Israel has entered into its true Rest 385

PART THIRD.

Christ and the High Priest 413
§ 1. Christ and Aaron 414
Intermediate Part of a Hortatory Kind 425
§ 2. The Messiah, as a High Priest after the Order of Melchisedec, is a superior High Priest to Aaron 444

PART FOURTH.

PAGE
THE MOSAIC TABERNACLE AND THE HEAVENLY SANCTUARY 471
§ 1. The two Tabernacles correspond to the two Covenants 471
§ 2. The Construction of the Mosaic Tabernacle 483
§ 3. The Service of the Tabernacle. The Blood of the Bullocks and the Blood of Christ 501

PART FIFTH.

THE LAYING HOLD ON THE NEW TESTAMENT SALVATION 528
§ 1. Theme of the Exhortation 529
§ 2. First Motive. Danger and Consequences of Falling Away 534
§ 3. Second Motive. Calling to Mind their former Faith 537
§ 4. Third Motive. The Historically demonstrated Power of Faith 541
§ 5. Fourth Motive. The Blessing of Chastisement 561
§ 6. Fifth Motive. The Choice between Grace and Law, a Choice between Salvation and Judgment 568
§ 7. Concluding Exhortations 573

APPENDIX.

ON THE DATE, DESTINATION, AND AUTHOR OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

Chap. I. The Circle of Readers 582
Chap. II. Time of Composition 585
Chap. III. Whether written originally in Greek 590
Chap. IV. THE WRITER. A) External Testimonies 595
Chap. V. CONTINUATION. B) Internal Reasons 605
A) Particular Intimations 605
B) The Doctrinal Import 606
C) Words and Phrases 611
D) The Style 613
Chap. VI. CONCLUSION. The Particular Hypothesis 615
Literature 623

THE FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Timothy.

Timothy is named as the receiver of the epistle, i. 2, iii. 14. It was intended for him alone, not for the church at the same time, as this would contradict the definite inscription, the character of the epistle as an official letter, and its whole import; on iv. 12 see the exposition. As to his personal history we learn from the New Testament that Lycaonia was his native country—whether Lystra (De Wette) or Derbe (Wieseler) was his birth-place is undetermined—that his father was a Greek, and his mother a Jewess who embraced Christianity (Acts xvi. 1–3). His mother's name was Eunice, his grandmother's Lois (2 Tim. i. 5). From this last passage compared with iii. 15, we may infer that Timothy had enjoyed the benefit of a pious education on the side of his mother. Already at the time of the apostle's second stay in that district, we find him mentioned as a *disciple* who had a good report of the brethren (Acts xvi. 1, 2). After he had been circumcised (Acts xvi. 3), and set apart with the laying on of hands to the work of an evangelist (1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 14, vi. 12; 2 Tim. i. 6, ii. 2), he joined the apostle on his journey through Lesser Asia and Macedonia, followed him to Rome, after having remained behind in Berœa (Acts xvii. 14–16), was deputed thence by him to Thessalonica, and returned to him at Corinth (Acts xviii. 5; 1 Thess. iii. 6). We find him at a later period in Ephesus again with the apostle, from whence he was sent to Macedonia and Corinth (Acts xix. 22; 1 Cor. iv. 17, xvi. 10, 11). The second epistle to the Corinthians does not expressly say that he had actually been there. But we find him again with the apostle in Macedonia (2 Cor. i. 1), and he went with him to Corinth (Rom. xvi. 21). He was one of the apostle's travelling companions on his return thence, and he went forward along with several others from Philippi to Troas (Acts xx. 4, seq). According to Phil. ii.

19–23, he was to have gone to Philippi. According to our epistle, he abode in Ephesus (i. 3), having being charged by the apostle with the care of the affairs of the church there. In Heb. xiii. 23, we have another historical notice concerning him, to which however no certain place can be assigned. Tradition makes him the first bishop of Ephesus, and to have suffered martyrdom there under Domitian. More will be found in Böhl, p. 22, seq. Comp. Winer's R.W.B. The passages in which the apostle speaks of Timothy are 1 Cor. iv. 17; xvi. 10, 11; Phil. ii. 19–23; 1 Thess. iii. 1–6; they show what love he bare to him, and what confidence he reposed in him. In the apostle's epistles, he is oftenest named along with the apostle in the inscription, 2 Cor. i. 1; Phil. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1; Philem. 1, which is also a testimony in his favour.

§ 2. Occasion, Design, and Contents of the Epistle.

Timothy had been left by the apostle in Ephesus, with the special charge of opposing a false form of Christian doctrine and Christian life which was manifesting itself there, and of giving heed to the settlement and administration of the church. As the apostle foresees the possibility of his return being delayed, he is induced to give instructions to his substitute for guiding him in his conduct, chiefly with respect to this charge (iii. 14, 15). But the design of the epistle is not limited to this its immediate occasion. The apostle has also words of admonition and warning to address to Timothy the *evangelist;* he sets before him what is incumbent on him as a good servant of Jesus Christ, both with reference to himself as an individual, and to the church, and gives him the necessary hints for his guidance in the discharge of these obligations. When we take this extended view of the design of the epistle, we shall not merely find that its contents correspond to this design when viewed as a whole, but we shall perceive also a regular method in its plan, and in the succession of its particular parts. The epistle accordingly divides itself into two parts. The first of these contains the instructions given to assist Timothy in the fulfilment of his temporary commission; ch. i. 3, 15. More particularly, ch. i. treats of the false teaching against which Timothy is to be on his guard; ch. ii. and iii. of the administration of the church; in ch. ii. are given directions with respect to the assemblies of the church, in ch. iii. for ordination to church offices. The second part, which extends from iii. 15 to the end, contains instructions bearing on Timothy's calling as an evangelist, setting before him what is incumbent upon him in this respect. The conclusion of ch. iii. forms the transition to the future falling away from the faith described in ch. iv., which

makes it the duty of Timothy as a teacher of the gospel all the more faithfully to hold fast the apostolical doctrine, and to make a conscientious improvement of the gifts bestowed on him (ch. iv). In ch. v. Timothy is farther instructed how he is to deal with the particular members of the church, according to the distinctions of sex, age, and according to other differences (in which from the nature of the case it cannot be expected that the line of distinction should be drawn between Timothy's position as representative of the apostle, and as an evangelist). Finally, in ch. vi., special injunctions are given him with respect to slaves, and with respect to the rich. The transition to this last point is made by a warning addressed to Timothy as an individual, against the desire to be rich, a warning which the apostle is induced to give from a regard to the character and pursuits of the false seducers.

The conclusion stands by itself, vers. 20–21, and contains a reiterated comprehensive warning against that secret science which is referred to in other parts of the epistle. For the confirmation and further expansion of this, see the interpretation.

§ 3. The Time and Place of Composition.

The historical circumstances under which the epistle according to its own statements was written, are the following. The apostle had gone from Ephesus to Macedonia, and had left Timothy to conduct the affairs of the Ephesian church until he himself should return, which he hoped would not be long, but which might possibly be delayed. The church was already fully organized. It had not only presbyters and deacons, but also an institution for widows belonging to the church. Already a *νεόφυτος* was ineligible to the office of a bishop, and in general, a Christian test was applied in the appointment to any office, and to any ecclesiastical distinction, v. 9, seq. A corrupt tendency to vain speculation, and a false asceticism, had prominently appeared in the church, which in the case of some had even led to a complete apostacy from the faith; the present already displayed the germ of an error which threatened the future with danger (iv. 1, seq). Even these circumstances show that the date of the epistle must belong to the later, nay, I might say to the latest period of the apostle's history. It will be difficult to prove that the existence of Christianity for two or three years is sufficient to explain the qualifications laid down in chap. iii. to be looked for in the appointment of ecclesiastical office-bearers, the rules laid down in chap. v. regarding widows, and the experiences of which we have there an account, as also the warnings pervading the entire epistle against false teaching and error. Can this epistle

have been written before the farewell address at Miletus to the Ephesian presbyters, in which the apostle warns against a danger, not that was already present, but which threatened the future; or before the epistle to the Ephesians, which contains no trace of the errors here pourtrayed, while the apostle himself represents these errors as the beginning of a falling away from the faith which was progressively to develop itself? We would here further recall to mind what has been said in the General Introduction, namely, that what the epistle contains respecting the prevailing errors, as well as the ecclesiastical institutions, indicates its place to be in the midst of the earlier appearances of this kind, and the latest within the apostolic era; that we find everywhere the marks of Christianity having been in existence for some length of time, and its presence having become familiar, as, for example, in the disappearance of the charismata, and the qualification of *aptness to teach* being required in the presbyter—although the total impression made by the epistle in this respect is much more striking when we compare it with the epistles to the Corinthians, or with that to the Romans, in proximity to which some would place it.

Meanwhile we proceed to consider those hypotheses which attempt to bring our epistle within the period comprehended by the Acts of the Apostles, without the supposition of the apostle's liberation from his imprisonment at Rome, to which we feel ourselves driven. We pass over Calvin's conjecture, who transfers its composition even to the period following the apostle's first stay in Ephesus (Acts xviii. 19; compare against it Wieseler, p. 290); we omit also that of Dr. Paulus, that it was written from the apostle's imprisonment at Cæsarea, an hypothesis which creates for itself the necessary facts, and can be maintained only by an arbitrary exegesis (comp. against it Böhl, p. 202, seq.; Matthies, p. 449, seq.; Wieseler, p. 302; Huther, p. 15, seq). Nor shall we do more than mention Schneckenburger and Böttger's view, which rests on the change of προσμεῖναι to προσμείνας, as we deny at the very outset their right to such an emendation against the unanimity of the codd. and the clear sense of the words (comp. Wieseler, p. 303). There remain for more particular examination, three hypotheses, of which the first fixes the date of the epistle to the period described in Acts xx. 1, 2 (held by many ancient and modern commentators as Theodoret, Hug, Hemsen, etc.), the second makes it to have been written during a journey undertaken by the apostle from Ephesus, in the period of his from two to three years' stay there (so Mosheim, who supposes the journey in question to have taken place at the commencement of this stay, Schrader, and last of all Wieseler, who place it at the end); finally, the third finds in the circumstances mentioned in Acts xx. 3–5, the most appropriate period for its composition (so Bertholdt and Matthies).

Of these hypotheses the first has seemingly the best connexion with the Acts of the Apostles, for in Acts xx. 1 we read that the apostle went on a journey from Ephesus to Macedonia; when more closely examined, however, it is found to be the most untenable. The grounds on which it is opposed, and which have already been adduced by Schleiermacher, Böhl, Mack, Matthies, Huther, Wieseler, etc., may be summed up in the following: The supposition that Timothy, on the apostle's departure from Ephesus, was left behind with the charge of conducting the Ephesian churches, contradicts the accounts in the Acts of the Apostles, and the notices in the two Epistles to the Corinthians. According to Acts xix. 21–23, Timothy had been sent to Macedonia, and from thence to go to Corinth (1 Cor. iv. 17) at the time when the apostle was purposing to set out on his own journey. It must therefore be supposed that, notwithstanding the insurrection caused by Demetrius, the apostle's departure was delayed so long, that Timothy was able to perform a journey over Macedonia to Corinth, there execute his commission, and return to him at Ephesus before he set out. Timothy—whom Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, supposes to be not yet in Corinth (xvi. 10)—must have returned to him at Ephesus by the time of Pentecost (xvi. 8), while the epistle was not written till about the time of the Passover (v. 6–8; comp. Meyer). But even granting that this period is not too short, or that Timothy did not actually go to Corinth, this hypothesis is still inconsistent with 2 Cor. i. 1, according to which Timothy did not remain in Ephesus, but stayed with the apostle in Macedonia, and was with him likewise during his short stay in Greece, and accompanied him on his return thence (Rom. xvi. 21; Acts xx. 4). The apostle further writes, 1 Tim. iii. 14, that he intends shortly to return to Ephesus. But according to Acts xx. 3; 1 Cor. xvi. 5, seq.; Acts xix. 21, he has the fixed purpose of journeying over Macedonia to Greece, and thence to Jerusalem, as also he expresses himself to the same effect again in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (xiii. 1), written from Macedonia, and in Rom. xv. 25, seq. Nay, so little does he think at that time of a return to Ephesus, that afterwards when induced by the plots of the Jews to change his original plan of going from Greece to Syria by sea, and thus obliged to come near to Ephesus, he sails past it, and only gives directions for the presbyters to meet him at Miletus (Acts xx. 16). On these grounds alone this hypothesis is untenable, altogether apart from the internal improbability of the state of things which it compels us to suppose (on which see Schleiermacher, p. 115, seq.), and from all the criteria of the epistle, which presents us with a form of the Christian life belonging to a much later period of the apostolic era.

The third of the hypotheses above stated, is surrounded with

difficulties scarcely less serious, as has already been shown by Mack, Huther, Wieseler, against Matthies, its most recent advocate, after Bertholdt had led the way. According to this hypothesis Paul had sent Timothy forward to Ephesus shortly before he set out on his journey back from Achaia to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 3, seq.), with a verbal commission, intending to be there soon also himself; but not being quite certain that he should accomplish this, he embraced the first favorable opportunity of writing this epistle from some place in Achaia or Macedonia, in order to give Timothy instructions how to act in the interval, only a short time, perhaps only a few weeks later than the Epistle to Titus was written, which Matthies likewise places in the same period. Against this view as defended by Matthies are the following considerations: 1. That it rests on an unwarrantable interpretation of the passage 1 Tim. i. 3 (according to the opinion of De Wette, Winer, Huther, Wieseler (comp. on the passage), in which πορευόμενος is made to refer, not to the apostle, but to Timothy. This interpretation is not made use of by Bertholdt, for he refers these words to the journey alluded to in Acts xx. 1, 2; but still the difficulty arises, why Timothy did not then remain in Ephesus, and why the apostle, after having been a considerable time in company with Timothy, as is the case here, should have referred to the commission which he then received. 2. The account of the journey in Acts xx. 4, 5, is inconsistent with this hypothesis, for according to it Timothy was not sent forward, but went in company with the apostle, and was parted from him only from Philippi to Troas, and thence to Assos. Matthies' view, therefore, contradicts this account. It must rather be supposed, as Huther observes, that the apostle did not send Timothy to Ephesus till later, possibly from Troas, and that he sent the epistle immediately after him, a supposition, however, which is not very conceivable. 3. How little accordance is there between the purpose of the apostle as expressed in iii. 14, iv. 13 of this epistle, ere long to come to Ephesus, and Acts xx. 16, where it is said, "For Paul had determined to sail past Ephesus because he would not spend the time in Asia." Nor can this have been his original purpose, as Acts xx. 3 shows. (Wieseler, p. 294, seq.) 4. And how strange must it appear, that in Acts xx. 16 no mention whatever is made of Titus? 5. And in general, what need was there of an epistle, seeing that Timothy had been with the apostle shortly before, and that the epistle itself gives no ground for supposing that any new information regarding the church at Ephesus had come to him, which induced him to write? 6. What is predicted in Acts xx. 29, 30, concerning a future error, does not consist with this hypothesis. In short, as Baur has justly observed against this hypothesis, "nothing agrees with it."

The second of the above-mentioned hypothesis, which places the apostle's journey to Macedonia, and the writing of the epistle, in the period of his from two to three years' stay in Ephesus, and in particular towards the end of this period, has most in its favour in the merely external historical data. This is Wieseler's view, and he has developed and defended it with great acuteness. With him agree Mosheim and Schrader, so far as to place the journey in question during the apostle's stay at Ephesus ; but the form which they have given to this hypothesis is altogether untenable, in proof of which we would here, for the sake of brevity, refer to what Wieseler has said against it, p. 295, seq. His own view is as follows (comp. p. 316). "The first Epistle to Timothy was written by Paul, certainly during his three years' stay at Ephesus (Acts xix.), previous to the writing of the epistle to the Corinthians, which has not been preserved, and the existing first epistle,—on the occasion of an intermediate journey not recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, either in Macedonia or Achaia, in the years 54–57, most probably, however, in the last year of his stay at Ephesus, A.D. 56." To this view it has been objected, as appears to me justly, by Huther : 1. That even were it admitted that the apostle had made a second journey to Corinth during the period of his stay in Ephesus, it would still be very doubtful that he was in Corinth shortly before the writing of the first Epistle to Corinthians, as he could then have had no occasion for writing ; which (referring to what has already been said in the Introduction to the Epistle to Titus) I would rather express thus—that the absence of all allusions to this visit in the epistle written shortly after, is strange. 2. Huther observes, that in spite of the safe position attempted to be taken by Wieseler, Acts xx. 29, 30, is still opposed to his view, inasmuch as there the error is spoken of as something altogether future. Wieseler's assertion that εἰς ὑμᾶς in that passage refers only to the presbyters, while the error was already present in the church, contradicts the context vers. 28 and 29, and is in itself scarcely conceivable : the apostle must have in this case expressed himself quite differently. (Comp. Titus i. 9, seq.) "And surely," says Huther justly, "Paul would not have passed over the existence of such errors in Ephesus without notice, if he knew the danger with which the church was threatened to be so great that he had thought it necessary before this, to give Timothy such earnest instructions with respect to these errors." The danger which threatened the future is represented as the progressive development of present appearances (Acts xx. 29 ; 1 Tim. iv. 1, seq.). It is therefore strange that the Epistle to the Ephesians, which, according to Wieseler, was intended for Ephesus, contains no trace of the errors mentioned in our epistle. 3. Huther observes, that the entire character of the epistle does not correspond to the view that

Paul was separated from Timothy only for a short time, and that immediately on his return he sent him away, as the instructions in the epistle imply a longer period of labour on the part of Timothy. Certainly, as the apostle must have left Ephesus again not long after his return thither (not longer than from the time of the Passover to that of the Pentecost, as the sea journey from Achaia by Crete to Ephesus could not have been undertaken long before the former of these periods), there appears something strange in the sending away of Timothy to Corinth, and thus withdrawing him from his important labours in Ephesus. But to this we have to add in general, that the objections which have already been expressed in the Introduction to the Epistle to Titus, are applicable here also, against this supposed journey made by the apostle towards the end of his stay at Ephesus, if it is to be taken as identical with the journey to Crete, as Wieseler must suppose it to be. Wieseler has indeed endeavored to obviate the objections arising from the already far advanced external organization of the church which meets us in this epistle. He remarks that, after the apostle had laboured between two and three years in Ephesus, it was quite possible for presbyters and deacons to have been appointed, which we will not gainsay ; we will also suppose that his observation accounts for what is said as to the exclusion of a *νεόφυτος* from the office of bishop ; but it can scarcely be conceived, that in the course of this period a widow's institution could have come to be established, or that the apostle should have already had such experiences in reference to this institution as are expressed in 1 Tim. v. 11. We have already sufficiently shown elsewhere, how the entire form of Christian life which meets us in this epistle, as well as the character of the errors combated in it, points to a later date, and how the separation of the second Epistle to Timothy from the first, which the above hypothesis implies, is unfavorable to its truth.

We see then that none of the hypotheses which we have just mentioned is without weighty difficulties, and we cannot but feel ourselves confirmed by this negative proof in the view, that this epistle also belongs to the period subsequent to the first imprisonment at Rome, and more particularly between the first and second. This is the view which is most commonly taken, next to that which regards Acts xx. 1 as the period in question. So Theophylact, Oecumenius. This view also has given rise to the subscription of the epistle, *from Laodicea*, which the Peshito also has. What conception we are to form of the course taken by the apostle in his journey after his liberation, to which 1 Tim. i. 3 refers, has already been shown in the General Introduction ; in like manner, what points of connexion are elsewhere to be found in other epistles. What has been there said in reference to the passages Philem. 22

and Phil. ii. 24, that when the apostle was liberated he returned to the east, remains intact, even after Wieseler's statement to the contrary (p. 299). As a special objection drawn from our epistle, against the supposition of so late a date, reference is made to the word *νεότης* applied to Timothy ; comp., in reply to this, the Commentary on iv. 12 ; the little experience which Timothy had in the administration and regulation of the affairs of a Christian church is also to be considered. Timothy then for the first time was placed in such a position ; compare the remarks by Hug, II., p. 330, seq. (4 Aufl.) And how, on the supposition that the instructions addressed to Timothy can be accounted for only by his youthful inexperience, shall we explain what is said regarding him in 1 Thess. iii. 1, 2 ; 1 Cor. iv. 17 ?

Nothing certain can be said as to the place where this epistle was written. Most probably, however, it was written from some place in Macedonia.

§ 4. Genuineness.

We have endeavoured, in the critical introduction to the Pastoral Epistles, to obviate those objections which apply to the three epistles together. We have here still to attend only to those doubts that have been raised with regard to this epistle in particular. It is alleged that the epistle is *historically* inexplicable, even though we place its date subsequent to the first imprisonment at Rome ; for it is inconsistent with so late a date that Timothy should be represented as a young man ; against which comp. the Commentary on iv. 12. —The same inference is drawn from the absence of all allusions to that imprisonment, and the subsequent journeys and fortunes of the apostle. But if, after his liberation and after those journeys, he was personally in Timothy's company (i. 3), it is difficult to see why he should communicate to him by letter what he might long before have done by word of mouth. Moreover this epistle is a purely official letter, and therefore not adapted to such communications.—But it is also alleged that *exegetically* the epistle is unaccountable, inasmuch as, A, it does not correspond to its professed and conceivable ends. *a.* From the object had in view in leaving Timothy in Ephesus, as stated i. 3, we are led to expect a special refutation of the errors of the false teachers ; but this entirely fails.—To this we reply, that it is not to be expected that the apostle should enter particularly into things which he has concisely characterized as empty talk, mere word-strife and insipidity. That he repeatedly reverts to these things, and expresses himself regarding them in such a variety of ways, is easily explained, as the exposition shows.

b. It is objected that, according to the professed design of the epistle, iii. 15, we are led to expect a treasury of seasonable and weighty directions and counsels as to the administration of a church; but we do not find this. We reply, that the sense of iii. 15 must be determined by the preceding context, and the question can then only be, whether ch. iii. like ch. ii. corresponds to its design, namely, to give Timothy the necessary guidance in these particular points. This question we unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative; comp. the Commentary. *c.* We might well suppose, it is alleged, that Paul even in an official letter to Timothy would, over and above what pertained to the business in hand, have much to say to Timothy himself, by way of instructing and quickening him; but all that is to be found in the epistle of this nature, either places on too low a level one who was the apostle's assistant (i. 18, seq., iv. 7, seq., 12, seq., vi. 11, seq.), or else is too general and of little use even for ordinary Christians (iv. 7, seq., 12, seq.; v. 23, vi. 11). To this we reply, that the passages here adduced contain an admonition to Timothy faithfully to fulfil his calling, or to maintain a holy conversation, such as becomes a Christian; or as v. 23, vi. 11, they refer to special things. Moreover, these admonitions have a special ground in opposition to the pursuits and character of the false teachers. Suppose that those pursuits, with the secret wisdom about which they were conversant, and their harmless appearance, might have attractions even for Timothy, and that he, as we learn chiefly from the second epistle, was not quite free from a leaning towards what was earthly—and this certainly is possible—then these admonitions become very intelligible. It will be a much more difficult task for those critics who suppose that the epistle was written at a later period to explain, how a pseudo apostle should address exhortations to Timothy so "unworthy" of him, especially if the writer had in his eye the Gnostic heresies of a later period, and thought it necessary to warn Timothy against participating in them. —B. As what is said with respect to Timothy is alleged not to correspond to the position and character of a helper of the apostle, and to bear out the close relation that subsisted between him and the apostle, expressed in i. 2, 18, iv. 6, v. 23, still less than in the second epistle (here it is not taken into consideration that the epistle is a business communication, the aim of which is concisely to state what is necessary), so it is further said, that it entirely fails in allusions to the church which stood in so interesting a relation to the apostle, comp. Acts xx. 18, seq. But in this objection it is forgotten, that the epistle was not addressed to the church (comp. on this the Introduction to the Epistle to Titus). In so far as Timothy was concerned, there was no occasion for such allusions in an epistle of this character, as also no passage in the epistle can be specified where it

can be said that such ought to have been introduced. Finally, apart from these historical references, the epistle is held even as a literary production to deny the apostle for its author, in its want of of all groundwork and connexion; in reply to which, we simply refer to the exposition, where it has been our endeavour to show the unreasonableness of this charge.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

§ 1. Inscription and Charge Given to Timothy in Opposition to those who Teach otherwise.

(i. 1–20.)

The inscription and salutation of the epistle, i. 1, 2, are after the common form in the epistles of Paul. We do not find here the predicate *apostle* more specially determined, as in Tit. i. 1, comp. with Rom. i. 1, seq.; Gal. i. 1, seq., where it forms an index to the import of the epistle. The writer simply designates himself as an *apostle of Jesus Christ* (which is not done on account of the church; comp. on Tit. i. 1, and 2 Tim. i. 1, where such a reference cannot be supposed)—refers to the Divine authority of his office, names the person to whom the epistle is addressed, and then adds the usual salutation at the beginning of his epistle, deriving it from θεὸς πατήρ (ἡμῶν to be cancelled) καὶ Χριστος, etc. Comp. 2 Cor. i. 1; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1. With this similarity, however, we find in this epistle, as in the other two Pastoral Epistles, what is peculiar. Instead of the common expression, *by the will of God*, in those passages which we have adduced, and which are otherwise similar, we find here as in Tit. i. 3, the words, *according to the commandment of God our Saviour;* on the other hand, 2 Tim. i. 1 retains the more common form of expression. It is further peculiar to this epistle, that the words *and Christ Jesus* are added to the expression *according to the commandment of God our Saviour* (the correct reading is not κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, but simply καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, comp. Tischendorf's Critical Observations). Further, the designation of Christ Jesus in this passage as *our hope* is also peculiar to this epistle. Fnally, in the benediction, between the *grace and peace* he has inserted *mercy*, which is found nowhere else, except in 2 Tim. i. 2. In the passage Tit. i. 4 it is not genuine. The peculiarity of this epistle, then, does not consist in the use of these expressions in themselves. The single expression *God our Saviour*

excepted, which, however, contains a thoroughly Pauline idea (comp. on Tit. i. 3), all the rest are used elsewhere by the apostle, although not precisely in the same place, namely, in the inscription of an epistle. On the expression, *according to the commandment of God*, comp. Rom. xvi. 26, and our remarks on Tit. i. 3 ; with respect to the words *Christ Jesus*, added to, *according to the commandment of God*, comp. Gal. i. 1, and Rom. i. 5 ; in the former passage the writer designates himself as *an apostle by Jesus Christ and God the Father*, in the latter we read *by whom* (namely, by Jesus Christ) *we have received grace and apostleship*. The only striking thing in our passage appears to be the circumstance, that the apostle has already in the very commencement called himself an apostle of Jesus Christ. This is no tautology, however, when it is considered that the words, *according to the commandment*, etc., are explanatory of the preceding, *apostle of Christ Jesus*, and it is warranted by the farther addition of the words, *our hope* to *Christ Jesus*, besides that we find what is nearly analogous to it in Rom. i. 1, comp. with ver. 5. The expression, *our hope*—in which Christ is designated as the foundation of our hope, as in Tit. i. 2 its object is denoted by *eternal life*—has its parallel in Col. i. 27, with which also Eph. ii. 24 is to be compared. And with respect to the word *mercy*, it is found connected with *peace* as a benediction, also in Gal. vi. 16, comp. also 2 John 3 ; Jude 2. We have already shewn in the Introduction to the Epistle to Titus what weight is to be attached to these peculiarities in a critical point of view. They are much more inexplicable in the case of an imitator of the apostle who had any wish to conceal himself, and who might so easily have adhered to the apostle's usual manner, than in the case of the apostle, whom we are not at liberty to make so dependent on his accustomed manner of expression, as that instead of *by the will* he could not have written *according to the commandment*, or instead of *grace and peace—grace, mercy, and peace.* A case like the former admits no farther explanation ; the latter, viewed in connexion with the words *God our Saviour* and *our hope*, plainly reflects the apostle's state of mind, as one in which these ideas were uppermost, so that the choice of the expressions, as in Tit. i. 1, 2, either stands in direct connexion with the import of the epistle, or is of a general nature, as in the case before us, where the expressions *God our Saviour, our hope—mercy*—shew in what frame the writer's mind was, without its being necessary that, as in the Epistle to Titus, I should endeavour to point out any more special reference to the design of the epistle. Still on comparing the expression *our hope* here, with Tit. i. 2, it seems to imply a more immediate reference to those false teachers who set aside this hope. It may suffice also to shew by a reference to such passages as i. 12, seq., ii. 3, iii. 16, iv. 9, 10,

vi. 12, seq., how the ideas indicated in the expressions under consideration pervade the epistle, and often come into prominence. Everywhere we find these great thoughts breaking forth, and the apostle's mind dwelling upon them with delight as resting-places.—For this reason I cannot agree with Olshausen, who finds in the expression *Saviour*, as well as in *hope* and *mercy*, a special reference to the apostle's situation in his imprisonment, comp. also Baumgarten, p. 232, seq. We have the expression *Saviour* and something corresponding to *our hope*, also at the beginning of the Epistle to Titus; and yet this epistle contains elsewhere not a single reference to the apostle's situation. Instead of the words *in the faith*, denoting the ground and element of this relation in which Timothy stands to Paul, we have in Tit. i. 4 the words, *according to the common faith*. Here, as there, the preposition is to be connected with the compound idea expressed in *genuine son*, comp. on Tit. i. 4, and Winer's Gr., § 19, 2. De Wette and others connect *in the faith*, only with *son*. Some have sought to explain the addition of the word *mercy*, which denotes the condescending mercy of God in contrast with our weakness and unworthiness (comp. Matthies on Tit. i. 4), by the reference to the *mediator* in the benediction, as it is peculiar to Paul to regard the office of a Christian teacher as a gift of *God's mercy*, 1 Cor. vii. 25; 2 Cor. iv. 1; 1 Tim. i. 16. It may be so, although Gal. vi. 16 does not confirm this view. At all events it is an expression of that with which the mind of the apostle shews itself to be filled in the whole epistle, and a proof of his warm affection for Timothy. Καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ πολλῆς φιλοστοργίας, observes Chrysostom. For what remains I refer to Tit. i. 1–4, where we have explained whatever else needs explanation.

Vers. 3–20.—The apostle forthwith proceeds, as in the Epistle to Titus, without further introduction to the subject itself. Timothy is reminded of the design of his being left in Ephesus, namely, to oppose the perverse tendency there to things which only minister strife, but do not promote Christian feeling and Christian life. The end which should ever be kept in view, is love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. But this fundamental characteristic is wanting in those teachers of other things, and hence the excrescences of empty talk which are to be seen in those who set up for being teachers of the law, without knowing what they are about. For the law is not designed for the upright, but to rebuke vices, in confirmation of which the apostle appeals to the gospel committed to him, the certainty of which he has experienced in himself. Thus, on the ground of this gospel, but at the same time also, on the ground of former prophecies regarding Timothy, he admonishes him to fight the good fight in order that he may be able to maintain faith and a good conscience, if the latter of which

be wanting, the examples of others warn him what will be the result.

Ver. 3.—Καθώς—the apostle begins the sentence with a *protasis*, but we look in vain for the *apodosis*, which, to correspond with καθὼς παρεκάλεσα—Μακεδ. would have to run somewhat thus, οὕτω καὶ νῦν παρακαλῶ ἵνα, etc. It will be apparent from this construction of the period, how similar in form and substance the apodosis must have been to the protasis, and how natural it was that the apostle should express in the protasis *as I besought thee*, etc.; that to which he is now about to admonish Timothy anew. Thus we actually find that the protasis, in which the commission that had been given to Timothy is more particularly stated, vers. 3 and 4, and not only so, but in which also the error is opposed by the corresponding truth, and the farther characteristics of the errors against which Timothy is to guard, are mentioned along with their refutation, vers. 6–10, which gives occasion for the reference to the gospel which the apostle is called to promulgate—that this protasis absorbs the apodosis, and properly contains what, according to the apostle's original conception, the latter ought to have expressed. Comp. Winer's Gr. § 63, 1, p. 503: "There is here properly an anacolouthon, inasmuch as Paul intended to write καθὼς παρεκάλεσα—Μακ. οὕτω καὶ νῦν παρακαλῶ, ἵνα, etc. While he brings the object of the παρεκ. within the protasis, the apodosis disappears." I do not think, however, that the occasion of the anacolouthon is to be sought in the ἵνα παραγγ.; but further on in ver. 5, which appears to me to be confirmed by Tit. i. 5, seq., and also by the circumstance that if the idea had been so simply conceived, no adequate reason could be given for the change. How frequently these anacoloutha occur in Paul's writings is shewn by Winer, a. a. Q., p. 504, seq., where reference is made to several examples of the kind. So also Olshausen. To what extent, moreover, the apodosis discovers itself again in ver. 18, if not in form at least in substance, see at ver. 18. The other methods of making out a formal apodosis, as, for example, that the apodosis begins with ἵνα παραγγ., or that προσμεῖναι is an imperative, or that καθώς is merely a transition-particle, or that vers. 5–17 forms a single parenthesis, have been all justly rejected by Winer. In like manner Schneckenburger and Böttger's change of προσμεῖναι into προσμείνας, which entirely fails in critical authority, and causes an unnatural position of the words, has justly met with no countenance.—As I besought thee (De Wette: "not commanded. The apostle does not command his helper, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 6, ix. 5, xii. 18") to remain in Ephesus when I went to Macedonia, that thou mightest forbid certain people from teaching otherwise, and giving heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister discussions rather than the saving dispensation of God in the faith—thus the apostle sets out, vers. 3 and

4. This commencement reminds us of the epistle to Titus in a two-fold respect. Here, as in that epistle, the introduction expressing the apostle's thanksgiving, which is usual elsewhere, with the exception of the Epistle to the Galatians, is wanting; and in both epistles the apostle begins by calling to mind a commission which had been given, and for the fulfilment of which the epistle gives further directions. Already, then, may we infer from this commencement of the epistle, if the writer is true to himself in the other parts of it, that this, like the Epistle to Titus, is, to use Schleiermacher's expression, an official letter, and, like it, was designed only for the person named in the inscription. This, as has already been observed in reference to the Epistle to Titus, will account for the absence of an expression of thanks in the introduction, as also for the absence of all allusions to the first imprisonment (if the epistle was written subsequent to this) during which Timothy was with the apostle. All this is quite different in the second epistle to Timothy, the peculiarity of which has been more justly apprehended by Schleiermacher than by many of the more recent commentators, when he says of that epistle that it is altogether of the confidential and friendly kind, and with respect to the contents, observes that it has nothing else in common with the first to Timothy than merely the personal relation of the apostle to his disciple, and is not intended to give directions as to the proper regulation of a church; and that the second Epistle to Timothy and that to Titus, have in their contents no similarity whatever. This distinction shews itself at once in the introduction (as 1 Tim. i. 3, seq., comp. with the commencement of the two other epistles, proves), and discovers an author who knows well what he writes.

Προσμεῖναι ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, πορευόμενος εἰς M. De Wette has already observed that πορευόμενος cannot with Matthies be referred to Timothy instead of Paul, and be rendered: when going to Macedonia to remain in Ephesus. This is grammatically impossible (comp. Winer's Gr., § 44, 3, p. 287, note, against De Wette, who thinks this connexion possible), and yields no proper sense. Quite as arbitrary is it, as every one will perceive (comp. likewise De Wette) to connect πορευόμενος with what follows, and to supply: so I entreat thee now, on thy journey to Macedonia, to remain, etc. There is no other way but to apply the word to the apostle. The journey, therefore, mentioned in Acts xx. 1, on the occasion of which Timothy did not remain in Ephesus, but rather went before the apostle to Macedonia, Acts xix. 22, cannot be here referred to, as might be shewn by many other reasons; comp. the Introd. The words following state the object for which the apostle left Timothy behind when he himself went to Macedonia—*that thou mightest forbid*, etc. Παραγγέλλειν, as here also 1 Cor. vii. 10, xi. 17; 1 Thess. iv. 11;

2 Thess. iii. 4, 6, 10, 12, with the following *μή* = "to forbid." *Τισί* = certain people, whom the apostle will not further designate; Timothy knows them already. We find the same indefinite expression also in ver. 6, 19, iv. 1, etc. He is to forbid the *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν* as well as the *προσέχειν μύθοις*, etc.—"to teach otherwise and to give heed to such doctrines." So Theodoret: *τούτους μὲν ἐπιστομίζειν . . . . . τοῖς δέ γε ἄλλοις παρακελεύεσθαι τῇ τούτων μὴ προσέχειν ἀδολεσχίᾳ.*—Ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν, at which the critics from Schleiermacher downwards have stumbled so much, and which occurs again only at vi. 3, it is quite evident from the latter passage, as Schleiermacher himself observes, can only mean; to teach what deviates from *sound doctrine;* an interpretation placed beyond doubt by the following words, *and consent not to wholesome words, and the doctrine which leads to godliness.* This passage, however, gives us more information about the *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν* than Schleiermacher finds in it, else he would not have proceeded to say, that Paul elsewhere from not knowing the suitable word, helps himself out with the roundabout expression *ἄλλον Ἰησοῦν κηρύσσειν*, 2 Cor. xi. 4; *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*,* Gal. i. 6, 8, 9. In the negative clause *and consents not*, etc., which is explanatory of the preceding, that from which these teachers deviate is expressed first, by *wholesome words*, and then by *the doctrine which leads to godliness*, both of which are substantially the same thing, in proof of which I refer to Tit. i. 9, and our interpretation, as also that of De Wette. Ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν denotes the teaching of things which lie aside from this doctrine according to godliness, or truth according to godliness, Tit. i. 1. In the Epistle to Titus we have found it uniformly confirmed, that it is not a heresy proper that is spoken of, or a strictly false doctrine in opposition to the true; and the same conviction is pressed upon us here in the word *ἑτεροδιδ.* as compared with vi. 3. Hence the use of this word by the apostle here, a word which properly signifies to "teach otherwise," not "to teach false doctrine," is fully vindicated, and the circumlocution mentioned by Schleiermacher *to preach another Jesus*, etc., does not answer to it. With reference to the formation of the word, Planck, in the work already noticed, has, in opposition to Schleiermacher, referred to the expression *καλοδιδάσκαλος*, Tit. ii. 3, according to which the apostle might easily form the word *ἑτεροδιδάσκαλος*, from which again the verb in our passage is derived in the regular manner. And are not the expressions *ἑτερόγλωσσος* and *ἑτεροζυγεῖν* closely analogous? From these analogous expressions an inference may be drawn rather for, than against the use of this word by the apostle. Olshausen and others have shewn rightly, why it is *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν* and not simply *ἑτεροδιδάσκειν*—be-

* Huther agrees with Schleiermacher, only that he finds no accessary hierarchical idea in the word.

cause, namely, the former expression involves the idea of making a business of teaching otherwise = to play the ἑτεροδιδάσκαλος. On Baur's critical doubts about this word comp. the General Introduction.

Ver. 4.—*Not to give heed.* On προσέχειν comp. Tit. i. 14. Olshausen says rightly, that the injunction not to give heed to such doctrines is aptly connected with the foregoing. We may also gather from this verse what that was, in which this ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν consisted. *Fables* and *endless genealogies* are the things to which the persons referred to (τινές) are not to give heed. We have already met with the word μῦθοι at Tit. i. 14, connected there with the epithet *Jewish;* it occurs again at 1 Tim. iv. 7, and 2 Tim. iv. 4. The latter passage speaks of the future, and in so far does not belong to our present purpose. In the former these *fables* are characterized as *profane* and *old wives'*, or insipid fables. Any more direct and special information as to their contents is as little to be obtained from this epistle, as from that to Titus. On the other hand, what clue may be found in the epistles, and especially in the Epistle to Titus, for farther determining this, and how much reason we have for believing that one and the same error is meant, has already been shown on Tit. i. 9. The case is similar with regard to the *genealogies*, which are named again only at Tit. iii. 9, and the connexion of which with the fables (comp. on Tit. i. 14, and iii. 9), as also with the *strifes about the law*, can scarcely be questioned (comp. on the same passages, and also on 1 Tim. iv. 7). We were accordingly induced to understand things of a Jewish character and origin as meant in all these expressions which throw any light on the constituent elements of these fables.* The genealogies, which at Tit. iii. 9 have no designative epithet, are here called *endless* (not aimless), Tob. xxxvi. 26 ; 3 Macc. ii. 9. Things are meant which may be spun out to an endless extent. The words following contain the reason of the warning against these things, *which minister*, etc. The reading οἰκονομίαν is so strongly confirmed, in comparison with the other. οἰκοδομίαν D**** and οἰκοδομήν D*, etc. (comp. Tischendorf), that we are not at liberty to yield it up from the convenience of the latter. Ζητήσεις is not to be taken differently here from vi. 4 ; 2 Tim. ii. 23 ; Tit. iii. 9, in all of which passages it denotes not strife, but questions of controversy, as the result of which are mentioned in these very passages, *contentions, strifes.* The epithet *foolish* applied to these questions in 2 Tim. ii. 23; Tit. iii. 9, is not necessary here any more than at vi. 4, as that with which they are contrasted plainly shows their nature. On παρέχειν comp. Gal. vi. 17 ; the original signification of the word, "to hold

* Huther explains μῦθοι and γενεαλ. of the Gnostic doctrine of Aeons. Comm. z. N.T.V. 1.

out towards one" (comp. vi. 17), explains the annexed clause with ἤ. These genealogies hold out only questions, and material always for disputation. Μᾶλλον ἤ intimates what ought to be held forth, namely, instead of the *questions* the *dispensation of God which is in faith.* Οἰκονομία θεοῦ ἡ ἐν πίστει. This expression is taken to mean either the gracious efficiency of God in the faith, or the efficiency of a steward of the house of God in awakening or promoting the faith. But the idea that the doctrine is to hold forth, to afford (or in whatever sense παρέχειν may be taken) the gracious efficiency of God, appears to me as unsuitable and as unwarranted by the usage of the apostle, as the other signification is remote from the context. For how can οἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ signify the efficiency of a steward of God, seeing that it is not an οἰκονόμος that is spoken of, but fables and genealogies, against giving heed to which, a warning is given, because they do not afford this οἰκονομία ? What else then can be understood by οἰκον. θεοῦ than that which ought to be the import of all Christian doctrine, namely, the dispensation of God for salvation, "which has its means and its realization in faith ?" (De Wette). So also Neander a. a. Q. I. p. 541, "the dispensation of God for the salvation of man."* With this interpretation the constant use of the expression in Paul's writings agrees (Eph. i. 10, iii. 2 ; Col. i. 25) ; it everywhere signifies a dispensation devised by God. I cannot see how, as De Wette maintains, the παρέχουσι does not suit this interpretation : these things, says the apostle, hold out questions, not the true import of the doctrine ; they afford a fruitless exercise for the understanding but nothing for the heart. The expression *which is in faith* evidently stands in opposition to the *questions.* Olshausen also thus understands the passage ; only, he further supposes that δἰκονομία τοῦ θεοῦ is used by metonyme to express what it brings to pass, namely, the progress of the life of faith. For this the apostle would doubtless have used οἰκοδομήν or the like.

Ver. 5.—"But the aim of the exhortation is love out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned." These words are not to be understood as a resumption of the ἵνα παραγγείλῃς, ver. 3, nor as the beginning of a new train of thought, but as occasioned by ver. 4, and as standing in an adversative relation to it (δέ). The otherwise abrupt transition from ver. 4 to ver. 5 were inconsistent with the circumstance that the flow of the ideas causes an anacolouthon (comp. on ver. 3). The apostle specifies the aim of the exhortation, with the view of showing how far the things of which he speaks in ver. 4 deviate from this aim. This aim is love out of a pure heart, etc. How remote from this are those *fables* and *genealogies* with their subtle speculations, which take the place of the dispensation of God which is in faith ! This love, which is the aim

* I rejoice to find that I coincide with Huther.

of all precept, rests on the foundation of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned, while those *questions* have nothing to do with that which is the subject matter of faith. How indeed can love which has its root in faith proceed from them? In order then to understand the connexion, two things must be taken into consideration, namely, the opposition of that which *is in faith* to the questions which exercise the understanding merely, and the stress which the apostle lays on the source out of which alone *love* can spring. A measuring line is here supplied, as Matthies justly observes, to Timothy and to every other. Τὸ *τέλος* according to the common analogous use of the word, Rom. vi. 21, 22; 2 Cor. xi. 15; Phil. iii. 19, signifies neither "sum" nor "perfection," but simply "aim." Παραγγελία, as *παραγγέλλω*, has always the definite sense of "precept, injunction," whenever used by the apostle, or elsewhere in the New Testament (comp. on *παραγγελία*, 1 Thess. iv. 2). It is therefore to be taken neither as a designation of the objective doctrine = *εὐαγγέλιον*, nor of the Mosaic law = *ὁ νόμος*, of which nothing is said here, nor of the law of Christian morality; but it is as elsewhere "precept, exhortation" in the wider sense, "practical doctrine as the principal part of the *sound doctrine* in opposition to the *fables*," as De Wette rightly explains it referring to iv. 11, v. 7, vi. 13, 17. The apostle selects the expression with the view of specifying the end to which all doctrine should tend in those who are instructed, and to the attainment of which all doctrine should admonish. The doctrine which has this practical aim becomes of itself *παραγγελία*. So also Olshausen, "The highest aim of all the labour of the Christian preacher should be a practical one, namely, to call forth true love." Such love, however, springs only from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. Ἀγάπη (without the article, comp. Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, p. 109) denotes the sum of the moral conduct of a Christian, comp. Rom. xiii. 10: *love is the fulfilling of the law*, Gal. v. 6.

On *καρδία* comp. Phil. iv. 7; on *καθαρὰ καρδία*, comp. Matth. v. 8, and Olshausen on the passage; 1 Pet. i. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 22. Purity of heart can result only from a previous purifying, comp. Acts xv. 9: *purifying their hearts by faith*. With the *pure heart* is then necessarily connected the second thing which the apostle mentions as pre-supposed in all true love, viz., the *συνείδησις ἀγαθή*, comp. iii. 9; 2 Tim. i. 3; or *καλή*, Heb. xiii. 18. It is the conscience which knows that its guilt is removed, and that it is reconciled to God, 1 Pet. iii. 21; since, as De Wette truly says, a conscience unreconciled to God and man cannot love purely, because it cannot believe.* —That only is true love which springs from a conscience that has

* Huther rejects the idea of reconciliation here, and understands *συν. αγ.* generally as the consciousness of inward harmony with the divine will.

experienced the power of divine love,—that has been kindled at divine love. The third thing necessary to true love is *faith unfeigned;* in which words the apostle names the new life-power that dwells in such a heart and conscience. The pure heart and good conscience is, with respect to its quality, to be viewed as springing from faith, observes Olshausen. It is *faith* which makes the *evil conscience* good, and which purifies the heart (Acts xv. 9); but it does this only when it is itself *unfeigned.* Where a good conscience is lost, there *faith* disappears, i. 19, and in its place comes, not unbelief, but a mere pretended faith, and talking (ver. 6), such as the apostle everywhere represents as a characteristic feature of the opponents who are combated in the Pastoral Epistles.—Ἀνυπόκριτος in the same sense as it is elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. xii. 9; 2 Cor. vi. 6. Comp. also Jam. iii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 22.—Looking back to what the apostle here says regarding the errors which Timothy is to check, according to the interpretation we have given, we find the same characteristics as in the Epistle to Titus. As in that epistle it is evidently not a dogmatical heresy that is spoken of, but errors which lead away from the truth that tends to godliness, and which belong to the sphere of unprofitable questions that cause only strife and contention, so also is it in this epistle. This is shown by the right interpretation of ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν, by the reason given for the warning against those *questions,* and by the practical end of all admonition being placed in opposition to them.

As ver. 5 stands in an adversative relation to ver. 4, so at the same time it forms the transition to ver. 6 and the following verses, which give additional characteristics of those errors. The apostle proceeds to say, that from the want of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned, certain persons have turned aside to vain talking. Schleiermacher indeed thinks the writer here makes but an awkward return from the digression in ver. 5, when he represents this—namely, that those opponents could not attain to that which is the effect of the true doctrine, as the reason why they had turned aside to vain talking. The writer here betrays, according to Schleiermacher, the utmost incapacity to return from a slight digression. But ver. 5 is, in our opinion, no digression. And is there any room for finding fault with the sentiment, that those seducers were wanting in that fundamental state of mind, from which alone can proceed that which is the aim of all Christian precept, namely, love, and that therefore they swerved from this aim, and became *foolish talkers?* This is indeed just the way in which the subject is treated everywhere in these epistles, comp. vi. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 15. Schleiermacher seems in what he says to have referred the *from which,* ver. 6, not merely to the three things last mentioned, but also to the *love,* in regard to which De Wette also was

in doubt. But even although we had not those parallel passages from which we learn that it is not the want of love, but the want of faith and a good conscience, from which the *foolish talking* proceeds, we yet could not refer the ὧν to ἀγάπη, as the expression εἰς ματαιολογίαν plainly designates a false aim in opposition to the true, which is denoted by ἀγάπη. Ἀστοχεῖν only in the Pastoral Epistles, vi. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 18. Ἐκτρέπεσθαι, "to swerve from," v. 15; 2 Tim. iv. 4 (Heb. xii. 13). Both expressions, as Mack rightly observes, are suggested by the τέλος. Ματαιολογία, as Tit. i. 9, ματαιολόγοι. What kind of vain talk the apostle means we now learn from ver. 7.

Ver. 7.—Desiring to be teachers of the law, without understanding either what they say or whereof they affirm. As at Tit. i. 14, besides the *fables*, also *commandments of men* are mentioned, and as at Tit. iii. 9, along with the *genealogies* are mentioned *strifes about the law*, so here also, with the fables and genealogies is connected the vain talk of those who affect to be teachers of the law. The expression νομοδιδάσκαλοι, which occurs only here, as also γραμματεύς only at 1 Cor. i. 20, reminds us too much of the usual signification of the term elsewhere (Luke v. 17; Acts v. 34), to admit of our assigning any other to it here. The sense then is: they desire to be in their way what the doctors of the law are among the Jewish people. That we are not to understand real teachers of the law is plain from the expression θέλοντες. Nor will the characteristic here given apply to the common Judaizing opponents; and Schleiermacher seems to me to have reason for his objections to this passage on the supposition that it refers to these well-known opponents.* He is surprised, and justly so, that these teachers of the law are not described as different from the genealogists and fablers, ver. 4, but that, on the contrary, the two passages are connected by the expression ματαιολογία, ver. 6. And he might have added that ματαιολογία itself is but a very weak designation of that Judaizing tendency, and one that never occurs. Further, he misses a climax here justly; for it has not escaped Schleiermacher to perceive, that the errors named in ver. 4 appear much less dangerous than the Judaizing tendency. He says with truth, "that for Paul, the introduction of the law was a much greater evil than he describes the fables and genealogies to be. And how differently does Paul elsewhere oppose the giving of an undue prominence to the law! There is not a single argument given here for a Pauline confutation of the Judaizers." In all this Schleiermacher appears to me to be perfectly right, and the reference to Gal. v. 23, *against such there is no law*, in reply to him, to be quite pointless; for the fundamental difference in the manner

* Huther also is of opinion, that the persons here meant did not maintain the obligation of the law in the same manner as the Pharisaical Jewish-Christians, but that in their allegorical interpretations of the law, they claimed to themselves that knowledge of the law which entitled them to impose arbitrary commands.

in which the refutation is conducted there and here is not thereby removed. But another question suggests itself, whether the supposition from which Schleiermacher and his opponents set out is well founded, namely, that this passage applies to that well-known Judaizing tendency; whether the very way in which Paul characterizes and refutes the tendency here opposed does not compel us to depart from that supposition, instead of making it the ground of objections against the passage? When we look to the manner in which the persons here alluded to are said to have come to their vain talk, ver. 6—to the expression *ματαιολογία*—to the *μὴ νοοῦντες*, as also to the opposition in vers. 8–10, we can scarcely fail to be convinced that quite a different class of opponents are meant than the common Judaists; they are men such as those described in Tit. i. 14, 15, of whom it is there said that they turn away from the truth . . . . that their mind and conscience is defiled. We found, in expounding that passage, that the common Judaists could not be meant. Can it be otherwise in the passage before us when there is so great a similarity in the errors described? Does not the expression *from which some having turned aside* indicate the same fundamental state of mind as the descriptions which we have just cited from the Epistle to Titus? And does not the same word *ματαιολογία* here, and in Tit. i. 10, shew the similarity in the error described? And do not the words, *to the pure all things are pure*, answer in a certain measure to the *not understanding what they say*, etc., in the former of which expressions the apostle gives it to be understood, that those seducers, while they seek a higher moral perfection in such *commandments*, shew that they are not *pure* but *defiled*. Certainly those who are here meant, like the well-known Judaizers, gave prominence to the law, otherwise the apostle could not go on to say by way of concession in ver. 8, *we know that the law is good*, nor could he describe them as those who wished to be teachers of the law; but the manner in which, and the end for which they gave prominence to the law, must have been different from that of the Judaizers, otherwise the apostle would have refuted their error in a different way. What remains to be said will result from the particular consideration of the passage. *Desiring to be teachers of the law*, says the apostle—they would be such, but they are not. And why not, we learn from the words following, *not understanding*, etc. It could not have been maintained of the common Judaists that they knew not what they said. The expression answers only to those who do not really aim at what their words declare, who do not see through the real tendency of that which they affirm. On the change of the relative to the interrogative see Winer's Gr., § 25, 1, p. 152. In the *ἅ* and *περὶ τίνων* De Wette does not understand different objects, as *περί τινος διαβεβ.*, comp.

Tit. iii. 8, does not signify "to put forth confirmatory assertions concerning anything," but "to confirm anything." But what signification is then to be given to περί? Others therefore (for example Leo) rightly explain the first member of the subjective assertions, the second of the object itself about which these assertions are made. So also Huther.

Vers. 8–10.—"But we know that the law is good if one use it agreeably to its design." The sentence is not antithetical to an assertion of these teachers of the law, which taught that the law is not good, as Baur understands it, regarding it as opposed to the Marcionitic rejection of the law; it rather concedes this assertion to the opponents, but adds a limitation (ἐάν) in connexion with which alone it is true, and the neglect of which leads to error. On this concessive sense of οἴδαμεν ὅτι, comp. Rom. vii. 14; 1 Cor. viii. 1. How little Baur's interpretation consists with the appellation *teachers of the law*, has already been shewn in the General Introduction. Against this view De Wette also justly draws attention to the circumstance, that ver. 4, comp. with Tit. i. 14, shews that it is not Judaizers who are spoken of. The limitation which the apostle annexes to the assertion, *the law is good*, namely, *if a man use it lawfully*, shews that it is not of the law itself, but of the use of it that he speaks. The law is good if a man know how to use it. By τις the apostle understands "him who will teach," as Bengel has already observed. Νομίμως, as the law itself desires to be used, "agreeably to the design of the law." But we learn from ver. 9, first negatively, and then positively, what the design of the law is, which he must know who will rightly use it. He must know and consider that it is not designed for the δίκαιος.* The negative sentence must doubtless contain the error, to the charge of which those teachers of the law exposed themselves. Consequently, they acted as if the law were designed for the righteous man; they thought it necessary to improve the gospel by the law, they set up requirements which involved a recurrence to the law, in order by the fulfilment of these to lead to a higher stage of moral perfection. The expression *bodily exercise*, iv. 8, points to such a tendency, which is there spoken of in connexion with the fables, and the same appears on comparing Tit. i. 14. And, if we are not mistaken in placing these fables and genealogies in connexion with the legal tendency, it would seem to follow that this tendency did not consist in simply giving prominence to the Mosaic law, but in such an application of the law as connected itself with pretentions to a more profound wisdom, through which a higher moral perfection was attainable than by a simple adherence to the gospel. With this interpretation the positive state-

* Multum de hoc Pauli loco disputatum esse tempore restauratorum sacrorum ab Agricola . . . . notum est. Leo.

ment of the design of the law fully agrees, and it alone will explain why the apostle here enumerates a series of the worst vices which the law is designed to punish. It fares with those teachers of the law that, while they would be wise, they become fools; while they boast of a higher wisdom and a higher morality, they really bring themselves down to the level of the *ἄνομοι*. For this very reason the apostle says of them, that *they know not what they say nor whereof they affirm*.—On *κεῖσθαι* in the signification, "to be ordained, appointed," comp. Luke ii. 34; Phil. i. 17; 1 Thess. iii. 3. On *νόμος*, without the article, Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, p. 109. *Δίκαιος* has here its exact opposite in what follows, according to which it cannot be understood of the justified person = *δικαιωθείς*, but in the sense which it often has = honest, virtuous, which indeed he only can be who is justified, and who has received the new life of the spirit. Comp. on the whole subject, Gal. v. 18, 23; Rom. vi. 14. Then follow as opposed to *δικαίῳ*, the general terms, *ἀνόμοις δὲ καὶ ἀνυποτάκτοις*. On *ἄνομος*, comp. Tit. ii. 14. *Ἀνυπότακτος*, as the effect of obstinacy, occurs only in the Pastoral Epistles in this sense; similar to it is the term *ἀπειθεῖς* often used by the apostle. As these two terms are connected with each other, so also are the two following, *ἀσεβέσι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοῖς*, and in like manner *ἀνοσίοις καὶ βεβήλοις*. On *ἀσεβής*, comp. Tit. ii. 12. *Ἁμαρτωλός* here denotes the open sinner. On *ἀνόσιος*, Tit. i. 8. *Βέβηλος*, Heb. xii. 16, unholy, impure. From these general terms, the apostle passes to special crimes and vices which the law is designed to restrain. He purposely names the worst crimes and vices, in order thus to expose the folly of those who make the observance of the law to be binding upon Christians, and thereby fancy that a special superiority belongs to them. "The law is designed for fratricides and matricides, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for Sodomites, for menstealers (comp. Ex. xxi. 16; Deut. xxiv. 7), for liars, for perjured persons, and whatsoever is contrary to sound doctrine." With regard to the first three of these terms, Schleiermacher remarks that they are all foreign to the New Testament, and also, that Paul is not wont to name such vices in such a connexion. These remarks remind us anew of how differently the apostle goes to work, when he elsewhere opposes the Judaizers. And what proper sense can we attach to what the apostle here says, when viewed as directed against the Judaizers, namely, that the law is not designed for the *righteous*, but for the *lawless?* He surely cannot intend to say: in reference to the *lawless*, etc., those Judaizers are right in their way of enforcing the observance of the law, but not in reference to the righteous. The entire distinction between the *δίκαιος* and the *ἄνομος*, as here given, has not the slightest reference to the question of dispute between the apostle and those opponents. For as they could not be supposed to insist on the *righteousness by*

the law only in reference to the δίκαιος, as little would the apostle desire that they should do this in respect to the ἄνομοι. On the contrary, all becomes plain, when we suppose that the apostle has in his eye, those who regarded the law as a means by which Christians were to attain a still higher moral perfection. In opposition to such, nothing more suitable could be said than just what the apostle here says, namely, that the law is quite good, only they must know that it is not designed for the righteous, as they think, but for the lawless, etc. These the law is designed to restrain. "And if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine," the apostle adds. On ὑγ. διδ., comp. Tit. i. 9, and Leo on the present passage. The apostle having already purposely named the most flagrant crimes and vices, now sums up everything else that is contrary to the doctrine which leads to godliness, in the words, *if there be any*, etc. Moreover, the expression here reminds us so strongly of the charge which the apostle brings elsewhere against these errors, namely, that they are wanting in the principle of morality, and consequently in the fruits of morality, that one might be inclined to suppose the apostle intends to say ironically: these teachers of the law ought certainly to use the law; enough will be found in them to which it can apply. Comp. Tit. i. 15, etc.

Ver. 11.—In testimony of what he has just said, namely, that the law is not designed for the virtuous, but for the lawless, the apostle appeals to *his* gospel, which has been intrusted to him. The critics have thought this appeal to his gospel to be altogether unnecessary, and regard this as an illustration of how the pseudo-apostle always seeks occasion to make the apostle speak of himself. But the words, *with which I was intrusted*, shew that the writer has in view a certain contrast; the gospel, as De Wette says, with which he is intrusted is, in reference to the manner in which it teaches that the law should be used, characterized as Pauline, in contrast with that of these *teachers of the law*. Thus is removed all ground for regarding what the apostle here says of himself as a merely casual expression. Κατά cannot be connected with τῇ ὑγ. διδασκαλίᾳ (Leo), were it for no other reason than that the article is wanting, and also that it would make an altogether superfluous and tautological explanation. As little is it to be connected with ἀντίκειται, which is already sufficiently determined by—*the sound doctrine*. It is rather in testimony of what he has said, ver. 9, respecting the design of the law, that he here appeals to his gospel. So also Huther. "In reality," says De Wette, "the sentiment in ver. 9 is Pauline (comp. Rom. vi. 14; Gal. v. 18); the apostle, however, would not thus have opposed these teachers of the law, but rather with the statement, that we can be justified only through faith. The writer takes an Irenæan position, between the friends of the law and the Pauline

party." The first of these remarks is as just as the second is harmless in regard to our position. The apostle is not dealing with those who contest the doctrine of justification by faith, but with such as in addition to faith, prescribe for the δίκαιος certain requirements of a pretendedly higher morality, for which they appeal to the Old Testament. Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς δόξης: "gospel of the glory of God," the import of which is this glory, 2 Cor. iv. 4. This glory is here, as elsewhere represented, as revealed to the world in Jesus Christ (Rom. ix. 23: Eph. i. 17, iii. 16). The designation, τῆς δόξης, as also the epithet μακαρίου, gives prominence to the preponderating value of the gospel, in opposition to that legal error; it is the revelation of the glory of him who is blessed. The revelation of his glory will therefore be rich in blessings. Μακάριος applied to God also at vi. 15; for what remains, comp. on Tit. ii. 13. On ὃ ἐπιστεύθην, Winer's Gr., § 39, 1, p. 232, a construction frequently used by the apostle, and only by him.

Ver. 12.—The apostle has appealed to the gospel which was committed to his trust, in opposition to those teachers of the law. In ver. 12, seq., he dwells on the manner in which this trust was committed to him, in order thus to show what certainty he has of the truth of the gospel—the certainty, namely, of a personal experience, in virtue of which he who was a blasphemer and a persecutor was transformed into a minister of Jesus Christ. The apostle, however, following the impulse of his heart, clothes the idea in the form of a thanksgiving. Baumgarten has traced the scope of the passage otherwise, a. a. Q. p. 224, in opposition to Schleiermacher, who finds here a total want of connexion. The apostle, according to Baumgarten, speaks of himself, in so far as in his case, the peculiar nature of the gospel, as designed precisely for the salvation of sinners and transgressors of the law, was convincingly manifested. The question to which no reply is given in vers. 9 and 10, namely, how are transgressors of the law to attain to righteousness, is here answered. This interpretation, however, will hold only when vers. 9 and 10 are viewed as opposed to the common Judaistic tendency. And even apart from this, ver. 12 appears to me to stand in so close a connexion with the emphatic words of the preceding verse *which was committed to my trust*, that it can only be understood as a farther explanation of these words. Nor do the words, *but I obtained mercy because I did it in ignorance*, agree with the above view. Doubtless the apostle intends to show, how in his own person, in his own history, the import of the gospel is strikingly represented, and how the entire forbearance of divine love has been manifested in the mercy which he obtained, and has thus made him a pattern to all who should hereafter believe. But are we to regard this as supplementary to the doctrine stated before respecting the design of the

law? There is surely nothing in these words about the law or its design. Nay, the apostle's conversion is in the least degree fitted to show the relation of the law to faith; for it was not a knowledge of his sins wrought in him by the law that brought him to Christ. This, however, must be the case with any one who should show by his example, how the transgressors of the law may be led by the law itself to the righteousness in Christ Jesus, how the law is a *schoolmaster to bring us to Christ.** Καί before χάριν ἔχω, which is not found in A.F.G., etc., has perhaps rightly been retained by Tischendorf according to D.I.K., etc. And I thank Christ Jesus our Lord who hath enabled me, that he counted me faithful, appointing me to the ministry, although I was before a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious, says the apostle, in explanation of the words *which was committed to my trust*, ver. 11. *Christ who hath enabled me*—inasmuch as the strength for the ministry to which the Lord hath appointed him, proceeds not from himself, but from the Lord who hath called him to this ministry; the apostle, as Matthies well observes, repels the supposition, that "at the time when he was called, the strength for the ministry was already present in him, and was only acknowledged by the Lord." On ἐνδυναμόω (a genuine Pauline word) comp. on Phil. iv. 13. The ground of his thanks is expressed in the words, *that he counted me faithful*, which are further explained by the following *putting*, etc., for this latter is the actual proof of the statement, *he counted me faithful. Faithful* (comp. 1 Cor. iv. 2), is the quality required of *a steward of God*, the strength is given by the Lord. On the whole expression comp. 1 Cor. vii. 25. In like manner the expression θέμενος εἰς has its parallel in 1 Thess. v. 9; comp. also Acts xiii. 47. On διακονίαν, in its wider signification, comp. Rom. xi. 13; Eph. iii. 7; Col. i. 23.

Ver. 13.—The apostle now describes his former condition in the words, *who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious.* Τὸ πρότερον, not τόν, according to A.D.*F.G., etc. These strong expressions are designed to give effect to the contrast with the foregoing, *putting me into the ministry.* In this way, by so powerful an experience of the transforming grace of the Lord, did he become a *minister* of Christ, from being a *blasphemer* and a *persecutor.* On βλάσφημος comp. Acts xxvi. 11; on διώκτης, at which Schleiermacher has stumbled, passages such as Gal. i. 13; on ὑβριστήν, Matth. xxii. 6, etc. The last expression forms a climax with the foregoing, denoting an act of wanton and contemptuous injury. On the participle θέμενος, not = the infinitive, comp. Winer, § 45, 4, p. 311. "But I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief."

* Huther: the apostle dwells till ver. 17 on the grace experienced by him, in such a manner, however, as to make it most clearly manifest, that the gospel committed to his trust is a *gospel of the glory of the blessed God.*

These words are not intended as a palliation of his conduct, but only to show that there was that in him upon which mercy might take hold, how it was possible for mercy to be shown to him. Mack well observes, that "the words of Christ, Matth. xii. 31, seq., were confirmed in the apostle, that every sin and blasphemy, even that against the Son, may be forgiven, so long as there is no blasphemy against the Spirit." *I obtained mercy;* this expression points to the fact denoted by, *was committed to my trust*, ver. 11, and *counted me faithful, putting*, etc. By this the apostle is assured that he has obtained mercy. The expression refers to the condition described in ver. 13, from which compassionating grace has rescued him. When the apostle says, *I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief*, he does not mean that he had a claim to such mercy, as if ὅτι introduced a sufficient reason for the bestowal of mercy; he only explains how it was possible that such a sinner could obtain mercy, Acts, iii. 17. The positive ground of mercy being shown to him, lies solely in the compassion of God, Tit. iii. 5. The ground of the *ignorance* lies in the *unbelief*, which implies that this ignorance is by no means unaccompanied with guilt. But there is still a great difference between the conduct which the apostle here describes, to which he was led by an honest zeal for the law, and that of which we read in Luke xi. 52; Matth. xii. 32, which proceeds from an indelible enmity against whatever is of God, and a wilful striving against the spirit of God. In this case grace could save only by compelling power.

Ver. 14.—"And the grace of our Lord was exceeding abundant with faith and love in Christ Jesus." The apostle here places in opposition to the state just described, ver. 13, the new state, namely, that of grace, which magnifies itself in his life and labours, and which has adorned these with faith and love in Christ Jesus, *i. e.*, love which has its root in him. Faith and love are the result of grace; when grace magnifies itself in a man, it brings faith and love along with it. *The love which is in Christ Jesus*, Olshausen remarks, is not the love which Christ has and exercises, but that which he gives to men. Its being joined with *faith* necessitates this interpretation. *Faith* and *love* form the antithesis to *unbelief*, ver. 13, comp. with ver. 6. The expression ὑπερπλεονάζω, only here = was exceeding abundant, not to be taken in a comparative sense; compare passages such as Rom. v. 20, vi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 15, where πλεονάζειν occurs, with passages such as 2 Cor. vii. 4; 2 Thess. i. 3, where similar compounds occur. That the humility as well as the greatness of the apostle is here expressed, as also elsewhere, has been observed by Mack, who refers to Phil. i. 21, ii. 1; 2 Cor. x. 5, 13–19; Gal. iv. 19.

Ver. 15.—The apostle has just described how the power of saving

love manifested itself in him. Thus from his own experience he can testify what he here says: assuredly true and worthy of all acceptance is the assertion, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom, he adds, I am chief. Πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, comp. on Tit. iii. 8. Ἀποδοχή, as also ἀπόδεκτος, (the former occurring again at iv. 9, the latter ii. 3, v. 4), only in this epistle. On the other hand, the apostle uses elsewhere δεκτός and εὐπρόσδεκτος, Phil. iv. 18; 2 Cor. vi. 2; Rom. xv. 31, etc.; comp., besides, Acts ii. 41, *they that gladly received the word* (ἀποδεξάμενοι τὸν λόγον). On the classical use of the word, see Leo on the passage. On πᾶσα ἀποδοχή, like πᾶσα χαρά, full joy, Winer's Gr., § 18, 4, p. 101. On *Christ Jesus* as the subject of what follows, comp. Phil. ii. 5, seq. Ἔρχεσθαι εἰς κόσμον, with definite allusion to the pre-existence of Christ. It is the substance of what is contained in the gospel committed to his trust, which the apostle here compresses into these words as the experience of his own life; comp. Matth. xviii. 11; Luke, xix. 10, "Of whom I am the chief." Some have thought this expression too strong, and endeavoured to soften it by pointing to the omission of the article (against which De Wette justly refers to Matth. x. 2, xxii. 38), or to the present tense, εἰμί, according to which it applies only to the saved sinner. But ὧν refers not to saved sinners, but to sinners in general. All these limitations come into collision with ver. 16, the entire signification of which rests on this πρῶτος in its full sense. The apostle also speaks elsewhere of his former life in the same manner; comp. Eph. iii. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 8, 9, where he states as the reason of his humiliation: *because I persecuted the church of God.* So here where the apostle calls himself πρῶτον, we are to associate this with what he says in ver. 13, nor are we to be hindered from this by the words, *I obtained pardon because I did it ignorantly*, etc., comp. above. Only to this reference of the πρῶτος to ver. 13—the outward act—corresponds also what he says of himself, ver. 16. It is the conduct of the apostle in itself, viewed by him apart from its mitigating circumstances, which constrains him to make use of this expression regarding himself.

Ver. 16.—*Howbeit for this cause I obtained mercy*, as above at ver. 14, antithetical with the apostle's judgment concerning himself. Although the chief of sinners, I yet obtained pardon for this cause —pointing forward emphatically to the ἵνα—that in me the chief (for πρῶτος is not to be taken differently here from before), Christ Jesus might show his entire forbearance, for a pattern to those who should hereafter repose their believing trust in him to life everlasting. The whole passage indicates how entirely in earnest the apostle was in the πρῶτος ἐγώ. Only thus can he see in his having obtained mercy, the entire riches of the divine forbearance, and hold it up as

a consoling pattern to all who shall hereafter believe, even to the greatest sinners. "A real miracle of the love of Jesus Christ to sinners," Olshausen. *Μακροθυμία*, some think it necessary, without reason, to understand this word as "magnanimity." But does not the long-suffering of the divine love which follows the sinner appear in the conversion of Paul? On *τὴν ἅπασαν* (so Tischendorf) *μακροθυμίαν*, comp. Winer's Gr., § 18, 4, p. 101. *Ὑποτύπωσις* (only again at 2 Tim. i. 13) = *τύπος*, 1 Cor. x. 6, 11; Phil. iii. 17, etc., or *ὑπόδειγμα*, John, xiii. 15; 2 Pet. ii. 6, etc. The common interpretation is, "that I may be a pattern," better thus, "that this proof of his long-suffering may be a pattern;" and perhaps for this very reason it is *ὑπότυπωσις*, and not *τύπος*. The less frequent connexion *πιστεύειν ἐπί* (Rom. ix. 33, x. 11; 1 Pet. ii. 6; [Matth. xxvii. 42]) represents Christ as the foundation on which faith rests. *To life everlasting*, this again is the mark which all true faith has, and keeps in its eye; comp. on Tit. i. 2.

Ver. 17.—The consideration of that which, as a pattern to all who should afterwards believe, has been done in the apostle, and has made him an enduring monument of the saving long-suffering of Christ, constrains him to the ascription of praise which he here makes, and with which he closes the explanation of the above *ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* in the same way as it was begun. Such expressions of adoration, says Schleiermacher, are found for the most part only where a subject somewhat fully treated is brought to a termination, and shown in a light convincingly clear; so Rom. xi.; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. ix. 15; Eph. iii. 21, etc. I think that both of these things may be predicated of the passage before us. The train of thought to which the *ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* gave occasion is brought to a conclusion, and it is made out with convincing clearness that he is warranted in saying that of himself. "And can any one," asks Baumgarten justly, "imagine a more suitable conclusion. The apostle has not merely in a general form declared the counsel of God for the salvation of men, with which his whole soul was filled, but he has brought this subject home to his own person and his own experience; he has held himself forth as a living announcement of the truth, his history as a type of the gospel." *Τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῶν αἰώνων* occurs nowhere else in the New Testament. The same expression, however, is found in Tob. xiii. 6, 10, and מַלְכוּת כָּל־עֲלָמִים, Ps. cxlv. 13. Parallel expressions beyond the Bible, both from the Christian and the ante-Christian period, have been collected by Böttger, on this passage and on vi. 15, a. a. Q., p. 97. Olshausen remarks that it is doubtful whether *αἰῶνες* is to be understood as denoting the sum of the ages = eternity, thus, king of eternity, or as equivalent to "world," which develops itself in time, as Heb. i. 2, xi. 3, comp. on *αἰών*, Harless on Eph., p. 143. De Wette also wavers between the

two significations. It appears to me better that *αἰῶνες* should be taken in the same sense as afterwards in *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων* = *πάντας αἰῶνας* (comp. on Phil. iv. 20). He is a king of the ages, which together make up the idea of eternity, as His kingdom (comp. Ps. cxlv. 13) is an everlasting kingdom. Huther takes *αἰῶνες* = world, as Heb. i. 2, xi. 3. To this the apostle is led by the foregoing expression, ver. 16, *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, with which the expression in ver. 17 is immediately connected, as also the rest of the epithets in this verse represent God, not so much in his relation to the world as in the infinite fulness and majesty of his being. Honour and praise are due to Him, the king of the ages, the immortal, invisible, the only God; for He it is in whom all fulness dwells, who has come nigh to us in Christ Jesus to save us. It is altogether wrong, therefore, to refer the doxology to Christ; the epithet *invisible* is decisive against this. On *ἀφθάρτῳ*, comp. Rom. i. 23; on *ἀοράτῳ*, Col. i. 15; Heb. xi. 27; Rom. i. 20. *Μόνῳ θεῷ*, not *μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ*, which has A.D.*F.G., etc., against it, and appears to be a gloss from Rom. xvi. 27, as also Jude 25. *Ἀμήν* is also added elsewhere in the same way (Gal. i. 5; Phil. iv. 20, etc.). Finally, comp. on Phil. iv. 20. Dr. Baur thinks that the epithets here applied to God are of a Gnostic cast. The parallel passages to which we have referred show how little necessity there is for such an opinion.

Ver. 18.—The apostle, after this explanation of *ὃ ἐπιστεύθην ἐγώ* upon which his heart has poured itself forth in an ascription of praise to God, now turns again to Timothy, comp. ver. 3. We have seen how in that verse there was a *protasis* without an *apodosis*. Have we not the apodosis here, if not formally, at least substantially? Let us in the first place inquire to what the *ταύτην τὴν παραγγελίαν* refers? It cannot be referred to the immediately-foregoing *faithful saying*, for *παραγγελία*, as we have seen, denotes an injunction or *charge*, and what we read in ver. 15 and the context is not given in the form of a *charge*. It will not even do to refer the *ταύτην τ. π.* directly to *παραγγείλῃς*, ver. 3, or *παραγγελίας*, ver. 5, as De Wette has shewn; for against the former it is to be observed that the import of the *charge* is there definitely stated in the words, *forbid some to teach otherwise*, against the latter, that it is not *a certain* injunction or charge, but precept *in general* that is spoken of in ver. 5. Thus the *ταύτην τὴν π.* can be explained only as pointing to the following *ἵνα* (so also Huther), where it is to be observed that the form of the sentence beginning with *ἵνα* has been modified by the words, *according to former prophecies regarding thee*, to which it is referred. The apostle therefore writes thus: this charge I commit to thee, my son Timothy, according to the prophecies which went before on thee, that thou dost war in them the good warfare. Without the *κατά* in the foregoing clause, the apostle would have

said: that thou dost war the good warfare, in which the substance of the charge is given (ἵνα in a weakened signification). But what else can the good warfare be which Timothy is to war, than the fulfilling of his calling? And the apostle has set before him in ver. 3, seq., what is the duty which his calling actually imposes upon him. The idea, therefore, which must have been expressed in the apodosis if it had been given, is found here, although in a more general form. Next to a regular apodosis, we could imagine no better form for the conclusion than that which we have here. Although the direct reference of ταύτην τὴν π. back to ver. 3, seq., is impossible, still, as Schleiermacher himself has perceived, the παραγγελία carries us back to the *faith* and *good conscience* in ver. 5, and reminds us that it is here we are to seek the substance of the apodosis to the καθώς, ver. 3. So also Olshausen: "Paul resumes in substance what is said at ver. 3, seq." He, however, explains the παραγγελία also here of the special commission to oppose the heretics. And does the writer of the epistle really, as Schleiermacher maintains, leap back in ver. 18 to the old subject? He has already, in ver. 8, seq., shewn in opposition to the teachers of the law, what is the right use of the law, and referred in testimony of this to the gospel committed to his trust, and proved that he has the assurance of his own experience to produce for the truth of this gospel. How naturally then is this followed up with the injunction to Timothy (so well-founded, in as far as the apostle is concerned, before whose eyes the certainty as well as the glory of this gospel has been presented) to war the good warfare, to do what he is taught to do in vers. 3–10? Similarly also Heydenreich: in virtue of this my office, which has been committed to me, who was once a persecutor, but who obtained mercy of the Lord, vers. 13–16, I charge thee, etc. The apostle, however, mentions at the same time an additional ground of obligation which Timothy has in his own person to war the good warfare of his calling, in the words, *according to the prophecies*, etc. He reminds him of the prophecies that have been spoken in regard to him, and charges him according to these to see that they are fulfilled in him, by warring the good warfare ἐν αὐταῖς. We see here that whatever might have the effect of stirring up Timothy to a faithful performance of his duty is held up before him. On παρατίθεμαι comp. Matth. xiii. 24, 31; Acts vii. 23; 2 Tim. ii. 2. Κατά has been regarded without any reason as a hyperbaton; it belongs really to παρατίθεμαι; in what way it belongs to στρατεύῃ is shewn by ἐν αὐταῖς. By προαγούσας προφητείας are denoted antecedent or preceding prophecies, comp. Heb. vii. 18; ἐπὶ σέ is to be connected with προφ. On the subject, comp. iv. 14, from which we may gather that on the occasion of *the laying on of the hands of the presbytery*, such words were spoken concerning him as indicated what was to be expected

of him. So Olshausen and Huther ; but it is not his ordination to his office that is spoken of. I am not inclined to regard the good report which, according to Acts xvi. 2, Timothy had of all the brethren in Lystra and Iconium as identical with these *prophecies*, comp. Acts vi. 3, etc. The occurrence referred to is to be conceived as similar to that in Acts xiii. 1, where we find *prophecy* and *laying on of hands* conjoined. For what remains comp. iv. 14 and 2 Tim. i. 6. True, nothing is recorded in the Acts of these prophecies in reference to Timothy. But what can be inferred from this ? As well might we suppose a discrepancy to exist between 2 Tim. i. 6 and 1 Tim. iv. 14. Compare also Gal. ii. 2 with Acts xv. 1, the former of which passages speaks of a *revelation*, of which the latter says nothing. This passage also supplies us with an argument against Schleiermacher, to prove that the apostle elsewhere also appeals to such a revelation. In reply, however, to the objection that it was not the apostle's custom to pay regard to prophecies when he himself had to act, in support of which Schleiermacher refers to Acts xxi. 11, seq., Baumgarten has already observed justly, that the prophecy cited from Acts xxi. 11 contains nothing at all about what Paul should do or not do, and has referred with reason to Paul's opinion concerning prophecy, 1 Cor. xii. 10 ; Eph. iv. 11 ; 1 Cor. xiv. 1.— Ἐν *αὐταῖς* is rendered by De Wette, "in the strength of," better "in, with," armed as it were with these. On *στρατεύεσθαι τὴν κ. στρατείαν*, comp. 2 Cor. x. 4 ; Eph. vi. 14 ; 1 Thess. v. 8 ; and on 2 Tim. ii. 3–5. It is not his conduct as an individual, but rather in his official character, which is here meant. Chrysostom : *διατὶ καλεῖ στρατείαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ; δηλῶν ὅτι πόλεμος ἐγήγερται σφοδρὸς πᾶσι μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ διδασκάλῳ.* Στρατεία, as Huther observes, means properly "military service," not merely "fight."

Ver. 19.—All fitness for this military service, however, stands connected with the character and state of the individual engaged in it. That which the teacher seeks to bring about in others, he must himself have, and hold fast ; hence the apostle adds, "holding faith and a good conscience," which he has mentioned above, ver. 5, as the fundamental condition of all Christian life and striving. He is to hold faith and a good conscience (ἔχων not holding fast = *κατέχων*, as if it would escape from him ; to which the expression *ἀπωσάμενοι* does not correspond); for the examples of Hymeneus and Alexander shew how it will go with those who put these away from them. The *good conscience* is represented as the condition and ground of faith. The sentiment, observes Olshausen, is practically of the greatest importance, that the loss of a good conscience will cause shipwreck of faith. The state of faith depends on the inmost tendency of the soul in man ; the consciousness of sin kills the germ of faith in man. Ἥν refers of course only to *ἀγ. συνείδ.* The expres-

sion *ἀπωσάμενοι*, "having cast off," denotes a wilful act. Bengel rightly shews the reason of this, when he says: they have cast it from them, as a troublesome monitor. The expression already points to the *ἐναυάγησαν*, according to which the good conscience is to be conceived of as the anchor of faith. It is found also in a metaphorical sense at Rom. xi. 1, 2; Acts vii. 39, xiii. 46; Prov. xxiii. 23; Hos. iv. 6; Ezek. xliii. 9. Conscience is a power in man which contradicts him when he acts in opposition to it; according to which the expression *ἀπωσ.* involves nothing unsuitable (against Schleiermacher). The consequence of this *casting off* is the *making shipwreck of faith.* Περί, "with respect to," Winer's Gr., § 49, i., p. 361. It is well-known how frequently this metaphor was applied in the ancient church, representing the course of faith as a voyage.

Ver. 20.—As examples of this class, Hymeneus and Alexander are named, who in this way have come not merely to the loss of faith, but have even gone the length of blasphemy, and upon whom, therefore, the apostle was compelled to exercise his apostolical power of punishment. In 1 Cor. v. 5, we find a parallel to this conduct on the part of the apostle. Olshausen remarks on this, that the idea of excommunication certainly lies in it, but so as that without the church of Christ we are to conceive of the kingdom and power of Satan (Acts xxvi. 18); he who is excluded from it becomes thereby the prey of Satanic power. A comparison with 1 Cor. v., however, suggests the question whether something still more special is not to be understood in our present passage. There, it is added, that the giving over to Satan is to operate not only spiritually but also physically. This implies that severe sufferings, disease and the like, should come upon the person excommunicated, which should have the effect of bringing him to reflection, in order that his soul might be saved. Here also the salvation of the persons concerned is the end which the apostle has in view. Nothing is here said of bodily sufferings; but although all the church doctors explain this formula as also a formula of excommunication, we yet do not find that it was ever used as such, but always *ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.* It would seem that the church has supposed that this phrase involved an apostolical prerogative (comp. Acts v.)—Παιδεύω denotes here as at 1 Cor. xi. 32; 2 Cor. vi. 9, etc., to instruct by discipline. Βλασφημεῖν can, in accordance with the context, be referred only to speaking evil of that which is Divine, comp. vi. 1, and 2 Pet. ii. 10; Jude 8. Hymeneus and Alexander are the persons in whom Timothy may see an example of what the apostle has just maintained. Whether the fact itself to which reference is here made, was already known to Timothy or not, is of no importance for the apostle's object. But the form of the reference shews, that the individuals must at all events have been known to him. Whether both belonged to Ephesus

cannot be determined with certainty, as this also was irrelevant to the apostle's object. The former name occurs also at 2 Tim. ii. 17, in connexion with Philetus, where these two are adduced as examples to shew how the "vain talking" tends ever more and more to ungodliness, and has even carried them the length of maintaining that the resurrection is past already. That what is there said is quite consistent with what we read in the passage before us, on the supposition that one and the same person is meant, and that the doctrine, *the resurrection is past already*, must be congenial to one who has an evil conscience, needs no farther shewing. The connexion with Philetus is no proof against the identity of the person, for it might easily be the case that Alexander did not participate with him in that special heresy, as he did in the moral aberration which lay beneath it. Hence, the most of commentators, Olshausen among the number, have maintained the identity of the person, while Mosheim has denied it. Comp. on 2 Tim. ii. 17. With regard to Alexander, we meet this name also again at 2 Tim. iv. 14, where the individual referred to appears as a personal adversary of the apostle, and Timothy is warned against him. He has there the by-name *ὁ χαλκεύς*, by which it is intended to distinguish him from another of the same name. He is not there described as having been shut out from the church, without however our being able to say that he was not, for on this latter supposition also, his conduct towards the apostle and the warning against him may be explained. Just as little is he described as a heretic. Many commentators, doubtless with reason, identify him with the person named in Acts xix. 23, and distinguish him from the one mentioned in our passage; while others again, as Olshausen, recognize three of this name, and understand a different person in each of the three passages. The whole question is one merely of probability. If accordingly we decide for the identity of the Hymeneus named here and at 2 Tim. ii. 17, and against that of the Alexander likewise named twice, the possibility of its being otherwise in reference to the former, must still be acknowledged. It seems therefore all the more surprising that the criticism to which we are opposed lays so much stress for its purposes on these names. Thus De Wette, on the supposition that the Hymeneus mentioned in the first and second Epistle to Timothy, is the same person, seeks to prove, from the difference in the circumstances referred to in each instance, the earlier date of the second Epistle to Timothy, and thereby the spuriousness of all the Pastoral Epistles. But if the circumstances cannot in reality be reconciled with the supposition that one and the same person is meant, there remains still the possible supposition that different persons are meant. To this it has been objected that, apart from the improbability which lies in the sameness of the name, Paul

would in this case have held up to the Hymeneus of the second epistle that of the first as a warning example. But this objection rests on the untenable supposition, that the Hymeneus of the second epistle was himself to be warned, whereas he is only adduced as an example for Timothy, to shew him whither that vain talking tends, in which case any such allusion to the Hymeneus of the first epistle would have been quite superfluous. And when it is further objected by Schleiermacher against two persons being meant, that in this case the person second-named must have been distinguished from the first by some by-name—we may reasonably reply that the one is sufficiently distinguished from the other, by being named in connexion with his companion in error. In addition to this, it cannot at all be proved that either in the one place or the other it is persons in Ephesus who are spoken of. This cannot be inferred from the fact that they are named as examples, as indeed generally the critics have paid too little attention to this circumstance, that the persons named are only meant to serve as examples. And if it were really the case, as those critics maintain, that the author of the first epistle had the second in his eye, and "thought it necessary to make it appear that the heresy had made progress such as would be sufficiently accounted for by what is said in the second epistle," why should he have separated Hymeneus and Philetus, who are there named together, and have placed Hymeneus along with Alexander, as he must surely have observed the different connexion in which the latter is mentioned in 2 Tim. ii. 17 ?* Will Dr. Baur's answer to this question be held sufficient, namely, that in 1 Tim. i. 20, Hymeneus stands at the same time for the Philetus named with and after him ? We have here one of those cases in which favour for the author or prejudice against him obtains free scope, because nothing can be evidently proved. For this very reason, however, the question can be of no advantage to the opposing critics.

Before leaving this section, we have still to look at the principal attack which has been directed against it by Schleiermacher. According to the Introduction, ver. 3, says Schleiermacher, it is the writer's intention to give directions to Timothy as to his conduct towards the heretics. But no such directions are to be found ; with the exception of vers. 3–11 and vers. 19 and 20, nothing is said about heretics at all till we come to chap. iv. 1 ; up to this place the writer has lost sight of his object. But even in chap. iv. 1 he cannot be said to have resumed it, for he speaks there of heretics who are to be expected at a later period. In ver. 7, indeed, he seems to speak of excrescences in doctrine already present, and in like manner in vi. 3–5, 20, passages, which, as regards their sense, we find exactly repeated, but which give no other instruction to Timothy than merely that he is to have nothing to do with those heretics.

Thus the introduction does not correspond to the body of the epistle, and what is said of the heretics forms, when compared with the rest of the epistle, but a very insignificant part of it. In reply to all this we would say, that, keeping in view particularly chap. i., it is principally to be borne in mind that the introduction ver. 3, in which Timothy is reminded of the object of his having been left in Ephesus, is by no means to be regarded as the theme of the whole epistle, as may be seen indeed from the epistle itself, iii. 14. That which was the *immediate* object for which Timothy was left in Ephesus, is also, of course, the immediate subject of the writing which was addressed to him. But why must the epistle have been written *solely* for the purpose of giving him instructions on this subject? As, over and above his special commission to oppose those who taught otherwise, Timothy was charged also with the settlement and administration of the church, as well as with the general duties of an evangelist, we find accordingly that the epistle treats of all these things. The only question then is, whether the section which professes to give instructions to Timothy on that part of his charge which has reference to the unsound doctrine, or rather which professes merely to remind him of this charge, is in reality what the introduction, *as I besought thee*, etc., warrants us to expect. And who can doubt that it is so, if it be kept in view that the apodosis to ver. 3 is absorbed in the protasis, and that in this latter therefore is to be sought what the apostle has to say on the subject to Timothy? We find the errors which Timothy is to ward off not merely designated in a general way in vers. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, but that which is erroneous in them is in vers. 4 and 5 especially noticed. The source whence they spring is shewn in ver. 6; in vers. 7–11 a species of the general error is more fully entered into, and Timothy is referred to the gospel which the apostle promulgates with the assurance of his own experience. In ver. 18 the apostle, referring to this gospel, and the prophecies which had gone before respecting Timothy, admonishes him to fight the good fight of his calling, in order to which he must take good heed to himself, and maintain that state of soul the loss of which brings along with it the loss of faith. All this is certainly no refutation of heresies in the strict sense, nor does it profess to be this; it is, however, a renewed statement of the charge which had been given to Timothy, and an advice as to the right way of fulfilling this charge. And this is all that the introduction warrants us reasonably to expect. In fine, those who, like Schleiermacher, hold the Epistle to Titus to be genuine, need not stumble at the way in which the apostle treats this subject here, for it is quite the same as in that epistle, and all that is peculiar to our passage is the anacolouthon, as an unprejudiced comparison will shew.

§ 2. Directions to Timothy with Regard to the Regulation of the Church.

A. REGARDING PUBLIC WORSHIP.

(ii. 1–15.)

Along with the commission which Timothy as the representative of the apostle in Ephesus received, to oppose those who sought to mislead the church by their fruitless pursuits, another was conjoined, namely, to take charge of the regulation and administration of the church. The apostle passes in chap. ii. to this part of the commission given to Timothy, in order to furnish him with directions regarding it, and, first of all, he gives him injunctions with respect to the assemblies for public worship. These, however, are not of a merely general kind, as if the church were to be begun *ab ovo*, but refer to special points which the state of the church leads him to suggest. The first direction of this kind is, that the prayers of the church be made for all men, and in particular also for magistrates, this duty being implied in the universality of the design and application of Christianity, which finds its expression in his calling to be the apostle of the Gentiles, vers. 1–7. Then, what is the right internal as well as external preparation for prayer, which it becomes the man and also the woman to make, vers. 8–10. Lastly, the special injunction that the woman make no public appearance, but find her vocation in the discharge of her conjugal and domestic duties, vers. 11–15.

Ver. 1.—*I exhort therefore*, etc.; the apostle thus begins to give instructions respecting *public* prayer, for it is of this that he is speaking, as vers. 8–11 shew. It is maintained that the *therefore* has no logical connexion with the preceding. Baumgarten proposes to supply this connexion by observing, that either Timothy is instructed how and what he is to do, in opposition to such destroyers as are mentioned in ver. 20, or it may be that the reference to the church predominates, and in this case it is shewn what is to be done in the church, in order to protect it from these destroyers. Both of these inferences, however, are ultimately conjoined, in confirmation of which he refers to iv. 16. Against this view, it is first of all to be noticed, that those named in i. 20 are not represented as destroyers of the church, but as individual examples of a falling away from the faith. Further, that chap. ii. shews throughout no such opposition to chap. i. The opposition which Baumgarten makes out here is found in Tit. ii. 1; but a comparison will shew that our pas-

sage does not admit of being interpreted in the same way. Olshausen also has rejected Baumgarten's view of this passage. The words, *I exhort therefore*, are rather, as Matthies has already observed, to be placed in connexion with ver. 18. This special direction which the apostle here gives, rests on that general admonition in ver. 18, which is confirmed by what precedes. So also Leo. Reference has justly been made to 2 Tim. ii. 1 for this οὖν, in opposition to Schleiermacher. Olshausen, differently. He finds the link of connexion in βλασφημεῖν, ver. 20, which he understands to mean—speaking evil of the magistracy. As the destruction of Jerusalem drew near, observes Olshausen, we find that all the Jews were seized with delusive dreams of freedom, with which also those Ephesian Judaists were infected. In opposition to these, Paul gives prominence to the injunction that prayer be made for all men, especially also for magistrates. But who could feel warranted in making βλασφημεῖν, which is only incidentally introduced, the transition-idea to chap. ii., even could it be proved to have this special reference?—The apostle says, *first of all* (which is not with Luther to be connected with *be made*, but with *I exhort*), not to signify that the injunction which follows in itself deserves this place—but there are special reasons which induce him to give it the first place here. The apostle aims at denoting prayer in its every apect, when he says, ποιεῖσθαι δεήσεις, προσευχὰς, ἐντεύξεις, εὐχαριστίας. On δέησις and προσευχή, comp. Phil. iv. 6. Ἔντευξις only again at iv. 5, from which passage we learn, that the term does not in itself denote specially "intercessions," which also is not involved in the word (ἐντυχάνω = adeo aliquem); comp. Book of Wisdom viii. 21; xvi. 28; chiefly, however, Rom. viii. 27, 34; Heb. vii. 25. It is plain from these passages, that ἐντυγχάνειν signifies to come in to any one, and as regards another, as well for, as against him, and so also ἔντευξις, which (comp. Wahl) occurs in the profane writers in the same sense as here (Diod. Sic. xvi. 25; Jos. Antt. xv. 3, 8). It obtains here through the following ὑπέρ the signification of intercession for some one. The word itself is therefore not chargeable with the offence which Schleiermacher takes at it, who calls it a "fine" word. To the *intercessions* are added *thanksgivings*. In this also is their Christian love to shew itself, namely, in giving thanks for the good that happens to others. These various expressions cannot be better rendered than in Luther's translation, in which the difference between them is given in the words themselves. It is not the import of the prayers by which they are distinguished, for ἔντευξις does not mean precisely a prayer for the aversion of evil (iv. 5), and as little does δέησις, to which this signification has in like manner been assigned, while προσευχή is made to mean prayer that good may be obtained (contrary to Jam. v. 16, 17). The design of the apostle in this accumulation of expressions, is

only to inculcate prayer in its every form, in all the relations implied in it; they are to *ask*, as the expression of need with reference to God; they are to *pray*, and then, by way of climax they are to come near to God asking. As examples of such an accumulation, the following passages have already been adduced by others, Gal. v. 19–21; 2 Cor. vi. 4, seq., etc. Similarly Huther, who observes that the first term expresses the idea of one's own insufficiency, the second that of devotion, and the third that of childlike confidence.—*For all men*, as Tit. iii. 1–3. This admonition to pray for all men, has doubtless the same reference here as there; it is designed for such as pretended, on the ground of their superiority as Christians, to have the right of looking down on all who were not such, as a mass of perdition. The *ὑπέρ* is to be connected with all the afore-mentioned species of prayer.

Ver. 2.—*For kings*, etc. On the reason of this injunction so oft repeated in the apostolical epistles, comp. on Tit. iii. 1. It is plain from ver. 3, seq., that here also the injunction is occasioned by a false view of the relation in which the Christian stands to the magistracy, as heathen, and therefore hostile. *For kings*—the expression is quite general, without any definite reference to the then Roman emperor. They are to pray for kings, it is all one who they are. It is a permanent ordinance. Baur finds in the plural a reference to the emperor and his associates in the government, as this relation was common in the time of Antonine. The writer would thus have forgotten his part. But not only for kings is prayer to be made, it is to be made for all who are *ἐν ὑπεροχῇ*, *i. e.*, who have any share in magisterial authority (comp. Rom. xiii. 1). The word *ὑπεροχή*, in its general signification, is used by the apostle only again at 1 Cor. ii. 1. The object or end of the prayer for magistrates, not its import, is then given in the words which follow: That we may live a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and decency. The *ἵνα* cannot denote the contents of the prayer, for that which one supplicates for the magistracy cannot be, that the suppliant himself may have a quiet life; it is evident also from the sentence introduced by *ἵνα*, that the import of the prayer cannot have been the conversion of the magistrates. It is the blessing which the suppliants are to expect in answer to their prayers, that is here stated by the apostle. The blessing which the magistracy obtains from their prayers will for them bear the fruit of a quiet, peaceable life. This follows from the design of all government, Rom. xiii. 3, seq.; if it is blessed in the fulfilment of this end, namely, the restraining of the bad and the advancement of the good, then does the subject necessarily enjoy the blessing of a quiet and peaceable life. The interpretation, "that there may be no insurrection amongst us," is unsuitable, and the other, "that the magistrates, convinced of our

respectful deportment, may let us live in peace," is unworthy. Can that be the blessing and this the object of the prayer? The purely subjective interpretation of Heydenreich, "in order by prayer to cherish a quiet, peaceably submissive public spirit," is also to be rejected, as De Wette has done. On ἤρεμος and ἡσύχιος Olshausen remarks, that the former signifies "not troubled from without," the latter "from within," 1 Pet. iii. 4. Leo, following Titmann, takes the former in an active, the latter in a passive sence. On ἤρεμος (only here), Winer's Gr., § 11, 2, p. 65. Βίον διάγειν, to spend life, stronger than ἄγειν, comp. Tit. iii. 3. Ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ, etc., Luther well renders, "in all godliness and propriety of conduct. On σεμν. Tit. ii. 2, 7, = honestas. De Wette explains the passage rightly when he says that this is the ultimate end, and depends on outward peace as its condition.—On the direction here given to pray for magistrates, Olshausen observes that the accounts in Josephus of the time immediately preceding the destruction of Jerusalem, throw a remarkable light on this command to pray for all. It was already enjoined in the Old Testament that the Jews should pray also for their heathen rulers, comp. Jer. xxix. 7; Ezra vi. 10. The Jews adhered to this custom. Augustus decreed that a lamb should be offered daily for him in the temple. This practice lasted till near the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. The Zealots, however, looked upon it as an act of idolatry, and required that the offering should cease, Jos. de bell. Jud. II. 17. The duty which the apostle here inculcates was particularly observed by the ancient Christians, of which Heydenreich has adduced proofs, p. 126. Comp. also on Rom. xiii. 1.

Ver. 3.—This command to intercede for all men is now confirmed by a reference to the divine will. Mack arbitrarily explains ver. 2 as a parenthesis. The true explanation is, that the apostle in these confirmatory words, returns to the injunction in its general form, without any special reference to rulers, which has already been made in ver. 2; and this appears from the relative clause, ver. 4, *who will have all men*, etc. For this, he says, is good, and acceptable before our Saviour God. Καλόν is to be connected with ἐνώπιον, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 21. On ἀπόδεκτος, comp. what is said on ἀποδοχή in i. 15. The apposition to θεός, which is purposely placed first, has an evident reference to the import of the clause, as ver. 4 shows:—who will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. He who is our Saviour wills that all should be saved; and therefore it is acceptable to him that we should pray for all men. On θεὸς σωτήρ, comp. Tit. i. 3.

Ver. 4.—Ὅς contains the confirmation of the preceding. Πάντας ἀνθρώπους is emphatically placed first, because what is meant to be confirmed is, that for all men prayer should be made. If God en-

tertains this merciful design towards all men, then have we no right to make distinctions which would shut out a portion of men. Our prayers must correspond to God's gracious design towards all men, and must be co-extensive with it. The question suggests itself, whether this confirmatory clause, which points out, in this gracious purpose of God, the reason of the obligation to pray for all men, renders it necessary to suppose that the apostle meant by δέησις, etc., prayer especially for the conversion of all men. Ver. 1, especially the term εὐχαριστίας, does not indicate this, nor does ver. 2, where, as appears from the concluding words, the conversion of the magistrates is not to be understood as especially meant. Thus the apostle here also, in the clause which begins with ὅς, aims at confirming the duty of prayer, not specially for the conversion of all men, but of prayer generally, as an obligation of love toward all men, in the fulfilment of which, however, prayer for the salvation of their souls will always have the chief place.—The critics have found in the prominence which is given to the universality of the grace of God, a polemical allusion to the Gnostics. In our passage this idea stands in close connexion with the direction to make intercessions for all men, and thus vindicates itself. That the sentiment is Pauline needs no farther demonstration, comp. only Rom. i. 5, v. 18, xi. 32, etc. On πάντας ἀνθρώπους comp. with respect to the article Winer's Gr., § 18, 4, p. 101; Rom. v. 12, etc. "It is the many expressed universally according to all the individuals which compose it." Not σῶσαι, as for example in Tit. iii. 5, but agreeably to the context σωθῆναι, intercession being here spoken of as the mediatrix of the divine grace. Σωθῆναι denotes the general, the ultimate end which is aimed at, καὶ εἰς ἐπίγν., etc., the immediate end as the means of attaining to the other. (Huther finds it more natural to understand σωθῆναι of salvation from sin and untruth, and the ἐπίγν. τῆς. ἀλ. as the end aimed at). There is therefore no ὕστερον πρότερον, comp. Winer's Gr., § 61, 3, p. 488. Καί = and in consequence of this. On ἐπίγν. stronger than γνῶσις = recognition, comp. Phil. i. 9.

Vers. 5 and 6.—The idea that God will have all men to be saved, is now itself confirmed by a new γάρ. One idea follows another here in close connexion. We have here before us the apostle quite as we are accustomed to see him elsewhere. The reason of this lies in the fact, that he is here moving in the same sphere of doctrinal disquisition, in which his manner is so well known to us throughout the other epistles. "For there is one God, one mediator also between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, ver. 6, who gave himself as a ransom for all which is to be testified in its time." The confirmation of πάντας, ver. 4, lies in the emphatic εἷς; one God, one Mediator, also there is; wherefore the one God is the God of all, the one Mediator between God and man is the mediator of all men. The

universality of the divine grace is only the other side of the oneness of God, and the oneness of the mediator. The same idea lies beneath the words of the apostle in Acts xvii. 26. Comp. also Rom. iii. 29 ; Eph. iv. 5, 6, etc. It is therefore harsh and unnecessary to understand *γάρ*, ver. 5, not as confirmatory of ver. 4, but as a second reason for the injunction to pray for all co-ordinate with that in ver. 4. *One God*, and therefore the *God of all ;* as such, he cannot save the one, and let the other be lost. And as there is one God, so is there also but one mediator between God and men ; the one is therefore the mediator for all. The words *one Mediator also* are added ; for it is the saving grace of God in Christ that is spoken of in ver. 4 : it must be designed for all, if there is but one God and one Mediator. " The idea of Mediator," observes De Wette, as also before him Schleiermacher, " refers to that of a mutual covenant (Heb. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24), which is only indirectly implied in the work of redemption alluded to in ver. 6 ; consequently the writer seems to have borrowed it from those passages." As regards first of all the Pauline character of the expression, we have but to call to mind Gal. iii. 19, 20, apart from those passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and passages such as Col. ii. 14 ; 2 Cor. v. 19, etc., where we find not indeed the expression, but the same idea. And is not the use of the expression in our passage vindicated by this—that the *all men* and *one God* are placed over against each other, and Christ is represented expressly as the *Mediator between God and men ?* Must then *διαθήκη* be expressly used in order to its being possible for *μεσίτης* to be used ?—*Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων* without the article, comp. in regard to the former, Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, p. 110. It is wanting in the second, because it is not intended to designate the totality, but to place the two ideas over against each other. The one Mediator is designated as the *man Christ Jesus.* Wherefore *ἄνθρωπος ?* Theodoret has already given the right answer : *ἄνθρωπον δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν ὠνόμασεν ἐπειδὴ μεσίτην ἐκάλεσεν· ἐνανθρωπήσας γὰρ ἐμεσίτευσεν* ; comp. Heb. ii. 14, iv. 15. When Baur observes here, that if Christ is named in opposition to the *one God* (but he is also called *Mediator*), he cannot at the same time be God, and that when in iii. 16 divinity is notwithstanding predicated of Christ, this only betrays the crude conceptions of the writer, into which he falls in consequence of intending in the one passage to oppose Docetism, while yet in the other he adheres to the Gnostic maxim : God is manifest in Christ—Olshausen replies to this, by pointing to those passages in which Paul also gives prominence to the humanity of Christ, and in like manner as here names Christ along with the *one God*, 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; Rom. v. 15, so that the charge of indistinctness falls upon the apostle himself. So also Baumgarten. Compare besides the Critical Introduction.—The

mediating agency of Christ is then in ver. 6, more particularly described in the words—*who hath given himself*, etc. On *ὁ δούς* comp. on Tit. ii. 14. *Ἀντίλυτρον* only here, elsewhere *λύτρον*; comp. on Tit. ii. 14. Schleiermacher has himself referred to the Pauline *ἀντιμισθία*, Rom. i. 27; 2 Cor. vi. 13, although he stumbles at *ἀντίλυτρον* on account of the redundant *ἀντί*. But there is no redundance in the expression, as *ἀντί* aims at giving prominence to the reciprocal reference of this *λύτρον*. Compare also *ἀντάλλαγμα*, Matth. xvi. 26. Schleiermacher's opinion that the expression should be referred to the words, *come to the knowledge of the truth*, is altogether without reason, as also the objection that the language of the writer is indefinite, and without an object, for that *σωθῆναι* and not the other is the principal idea, is shewn by the right interpretation of ver. 4, as also by the words *our Saviour* added to God, ver. 3, and by the sentiment of ver. 5 itself, in which Christ is represented as *Mediator*. Why has Schleiermacher not carried out here the comparison with the Epistle to the Hebrews? Heb. ix. 13, seq.—*Τὸ μαρτύριον*, etc. On the construction, Winer's Gr., § 59, 9, p. 472, comp. Rom. xii. 1. The *τὸ μαρτ.* is to be taken as the accusative, and in apposition with the preceding clause. The article is almost demonstrative, *i. e.*, "that which is to be testified of," (De Wette). *Μαρτύριον* as also elsewhere by Paul, 1 Cor. i. 6, ii. 1; 2 Thess. i. 10. On *καιροῖς ἰδίοις*, Tit. i. 3; Gal. vi. 9, iv. 4.

Ver. 7.—We see here how the apostle refers to himself as a teacher of the Gentiles, in order to prove the universality of the Divine grace, just as at i. 12, he designates himself in his conversion, as an announcement of the gospel. "For which I was appointed a herald and an apostle. I speak the truth and lie not—a teacher of the Gentiles in the faith and in the truth." On *ἐτέθην*, comp. on. i. 12. On *κήρυξ*, 1 Cor. ix. 27, xv. 11; Tit. i. 3. On the whole subject, 2 Tim. i. 11; Eph. iii. 1–12; Col. i. 23. *I speak the truth*, etc., (comp. Rom. ix. 1) the apostle adds by way of asseveration (*ἐν Χριστῷ* is a gloss from Rom. ix. 1). In so far as Timothy was concerned, such an asseveration was not necessary; it has respect, however, not to Timothy, but to the subject. The confirmatory reference of the words to the preceding induces him to affirm this with all emphasis. The protestation itself, as at Rom. ix. 1, stands before what is to be affirmed, namely, that he is a *teacher of the Gentiles*, by which the foregoing predicates are, agreeably to the connexion, to be more exactly determined. It cannot be otherwise explained why the protestation should have been inserted between them, and the context evidently shows, that the whole stress of this affirmation rests on the words, *teacher of the Gentiles*. De Wette understands the words *ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ* subjectively, and renders, "in truth and verity;" so also Leo =

πιστὸς καὶ ἀληθινός. But it is not from the apostle's own personal truth and verity we can perceive that the universal grace of God manifests itself in his calling; it is rather from this—that he is a teacher of the Gentiles in the right faith and in the truth. The reading ἐν πνεύματι, instead of ἐν πίστει, has not much in its favour, either internally or externally. The context shews why ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is added to ἐν πίστει: it is the faith which is the truth. On the absence of the article, Winer's Gr., § 19, I., p. 109.*

Ver. 8.—"What now are we to think of ver. 8, seq.?" asks Schleiermacher. "If he intends to return to the subject which he has already left, then must we suppose that he purposes now to enter into particulars, and to shew what becomes men and women in prayer. But of the men nothing at all new is said, except what is implied in the words *in every place*, which, however, have nothing special in them. Of the women, indeed, things are said which are special enough, but such as in no way concerns prayer alone. And in general it is difficult to refer any part of ver. 9 only to prayer. It sounds best to make ver. 8 a pause, and to refer the ὡσαύτως, ver. 9, back to παρακαλῶ, ver. 1; but against this is the clear connexion between ver. 8 and ver. 9 in the τοὺς ἄνδρας and τὰς γυναῖκας, nor would ver. 12, αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, with the subsequent verses dependent upon it, suit this view. Nothing, therefore, remains but to suppose that the author, on returning to his subject in ver. 8, makes special mention of the men, because he wished also to speak of the women in connexion with prayer; now, however, 1 Pet. iii. came to his mind, and with its assistance he brings everything into the order which it would admit of." Now, it must be admitted, that in ver. 8, *I will, therefore*, etc., the writer returns to the direction at ver. 1; in like manner, that ver. 9, on account of the clearly-expressed opposition of *men* and *women* (vers. 8 and 9), cannot be the beginning of a new section, against which also would be the term ὡσαύτως. But on the other hand, there is no reason for regarding ver. 11 also in the light of a direction for prayer, for this is not merely wanting in all external connexion, but the μανθανέτω shows plainly that the apostle is speaking of something else. Baumgarten also adheres to this view. Olshausen, on the contrary, thinks he finds the key to the right understanding of the passage, in the separation of ver. 8 from ver. 9; he understands ver. 9 as the beginning of quite a new injunction to women on the subject of modesty, and accordingly, that only βούλομαι is to be supplied at ὡσαύτως. He goes on to shew, that the reason of this separate mention of the men and the women is explained by the circumstance, that those Judaizing heretics sought to extend their theories of freedom also to the emancipation

* Huther understands ἐν to denote the sphere: in faith (subjectively), in truth (as the objective good).

of women, as Dr. Baur has observed; only, that this was not confined to the Marcionites. We find the same at 1 Cor. xi. 5, seq., xiv. 34 (from which it is evident that any reference to Judaizing heretics is superfluous), and it is perfectly natural, as women also were endowed with the *χαρίσματα*, Acts xxi. 9; Joel iii. 1. Paul says then, that the women are not to suppress their gifts, but to use them in a manner becoming their sex; so Olshausen. But apart from the circumstance that nothing is here said about gifts, Schleiermacher, in opposition to the above view, might have insisted on the force of the *ὡσαύτως*, which always supposes a *similarity* in the subject-matter, as also on the opposition of *men* to *women* in ver. 8 and ver. 9. It cannot be conceived why prayer should be urged as a duty on men exclusively, which would be the case if ver. 9 were taken as the beginning of a new section.—In the words *I will therefore* the writer turns back to the directions on prayer in ver. 1. There it was stated quite generally that *prayer should be made*, the principal thing in addition to this being *for all men*, which is confirmed in vers. 3–6. In resuming this subject here, the apostle looks at it in another aspect, doubtless in this also, as in the first exhortation, yielding to the inducement of special circumstances; he here treats of the manner in which, generally, prayer should be made, the right demeanour in the discharge of this duty. The words in ver. 1, *that supplications be made*, are in this aspect farther explained, according to the difference of sex. He has in this respect something different to say to the men from what he has to say to the women. We find in ver. 8 what applies to the men. "I will now (= I appoint) that the men pray in every place, lifting up holy hands without wrath and disputation." The introductory *προσεύχεσθαι*, as De Wette well observes, resumes the previous subject, and on it the emphasis is to be laid. Some have thought that the emphasis is intended to be placed on—*the men*, and the idea is that only men are to conduct prayer; they alone are to pray in the public assemblies, not the women, 1 Cor. xi. 4, 14, 15. But *προσεύχεσθαι* may be used with reference to the whole congregation, and as in ver. 9 we do not find it said of the women that they are to be silent, as the antithesis would require, we must therefore understand *προσεύχεσθαι* not as meaning to pray before others, but in its general signification, which alone corresponds to ver. 9. For what we read in ver. 12, *I suffer not a woman to teach*, has no reference to this passage. In the words, *in every place*, it is chiefly to be observed, that it is public prayer, and not secret prayer, that is spoken of. Some have thought it necessary to suppose a polemical allusion in these words to the limitation of prayer by the Jews to the temple or the synagogue, which is not even historically tenable, and which, as addressed to a Christian church which had been for a long time

in existence, would have no significance. The words, *in every place*, are not to be understood (as also Mack and Matthies are of opinion) as exclusively referring to the prayers of the men, but belong to the whole passage. In every place where prayer is made, it is to be made in the manner prescribed in the following instructions. *In every place*, however, certainly refers to the different places of meeting. The qualifications which are required now follow. "Lifting up holy hands." On ὅσιος, holy, pure, unstained by vice, comp. on Tit. i. 8. On the form, Winer's Gr., § 11, 1, p. 64. On the expression, Ps. xxiv. 4. On ἐπαίρειν, 1 Kings viii. 23; Ps. cxl. 2, etc. So also in the profane writers, Virgil Aen. 1. v. 92, Hor. carm. iii. 23, v. 1 (Mack). *Without wrath and disputation*—doubtless refers to circumstances peculiar to the church, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 2, seq. Διαλογισμός is rightly understood by the majority of the more recent commentators not as = doubt, but = disputation, comp. on Phil. iii. 14. The connexion with ὀργῆς leads to this interpretation. It is not to be explained of the conduct of Christians towards those who are not Christians, but of their conduct towards one another. If now we call to mind Schleiermacher's objection against ver. 8, namely, that nothing new is said in it except what is implied in the words *in every place*, we find that it no longer has any force. We have seen that something new is certainly introduced, namely, the right deportment in prayer, and that sufficient instructions are furnished on this head, if we do not start from the false supposition that the apostle must of necessity treat the subject in all its bearings, but rather suppose, what is so natural, that his instructions have reference to those points in which the church was specially deficient. I do not see what further fault can be found with ver. 8, if it so understood.

Vers. 9, 10.—The τοὺς ἄνδρας in ver. 8 leads us to expect its opposite γυναῖκας. In ver. 9 follows what applies to the woman in distinction from the men, in the same respect in which the men are spoken of, ver. 8. The very contrast, therefore, which involves at the same time a similarity, as well as the particle ὡσαύτως, obliges us to understand what is said of the women, as an injunction with reference to their conduct in prayer. But the precise difficulty which Schleiermacher finds here, is that ver. 9 by no means treats of prayer only; nay, that in general it will not do to refer any part of ver. 9 to prayer at all. We shall first attend more particularly to the import of vers. 9, 10. On ὡσαύτως what is necessary has already been said; comp. Tit. ii. 3, 6; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 11, v. 25; Rom. viii. 26; 1 Cor. xi. 25. Βούλομαι is to be supplied from ver. 8; but what the apostle here enjoins must be related in its import to what is said in ver. 8. Upon this follows not indeed προσεύχεσθαι, but κοσμεῖν. But the construction of the sentence itself shews that the apostle had not

κοσμεῖν in his mind from the first, for κοσμεῖν finds its proper antithesis in the following ἀλλά, ver. 10, and the connexion of κοσμεῖν with ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ, does not seem quite suitable, as De Wette has already observed. To the same effect also is the circumstance, that ἑαυτάς does not come in till after κοσμεῖν, shewing that this latter term is to be connected with what follows. Thus we have, at all events, good grounds for supplying προσεύχεσθαι from the preceding, and for connecting with it the words ἐν κατ. κοσμ., etc., so that this special injunction as to the conduct of the women in prayer corresponds to that which is given to the men in the words *lifting up holy hands*, etc. This verse, then, from its very beginning, refers to prayer, and what is said of the women in vers. 9, 10, is to be understood as referring primarily to public prayer, although, of course, it applies also to other circumstances, and chiefly to public worship in general. The sole difficulty in the structure of the sentence then lies in the asyndetic infinitive κοσμεῖν. Had it been the participle, then all foundation for the doubts of the critics would have been removed. But have we not examples elsewhere of a similar change in the construction? How easily might the apostle, in his design to bring prominently out the right deportment on which everythings depends, exchange the participial construction for the infinitive; just as he elsewhere uses the finite verb instead of proceeding in the participial construction; comp. in Winer's Gr., § 63, 2 b., p. 505. De Wette has similarly explained the structure of the passage, and thus removed the difficulties which Schleiermacher has found in it. Huther supplies only βούλομαι, and connects γυναῖκας directly with κοσμεῖν.—Καταστολή similarly ἐν καταστήματι ἱεροπρεπεῖς, Tit. ii. 3. In the profane writers it has the signification of a becoming conduct, and to this more general signification = *habitus*, we are also apparently led by Jos. de bell. Jud. II. 8, 4. The majority of commentators, however, understand here the apparel. Also Passow Lex. The context furnishes too little to determine the point. Κόσμιος only again iii. 2 = decorus, becoming. Μετὰ αἰδοῦς, etc., with shamefacedness and modesty.* Comp. on σωφρ., Tit. i. 8 and ii. 2, 5. That by καταστολή is meant the outward *habitus* is evident from the following negative clause, *not with broidered hair*, etc. The infinitive κοσμεῖν is dependent on βούλομαι: that they adorn themselves not with broidered hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array, but (ver. 10), which becometh women who profess godliness, with good works. The ὃ πρέπει is thus put parenthetically, and δι' ἔργων ἀγ. is to be connected with κοσμεῖν, which, as De Wette observes, is suitable enough, as good works are an indirect ornament. Winer also thus understands the passage, § 23, 2, Anm. p. 143; while others (Mack,

* Xen. Cyr. VIII. 1, 11; διήρει δὲ αἰδῷ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ τῇ δὲ ὡς τοὺς μὲν αἰδομένους τὰ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ αἰσχρὰ φεύγοντας τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ (Leo).

Matthies) explain ὅ by ἐν τούτῳ ὅ, and connect δι' ἔργ. ἀγ. with ἐπαγγ. to which therefore the signification of ἐπαγγ. = profiteri does not correspond (De Wette). Of the signification there can be no doubt, according to the context, and a comparison with vi. 21. We find, moreover, in the Pastoral Epistles the word also in the signification in which it is elsewhere used by the apostle ; comp. Tit. i. 2. On *good works*, comp. Eph. ii. 10. On the entire passage, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 2, seq.; 1 Pet. iii. 3, seq.

Vers. 11–15.—We learn from these verses that besides the fondness for exterior adornment which shewed itself even in the public assemblies for prayer, the apostle had still another kindred fault to censure in the women of the church, namely, their putting themselves forward in consequence of mistaking the proper sphere assigned to them. This displayed itself in their coming forward to teach in the public assemblies, and thus usurping an authority over the man. To this also we find a parallel in the first epistle to the Corinthians (xiv. 34), which has this in common with our epistle and that to Titus, that it throws light on the state of the church in regard to morals and discipline ; it cannot therefore be maintained with certainty that this public appearance on the part of the women stands in connexion with the so-called heresies which the apostle combats. The passage 2 Tim. iii. 6, seq., affords no proof of this. A reference to 2 Cor. xi. 5, xiv. 34, will suffice in opposition to Baur's anti-Marcionitic interpretation of the passage, for our present passage contains nothing more than may be found in those passages. That the apostle, in this epistle, where he has in view the state of things in the Ephesian church, repeats in substance the injunctions which had before been given to the church in Corinth, without noticing any cause which had led him to do this, has certainly nothing surprising in it. Doubtless the cause was known to Timothy. Comp. the General Introduction.

Vers. 11, 12.—Γυνή not γυναῖκες ; thus the form of the expression, as well as the absence of all connexion, shews that the apostle passes on to something new, which is also self-evident in the words, *learn in silence*. There is here an antithesis in every word. *In silence*, opposed to drawing attention to themselves by a public appearance. Even the putting of questions by the women in the public assembly is rebuked by the apostle, 1 Cor. xiv. 35. *Let her learn* as opposed to *teach*. *In all subjection*, in opposition to *usurping authority over the man*, 1 Cor. xiv. 34. *Being in subjection* is in that passage represented as the proper position of the woman, which of itself excludes the *teaching* in public assemblies ; but not of course teaching in general, Acts xviii. 26. Instead of the reading γυναικὶ δὲ διδ. A.D.F.G., etc., offer the other, which is also on internal grounds to be preferred : διδάσκειν δὲ γυναικί, etc. That the

apostle says here, *I do not permit*, and not as in 1 Cor. xiv. 34, *it is not permitted*, which Schleiermacher has thought strange, scarcely needs vindication; for the words *let them be silent*, and *as the law also saith*, which the apostle uses in that passage, are, as Baumgarten has already observed, in no way milder. *Nor to bear authority over the man:* these words are not to be understood generally, but in relation to what goes before, namely, the speaking in public assemblies, as 1 Cor. xiv. 34, also shews, where *to speak* has for its opposite *to be in subjection*, or as in our present passage *to be in silence*. So also De Wette. Αὐθεντεῖν, Hesychius; ἐξουσιάζειν. The word occurs nowhere else; comp. Winer's Gr., § 2, p. 22. At εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ supply βούλομαι or some such word, as at 1 Cor. xiv. 34.

Vers. 13, 14.—"Consider now," says Schleiermacher, "how the following, vers. 13–15, can ever be said to be Pauline?" Neither the stress which is here laid on the priority of creation, nor the imputation of the first sin to Eve in contradistinction to Adam, can Schleiermacher regard as coming from the man who penned 1 Cor. xi. and the Epistle to the Romans (v. 12, seq).—As confirmatory then of the injunction, that the woman must not teach publicly, nor usurp authority over the man, but must conduct herself quietly in the public worship, the apostle proceeds to say that Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and fell into trangression. The word ἐπλάσθη is used by the apostle in the same sense only again at Rom. ix. 20.* The priority of creation belonging to the man seems not merely probable (De Wette), but an evident proof of the subordinate relation of the woman to the man—for the context requires this. We find also in 1 Cor. xi. 8 the words, *for the man is not of the woman but the woman of the man*, used by the apostle to confirm a sentiment similar to that in the passage before us, namely, *that the woman is the glory of the man*, according to which the woman is placed under the man as *the image and glory of God*. We have therefore no ground for surprise, that the same man who wrote these words should also be the author of the passage before us. For that the apostle in 1 Cor. xi. 11 corrects himself by the word πλήν, and retracts the reasons stated before, is evidently false. Πλήν is rather only a caution against a possible misinterpretation of his words; comp. Meyer on the passage. It must first be proved that the view which the apostle here expresses is itself untenable, ere it can be found fault with. We have no such parallel to the other reason which is here adduced by the apostle: *and Adam was not deceived*, etc. It is rather thought that the passage is contradicted by Rom. v. 12, seq., inasmuch as there all sin is traced to the *transgression of Adam*.

* Huther: it occurs in the Sept. Gen. ii. 7, in the same sense as here, from which passage the apostle has here borrowed.

And nothing certainly could be said against this, if in our passage it were declared that Adam had not sinned. But the *being deceived* is evidently to be distinguished from "sinning," as in respect to Eve it is said immediately after, that she *was in transgression* as the consequence of *being deceived*. It is therefore equally contrary to the sense of the passage as it is arbitrary, to supply πρῶτος at ἠπατήθη, from which would arise the sense, that Eve was first deceived, and then also the man in the same way. The expression *was deceived*, in the specific sense which it obtains from its reference to the history of the fall, applies only to the woman; comp. also De Wette. It is only the beginning of sin to which the apostle here particularly looks, and this certainly belongs to the woman who allowed herself to be led into sin by the serpent, while this can be directly denied of the man. Gen. iii. 12 respecting the introduction of sin, and the order in which the punishment was declared against the parties concerned, agrees exactly with what the apostle here says. The connexion at Rom. v. 12, seq., is quite different. There the apostle is speaking of how sin was brought into the world by the first sin, how the sin and death of the race were thus brought about; and in this case it is the sin of the man, as the passage itself shews, through which the first sin has become the sin of the race. So also De Wette on this passage: "There is no contradiction, inasmuch as there Adam is regarded as the head of sinning humanity, and no reference is made to the part which the woman acted." In Gen. iii. 16 we find precisely the same sentiment, namely, the subjection of the woman as the consequence of her infatuation. So also in our passage; not as Bengel renders: facilius decepta facilius decipit; for it is not the capacity or incapacity of the woman that is spoken of, but her position in consequence of sin. On γίνεσθαι ἐν, "to fall into a state," Phil. ii. 7; 1 Thess. ii. 5, etc. Instead of ἀπατηθεῖσα the stronger compound ἐξαπατηθεῖσα is the true reading according to preponderating authorities. Γυνή must not on account of ver. 15 be taken generically, but can only be understood of Eve in contradistinction to Adam. The generic signification which it receives in ver. 15 is evidently to be explained by this—that the position of the man and the woman with relation to each other is derived from Adam and Eve as their types.

Ver. 15.—"Think you indeed," asks Schleiermacher, "that Paul, when he wrote 1 Cor. vii., was of the opinion, that the salvation of the female sex depended on child-bearing?" No—we confidently answer, nor does our passage say this. Even though we should understand διά in the sense "through," still do the words, *if they abide*, etc, shew that the writer makes the salvation of the female sex to depend on the condition of faith. But we need not take διά to denote the means of the salvation spoken of. We find διά used

to denote the circumstances amid which anything takes place, comp. Winer's Gr., § 47, p. 339, both with transitive and intransitive verbs; thus the passage before us may be rendered: the woman will be saved in child-bearing if they continue, etc. Nay, *διά* cannot well be understood otherwise; for as *σωθήσεται* represents the salvation of the woman as not brought about by herself, it would not correspond to this to understand *διά* as denoting purely the means by which this is brought about. Nor would it be suitable for another reason. *Child-bearing* evidently denotes the sphere which properly belongs to the woman, and thus stands in opposition to the sphere of public teaching, which she enters upon only by usurpation. If, then, child-bearing is here to be understood as the means of salvation, then we are required by the antithesis also to understand, that the teaching in public was regarded as a means of salvation, which certainly was never imagined either by the apostle or by those women. The apostle then adds the words, *through child-bearing*, with no other object than just to point out to the woman her proper sphere of duty, and in particular how this position has been assigned to her in consequence of the fall, Gen. iii. 16. In this sphere to which God has appointed her, not in one of active duty for the advancement of the kingdom of God to which she is not called, and which contradicts the position assigned to her by God, will she be saved under the conditions which are the same in all. De Wette has thought that *σωθήσεται* here does not admit of being taken in its common acceptation, but that it includes in a positive sense the reward, in like manner as *βαθμός*, iii. 13, *θεμέλιος*, vi. 19, in support of which he refers to Phil. i. 19 and 1 Tim. iv. 16. He thinks that the idea in the writer's mind is that of the reward which the woman may earn for herself; although shut out from the office of public teaching she is not without compensation—the discharge of her duties as a mother is the way by which she may earn for herself merit and reward. All this arises from understanding *διά* as denoting the means, for which we see no necessity. The context also is against it. For the expression, *but she shall be saved*, evidently stands opposed to, *was in transgression*. And the apostle says, *she shall be saved*, not for the purpose of consoling the women on account of their sin, but of shewing them the way by which they may attain to the mark reached by every Christian; they have simply to abide within the sphere assigned to them (Gen. iii. 16). The emphasis lies on *διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας*. But the apostle adds, *if they continue*, etc., to prevent the misunderstanding that this of itself could effect anything. *Μείνωσι* in respect to the sense refers to *γυνή*, not to *τέκνα*, implied in *τεκνογ.*, "since *γυνή* stands for women in general."—Winer's Gr., § 58, 4, p. 458. The conduct of the children could not in such a way be made a condition of the mother's

salvation. Corresponding to i. 5, the apostle here mentions *faith* and *love* as the fundamental conditions of salvation. The special reference in our passage induces him to add the words, *in holiness with discretion.* Ἁγιασμός, not specially castitas, but holiness, as Rom. vi. 19, 22, etc. Σωφροσύνη, comp. on Tit. i. 8, denotes what befits the mens sana, doubtless not without a retrospective reference to the presuming forwardness which is rebuked in ver. 11. With regard to the contradiction which some have found in this passage (on account of the διὰ τῆς τεκνογ.) with 1 Cor. vii. 7, seq., 25, seq., 38, seq., comp. on v. 14.

§ 2. Directions to Timothy with Regard to the Regulation of the Church.

B. Regarding the Offices of Presbyter and Deacon.

(Chap. iii. 1–13).

The writer now turns to another department of the regulation of the church. He states in vers. 1–7 the qualifications of the bishops—in vers. 8–13 those of the deacons and deaconesses. The connexion here is simple and clear, and even Schleiermacher gives the writer credit for having preserved the connexion uninterrupted throughout these thirteen verses.—In this section our epistle bears most similarity to that to Titus, comp. i. 6, seq. Some have allowed themselves to be betrayed by this similarity into the supposition that Timothy's commission, like that of Titus, was to organize a church in Ephesus, according to which our epistle must have been written previous to the event of which we have an account in Acts xx. 17, seq. "This supposition," observes Schleiermacher with truth, "is clearly wrong, and is an idea transferred from the Epistle to Titus to this epistle. Nothing in the epistle favours it; all that we find here is, directions as to what is to be done when any one deserves to be promoted to an office of the church. These directions then are given in case a vacancy should occur, or the number of office-bearers should require to be increased, or if you will, in reference to the churches in process of formation in the neighbourhood of the chief city." The existence of presbyters, as De Wette observes, even of presbyters who taught, v. 17, 19, is presupposed, and a church which had an institution for widows in connexion with it, must, beyond question, have been fully organized. Even Neander's conjecture (p. 540), does not appear to me well founded, namely, that such disorders had arisen in the church as rendered a new organization necessary in many respects, the deposition of many who

had hitherto presided over churches, and the appointment of others. For I neither think myself justified by what is said of the false teachers in supposing that they exercised such a disturbing influence, nor do I find any trace of directions having respect to a new organization, nor anything about the deposition of presbyters and deacons. Paul writes, as we learn from iii. 15, for the purpose of letting Timothy know how he is to conduct himself in the house of God, *i. e.*, as the immediate context shews, how he is to act in the appointment of ecclesiastical office-bearers—and why not also what he is to require of those who have been already ordained? These directions, as we find in iii. 14, 15, are given with the view of making provision for a period of an uncertain length, it may be longer or shorter according to circumstances. What ground for surprise, then, is there in the fact, that instructions are given to Timothy with reference to this subject also, which is of so great importance to the prosperity of the church?—If even these remarks indicate a writer, of whom it must be admitted in comparing this with the Epistle to Titus, that he keeps in view the historical difference in the circumstances peculiar to each, it is no less decisively manifest in the fact, that only in this epistle is anything said of deacons, while that to Titus makes no mention of them. While the Epistle to Titus deals with those who, although they had long been Christians, had not yet been formed into a church, ours has to do with a church which had been long in existence, and was fully organized. The former therefore treats of the office, without which church-fellowship cannot subsist, that, namely, of presbyter; in our present epistle, on the contrary, the office of deacon also as well as an institution for widows has been already called into existence, by the wants which have become felt in the course of a longer continuance. This circumstance, as already noticed in the Epistle to Titus, is of great importance to a right understanding of the nature of the diaconate, which must by no means be placed on a level with the office of presbyter, and regarded as equally necessary and universal with it. I would refer to the excellent observations on this subject in the Zeitschrift für Protest. u. Kirche, Sept. 1849, p. 140, seq., where it is said with truth, "There were only two offices for the administration of the Christian church—1, the apostolic, for the administration of the whole; 2, the presbyterial, for the individual congregations. The diaconate, which was called forth by a necessity (Acts vi. 1), was by no means an essential part of the ecclesiastical constitution. What we at present need is the *service* of the deacon, not the *office*."

With respect now to the qualifications required of a presbyter as also of a deacon, it is alleged that here also, as in the Epistle to Titus, instead of a treasury of striking and weighty directions, we

find only such qualifications as any one might have suggested, with the exception of two, those, namely, in ver. 2 and ver. 6 ; comp. De Wette, p. 61. He has not mentioned here what other qualifications he would have expected, as he has done in the Epistle to Titus. Instructions and counsels "for the management of the church" we have no right to expect, for the words of iii. 1, *if any one desire the office of a bishop*, intimate that it is ordination and the qualifications for it that are spoken of. The only fault then that can be found is, that other qualifications have not been mentioned. But was it necessary for the apostle at this stage to tell Timothy, as De Wette thinks he should have told Titus, to look out for enthusiastic adherents of the gospel, who were warm and zealous in the faith ? I apprehend that this must have been self-evident to Timothy if anything was. Or are we to maintain, that the apostle ought to have taken more into consideration the measure of Christian knowledge, gifts of teaching, etc. ? But we have no right all at once to suppose, that the presbyter of the first Christian church was necessarily a teacher, although it may have become him to be *apt to teach*, iii. 2 ; v. 17. It appears to me that great wisdom lies beneath the moderate character of the qualifications here specified. What safer criterion could be applied to the candidate for the presbyter's office than the nature of his previous life, and the Christian influence which he exercises in the circle of his family ? And what can be of greater moment in him who is to preside over others and to enlighten them, than the opinion which they entertain of him and his moral integrity, especially in those things in regard to which the state of the church will devolve upon him the duty of making a vigorous opposition to them ? In the present state of the church, if the ordination of presbyters were treated of, it would be necessary first of all to require that he who is to preside over a Christian congregation should profess the faith of the church to which this congregation belongs ; but, apart from this, what other qualifications could be more suitable than those here enumerated, in so far as these require, that he who is to rule others must first have proved that he knows how to rule himself and those immediately belonging to him ? Moreover, the criticism to which we are opposed itself admits that in vers. 2 and 6 (and why not also ver. 7 ?) qualifications are named which every one could not suggest. With regard to particulars, see the interpretation and the remarks at the conclusion, ver. 7.

Ver. 1.—*It is a faithful saying*, as at i. 15, comp. on Tit. iii. 8, does not belong to what precedes, because, as Mack observes, when this formula refers to what goes before, it never stands separated in this way from what it belongs to. Besides, what immediately precedes has not enough of the character of a universal proposition to

render this formula suitable as applied to it. Neander (I., p. 539) characterizes the sudden transition here as unpauline. The passage makes no other impression upon me in this respect than 1 Cor. vi. 1, 12, vii. 1, etc. The abruptness of the transition is just a proof that the apostle enters upon a new subject with the perfect consciousness of its being so. On the πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, De Wette observes that it here introduces not, as elsewhere, a maxim of faith, but a maxim of experience. But I would hesitate to call what follows a maxim of experience, for if the apostle had further confirmed the saying, he would assuredly have done so by a reference to doctrine; it rests, therefore, on a basis of doctrine, and on this very account the formula πιστὸς ὁ λόγος need not surprise. The reading ἀνθρώπινος instead of πιστός deserves no consideration. The saying which the formula introduces runs thus: *if one desire the office of a bishop he desires a good work.* On ἐπισκοπή, comp. Acts i. 20 = the office of an overseer. That πρεσβύτερος and ἐπίσκοπος originally denoted the same offices of the church has already been shewn on Tit. i. 5, and in the General Introduction. The expression ὀρέγεσθαι, properly "to stretch one's self out," besides at vi. 10, occurs again only at Heb. xi. 16, and the corresponding ὄρεξις is used by the apostle only again at Rom. i. 27. It is by no means necessary to understand καλὸν ἔργον—as Schleiermacher does out of prejudice—to denote res bona; it signifies, as usual, "a good work." For we may well suppose that the ἔργον here expresses some duty to be performed, as it refers to ἐπισκοπή, which denotes the official duties belonging to an ἐπίσκοπος. He who aims at such official duties desires a good work; the phrase is, therefore, substantially the same as in Phil. i. 6; 1 Thess. v. 13, and in other passages of the Pastoral Epistles. That such a thing was known at that time as striving for the office of a bishop is generally doubted by the critics. But if from the very first, the bishops were chosen, and did not assume the office of themselves, one cannot see how, after a ten years' existence of Christianity in Ephesus, the desire may not have been entertained by many to take part in the administration of the church as bishops. Comp. Jam. iii. 1 (Baumgarten). There is nothing either in the expression ὀρέγεσθαι in itself, or in καλοῦ ἔργου, as Matthies has already observed, to render necessary the supposition of any ambitious rivalry and competition for the office. If the apostle had had in view such as were not called, and whom he would keep back from the office, he would certainly have used a different epithet, such as δυσκόλου, or some other pointing to the responsibility connected with it, ver. 2, seq. Here follow the personal qualifications for this office, vers. 2–7, which almost entirely coincide with those mentioned in Tit. i. 6, seq.; we refer therefore to that passage for the exposition, and notice here only what is peculiar to our pre-

sent passage. On the whole subject, see on ver. 7. Δεῖ οὖν, thus the apostle begins, these words being placed emphatically before what follows, just as the δεῖ γάρ in Tit. i. 7. Οὖν as an inference from καλοῦ ἔργου, and not merely as connecting what follows with the preceding. The excellence and dignity of the office do not consist with moral turpitude on the part of the office-bearer. Ἀνεπίληπτον, properly, "one against whom nothing can be laid," occurs only in our epistle, comp. however ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι in Luke xx. 20. The word is not unusual elsewhere, comp. Wahl. Passow. And Planck well observes, that the term ἄμωμος, to which Schleiermacher refers, is used by the apostle likewise only in the two contemporary Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians, and in these occurs several times. We may learn from this predicate being placed first, what is the true point of view from which the whole passage should be considered; comp. on Tit. i. 6. We find here, as there, that the stress is laid on the moral repute in which the person to be chosen is held among those over whom he is to preside. He must stand pure and blameless, free especially from the reigning vices, if he is to be able rightly to fulfil the duties of his office. Here also, as in the passage in Titus to which we have referred, it appears to me that the emphasis which is laid on the qualification, *husband of one wife*, is to be explained by the regard which is had to the prevailing opinions on morality. Comp. on Tit. Olshausen is also of the same opinion. On the import of this qualification, which can be explained only of second marriage, as Olshausen also thinks, Schleiermacher's prejudice against our epistle, as Dr. Baur has already observed, becomes very glaring. In Tit. i. 6, according to Schleiermacher, we have no reason to understand the words otherwise than of polygamy, properly so-called; here, on the other hand, they must, on account of ver. 9, be understood of deuterogamy. The latter assertion is certainly correct; but if the words are to be understood here, there can be no reason for explaining them differently in Tit. i. 6; and if the necessity of explaining the words of second marriage in our epistle is to be taken as a mark of spuriousness, this applies to the epistle to Titus, as well as to the first Epistle to Timothy (Baur. p. 115). We have already said all that is necessary on this subject in connexion with the corresponding passage on Titus. The farther qualifications which are mentioned, and which for the most part are of a more external kind, are also to be explained from the same point of view, and with reference to the prevailing faults and vices. Νηφάλιος is taken in a metaphorical sense by some, so Chrysostom, νηφάλιον, τουτέστι διορατικὸν, μυρίους ἔχοντα πάντοτε ὀφθαλμούς, etc., and Theodoret. But we do not find it used any where else in this special reference to the office, comp. ver. 11; Tit. ii. 2; rather in the metaphorical sense it would be "sober = prudent, discreet, in

the general sense" (Matthies). In ver. 11, compared with Tit. ii. 3, the term is certainly to be understood in its literal sense, yet it appears to me more natural to understand it here in the sense of spiritual sobriety, especially as in ver. 3 we find the qualification, *not given to wine*. Olshausen differently. On *σώφρων*, Tit. i. 8. Κόσμιος occurs here again only at ii. 9 : *καὶ φθέγματι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βλέμματι καὶ βαδίσματι· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φαίνεσθαι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σωφροσύνην*, Theodoret ; thus = sober, reputable. *Φιλόξενος*, as in Tit. i. 8. *Διδακτικός* corresponding to the qualification in Tit. i. 9 ; the word again occurs only in 2 Tim. ii. 24. In what respects we may regard this as a feature which points to a late period of the apostle's labours, comp. the General Introduction, § 4. I do not see what objections can be brought against the qualifications of a bishop mentioned in ver. 2, when regarded from the point of view which we have shewn above as that in which they ought to be regarded. Taken together they present the picture of a worthy overseer.

In the negative qualifications which follow in ver. 3, and which might appear to have too much of a merely external and self-evident character, it will be perceived that there is a reference to prevailing faults which are therefore particularly specified, as is also the case in the Epistle to Titus i. 7 : *not given to wine, no striker*—the second as the consequence of the first. There is no necessity to understand by *πλήκτης*, a fighter, it denotes here only one who is given to quarrelling and scolding ; comp. Passow. *Πάροινος* with the accessary signification of "impudent," one who gives offence when under intoxication. *Μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ* is a gloss. The qualifications *ἐπιεικῆ* and *ἄμαχον* are placed in opposition to *μὴ πλήκτην*, comp. on Tit. iii. 2. *Not covetous* belongs to the series of predicates introduced by the particle *not*, and is therefore not to be joined with those forming the contrast introduced by *but*. The expression occurs again in Heb. xiii. 5.

Vers. 4, 5.—Besides the moral qualities which have respect to himself personally, regard is also to be had, as in Tit. i. 6, to his character relatively to those belonging to him—his qualities as the head of a family. The Christian influence which he is able to exercise in his own house will shew to what extent a successful influence on the house of God may be expected from him. *His own* is therefore to be understood in opposition to the house of God ; comp. ver. 15. *Οἶκος* comprehends all the members of his house, also his servants ; comp. ver. 12. It is added specifically, *having his children in subjection*, etc. *Ἔχοντα* here is explained by some as = holding, and in this case, the words *μετὰ πάσης σεμνότητος* are referred to the father. So Wegscheider, Heydenreich, and Matthies. Others, as Leo, Mack, De Wette, understand *ἔχοντα* as = having, and refer *μετά* to the children. The parallel passage in Tit. i. 6 is

in favour of the latter, against which neither the expression σεμνότης nor the μετά—not ἐν—is decisive, as De Wette remarks, appealing to ii. 2, ii. 15, vi. 6. Ἔχοντα is then the consequence of *ruling well*, and σεμνότης, propriety of conduct, as in ii. 2, denotes the fruit in which his influence is to be perceived. Ver. 5 shews why this particular quality deserves a special consideration, by an inference a minori ad majus. How shall he who knows not how to rule his own house take care of the church of God? The apostle places on the same footing the capacity for both duties, that of ruling one's own house and taking care of the church. That which qualifies for ruling one's own house qualifies also for an efficient discharge of official duties. Hence the inference from the one to the other. The office gives a wider sphere of active duty, but it is the same energy of a Christian and moral character that must be brought into exercise here, as in the narrower sphere of the family. The exact opposite of the idea here expressed is the abstract separation between the office and the person. Δέ, "the sentence is parenthetically opposed to the ruling well his own house," Winer's Gr., § 53, 102, p. 401. The antithesis to ἴδιος is here clearly expressed by *church of God*, compare with verse 15. Ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, again at Luke x. 34, 35.

Ver. 6.—Two qualifications are mentioned in vers. 6 and 7 which do not occur in the Epistle to Titus—μὴ νεόφυτον, still dependent on the δεῖ, ver. 2, and also, that the candidate have a good report of those without the Christian church. The word νεόφυτος, which became a standing expression in the later ecclesiastical usage, is found only here in the New Testament; literally, recently planted, in the Sept. The figure, used of the νεοκατήχητος (Chrysostom), or νεοβάπτιστος (Theophylact), naturally suggests passages such as 1 Cor. iii. 6, seq.; ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, which represents the Christian church as a planting of God; comp. 1 Cor. iii. 9; Rom. vi. 5, xi. 7. We have therefore no reason for surprise at the word when the apostle designates his own apostolical labour by the word φυτεύειν. But there is greater reason for surprise, says Schleiermacher, at the requirement itself; for how could Paul contrive to make no νεοτελής a bishop in any of those many churches which he often planted hastily one after another on a journey. This might have been possible, he says, twenty years later. Why then may it not have been so ten years later? And what the apostle writes to Timothy with special reference to Ephesus, where Christianity had existed for some length of time, is not to be held as an inviolable rule for all cases. Matthies has already expressed himself to the same effect, and referred to the circumstance that this particular rule is wanting in the Epistle to Titus. "But," replies De Wette, "the rules are laid down in quite a general form." They will therefore apply everywhere in

the same circumstances. It is well-known that the church adhered to the rule here prescribed, comp. Canon Ap. 80. Why a neophyte is not to be made a bishop is shewn in the words which follow, *ἵνα μὴ τυφωθείς*, etc. The expression *τυφοῦσθαι*, from *τῦφος*, smoke, vapour, = fastus, Pol. xvi. 22, 4; 3 Macc. iii. 18 (Wahl), literally, surrounded with fog, only again at vi. 4, and 2 Tim. iii. 4. Huther renders it "stupid pride," and refers to vi. 4. It occurs elsewhere in this sense; comp. Passow, and the Gen. Introd., § 4. In the following words, *εἰς κρίμα διαβόλου*, the comparison of ver. 7, and 2 Tim. ii. 26, makes it certain, that by *ὁ διάβολος* is to be understood not the calumniator in general, but the calumniator *κατ' ἐξοχήν* = הַשָּׂטָן. Comp. also Harless on Eph. iv. 27: "*ὁ διάβολος* is used by the apostle only as an appellation of the devil." Κρίμα never occurs in the sense of "accusation," in which some would take it here, understanding *τοῦ διαβόλου* as the genitive of the subject, but always denotes causa, or discretum, or judicium. Here it can denote only the last of these. In this case *τοῦ διαβ.* is not to be taken as the genitive of the subject, for *κρίνειν* is not the business of the *διάβολος*, but with many of the older and more recent commentators (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Bengel, Heydenreich, Leo, Mack), objectively, against which its being used subjectively in ver. 7 is not decisive, as De Wette maintains it to be. It is the same judgment in consequence of the same fall; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. So also Olshausen. The omission of the article, which Matthies brings as an an objection, is explained as in many other passages, by the more special determination of the term in the words which follow, Winer's Gr., § 19, 2 b., p. 114. Κρίμα not differently here from Rom. ii. 2, iii. 8, xiii. 2; Gal. v. 10. In Rom. iii. 8, *κρίμα* is as here, connected with the genitive of the object. Huther understands *τοῦ διαβόλου* on account of verse 7 as the genitive of the subject.

Ver. 7.—Another special qualification, likewise mentioned only here, is good reputation among those without the church. In the Epistle to Titus (chap. ii.), it is urged as a duty on all the members of the church to commend the gospel by their conduct; but no special application of this injunction is made to the *ἐπίσκοπος*. Αὐτόν is to be cancelled according to critical authorities (comp. Tischendorf). *To have a good report;* the apostle ascertained this with respect to Timothy himself ere he connected himself with him, Acts xvi. 2. Καί introduces the new quality which must still be added to those already enumerated. Οἱ ἔξωθεν—elsewhere *οἱ ἔξω* (1 Cor. v. 12, seq.; Col. iv. 5; 1 Thess. iv. 12), is used by the apostle; the same expression as we have here is found also in Luke xi. 39, seq.; 1 Pet. iii. 3 (De Wette). This rule is also explained by a *ἵνα μή*. "Lest he should fall into reproach, and into the snare of the devil."

Εἰς not being repeated, might lead us to suppose that ὀνειδισμός is also to be connected with τοῦ διαβ., according to which the devil is represented as the author of the reproaches which are brought against the bishop, especially, as the context shews, by *those that are without*. But this circumstance is not decisive, and the interposed ἐμπέσῃ, renders the independent construction of ὀνειδισμός more natural. It would also be difficult to point to a passage where, in like manner as here, the devil is represented as the immediate author of that which is done by others. There is difficulty in determining the sense of the following words exactly, παγὶς τοῦ διαβ., and their relation to ὀνειδισμός. Is the *reproach* itself the *snare?* Or is the *reproach* the occasion of *falling into the snare?* Or are both to be taken as independent—the reproach and the snare? Against the first is the general usage of the expression, according to which it denotes always a subjective state, 2 Tim. ii. 26; also 1 Tim. vi. 9. The apostle describes one who has passed out of his former life of sin, and is therefore no longer in the snare of the devil, inasmuch as he speaks of a *falling into the snare*. If now, such an one is calumniated in consequence of his previous life, he does not, eo ipso, fall again into the snare, if he is not thereby led away from the new life of the spirit. Thus the reproach is not itself the *snare*. Nor can the third of the above explanations, which takes them as independent of each other, be vindicated; for they stand in too close connexion. Ὀνειδισμός therefore must be understood as the *possible occasion* of falling into the snare. It is not, however, the vexation produced by the reproach (Heydenreich), nor the revenge thereby awakened (Grotius), which leads into the snare, but the *reproach* itself, the continual upbraiding with former sins. This indeed may lead the truly converted, to a more zealous striving after holiness; but it may easily also have the contrary effect, of leading him who finds himself pursued and surrounded by his former sins and stripped of his reputation, to become in the end morally indolent, to give himself over to his former sins, and to become as bad really as is his reputation. Quid enim spei restat, si nullius peccati pudor? (Calvin.) It is this case, so easily possible, which the apostle has here in his eye. The connexion with ὀνειδισμός is less regarded in Theodoret's explanation, which is followed by Mack: ὁ γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις πλείστην ἔχων πρὸ τῆς χειροτονίας διαβολὴν ἐπονείδιστος ἔσται καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνείδεσι περιβαλεῖ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν προτέραν ὅτι τάχιστα παλινδρομήσει παρονομίαν, τοῦ διαβόλου πάντα πρὸς τοῦτο μηχανωμένου. So also Olshausen, who gives special prominence to the possibility of being led away.—If now we review the order in which the qualifications of a bishop are enumerated, we find that in ver. 2 are mentioned those positive moral qualities of the most general description which it becomes a bishop to have; in ver. 3 the faults from which

he must be free; and in vers. 4, 5, and 6, certain other rules are given which have a special reference to the choice of a bishop. Our epistle has much in common with that to Titus, and yet, as a comparison will shew, it is quite free and independent. On the objection already treated, that we have here for the most part only *general* moral qualities, and but few which refer specially to the ἐπίσκοπος, I add Olshausen's explanation, who observes, that the objection may be obviated by the following considerations: 1, that the description of the bishop bears an antithetical reference to the character of the heretics; 2, that the apostle pre-supposes, in those persons who fill offices of the church, the peculiar gifts which they need as secured through the χαρίσματα. That this was in the apostle's mind is evident from 1 Tim. iv. 14. I think, with Neander, that the χαρίσματα had obviously become less prominent, whence the choice became more difficult. The apostle, as I apprehend, takes for granted the presence of true faith in the bishop, or rather he desires, at the same time, the evidence of this in the life. Finally, it may be shewn, that beneath those more general qualifications also there lies a special reference to the *bishop*. There is a special reason, for example, that a bishop should be *unblameable;* the qualification, *husband of one wife*, implies obviously a special reference to the bishop, for this is not required of all. And do not νηφάλιος (spiritually sober), σώφρων, κόσμιος, denote qualities such as especially befit a bishop, who would unite in himself moderation and dignity outwardly as well as inwardly? Why a bishop should in an especial manner be *given to hospitality* will at once appear from the circumstances of the early church. *Apt to teach*, also applies to him, qua ἐπίσκοπος. On ver. 3 comp. above. And in vers. 4–7 we have solely qualifications which bear a special reference to the bishop, or rather to an officer in the church, as we shall afterwards find the same also required of the deacon.

Ver. 8, seq.—Here follow, in like manner, the qualifications of a deacon. "But what say you to this," asks Schleiermacher, "that this epistle makes two descriptions out of the one in the Epistle of Titus, one of the bishops and another of the deacon?" We say, in the first place, that the circumstances of the church in Ephesus which had existed for some length of time, required a mention not merely of presbyters, but of deacons; and this circumstance argues the genuineness of the epistle. Comp. above and the General Introduction. We say further, that here also, as well as in what precedes, the writer shews himself to be in great measure independent of the Epistle to Titus; and we have by no means a mere duplicate of the description in Tit. i. 6, seq. For that the deacon as well as the bishop must be free from the prevailing vices of intemperance and avarice, seems very natural, and that from him as a servant of

the church it should be required, that he be the *husband of one wife*, and be able to rule well his own house, cannot surprise us, after what has already been said on these qualities. We find, however, several other things required of the deacon which are neither a repetition of what is said with reference to the bishop here, nor of what is said at Tit. i. 6. But how far the qualifications of a deacon here given are suitable will be shewn in the exposition, and at the conclusion of the section.

In Acts vi. 1, seq., we find the necessary information as to the origin of the diaconal office, its name, and its sphere of duty. We see there plainly, that this office owes its origin to a necessity which first arose with the extension of the Christian church; hence it is that no mention is made of it in the Epistle to Titus. The *name*, although it does not occur in that passage in the Acts of the Apostles, is doubtless to be traced to the expressions *διακονεῖν τραπέζαις*, and *διακονία* in vers. 1 and 2. The *sphere* of this office is also marked out in its being distinguished from the *διακονία τοῦ λόγου* and *προσευχή*, ver. 4, as consisting in the care of the poor, with which also the care of the sick and of strangers came gradually to be connected. Comp. on the subject Winer's R.W.B., in which will be found the further literature connected with it, and Neander apostol. Zeitalter I., p. 47, seq. The name *διάκονος* occurs again in the New Testament only at Phil. i. 1, and Rom. xvi. 1, in the latter passage as an appellation of Phœbe, hence = deaconess.—Among the qualifications here enumerated, that of moral propriety of conduct in general, stands first (Tit. ii. 2). The apostle does not mean by this, a qualification having a characteristic reference to the deacon; he only means to say, that he who is to fill the office of a deacon in the church must, above all, be a true Christian, whose moral conduct bears testimony to his Christianity. He then mentions certain prevailing vices from which a deacon must be free. Two of these are the same as have already been specified in ver. 3, with reference to the bishop, namely, *not given to much wine, not covetous*. So also Tit. i. 7. On *προσέχειν* = "to be given to," see on Tit. i. 14. Before these two, however, stands one qualification at which the critics have stumbled so much—*μὴ διλόγους*. The word nowhere else occurs in the New Testament, nor is it found in the Septuagint. The sense of *repetition*, in which it is used by Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon, is not suitable here. On the other hand, the analogous expression, *δίψυχος*, which we find in Jam. i. 8, iv. 8, and the still more kindred expression, *δίγλωσσος*, in the Septuagint, Prov. xi. 13, may be referred to. *Μὴ διλόγους τουτέστι· μὴ ὑπούλους μηδὲ δολερούς*, observes Chrysostom—*μὴ ἕτερα μὲν τούτῳ, ἕτερα δὲ ἐκείνῳ λέγοντας*, Theodoret. The prominence which is given to this quality is to be explained by the extensive personal intercourse which the deacon

would have with the members of the church; comp. Mack on ver. 8.

Ver. 9.—The apostle farther requires of deacons that they hold the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience; comp. i. 19. In the expression, *mystery of the faith*—as the similar one, *mystery of godliness*, ver. 6 shows—*faith* is to be understood subjectively: (in quo fidem collocamus, Wahl). So also De Wette. On μυστήριον comp. Rom. xvi. 25; Eph. iii. 3; Col. i. 26, 27, etc. Comp. Harless, p. 35: *mystery*, inasmuch as it was known by no man until God himself revealed it. But Harless admits (p. 510, on Eph. v. 32), that the word has still another signification, in which the idea of mystery refers not merely to the manner of its revelation, but to the thing itself. In this latter sense it must be understood in iii. 16 (comp.): therefore also in the same sense here. So Planck, Leo. Schleiermacher has remarked on this passage, that the deacons were precisely those who had least to do with the *mystery of the faith*. However, this qualification is not to be understood as implying that the preaching of the gospel was the vocation of the deacon as such (although Stephen and Philip were also evangelists, this was in no way connected with their office as deacons), but as a qualification which is required of every Christian, especially of those who undertake an office in the church; comp. i. 5. The emphasis rests on the words, *in a pure conscience*, which are to be understood, as De Wette has already observed, in a general sense, not with special reference to the fulfilment of the office.

Ver. 10.—But these also, continues the writer, must first be proved, then may they serve (administer the office of a deacon), if they are blameless. (Huther: καὶ—δέ as particles of connexion and emphasis.*) The trial to which the future deacon was to be subjected, consisted not in a period of probation, but in a previous inquiry as to whether the requisite qualifications, laid down by the apostle, were found in him, as is evident from the expression, *being blameless*, which denotes the result of the inquiry. Who makes the trial is not stated. Acts vi., the church chose the fitting persons, and the apostles confirmed the choice. In the later practice of the church the trial was made by the presbytery (Constitt. ap. viii. 4); comp. De Wette. Agreeably to the position which Timothy occupied, it was principally his duty to take care that unworthy persons should not be admitted; on the disappearance of such an office as he exercised, the duty naturally devolved on the presbytery.

Ver. 11.—*Even so must the women*, etc. What women are here meant? Christian women in general cannot be meant in this connexion. The view also which Mack and Wieseler (p. 309), have most recently defended, namely, that the wives of the superintend-

* Καὶ οὗτοι δέ—"and let these too."—K.

ents and deacons are meant, contradicts the order, according to which the rules which refer to the ἐπίσκοπος are ended at ver. 7, as ver. 8 shews, and at ver. 12 the deacons are again spoken of. Agreeably to the context, the expression must be understood either of the wives of the deacons, or of deaconesses. The latter view is taken by Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others, most recently by De Wette, while Matthies, and also Olshausen, understand the wives of the deacons as meant. So also Huther. But it is difficult to see why special rules should be laid down with respect to these, and not also with respect to the wives of the overseers, unless it be supposed that the wives of the deacons were deaconesses. Again, if it is the wives of the deacons that are meant, the omission of the αὐτῶν is strange, as well as the particle ὡσαύτως, which the apostle uses, as here in ver. 8, and elsewhere in ii. 9 ; Tit. ii. 3, 6, to denote the transition to rules for another class of persons. Further, although the repetition of διάκονοι, ver. 12, is not surprising even on the supposition that by γυναῖκες are meant the wives of the deacons, seeing that the subject required to be named anew after the γυναῖκες, yet the construction, as a whole, is strange. For, as ver. 12 still speaks of the domestic relations of the deacon, any rule regarding their wives would have found a much more suitable place here in relation to the deacon himself, since it is altogether unsuitable that such should stand by itself, and without any reference to the deacon. I am not inclined, however, to lay any weight on the expression, *faithful in all things*, as is done by De Wette and others, who oppose the application of the words to the wives of the deacons ; for although deaconesses are meant, this characteristic cannot still be referred to fidelity in the discharge of the duties of their office, but must be understood as a condition of their being appointed to office. Add to this, that the apostle could not, from a regard to perspicuity, employ the word διάκονος here, which he uses of the deaconesses in Rom. xvi. 1 ; that there were doubtless deaconesses in Ephesus who are not mentioned at all (not even in chap. v.), if not here ; that on the supposition of deaconesses being meant, chap. iii. embraces in due proportion all the persons in the service of the church—when these things are taken together it will scarcely admit of a doubt, that γυναῖκες is here to be understood of deaconesses. The apostle having specified the moral qualifications of a deacon, is led by the homogeneousness of the office to connect with these such as are proper to deaconesses. Here also he puts σεμνάς first, as in ver. 8, with respect to the deacons ; the μὴ διαβόλους answers to the μὴ διλόγους, and is certainly more suitable to the female sex (Tit. ii. 3). Then follows *sober*, corresponding to *not given to much wine*, ver. 8, and therefore to be understood here of sobriety in the literal sense, comp. Tit. ii. 2. Lastly, *faithful in all things* is a comprehensive

expression, answering to *not covetous*, etc., so that the apostle evidently demands the same qualifications in the female deacons, only with the partial modifications arising from their sex. And it is just this circumstance—namely, that the qualifications are substantially the same—which has led the apostle to mention the female deacons in this place. In ver. 12 he turns again to the male deacons, and in respect to their household relations lays down the same conditions as he has laid down in the Epistle to Titus with respect to the bishop; and here also, in iii. 2, 4, conditions which apply to every one who would fill an office in the church.—The expression, *faithful in all things*, observes De Wette, against Matthies, may suitably be limited to the various duties of the deaconesses. But it is the conditions pre-requisite to the appointment to the office that are here spoken of, and therefore this limitation is not at all necessary. The being faithful in all things rather appears to me to be a summary expression, substantially answering to the *not greedy of filthy lucre*, ver. 8, and to what is said in ver. 9; "faithful in all the things of life as well as of faith," is what is meant.

On ver. 12, comp. ver. 2 and 4. Schleiermacher's doubts arising from the shock which the connexion suffers in ver. 11, might now be regarded as disappearing of themselves, although he thinks that the interruption is not so great if deaconesses are not understood as meant. Reviewing now the qualifications of deacons here prescribed, we must certainly admit that here, as in vers. 1–7, it is not so much the specific qualities of a deacon that are given, as the description of a Christian in general, such as must first be pre-supposed, especially in him who would undertake the office of a deacon. Planck has already observed rightly, that the apostle intends rather to mention the qualities which are to be looked for as the first condition of receiving office, than the special qualifications for the discharge of the duties of the office. As in general, in the Pastoral Epistles, emphasis is laid on the practical side of Christianity, in opposition to the so-called heretics, the same is also manifest here, whether it be, as Olshausen thinks, that the apostle takes for granted the possession of the χάρισμα, or whether it be that on the comparative withdrawal of the "gifts," he thinks that the safest criterion of future efficiency in the office is to be sought in the previous moral character of the person to be elected; it being pre-supposed that he was in other respects the man for the office, upon which the apostle says nothing further, because it must have appeared self-evident to Timothy that no one was to be made a deacon who possessed neither the disposition nor the talent for the peculiar duties of such an office. Nor is there much difference between what we find here and in Acts vi. *Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men of honest report*, say the apostles to the church, and thus, just as is done in

our epistle, they give the first place to the general qualification of a good reputation, ver. 3. The expression, *full of the Holy Ghost*, also involves no special reference to the office; such a reference is apparent only in the qualification *full of wisdom*; and afterwards, in ver. 5, it is expressly said of Stephen that he was a *man full of faith and of the Holy Ghost*, by which, in like manner, no special qualification for the διακονεῖν is denoted. But with reference specially to the qualities mentioned in our epistle, it would not be difficult to point out also in them the reason why they are particularly required of a deacon. It is certainly not accidental merely, that in the case of the deacon less weight is laid on personal dignity than in the case of the bishop (comp. ver. 3, κόσμιος); it is enough for him that he be σεμνός; the μὴ διλόγους, also, is thought by Schleiermacher to be suitable, comp. above. The *holding the mystery of the faith*, etc., when rightly understood, expresses only the qualification of a true faith having its root in the heart, in opposition to the merely pretended faith of those who taught otherwise. How could the deacon, whose whole work was to spring from true love to God and the brethren, be wanting in a true faith, without which a true love is not conceivable! The apostle, as Schleiermacher thinks, might certainly have added the qualifications expressed by the terms, *hospitable, a lover of good, just.* But how much would still have to be said besides, if the apostle had aimed at enumerating everything! It suffices him to lay down, in general, the qualification of moral propriety of conduct, with special allusion to the prevailing vices, and that of faith having its root in a pure conscience. And it may certainly be supposed that those who were found blameless in respect to the things mentioned, would not be deficient in those qualities referred to by Schleiermacher, nor in others equally important.

That qualifications so high are required in a deacon, is now confirmed in ver. 13, by a reference to the importance of this office, as shewn in the great personal success which a deacon, who has used his office well, may hope to reap; so also De Wette. Οἱ γὰρ καλῶς διακονήσαντες—the apostle then has in view the termination of the official course, as appears from his using the aorist; he represents the fruit which results to the deacon from a good service. This fruit he denotes by the words, *they purchase for themselves a good position and great boldness*, etc. If it is steadily kept in view, that the apostle intends here to specify the final reward which will assuredly accrue to every one who has administered the office well, it will be seen that he cannot mean by this, promotion to the higher office of a presbyter. Apart from the moral value of such a motive, the καλόν does not correspond well to it, as it would seem to imply that the office of a deacon was not also a good degree of honour, if

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY 6539

indeed *βαθμός* is to be taken at all in this sense. We would expect, at least in this case, that the idea should have a comparative form. Nor does the aorist *διακονήσαντες* agree with this interpretation, since it represents the acquisition as the result of the completed service. Farther, it is not to be conceived that the apostle holds out to every deacon the prospect of promotion to the office of a presbyter, and that, as the certain reward of his service, not to say that the idea of the offices, and their relation to each other, which lies at the foundation of this view, is entirely unapostolical; comp. Mack on the passage, who justly refers against this view to passages such as 1 Cor. xii. 4–11; Rom. xii. 7, seq. "We find that even in the second century, the idea of moving upwards in the offices of the church is as yet unknown," Olshausen. And how unsuitable would the connexion be, between this reference to the higher place of honour in the church which is to be attained, and the words *great boldness*, etc. Quite as inconsistent with the context of the passages, which points to the final reward to be attained by him who faithfully discharges the duties of his office—is that other view founded on a purely internal signification given to the expression *καλὸν βαθμὸν περιποιοῦνται*, and substantially the opposite of the preceding, by which the expression is understood of progress in the faith. Is it likely that the apostle should confirm the high qualifications which he lays down by saying, that the faithful fulfilment of the office brings along with it an increase of faith? The following *πολλὴν παῤῥησίαν* to which reference is made with *seeming* justice in support of the internal signification assigned to *βαθμόν*, is, as we shall afterwards see, quite to a different effect, and how different also is the idea in the kindred passage, vi. 19, *that they may lay hold on eternal life!* How unsuitable also to the expression in our passage is such an interpretation of a merely internal kind, and how little does its generality warrant our limiting it to faith! With more apparent correctness therefore have others—most recently Mack and Matthies, and also Olshausen*—explained the expression as denoting the influential position in the church which those only attain who use the office of a deacon well. The apostle is supposed, according to this interpretation, to have the welfare of the church in view in the qualifications which he lays down for the deacon. He prescribes qualifications of so high an order, it is said, because a deacon who has served well gains an influential position; much therefore (so we are to supply) of the welfare of the church depends on him. But in regard to this interpretation, the first thing that strikes one must be, that the reference to the church is not more clearly expressed in the passage; then the words *βαθμὸν ἑαυτοῖς*, etc., speak first of all

* Also Huther: he understands by *βαθμός* the estimation in which the person is held in the church, by *παῤῥησία* the joyous and confident freedom.

of a reward for good service which the deacon himself is to obtain. Nor, as De Wette also observes, will the words, *and much boldness in the faith*, agree with this interpretation (comp. infra), and least of all the words, *they who have used well the office of a deacon*, according to which the apostle would say that he prescribes such high qualifications, because those deacons who fulfil their office well gain an influential position in the church; as if the apostle did not prescribe those qualifications because they are necessary in order to a faithful discharge of the duties of the office, but on account of the influence which such a fulfilment draws after it. If, however, it is said that the apostle intends to express the idea, that he prescribes conditions so strict because *only* one who has served well acquires authority and influence in the church, it will at once be perceived that this idea takes its rise from the arbitrarily inserted "only," and even then would the words, *they who have fulfilled the office of a deacon well*, remain unintelligible, for the apostle would in that case have used the present, as Mack and Matthies have done in their interpretation, with more propriety than the aorist which represents the *βαθμόν*, etc., as the final result of the fulfilment of the office. If accordingly the passage can be understood neither of ecclesiastical preferment, nor of progress in the faith, nor finally, of ecclesiastical authority in general, the only interpretation which remains is that which makes *καλὸν βαθμόν* denote the result of a faithful performance of official duty in the personal salvation of the deacon; as modifications of this view again, some, as already Theodoret, understand by *καλὸν βαθμόν* a high degree of blessedness, others a good hope of this; so De Wette following Heinrich. The *καλ. βαθ. περιπ.*, then, denotes the sure final gain for every one who has served well; the aorist has thus its proper force; and the additional clause, *much boldness*, etc., agrees with this. For De Wette has already rightly observed, that *παῤῥησία* cannot signify candour in the statement of the Christian doctrine, as Heydenreich will have it, but as Mack and similarly also Matthies think, a firm standing forth for the truth and against error, as *πίστις* cannot be understood objectively either of the doctrine of faith or the things of faith, but only subjectively of that upon which the *παῤῥησία* rests. *Παῤῥησία* is rightly understood only in the sense of 1 John iii. 21; Heb. iv. 16: "confidence toward God," and hence that explanation of *καλὸς βαθμός* alone is correct which has been last adduced; and, in particular, De Wette prefers the latter modification of this view, according to which it is not a high degree of blessedness, but a good expectancy of this that is spoken of; in support of which he refers to the parallel passage, vi. 19. I entirely agree with De Wette in his opinion. *Παῤῥησία* denotes (comp. Harless on Eph., p. 303) "the feeling of freedom and joyfulness entertained towards another

person, especially one who acts as a judge." Such joyfulness which springs from faith, even the faith that results from fellowship with Christ, is the certain final gain of him who has administered the office of a deacon well. How unsuitable would this accessary clause be, if the apostle had already promised before a high degree of blessedness to the deacon; how suitable, on the other hand, does it appear, when *καλὸς βαθμός* denotes the good position towards God, so that *καὶ πολλήν*, etc., explains this indefinite expression in its subjective aspect. *Βαθμός*, properly step, threshold, etc., denotes here figuratively the degree of worth which one has obtained in the eye of God. The connexion of the verb *περιποιεῖσθαι* (which does not correspond to the figure) with *βαθμός* is explained by the metaphorical use of the expression *βαθμός*. The word *περιποιεῖσθαι* occurs again only in Acts xx. 28, and is there used by the apostle; besides frequently *περιποίησις*, 1 Thess. v. 9; 2 Thess. ii. 14; Eph. i. 14; also Heb. x. 39, and in the New Testament only again at 1 Pet. ii. 9, so that we are at liberty to regard it as a genuine Pauline expression. On *ἑαυτοῖς*, with the middle, comp. Winer's Gr., § 38, 6, p. 230.

§ 4. Admonitions Addressed to Timothy as Teacher in the Prospect of a Future Falling Away.

(iii. 14—iv. 16.)

The writer has here evidently arrived at a conclusion. What he has written is to serve as a rule to Timothy for his conduct in the office of representative of the apostle, which has been temporarily commited to him, in case the apostle himself should not soon return to Ephesus. What the apostle now further writes to him is therefore not instructions precisely of the same kind. They are rather general directions, as to how Timothy is to fulfil in general his vocation of a *servant of Jesus Christ*, ver. 6; although in these also, as was to be expected, the apostle keeps in view the special circumstances of Timothy. The point, therefore, which is treated of here is, what use Timothy is to make of the "gift" which has actually been committed to him, ver. 14. The transition to this lies in the designation of the *house of God* as the *church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth*, ver. 15, and in the mention of the *mystery of godliness*, ver. 16. With this is immediately connected what is said in iv. 1, seq., where the apostle, pointing to the falling away from the faith which threatens the future, vers. 1–5, shews Timothy what is his duty as a faithful servant of Jesus Christ in the prospect of such a danger, vers. 6–11, and how he is to per-

form this duty chiefly in his present circumstances, vers. 12–16. For it is of course understood, that Timothy is not to neglect his general calling as an evangelist in attending to his special commission, nor to allow the gift which has been committed to him to be useless. It is not therefore without reason, and merely because the writer has a liking to the theme (De Wette), that he comes again, in iv. 1, to speak anew of the heretics; nor are they the same heretics as the former, but others, and as such are expressly designated. The mention of these, however, forms the basis of the further admonitions addressed to Timothy.

Ver. 14.—"After the writer has maintained a connexion throughout thirteen verses, the absence of such connexion appears now all the more glaring, and we stumble now at almost every word," Schleiermacher, p. 196. At the words, *these things write I unto thee* we see no reason to stumble; as the conclusion of the preceding, they have, as we have seen, their appropriate place. Nor is there anything to stumble at in the following words, *hoping to come to thee sooner.* For Schleiermacher's opinion, that the apostle, at the time when he wrote the epistle, could not possibly entertain the purpose of coming to Ephesus, rests on the false supposition that the epistle was written at the period of which we have an account in Acts xx. 1; on which, comp. the Introd. But it is very strange to find him maintaining, that if the apostle actually had this purpose, then the most of the instructions given in this epistle were unnecessary, seeing that the apostle himself says, *but if I should be delayed that thou mayest know*, etc.; the participle ἐλπίζων is, as the context shews, to be resolved thus, "although I hope;" comp. Winer's Gr., § 35, 4, p. 217. Τάχιον (other codd. have ἐν τάχει, which on internal grounds is the more improbable), is properly the comparative; the apostle hopes to come to him sooner than is presupposed in the instructions given to him, not, certainly, on account of ταῦτα, sooner than my epistle arrives. On the historical circumstances comp. the Introd.

Ver. 15.—The apostle, however, foresees it also to be possible that he may remain longer away; hence he says, but if I delay that thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, etc. On οἶκος θεοῦ taken from the Old Testament (see Wahl), comp. 1 Cor. iii. 9, 16; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 22; Heb. x. 21. On ἀναστρέφεσθαι, to walk, here = to conduct one's self, 2 Cor. i. 12; Eph. ii. 3; Heb. x. 33, xiii. 18. Schleiermacher has characterized this whole expression as not sufficiently appropriate to the instructions which have been given; comp. against this Heb. xiii. 18, and let it also be considered, that the general term ἀναστρέφεσθαι receives through its connexion with ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ a definite reference to one who has been intrusted with superintendence and

government in this house (Heb. iii. 2, 5). The accessary clause too, *which is the church*, etc., shews that the apostle in the words πῶς δεῖ—ἀναστρέφεσθαι means, not the duty of maintaining a consistent conduct as it applies to every Christian, but the special obligations resting on Timothy in consequence of the commission which he had undertaken. So also Olshausen: ἀναστρ. used of Timothy's conduct in the office. According to Huther σέ is not to be supplied, but ἀναστρ. is used quite generally. The words, *which is the church of the living God*, etc., also form at once the conclusion of the foregoing—inasmuch as they hold up before Timothy the greatness and importance of his office as *a servant of the house which is the church*, etc.—and the transition to what follows, as is apparent chiefly in the words, *pillar and ground of the truth*. Therefore ἥτις is to be taken not merely as the simple relative, but as having a confirmatory reference to the preceding: as that which is, etc. The apostle designates the *house of God* as *the church of the living God*. What De Wette here observes is true, namely, that the concrete idea of the Ephesian church is extended to the universal idea of the church in general. The labour which is directed towards a particular church, is service in the one great house of God to which every individual church belongs as a part, and every individual Christian as a stone of the building. In the expression, *church of the living God* (the Old Testament קְהַל יְהוָה), this *house of God* is designated according to its internal glory. On the expression ἐκκλησία comp. Olshausen on Matth. xvi. 18; 1 Cor. i. 2. The epithet *living* applied to *God*, the Heb. אֵל חַי, is explained by such passages as Acts xiv. 15; 2 Cor. vi. 16; 1 Thess. i. 9, etc.; it is the opposite of the θεοὶ νεκροί, μάταιοι, and the εἴδωλα. On the import of the relation expressed by the genitive, comp. the passage already adduced, 2 Cor. vi. 16: *for ye are the temple of the living God, as God hath said—I will dwell in them, and walk in them, and I will be their God.—Pillar and ground of the truth;* these words are interpreted by some (till the 16th century by all, and by many of the more recent commentators, as Mack, Matthies, De Wette) as predicated of the *church*, by others (first of all in the Basle editions of the New Testament 1540, 1545, then by Bengel, Mosheim, Heinrichs, Wegscheider, Heydenreich, Flatt), as predicated of the *mystery of godliness*.* In the latter case, the words must be taken as the beginning of the following section (as already Bengel has done, and Olshausen also adopts this view), and would thus have a similar abruptness to the words iii. 4, *it is a faithful saying*, viewed as referring to the preceding. In this case the objection loses its force, namely, that if the words are to be

* Comp. Mack on the passage, who traces this view to the principles of the Reformation, though Luther, Calvin, and Beza, are of opinion, that Protestantism comes into collision with this designation of the church; on which infra.

understood as predicate of the following *mystery of godliness*, there is a want not merely of logical but also of grammatical connexion. The ancient division of the chapters, too, makes a new section to begin with ver. 16 (comp. De Wette); and certainly it would suit better to take the words *pillar*, etc., as belonging to the new section, if, in general, the words could be fitly interpreted as predicate of the *mystery*. Schleiermacher indeed, thinks, that it were very strange to name a particular truth such as is that which follows—the pillar of all truth—but against this De Wette maintains with good reason, that the words *pillar*, etc., form an appropriate predicate to *mystery*, since the historical Christ (ver. 16) is in reality the foundation of the Christian truth. He is not, however, defending this interpretation. But it must be admitted that Schleiermacher is perfectly right in his other remark—that grammatically, two predicates such as *pillar* and *ground* do not well stand in the same series with the third epithet which is expressed by an adjective, *confessedly great*, and every writer would say: for the pillar of all truth is this confessedly great mystery, etc. De Wette quite agrees with Schleiermacher in this, and also refers to the grammatical difficulty implied in a weighty predicate, such as *pillar and ground*, being followed by a much weaker one, such as *confessedly great*.—If accordingly we adhere to the old interpretation, then the words *pillar and ground of the truth* are the predicate of *house of God*, which is designated as *the church of the living God*. So also Huther.—Στῦλος is used by the apostle in the same metaphorical sense again at Gal. ii. 9; it occurs besides in Rev. iii. 12. Wahl rightly: omne id, cui ut primario et præ ceteris insigni innititur aliquid. Thus in the passage first adduced, three of the apostles are called στῦλοι, as those upon whom the continuance of the Jewish Christian church depended; here the church is styled *pillar of the truth*, inasmuch as the continuance of this truth, its historical existence as Christian truth rests on this—that there is a church which supports and preserves the word of truth. Without a church there would be no Christian truth on the earth; on the existence of the former rests therefore the existence of the latter upon earth. In it alone is truth, out of it error and lies; he who is devoted to the truth belongs eo ipso to the church, he who rejects it thereby shuts himself out of the church; comp. Mack, p. 281. Some have been embarrassed by the idea here expressed, on comparing it with other passages in which the apostle represents Christ as the alone ground of the truth; comp. 1 Cor. iii. 11, etc., in which the church is represented not as bearing up the truth, but rather as borne up by the truth, and the truth not as needing the church in order to its existence, but, on the contrary, the church as needing the truth in

order to its existence. This arises, as Baumgarten (p. 246) has already aptly observed, from confounding the truth as it is in itself, with the truth as it is acknowledged in the world. In the former respect, "it needs no pillar, but supports itself;" in the latter, it certainly needs the church as its pillar, as its bearer and preserver. The greatness and importance of Timothy's calling are designed to be held up to him in the representation of the excellence of the *house* in which he serves; and this excellence which belongs to the church is represented by the apostle in opposition to the threatening heresy which he has already in his eye as consisting in this—that the church upon earth has the calling to preserve within itself the sure truth for the world, to secure its continuance on the earth. The choice of the metaphor is to be explained by the opposition which it implies to the heresy afterwards spoken of. This vocation the church has had and exercised from the beginning, and will continue to have and to exercise as surely as it is the church of the living God, and has the promise that even the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. It has and exercises this, however, not merely in so far as it rests, but because of, and in virtue of its resting on the everlasting foundation (1 Cor. iii. 11), which is Jesus Christ. It is the support of the truth for the world, just because it is itself borne up by the truth which rests on itself, and is sure; and Mack is quite right when he says (p. 286), that words to the following effect are not to be supplied: namely, "if and in as far as the truth is present in it," which would divest what the apostle says of all meaning, and make him, while he seems to say something of the church, really to say nothing. The apostle knows nothing of a *church* which has not the truth, or which has it only in part. But the Catholic commentator clearly shews the restraints of his confession, when he all at once transfers what the apostle says of *the church of the living God*, to the historical idea of his own church, and so finds in this passage a New Testament proof (perhaps a prophecy?) of its infallibility. It is not historical descent that makes a church to be a church, but as Mack himself admits (p. 286, Anm., 1), this only—that it has the truth for its foundation; and it is not a church in the true sense precisely in proportion as it is wanting in the ground of the truth—a test from which no historical appearance calling itself a church, or even "the church," can withdraw itself. Ἑδραίωμα, "a firm stay, foundation," forms a climax with στῦλος. The word used only here, similar to θεμέλιος, 2 Tim. ii. 19, has no parallel in the New Testament usage except in the word ἑδραῖος, used only by Paul, and by him three times. An objection against the interpretation of this passage which we have adopted, has been founded on the alleged inelegance of expression implied in designating the

οἶκος θεοῦ as στῦλος and ἑδραίωμα; but when it is observed that the literal expression *church* precedes the new metaphors, and that in both metaphors there is a different allusion, the impropriety will not appear so great. Mack has already referred to 1 Cor. iii. 9, *God's husbandry, God's building*, although the case is not quite parallel.

Ver. 16.—"And confessedly great is the mystery of godliness, etc." says the apostle, and he proceeds to unfold the contents of this mystery. We have already seen, that the transition to the following section lies in the designation of the church as *the pillar and ground of the truth;* for if we regard these words as referring to what precedes, we can see no immediate occasion for such a designation of the church, as Schleiermacher also has remarked. If now the apostle, in the view of what he has further to say, joins the predicates *pillar and ground of the truth* with what goes before, we shall be at no loss, with Schleiermacher, as to the connexion of our verse with what precedes and what follows, but may consider the words, *and confessedly great*, etc., as the description of the *truth* which is committed to the church as a treasure to be guarded by it. It is the design of the apostle to shew Timothy the excellence of that *house* in which he is a servant, and what could be more suitable to this design than that the *truth* which has its historical existence in the church should be represented in its inherent greatness? "The stay and fortress of the truth is the church; and (the καί stands first with emphasis),* confessedly great is this truth whose supporter she is." Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα—says the apostle, *i. e.*, without contradiction great, confessedly great, so as not to be doubted—of course only among those to whom this μυστ. is a revealed mystery. The word ὁμ. occurs only here in the New Testament, but often in the profane writers, Josephus and others. Compare further on the interpretation of the idea, infra on ὅς. *The mystery of godliness*—the apostle here styles that truth a mystery accessible only to piety (comp. on ver. 9), in opposition to the error to which, because it is wanting in piety, this is a sealed mystery (iv. 2). Even in the case of godliness, this mystery, although *revealed*, yet *surpasses all knowledge;* and this designation seems to me to be selected here, chiefly from regard to the wondrous excellence embracing heaven and earth, of him who is its essential import. Compare on this sense of μυστήριον, Eph. v. 32 (and Harless on the passage), then Eph. iii. 19, comp. with ver. 18, where we are conducted to a more profound understanding of this mystery. The apostle proceeds forthwith to unfold the constituent parts of this acknowledged mystery of godliness. Here,

* Huther understands the καί as bringing forward into prominence the predicate which follows.

however, we encounter a critical difficulty in the first word.* The reading wavers between ὅς, θεός, ὅ. ΄Ο has least in its favour, of which Tischendorf says: ὅ (quod Latinos ad ὅς non θεός lectionem conformasse patet) D* Vulg. it. pp. lat. pl. (*i. e.*, omnes exc. Hier). Nor has this reading internal support, for that Christ himself should be called the mystery of godliness (Col. i. 27 is to a different effect) is just as improbable as that without this reference he should be denoted by the neuter ὅ. On θεός Tischendorf observes: θεός (*i. e.*, ΘC pro OC) D.***I.K. al. fere omn. (= almost all minusc.) Arab. polygl. Slav., Did., Chr., Thdrt., Euthal., Maced. (who, however, is charged with having changed ὅς into θεός), Dam., Theoph., Oec. Praeterea lectioni θεός favere putantur Ign. (ad Eph. xix. θεοῦ [sed Syrus υἱοῦ pro θεοῦ, cf. Bunsen de epp. Ign. Hamb. 1847, p. 82] ἀνθρωπίνως φανερουμένου), Constitt., Hipp., Thaum., s. potius Apollin. ap. Phot. On ὅς: A.*C.* (de utroque cf. excurs. meum ad 1 Tim. iii. 16, Prol. ad Cod. Ephr., p. 39, seq.), F.G. 17.73.181 item codd. Liberati. Vict. Tunun. Hincmari (affirmantium quippe Macedonium sub Anastasio imp. ὅς in θεός mutasse), item goth. Syr. post. s. Syr. post. in margine. cop. sah, item Cyr. Theod. Mopv. Epiph. (bis) Pseudo-Chrys., item Gelas. cyzic. s. Mac. Hier. ap. Gelas. in actis conc. Nic. ii. 23; item. Hier. Porro ὅς s. ὅ habent Syr. ar. erp. aeth. armen. Praeterea ὅς lectioni favere videntur Barnab. Theodot. Just. (?) ad Diogn. Clem. ap. Oec. Orig. Orig. interpr. Greg. Nyss. Bas. Nestor. apud Arn. jun. Did. The weight of the external evidence leans to the side of ὅς, in favour of which Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, De Wette, Matthies, and also Olshausen have decided; while θεός has been defended by Matthäi, Heydenreich, Leo, Mack, and others. Apart from the external testimonies, it is urged in favour of the reading θεός that it avoids the difficulties of the other reading, and is altogether suitable to the connexion which stands in need of a definite *subject*. That Christ is styled θεός by the apostle cannot cause surprise. So most recently Leo Excurs. I., p. 74, seq., Heydenreich on the passage and Mack. No similar passage certainly can be shewn in which the apostle has given the appellation θεός to the subject as becoming incarnate (comp. Phil. ii. 5); meanwhile comp. on Tit. ii. 13. That, however, which is alleged to be most in favour of this reading, namely, the facility of its interpretation, seems rather to be against it. For if θεός was the original reading, the origin of the other difficult readings is as unaccountable as that of θεός as a marginal gloss is easily accounted for on the supposition that ὅς was the original reading. How could it be con-

* Baumgarten: Vindiciae vocis θεός, 1 Tim. iii. 16. Hal. Mgd. 1754. Patriccii vind. voc. θεός, 1 Tim. iii. 16. Argentor. 1777. Schulzii Programma de Myst. . . . ad 1 Tim. iii. 16; Hal. 1782. Michael Weber; crisis loci Paul. 1 Tim. iii. 14–16. Lips. 1784 (in Leo, p. 32).

ceived that any one should, in place of the definite θεός, have put a ὅς, which having no definite reference would be here so peculiar? The case of Macedonius, who is said to have changed ὅς into θεός, is no proof of this, but rather proves the reverse (against Mack), namely, that ὅς is the original reading. And it is remarkable, if θεός was indeed the original reading, that this passage was not made use of in the Arian and later controversies (comp. Mack, p. 295). But the contents of the various clauses of the verse, *was justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory*—as others, and most recently De Wette, have observed, will not correspond to the subject θεός. For when Heydenreich, in reply to this, says, that these clauses must not be referred to θεός by itself, but to θεὸς ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, he does not thereby solve the difficulty, but rather acknowledges it, as it is not the θεός manifested in the flesh that is the subject, but all the clauses, the first not excepted, have an equal reference to the θεός. We are accordingly at liberty to maintain, that if the reading ὅς will but afford an intelligible interpretation, it is decidedly to be preferred. We do not certainly think that ὅς can be taken as Matthies takes it (comp. De Wette) to signify ecce! est qui! One—who, etc. The passages to which he refers in support of this are quite of a different kind, inasmuch as in them only the demonstrative is omitted, Rom. ii. 23; 1 Cor. vii. 37; John i. 46, iii. 34; 1 John i. 3. But even the omission of the demonstrative we shall find to be not applicable here, either in the way of οὗτος having to be supplied at ἐδικαιώθη, or of the apodosis being quite left out; for, against the former, it is urged with reason by the advocates of the reading θεός, that the text contains no indication of such a construction, but rather indicates that all the small clauses stand in a like relation to the subject, and, in general, that no reason can be shewn why the apostle should have placed, *was manifested in the flesh*, in the protasis, and all the others in the apodosis; to which is also to be added, that the words, *was preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world*, would not at all be suitable to the context if the apodosis begins with, *was justified*, etc., (comp. Mack, p. 294). Against the other supposition—that the apodosis is entirely left out—is the circumstance, that it is difficult to see what idea this apodosis could have contained (comp. Mack). The only remaining supposition, then, is, that ὅς bears reference to a subject not named, for which also De Wette has decided. The merely relative designation of the subject by ὅς may then be most naturally explained by supposing that the apostle makes use of words taken from another source in order to represent the mystery of godliness, words which perhaps he found in a hymn (or in a formula of confession), in which he could take it for granted that the

subject was known.* So also Winer's Gr., § 64, 3, p. 519.† Perhaps the words *great mystery*, with which the apostle introduces what follows, are borrowed from some such source, and the word *confessedly* is employed to give notice that the apostle is citing words in which the greatness of this mystery is acknowledged and celebrated in the church. We are not, however, therefore at liberty to translate ὁμολογουμένως "according to the hymn," as Mack does contrary to the ordinary usage. Already Grotius, then Paulus, Heydenreich, Mack, De Wette, and others, have regarded the 16th verse in the light of a quotation from such a source as has already been hinted. In proof that hymns were then used, reference is made to Eph. v. 19 (comp., however, Harless on the passage), and Col. iii. 16; then also the account of Pliny I. x. ep. 97: quod essent soliti stato die ante lumen convenire carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem, and the statement in Eusebius (h. e. l. V., cap. 28): ψαλμοὶ καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀπ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γραφεῖσαι τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες. With respect to the form, Mack justly observes that the short unconnected sentences in which the words are similarly arranged, and the number of syllables almost equal, while the ideas are antithetically related, are so suitable to religious hymns, that we find all these characteristics in a series of later hymns used by the Greek and Latin church. When we look particularly at the separate clauses in which is represented the mysterious excellence of him who is the essential import of this great mystery, it will be evident, as others have already noticed, that they form parallel clauses, of which every two are a connected pair, and form an antithesis turning upon the opposition of heaven to earth, and so placed as that the order of the antithesis is reversed in each new pair of clauses:—flesh and spirit—angels and nations—world and heavenly glory. It will also at once be perceived that there is a correspondence between the first and the last clause—was manifested in the flesh—was received up into glory.

If, now, we descend from these general observations to particulars, we find that the first member ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί presents no difficulty. By ὅς is meant Jesus Christ, whom the apostle elsewhere also represents as the subject of predicates which extend beyond his earthly existence, comp. on Phil. ii. 5, 6. The sense of the whole clause is the same as John i. 14, *the word became flesh*; 1 John iv. 2, *Jesus Christ, who has come in the flesh*; Phil. ii. 7, *who was in the likeness of man.* He who before was concealed is become manifest, so that he can be seen, nay touched (John i. 14; 1 John i. 1, seq.). Dr. Baur discovers in the use of the expressions φανεροῦσθαι,

* Olshausen is for referring ὅς, in respect to the sense, to μυστήριον, and appeals to Col. i. 27, where the apostle calls Christ himself μυστήριον. Comp. supra.

† And Huther.

ἐπιφαίνεσθαι, ἐπιφάνεια, a mode of conception that has an affinity to Gnosticism. Comp. against this, on ἐπιφαίν. Tit. ii. 11; and on ἐπιφάνεια, Tit. ii. 13. With respect to φανεροῦσθαι, comp. Rom. iii. 21, xvi. 26; Col. i. 26 (Heb. ix. 8), in all of which passages the expression is used with reference to the appearance of salvation in Christ. In Col. iii. 4 it is used with reference to the person of Christ himself, not indeed, as here, of the first coming of Christ, but of his second coming; it is clearly, however, only accidental that it does not occur with reference to the person of Christ in his first coming. We find the expression repeatedly used in precisely the same manner as here by the apostle John, in the same epistle in which he combats the Gnostic denial of the truth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh (1 John iii. 5, 8); and how often is the same expression used of the revelation of the love of God in Christ, the δόξα, the ζωή! How little ground, then, for the alleged relationship found in these epistles to the Gnostic view of the incarnation is given in this passage, and in 2 Tim. i. 9, iv. 1, 8; Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4! Finally, Dr. Baur's objection of a doctrinal contradiction between 1 Tim. ii. 4 and the present passage, inasmuch as there Christ is represented as a mere man—has been obviated by the remarks on that passage. De Wette, also, has rejected this supposition of a contradiction (p. 86).—Ἐν σαρκί, antithetical with the following ἐν πνεύματι; it designates the one side of his being, the visible, human, in opposition to the divine (comp. Harless, p. 162, seq.); he took on him the human nature in its weakness (Rom. viii. 3, he was sent *in the likeness of sinful flesh*). Over against this clause, in the description of the great mystery, stands the following ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι. When we attend to the antithesis in ἐν σαρκί, and observe further, how in the two following pairs the two members always correspond, it will be evident that every explanation of these words must be rejected, which would make ἐν πνεύματι = "through the spirit, by virtue of the spirit," and would then interpret accordingly. Πνεῦμα can denote here only the θεῖον in him, in opposition to the σάρξ in him, and ἐν, not "through" but as before only "in." So also Olshausen. The great mystery of godliness is here represented by the wondrous union of opposite things in his person, namely, of the human and the divine life.* He was *justified in the Spirit*—the other side of his being, which is opposed to the *flesh*. The meaning of the expression ἐδικαιώθη can, it is evident, be only this—that he who is manifested in the flesh is shewn at the same time in his higher nature, the other side of his being (comp. the similar passage in Rom. i. 3, 4). Why ἐδικαιώθη? The general signification of the expression is, justus declaratus est. How is it to be applied here?

* Huther: the spiritual principle of life dwelling in him, but at the same time emanating from him.

Certainly not in the sense in which it is commonly used by the apostle, as opposed to guilt and punishment, Rom. ii. 13, iii. 26, etc., but in the sense in which we find it in Rom. iii. 4; Matthew xi. 19; Luke vii. 35, where the expression is used of God, or of *wisdom*, to signify the opposite of being mistaken or misapprehended. The apostle here says, *was justified*, in opposition to the state described in the words, *was manifested in the flesh;* in opposition to this state of humiliation which exposed him to misapprehension (comp. John vi. 41, 42, vii. 27), he was justified *in the Spirit*. So already Mack and others. Wherein then consisted this being justified in the Spirit? The true answer is—in all that by which his higher origin was made known, in the revelation of that *glory* which is spoken of in John i. 14, *we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth*, and which was manifested in his words (Matth. vii. 29; John vii. 46, etc.), in his works (John ii. 11, iii. 2, xiv. 11), and in the events of his life, above all in the resurrection (Rom. i. 4; Acts ii. 36, etc.). To make it consist in the last of these alone, or in the miracles alone, or the baptism, or the fulfilment of prophecies, is according to the context quite arbitrary. The interpretation which associates it with the operation of the Spirit after his outpouring (John xvi. 8–16) comes into collision with the right understanding of ἐν of the πνεῦμα, of the antithetical relation between the first and second member in this pair of clauses, and the train of thought expressed in the two following.

From the wonderful *manifestation* in flesh and in Spirit of him who is the substance of this great mystery, the description now advances to the equally wonderful circumstance of *his being made known*, in which a similar antithesis shews itself—*was seen of angels —preached among the nations*, Col. i. 27. To explain ἄγγελοι either of the apostles (Heydenreich, Leo, and others), or of the bad angels, and accordingly to connect this part of the description either with the appearances after the resurrection, or the descent into hell, is contrary to the usage of the word. The former of these views is also inconsistent with the antithetical relation which prevails throughout all the pairs of sentences. With as little propriety can the reverse signification be attached to ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις—angels appeared to him (Matth. iv. 11; Luke xxii. 43). Mack gives the sense of the words thus, appealing to Heb. i. 6, 7, seq., ii. 9—"Christ appeared to angels as their commander, in which the apostle would represent the exaltation of Christ above all angels." But nothing is said of dominion and exaltation above the angels. How little we are justified in thus extending the meaning of ὤφθη is shewn by the antithetical clause, was *preached among the nations*. He was seen by the one—proclaimed to the others. And how little

does that interpretation correspond to the train of thought from the first pair of clauses to the third! (comp. infra). How forced would be the connexion of the ideas! (comp. Mack, p. 292, and against him Matthies, p. 320). Moreover, those passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews that have been referred to, as well as Eph. iv. 8; Col. ii. 15, do not tell us that Christ after his ascension was presented to the angels as their commander. Ὤφθη ἀγγ. can only signify the making known of Christ among the angels, and corresponds to the preaching of him among the nations. So already Chrysostom, "Angels saw the Son of God with us not having seen him before," and Theodoret, "they saw him incarnate." Comp. passages such as Eph. iii. 8, and 10; 1 Pet. i. 12.* As showing the relation which the work of redemption bears also to the celestial powers, compare such passages as Eph. i. 20–23; Col. i. 15, seq., ii. 10, 15; they, however, do not express the idea of our passage, but belong rather to the third pair of clauses. Mack's remark that the interpretation—the celestial spirits saw his work upon earth—is arbitrary and opposed to the context, in which the words are all to be taken in their literal sense, is without force, as it was not his work which the angels saw, but himself made flesh, and that as literally as was his being *preached among the nations*. The ὤφθη certainly took place upon earth, but the description in this verse has nothing to do with that; it aims at representing the mysterious antithesis as denoted by flesh—spirit; angels—nations; world—glory; the gradation in the thought lies in the words *manifested, seen, preached*, and then *believed, received up*, and is evidently rather material than chronological.—After he who is the import of this mystery was manifested, he was preached, and in consequence of the preaching is believed on—his reception upon earth, to which his reception in heaven then forms the antithesis. The article is wanting with ἀγγέλοις (comp. Winer's Gr., § 18, 1 Anm.), therefore not "the angels," but "angels;" it is the opposition of angels and nations that is aimed at, for in this opposition lies the *great mystery. Preached among the nations.* The expression ἔθνη quite generally, as in Matth. xxviii. 19, not in contradistinction to the Jewish people. What the angels came to know by seeing, these learn through preaching. He is a new message to the one class as well as to the other; and precisely in this union of heaven and earth in his person, in this wondrous unity formed of things most opposite lies the mystery.

The first member of the third antithesis now naturally comes after the last clause—*he was believed on in the world* as the consequence of being *preached* (comp. Winer's Gr., § 39, 1, p. 233;

* Huther understands the expression of the ascent into heaven, with which the last clause is at variance.

2 Thess. i. 10; 1 John iv. 16); *in the world*—by which is to be understood, as opposed to the *glory*, the ungodly world, the world lying in wickedness (1 John ii. 15, seq.). Thus he found a reception in the world, a place in it so to speak. To this reception in the world is now antithetically opposed the next member—*he was received up into glory*—where he now sits enthroned at the right hand of God. On ἐν with verbs of motion, comp. Winer's Gr., § 50, 4, p. 367. According to De Wette, this is not to be understood of the historical ascension of Christ, of which we have an account in Mark and Luke, but of a celestial event. De Wette, who refers the being *seen of angels* to a scene beyond the reach of sensible observation—the counterpart to the descent into hell—would naturally understand the being *received up into glory* not of the ascension, but only of another occurrence which took place in heaven.* But this very necessity of referring the clear words, *he was received up into glory*, to something else than the ascension of Christ, is a proof that his interpretation of the words, *seen of angels*, is incorrect. Our view of the words does not compel us to go beyond the historical event of the ascension, which indeed could not be more appropriately described (comp. Mark xvi. 19, *he was received up into heaven, and sat down*, etc.; Acts i. 11, *he who is taken up from you into heaven;* Luke xxiv. 51). And if this be not what is meant, what other ἀναλαφθῆναι ἐν δόξῃ is conceivable? Our interpretation maintains the suitable antithesis in the two clauses, the one of which expresses Christ's glorification in the world, the other in heaven; there, as also here, he has a place as king of an empire, which embraces heaven and earth. How clear are thus the antithesis in each of the three pairs of clauses by which this great mystery of godliness is represented! How simple and apparent is thus the progress from *was manifested* to *was received up*. How obscure, on the contrary, does everything become, when with De Wette we suppose the being *seen of angels* to refer to a scene in heaven, and the being *received up into glory* to another celestial event! Dr. Baur has denied that there is any logical connexion in the sentences as they follow each other; on the other hand, he discovers a Gnostic complexion in the expressions ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πν. and ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις; in which case his being at a loss to find any logical connexion is quite as accountable as it is conclusive against his interpretation. Meanwhile, Dr. Baur has still made the attempt to introduce some clearness into the connexion, by supposing in each of the three pairs an antithesis of a Gnostic and anti-Gnostic sentiment. Strange that a writer, to combat Gnosticism, forges epistles, and then "by each of these clauses seeks as much as possible to satisfy both the orthodox and the Gnostic party;" comp. the General Introduction. Moreover,

* The same remark applies also to Huther.

this will only explain the arrangement of the sentences in pairs, not the logical progress in the ideas expressed by the six clauses; finally, however, as we have seen from the exposition, we are not under the necessity of going beyond the Pauline sphere of ideas, and of having recourse to the help of Gnosticism in order to explain the words. It is still objected by Schleiermacher, "that an enumeration such as this should also be arranged in historical order." But it is not a mere enumeration of successive incidents, but a representation of the *great mystery* of faith. And the order followed in this representation begins with the revelation of the Saviour, and advances to his being made known, and thence to his being glorified. We have still another of Schleiermacher's objections to consider. "If Paul had written ver. 16 as an introduction to what follows, with the view of laying down the cardinal doctrine from which the seducers would deviate, surely the subsequent description would harmonize with this; what follows, however, contains nothing in any degree opposed to the import of ver. 16." This objection contains already a false supposition. For it is not the apostle's design in ver. 16 to represent merely the cardinal doctrine from which the seducers would deviate, but rather the great mystery of all piety, of which the church is the bearer. In opposition to this great thesis, so to speak—though it is not properly stated as the thesis of what follows, but rather as the continuation of the στῦλος, etc.—the writer places as its antithesis, in an equally general form, the words iv. 1: *Now the Spirit speaketh expressly that some shall depart from the faith;* for this sentence is evidently the principal one, and all that follows is but the further explication of it; comp. De Wette, p. 88, who admits that the heretics are not directly but only secondarily mentioned. I regard it therefore as superfluous, nay as trifling, when we look to the comprehensiveness of this description of the great mystery, to attempt to point out in its particular clauses, the allusion to future heresies. If the apostle had intended any such definite correspondence, it would doubtless have been made more apparent, chiefly in the characteristics mentioned in iv. 2, seq. But it is rather his design to give a positive representation of the truth which is the confession of the church, with which is then contrasted the future falling away from the faith (iv. 1). This positive statement of the truth, however, includes in it on every side the opposition to the error.

Chap. iv. 1.—In opposition then to this description of the great mystery of godliness, the apostle places the prediction of the threatened falling away from the faith (δέ). "But the Spirit speaketh expressly that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith." The expression ῥητῶς (only here = with express words, distinctly), as also the whole tenor of the passage shews, that the apostle refers

to predictions of the Spirit lying before him. It is the general prophecy of a future falling away, such as was declared by our Lord himself in Matth. xxiv. 11, seq., 24, and by the apostle in 2 Thess. ii. 3, seq., in allusion to the prophecy of the Old Testament (Dan. vii. 25, viii. 23, seq., xi. 30, seq ; comp. Hofmann, a. a. O., ii. p. 291, seq.), which the writer has here in his eye. Comp. also 1 John ii. 18 ; 2 Pet. iii. 3 ; Jude 18. Others again (so also Olshausen) understand a prediction which was uttered by the prophets at that period, and refer in support of this view to Acts xi. 28, xiii. 2, xx. 23, xxi. 11. The prophecy, however, so far as regards its general import, had been made long before, but the special application of it in this passage proceeds evidently from the apostle, whose eye, enlightened by the Spirit, discerns in the present the beginnings of the apostacy which is to come to full manifestation in the future. It is thus clear that the writer uses the expression *ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς* looking forward from the time at which he writes, and we shall find also in what follows that we have not before us the words of a prediction made by another, but the interpretation and application of this by the apostle himself. Καιρός is used here quite as appropriately as in 2 Cor. vi. 2 ; 1 Thess. ii. 17 : 1 Cor. vii. 5, as Planck has already observed against Schleiermacher. The words, *some shall fall away*, etc., in which the general import of that prediction is expressed, form the proper antithesis to what goes before, iii. 15, 16 ; it is not then the heresy itself which is here placed in opposition to what is there said, but the falling away from the faith of the church as described in iii. 16, in consequence of heresies ; comp. above. On *ἀφίστασθαι*, comp. Heb. iii. 12. The apostle himself now more particularly describes how such a falling away would be brought about, and he does this with express reference to the appearances of the present, which indicate beforehand the nature of the future falling away. *Giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils.* Προσέχειν as at i. 4 ; Tit. i. 14. It is not merely an unhealthy Christianity, such as we have been dealing with hitherto, but the entire falling away from the faith, which is to be the result of this *προσέχειν*. In accordance with this, the expressions *πνεύματα πλάνα—διδασκαλίαι διαμονίων* are much stronger than those which have been hitherto used by the apostle, to designate the appearances of the present. On *πνεύματα* it has already been rightly observed by De Wette, that the expression denotes neither the teachers who are first spoken of in ver. 2, nor their doctrines, but the manifestations of the *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης* in opposition to the *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας*, 1 John iv. 6 and iv. 2, seq.; 1 Cor. xii. 10, xiv. 12–32. Πλάνος, leading astray, as in 2 Cor. vi. 8. The words *διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων* will then signify not doctrines concerning demons, but proceeding from demons ; the for-

mer interpretation would, moreover, stand in no connexion with the rest of the passage ; comp. also, Winer's Gr., § 30, 1, p. 168 ; with respect to the expression comp. 2 Cor. xi. 15, *the servants of Satan.** The following words, ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων do not admit of being connected with διδασκαλίαις ; for then the words would stand as a more definite explanation of διαμονίων, which is inadmissible, inasmuch as men cannot be understood by the expression, or else διδασκαλίαις must be repeated as De Wette observes. We shall therefore have to connect the words with the proximate verb προσέχοντες, and understand them as denoting the cause of that *giving heed*, etc., and as a description of the seducers, not of those who fall away, to whom neither the expression *hypocrisy* nor *speaking lies* would be suitable ; as also the words, *having their conscience seared*, etc., remind us of similar characteristics of the seducers in Tit. i. 15 ; 1 Tim. i. 6, vi. 5, etc. That which allures to apostacy is the pretended shew of sanctity which, however, stands in glaring contrast with the inward character of these seducers ; hence the expression *hypocrisy*. Ψευδολόγοι, a designation of heretics properly so-called, therefore a stronger expression than ματαιολόγοι, Tit. i. 10 ; 1 Tim. i. 6. Κεκαυτηριασμένων τὴν ἰδ. συν. = such as are branded in their own conscience ; Wahl rightly, qui sauciam sclerum conscientia habent mentem. The expression, which is borrowed from the branding of criminals, is not with Theodoret to be explained of the callousness of conscience, which can only be considered as an accident of the branding ; but points primarily to the permanent defacement and degradation of their inner nature, of which they themselves are conscious in consequence of sins which they have committed against their better knowledge and conscience. The ἰδίαν is not, as De Wette thinks, without emphasis, but indicates the contrast between their own inward character and their professed design to lead others to true holiness. The characteristic expressed in the words, *having their conscience branded*, etc., explains the *hypocrisy*, for, as Calvin well observes, malæ conscientiæ . . . . semper ad hypocrisin . . . . confugiunt. It at the same time furnishes the key to the right understanding of the error as it is described in ver. 3. It lets us see the false spiritualism of these lying teachers, as the reverse side of their mannner of thought and action till then devoted to sensuality. Their own inward impurity is reflected in their eyes in the world without them, and hence their asceticism. Comp. on the whole subject Tit. i. 15. The apostle now specifies particular features by which these future heretics will be identified, and these of a practical kind, not merely because they fall most

* Olshausen observes that a man never stands isolated; if the Divine Spirit do not lead him, the evil spirit will; hence the heretics are here represented as inspirations of the evil spirit.

under observation, but because in them is most apparent the glaring contradiction between them and the real inward condition of those hypocritical seducers. What the apostle here states as the characteristics of these seducers—not as the enumeration of their errors—stands in fitting connexion with the appearances of the present, and is represented as an aggravation of these. We look therefore for the analogies to these not apart from, but in the phenomena which the Pastoral Epistles themselves lay before us as already present. Κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων, he says. (On the connexion of the ἀπέχ. with κωλυόντων, comp. Winer's Gr., § 66, 2, p. 548. For the latter infinitive we must take κελευόντων out of κωλυόντων, which is = κελευόντων μή). The error combated in the Pastoral Epistles, is a morally unfruitful, pretendedly higher wisdom connected with commandments which were to lead to a supposed higher perfection. This perverted ascetical tendency meets us most plainly in Tit. i. 14, 15, in which passage the apostle, in like manner as here, places in opposition to the seducers the maxim—*to the pure all things are pure.* From the general resemblance between the errors as described in the Epistle to Titus, and in our epistle (comp. the General Introduction), we can scarcely doubt, that what is said of those errors is also applicable to the errors represented in our epistle as present. Besides vers. 6 and 8 of this chapter refer to an ascetical tendency existing at the time (comp. Baur a. a. O., p. 25); and in passages such as i. 6, seq. (comp. the interpretation), 2 Tim. ii. 18, the root of such an asceticism is evidently shewn to be a false spirituality. It can therefore not surprise us, when the apostle, foreseeing the future in the present, represents the *abstaining from meats* as a mark of the future apostacy. True—admitting the other statements of the epistle—this special error had already been clearly developed; nay, we might rather wonder why the apostle places it in the future, did we not consider, that substantially nothing depends on whether the heresy in question did not come fully out till a future period, as it is only the fruit of this, namely, the falling away, which the apostle represents as future. We can certainly point to nothing in the epistles specially analogous to the *forbidding to marry;* but so much at least must be acknowledged, that such an error lies in the same direction with a view which transfers inward impurity to the external world. The existing ascetical tendency had not yet reached this stage in its development according to the traces which we have of it in these epistles; but does not the co-existence at a later period of these two errors which the apostle here names, as we find them in Marcion, the Encratites, and the Manicheans, prove their internal connexion, and fully bear out the apostle's prediction? This union of the two errors, in the opinions of Marcion and his followers, is the result indeed of their Gnostico-dualistic view of the

world; but must we suppose this to have been already in existence, in order to understand the prediction of the writer? In the manner in which he mentions these errors ver. 3, seq., he does not betray in the least degree, that he derives them from this Gnostico-dualistic view; nay, the separation of clean and unclean had a direct point of connexion with the Old Testament laws regarding meats. And if we look to the nature of the thing itself, we may with reason maintain that nothing was more likely than that the false spiritualism which made ethical perfection to consist in abstinence from outward things, should reckon marriage among these things, and that too without its being derived from any Gnostic view of the world, or aversion to the creation. Where would a misunderstanding of the Christian view of the opposition between flesh and spirit more naturally betray itself than in the ideas concerning marriage? And how plausible a ground has the prohibition of marriage to rest upon in the words of our Lord himself (Matth. xix. 10, seq.), and such expressions of the apostle as we find repeated in 1 Cor. vii.? Think, for example, of an Origen!

And did appearances of the kind described in our passage, even apart from what we read in the Pastoral Epistles, lie so far out of the apostle's sphere of vision as to make his words unintelligible when applied to his own time, and to necessitate our supposing that a contemporary of Marcion was the author? We have certainly not the common Judaistic opponents of the apostle before us in this passage; but neither are the heretics of the Epistle to the Colossians, with their *philosophy* and their asceticism, the common Judaists, although they stand more nearly related to them than do those in our passage. These Colossian heretics afford a striking parallel to the ascetic tendency described in our epistles (comp. especially Col. ii. 16, seq., and Steiger on the passage). And have we not in the Essenes, and Therapeutæ, as also in the Ebionites, kindred examples of an asceticism connecting itself with the Old Testament, but extending far beyond its prohibitions of meats, just as we have already found to be the case in regard to the error combated in these epistles? Nor could Baur object, even though a Gnostic view of the world could be shewn to belong to the heretics here described, when he himself frankly acknowledges that such a view prevailed among the Jewish Christians at Rome. With regard to the other feature, namely, the *forbidding to marry*, we may reasonably refer, in order to prove in a general way that this error was not so remote from the apostolic period (for it does not appear from the Pastoral Epistles to have as yet assumed a decided form) to chap. vii. of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, which, especially in the beginning, and then in vers. 28 and 36, shews plainly that the apostle is refuting spiritualistic doubts regarding marriage.

Still more to our purpose, however, is it, to refer likewise to those sects in whom this error appeared in connexion with Jewish perversities—to the Essenes and Theraputæ, of whose contempt of marriage we have accounts in Philo II. 633 ; Jos. Antt. 18, 1, 5 ; Bell. Jud. 2, 8, 2. Additional literary notices, both with respect to the *abstaining from meats*, and the *forbidding to marry*, will be found in Böttger, a. a. O., p. 146, seq.

In opposition to this false asceticism, which the apostle sees from the tokens of the present to be coming, he goes on to say : *which God hath created*, etc. We are here to mark the close connexion of these words, which are evidently the apostle's own, with the preceding. As the characteristic features of the heretics, ver. 2, are entirely founded on those mentioned elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles as belonging to the seducers already existing, and are these in a more aggravated form, so in the manner in which the words before us are connected with the preceding, we may perceive that the apostle is not quoting the words of a prophecy uttered by another, but has himself sketched the characteristics of the future heretics on the ground plan afforded by that general prediction (comp. on ver. 1). That which the apostle here places in opposition to them, is not a reference to the inferior position of Judaism, nor is it the refutation of a Gnostico-dualistic view of the world, such as we should expect from an anti-Gnostic writer of the second century (comp. the General Introduction, § 3); but it is a reference to the design of the creation, which can be fulfilled only by a thankful enjoyment of the meats which God hath created. " Which God hath created to be enjoyed with thanksgiving by believers, and such as have known the truth." The end for which meats exist then is, according to the apostle, to be enjoyed ; this enjoyment, however, supposing it to be in other respects the true enjoyment, has a condition attached to it in the *with thanksgiving*. The words, *to be enjoyed with thanksgiuing*, stand opposed to the error implied in *abstaining from meats*. This true enjoyment by which the design of the Creator is fulfilled can be experienced only by believers and (epexegetically) those who have known the truth. These words involve an opposition of a twofold kind, namely, in the first place, to the inferior position of Judaism, which has not yet penetrated to the full knowledge of the truth (Acts x. 10, seq.), which, however, as the context shews, is not what is here referred to—and in the second place, to the transcendental position of the heretics, who make the superiority of their *knowledge* and their higher moral perfection to consist in abstinence from meats, which is what the apostle here refers to. That the apostle intends not to deny that meats were created for all men, is self-evident ; here, however, he shews only who they are in whom the design of the creation is

really fulfilled. On *μετάληψις* (only here), comp. the use of *μεταλαμβάνειν*, Acts ii. 46, xxvii. 33 ; on *ἐπεγ.*, what is said at Phil. i. 9 on *ἐπίγνωσις*. *Τοῖς πιστοῖς* is simply the dative of destination.

Ver. 4.—The words, *to be received with thanksgiving*, are now, in vers. 4 and 5, farther confirmed. It is not, however, the natural cleanness of the meats as what God hath created, to which the apostle here attaches importance ; he rather represents the being *good*, as dependent on the being received with thankfulness. What the apostle here maintains, in confirmation of the preceding, is the perfectly equal fitness and lawfulness of every creature of God in respect of enjoyment, under the condition of thanksgiving in the enjoyment ; for (ver. 5), it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer. In regard to the Old Testament, it is the same truth which is here recognized as that which was disclosed to Peter through the vision, Acts x. 11–16 ; but it does not stand here in definite opposition to the Old Testament. Nor does it need any proof—for it is universally admitted—that the apostle would oppose this Judaism in a different manner ; not to speak of the *forbidding to marry*, in connexion with *abstaining from meats*, ver. 3, a feature which does not admit of being associated with the common pharisaical Judaism. But we have already hinted how little vers. 4 and 5 are suited to refute the Gnostic dislike to the creation. How should nothing more have been said in this case, than that not in the abstinence from, but in the thankful enjoyment of meats, is the purpose of the Creator fulfilled, seeing that the point in dispute must have been, whether God is the Creator ? It would, at least, have been something to the purpose if he had even said, what he says at 1 Cor. x. 26, *the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof.* Such a sentiment would have had far more of an anti-Gnostic cast than the *every creature is good* in our passage, with the condition which is attached to it, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, and the *for it is sanctified*, etc. What is there in these expressions more anti-Gnostic than in the words, *nothing is unclean of itself*, etc., Rom. xiv. 14, or *all things are pure*, Rom. xiv. 20 ? And what opposition to the Gnostic dualism is implied in making the *good* to be dependent on the *thanksgiving ?* Finally, Dr. Baur's critical notices, drawn from the period of the Gnosis, p. 24, seq., serve well the purpose of letting us see the later form of these errors.—The apostle has still to justify his assertion that meats are intended to be enjoyed with thanksgiving. He does this in the verse before us, by placing in opposition to the arbitrary distinctions made by the heretics in meats, the maxim that every creature is good, and not to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving. He does not say *καθαρόν*, as at Rom. xiv. 20, or *κοινόν*, as xiv. 14 ; for he here speaks in opposition to the opinion of the heretics, who, in regard to the

enjoyment of the things in question, maintain that they are *οὐ καλόν —ἀπόβλητον*. He, however, limits his own assertion by the conditional clause, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, which is confirmatory of the *with thanksgiving* in the preceding verse. This clause is therefore to be closely connected with the preceding—*good, and nothing to be refused.* It is not two different things that are here adduced—the natural purity and the receiving with thanksgiving—but the first under the condition of the second. On *κτίσμα* (comp. Jam. i. 18), for which Schleiermacher will have *κτίσις*, according to the Pauline usage, Planck has already remarked, that Paul uses *ὀφείλημα* at Rom. iv. 4, and *ὀφειλή* everywhere else, Rom. xiii. 7; 1 Cor. vii. 3; *περίσσευμα* at 2 Cor. viii. 14, but generally *περισσεία*, Rom. v. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 2, x. 15; *πόμα* at 1 Cor. x. 4, usually *πόσις*, Rom. xiv. 17; Col. ii. 16; *προσκοπή* at 2 Cor. vi. 3, usually *πρόσκομμα*, Rom. ix. 32, 33, xiv. 13–20; 1 Cor. viii. 9, etc. Schleiermacher's objection to *ἀπόβλητος* is obviated by what has already been remarked in regard to this word. It may, moreover, be said in reply to it, with Planck, that *κοινός*, which Schleiermacher would have expected from the apostle if he had been the author, occurs only once in this sense, Rom. xiv. 14, and *ἀκάθαρτος*, which Schleiermacher also adduces, not at all. On *λαμβανόμενον*, comp. John xix. 30; Acts ix. 19; Mark xv. 23. On resolving the participle by "if," as at iii. 10, vi. 8, comp. Winer's Gr., § 45, 2, p. 307.

Ver. 5.—That the apostle did not intend in the words, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, to express a merely accessary idea, and that we are not, as many expositors do, to take the sentence, *every creature of God is good* by itself, as that which the apostle places in opposition to the heretics, and expressive of the natural purity of the creature as opposed to the assertion of the malignancy of matter, is evident from ver. 5, in which we are told that the creature becomes *good* precisely in consequence of the *thanksgiving.* "For it is sanctified (every creature) by the word of God and prayer." *Is sanctified,* says the apostle. Does he in this expression teach, that there is a natural impurity in the creature which must be removed by the word of God and prayer? That would be in manifest contradiction to what he declares to be his conviction in Rom. xiv. 14, *I know and am persuaded . . . that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean.* But the apostle says nothing inconsistent with this in our passage. And this is the place where we must meet the question—why does the apostle, in the whole of this passage, lay such emphasis on the *with thanksgiving*, or more definitely still, as we find the question already set before us in ver. 5, what meaning are we to attach to this expression, *ἁγιάζεται*? Let us look, first at the means through which this *ἁγ.* is effected, namely, through the word and

prayer. The context, according to which the whole sentence, ver. 5, stands as an analytic confirmation of ver. 4 (γάρ), compels us to take *by the word*, etc., as explanatory of *with thanksgiving*, ver. 4. For, that everything is good and not to be rejected, if it is enjoyed with thanksgiving, can only be confirmed by shewing, how the *with thanksgiving* brings along with it the being *good*. This relation of ver. 5 to ver. 4 is still further confirmed by this—namely, that ἁγιάζεται, like the present λαμβανόμενον in the preceding verse, is evidently to be understood in reference to every time when meats are enjoyed ; for this is the very thing to be proved, namely, that meats are then good when they are *enjoyed with thanksgiving*. Although—even apart from this connexion—the present tense in ἁγιάζεται is sufficient of itself to forbid our interpreting it of a sanctification of the creature for enjoyment once for all ; and, in like manner, ἐντεύξεως can certainly mean only ever-repeated prayer. What then are we to understand by the διὰ λόγου θεοῦ, which is connected with ἐντεύξεως, and depends with it on one and the same preposition, which is not repeated ? If we explain it of the saying uttered once for all recorded in Gen. i. 29, ix. 4, as Mack does—and similarly Matthies only without this definite allusion—then the confirmatory relation to ver. 4 is destroyed, for this would clearly leave unexplained, why in the enjoyment anything should depend on *thanksgiving*. It would also deprive ver. 4 of its meaning, which ver. 5 is intended to explain ; for then, instead of *being received with thanksgiving*, something else would be introduced as determining the being *good;* it contradicts, in fine, the present tense in ἁγ., and the union of things so diverse under the preposition διά.* The same difficulties meet the interpretation which explains λόγος θεοῦ of the Christian doctrine in general. For is not the Old Testament with its commandments about meats also λόγος θεοῦ ? A more definite appellation then should have been found for the Christian doctrine. And according to this interpretation ἁγιάζεσθαι must be understood either very indefinitely, or in a double sense, on the one hand, in reference to the *word of God*, on the other, in reference to *prayer;* nor does it correspond to the present tense in ἁγ., which, in reference to *prayer*, must be regarded as expressing what actually takes place, and is repeated on every enjoyment. Least of all, however, as in the former instances, and in precisely the same way, will this interpretation correspond to the connexion with the preceding. Either must *every creature is good* be taken by itself as expressive of the natural purity of every creature of God, and *if it be received*, etc., only as an accessary limitation—and then

* The view can of course find no acceptance which refers λόγος θεοῦ to the creative word, Gen. i. 1, as the subject spoken of is the *sanctification* of what is already created.

the καλόν would need no further confirmation through ἁγιάζεται, for it is already pure ; nor would *if it be received*, etc., obtain any such confirmation in ver. 5, for *by the word* would then refer to something quite different. Or again—and this alone is the right way—we must regard, *if it be received with thanksgiving*, as the condition on which the καλόν depends, in which case the λόγος θεοῦ can be nothing substantially different from the *thanksgiving*. This has also been rightly understood by De Wette, and therefore, in contradiction to his own interpretation of the preceding, according to which, the apostle, in opposition to the doctrine of the malignancy of matter, asserts its purity, he has understood the words of ver. 5, not of the objective ground of this purity, but of a permanent sanctification of the creature through prayer, which presents certainly a strange succession of ideas. For, in opposition to the Gnostic malignity of matter, the creature is first of all called good ("good or pure," p. 90, etc). Then again, it is immediately said to be not pure, in opposition to the Gnostic malignancy of matter—for the purity ("in contrast with the malignancy of matter maintained by the Gnostics," De Wette), is connected with the condition of the creature *being received with thankgiving*. The writer then must himself have been half a Gnostic. If the *thanksgiving* was wanting, then matter remained malignant, but when this was present, then "all impurity was removed," as ver. 5 is held to teach. For such absurdities, the pseudo-apostle must submit to be characterized as one "who did not rise to the abstraction," that "every thing is pure also without this condition." The real state of the case is, that the expositor lands himself in these absurdities, by supposing that the writer is here combating the doctrine of the Gnostic malignancy of matter, when he has not this in his mind at all ; for if he had, he would make no such conditions as is expressed in, *if it be received with thankfulness*, nor would he have said, *it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer*, but would have expressed himself in quite a different manner. But De Wette is quite right in declaring that λόγος θεοῦ stands in a confirmatory relation to the preceding, *if it be received with thankfulness*, and maintains that it can only signify the word of God expressed in prayer, whether the writer regarded prayer as consisting in words from the Scriptures, or regarded the suppliants as filled with the Spirit and thereby as organs of the Divine word, in favour of which latter, reference might be made with Bretschneider to Sir. xlviii. 2 ; 1 Kings xvii. 1. The latter is, however, not the correct view (for although the word which a prophet speaks as commissioned of God is so named, it is no proof in the case before us); but the former—only we must guard against a too outward apprehension of prayer as consisting in a λόγος θεοῦ. All prayer assuredly grows out of God's word, and substantially consists in it,

even although it should not be composed precisely of Scripture words, or consist of a Psalm, which, for example, would not be the case in the ancient prayer at meat, Constitt. ap. vii. 49 (in Heydenreich). The simplest interpretation of λόγος θεοῦ is indeed that given by Wahl, Leo, and others = oratio ad Deum facta. But it is grammatically inadmissible, for ἀγάπη, or φόβος τοῦ θεοῦ, are examples of quite a different kind.* Καὶ ἐντεύξεως the apostle adds. He does not repeat the preposition, which he must have done if λόγος θεοῦ denoted a reason quite different from prayer, and consisting in a Divine utterance or a Divine ordination (comp. Winer's Gr., § 50, 7, p. 373). It is therefore also on this ground more correct to take λόγος and ἔντευξις as one principal idea. On ἔντευξις properly aditus, comp. 1 Tim. ii. 1; it signifies not a species of prayer defined according to its import, but prayer as a coming near to God, whether in the form of thanksgiving or of supplication. The principal idea then expressed by *thanksgiving* is separated into the two elements of *the word of God*, and *prayer*, and this analysis, if it is to be of any use, must be intended to make more apparent the sanctifying efficacy of the *thanksgiving*. Now it is plain that λόγος θεοῦ is a designation of prayer according to its general import (the specific form of thanksgiving does not come into notice here) in its objective aspect, while ἔντευξις points to the subjective side, namely, that it is a coming near to God. As then the relation of prayer to God, in its contents as well as in its form, is here indicated, so also that for which prayer is made, or as here specially, that for which thanksgiving is made, is regarded in this relation, and this relation in which it is thus placed through prayer is that which the apostle here describes as having a sanctifying influence, and as consecrating for enjoyment. The opposite of such a separation and consecration is certainly not a Gnostic malignancy of matter, nay, not even such a natural uncleanness of the thing to be enjoyed as would make it *unclean in itself* (against which Rom. xiv. 14; 1 Cor. x. 26; Matth. xv. 11), as this ἁγιάζεσθαι applies not merely to what is unclean in the Old Testament point of view, but to *every creature*. It is rather opposed to that view which regards every creature as unholy and profane, on account of its being a part of the κτίσις which is burdened with a curse, which is subject to *vanity* and the *bondage of corruption* (Rom. viii. 19, seq). It is profane, and needs sanctification in so far as it is opposed to the life from above, the new life of the Spirit in which the Christian stands. And this purification it receives for enjoyment, through the sactifying relation of prayer to God which is uttered over it. The *corruptible* does not indeed thereby become *incorruptible* (Matth. xv. 17), just as the *body of death*, though it be sanctified through the new life of the Spirit,

* Huther also agrees with the interpretation here given. Commentar. z. N. T., V. 1.

does not thereby become a *body of immortality;* but it is brought out of its naturally alien position with reference to that which is of the Spirit, into its true relation to the new life. For an analogy to that which the apostle has here in his mind, we have but to look to the holy sacrament of the supper, in which the thanksgiving prayer clearly implies such a *sanctification* as we have here. The apostle, however, will have a *sanctification* not merely in the use of the creature connected with this ordinance, but in every use of it. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 31 ; *Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.* And again, ver. 30 : *why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks ?* Thus, by a more minute investigation of the words of our passage, we are led quite away from the allusion to a dualistic view of the world peculiar to Gnosticism. What we have here is substantially the same as what the apostle expresses in Tit. i. 15 by the words—*to the pure all things are pure, but to the defiled and the unbelieving nothing is pure;* and our passage only shews in addition, how in the case of the Christian, external things = meats, are, through his thanksgiving, received into the sanctifying relation to God in which he stands ; so that the sanctifying influence of his inner life extends to outward things, while in the case of those others who boast of their *faith* and *wisdom*, the external world is, and remains, the mirror of their inward impurity. The apostle does not enter on a special refutation of the *forbidding to marry.* What he has said as to the misapprehension of the design of the creation in reference to *meats* may easily be applied also to this error ; and then this error belonged to a period more remote from the present, as we find it noticed nowhere else in the epistles.

Ver. 6.—The mention of the prophecy of a future falling away forms the basis of the following admonitions to Timothy. That the future and the present are here mixed up with each other in a very unsatisfactory way, as Schleiermacher maintains, is without foundation ; for vers. 1–5 refer quite as clearly to the future as ver. 6, seq. do to the present. The description of that which threatens the future is designed to let Timothy know what it is necessary he should do in the present, and because the future was in its beginnings already present, and was future only in its more aggravated form, it is easily understood, why the truth which stands opposed to the future error in its full development, should have prominence given to it already in the present. What is there more unpauline in the transition here than in the similar one at 2 Tim. iii. 5 ? Or more unsatisfactory than 1 John iv. 3, ii. 18 ?—Ταῦτα τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ὑποτιθέμενος, etc. Commentators differ in opinion as to the reference of ταῦτα. From the expression ὑποτιθέμενος (to put anything under the foot or into the hand of another, then to advise, admonish, also

to instruct generally, comp. Passow; in the New Testament only here; comp., however, Rom. xvi. 4), so much only can be determined, that it cannot refer to anything already known, consequently not to ver. 16, *confessedly great is the mystery*, etc., as Heinrichs thinks, who arbitrarily makes iv. 1–5 to be parenthetical. But neither can ταῦτα refer to iii. 16; iv. 5; or to iv. 1–5, not so much because iv. 1, seq., does not stand in direct opposition to iii. 16, as De Wette has observed with respect to the former, comp. above; but rather on account of the clause that follows, namely, *thou shalt be a good servant*, etc., and on account of the connexion as traced above, according to which the mention and description of the future falling away is the basis of the admonitions which follow. The threatening danger lays on Timothy, as a good servant, the charge of making a vigorous resistance; this, however, cannot consist merely in the communication of the fact that such a falling away threatens to come, but in holding forth the truth which is opposed to those errors, as the apostle has correctly expressed it in vers. 4 and 5. This must appear still more on considering the following words, *nourished up*, etc., and those of ver. 7 (comp. below).* Schleiermacher has also seen it to be most natural to refer ταῦτα to vers. 4 and 5; only, he thinks that there was no need of mentioning the future falling away as the foundation of the instruction, vers. 4 and 5, inasmuch as it was already opposed to the errors then existing. As if it must not have been the strongest inducement to Timothy to resist the already existing beginnings of evil with all the power of the truth, to show him the danger that was to grow out of these beginnings! "If thou lay these things before the brethren, thou shalt be a good servant of Jesus Christ, who is nourished up in the words of faith and of the good doctrine to which thou hast attained." Διάκονος, in its general signification, as 2 Cor. iii. 6, vi. 4, etc. Ἐντρεφόμενος (comp. Winer's Gr., § 45, 5) is not put for the perfect, but is properly the present, and "shews that the *words*, etc., are to be a permanent means of nourishment and culture to Timothy." Comp. ver. 12, and 2 Tim. iii. 15. The expression occurs only here. Timothy would not shew himself to be such a *servant*, etc., by repeating the prophecy which has just been mentioned by the apostle, but by counteracting the danger through the word of truth. *And of the good doctrine*—the apostle adds epexegetically, as the more special designation of the Christian doctrine in opposition to that error which, in respect to its contents, is characterized by the ex-

* So already Schleiermacher, p. 204: "If it (ταῦτα) refers to 1–3, then you can understand by the words ταῦτα ὑπ. nothing else than 'if thou dost diligently urge the warning against the future apostacy,' thou shalt be a good servant, etc., which indeed is as jejune as can be, and with which the following words (ἐντρεφ.) in particular do not at all agree."

pressions, *fables, genealogies*, and *commandments of men*, and which Timothy is charged to counteract; similarly elsewhere the *sound doctrine*, comp. on Tit. i. 9; ii. 1; 1 Tim. i. 10, vi. 3. Even the words, *to which thou hast attained*, involve an admonition. Timothy is to remain faithful to that to which he has attained. Παρακολ. comp. with 2 Tim. iii. 10, used nowhere else by the apostle. Schleiermacher, in support of his critical views, wishes us not to forget to place 2 Tim. iii. 10, 14, beside ver. 6, which passages we can compare without seeing anything to stumble at; in like manner also 2 Tim. ii. 15, 16.

Ver. 7.—The mention of the καλ. διδ. reminds the apostle of that ματαιολογία which is opposed to it, and he is led by the antithetical reference to what he has just been saying, to speak directly of it in ver. 7. If Timothy is to effect anything in his opposition to the present errors, he must himself remain free from their infection, and there follows accordingly a pointed reference to those errors of the present, in their two-fold form of a false theoretical and a false practical tendency. In opposition to *the words of the good doctrine*, the apostle first of all places the *profane and old wives' fables* with which he is to have nothing to do. I do not comprehend how De Wette could say, it is perhaps the theosophic systems called just before *doctrines of devils* that are here meant. Was it then necessary that Timothy should be warned against these doctrines, which are described as future, and as running directly counter to the truth? And do not the fables here clearly point to the fables named in i. 4, as belonging to the present (comp. with Tit. i. 14), and which are nowhere else characterized as strictly a heresy? The difference of designation here tends, De Wette thinks, to mislead the reader, but in this he acknowledges the incorrectness of his own interpretation. How simple and clear, on the contrary, does the passage become, when the *fables* (together with the *genealogies* and *commandments of men*) are viewed in the manner we have done, as appearances of the present which have a harmless look, but which might possibly lead to a falling away, and which will in the future increase to an open hostility to the truth. On μῦθοι see on Tit. i. 14, and above at i. 4. These *Jewish fables* are here styled *profane and old wives'*. On the first epithet comp. i. 9; besides vi. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 16. The word occurs elsewhere only at Heb. xii. 16. If these *fables* (comp. i. 4, etc.), bore no moral fruit, had nothing to do with the real subject-matter of faith, and did not promote true piety, we can easily understand why this epithet, "profane, unholy," should be applied to them. And it is difficult to see why they may not have been, at the same time, silly and anile. Comp. Planck against Schleiermacher. Dr. Baur has explained γραώδης μ. to mean a myth which treats of an old matron—the Sophia Achamoth—which, apart from

other considerations, contradicts the derivation of the word from εἶδος, comp. *e. g.*, θεοειδής. And how unsuitable an epithet beside that of *profane* would be that which characterized these fables as treating of an old woman. Would there be in this any reason for warning Timothy against them? And then this epithet would only apply to a certain definite myth, while those myths in general, as they are said to be *profane*, could not be also characterized as γραώδεις. Enough, however, has already been said to shew, that it is not the myths of the gnosis in the second century that are here meant. The *genealogies* and *commandments* are not specially mentioned here; these things are all connected with each other; hence, elsewhere, even when it is intended to give a connected view of them, sometimes one and sometimes another is passed over in the enumeration (comp. Tit. i. 14 with iii. 9). On παραιτοῦ = to forbid one's self, comp. at Tit. iii. 10. But Timothy is also warned against another danger which is closely connected with the one just mentioned; as the being taken up with fables leads away from the true objects of knowledge, so also, and at the same time, from *godliness;* comp. i. 4, seq.; Tit. i. 1, 2; ii. 1, etc. Nay, these pursuits add to the claim of a higher wisdom, that of a higher morality, on the ground of a false relation to the law, Tit. i. 14, iii. 9; 1 Tim. i. 6, seq. In opposition then to being occupied with the fables, Timothy is also especially warned against this false practical tendency of an ascetic nature: *but exercise thyself unto godliness.* We have only to compare i. 4, 5, in order fully to understand this new admonition. We have the same transition only in the reverse order also in 2 Tim. ii. 22, 23. The expression γυμνάζειν (comp. Heb. v. 14, xii. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 14 = exercise thyself unto, in behalf of godliness) is occasioned by the antithetical allusion to these errors, comp. ver. 8. Others (Lösner) think that the apostle has been led by the expression ἐντρέφεσθαι to the metaphor taken from the gymnasium, as we read in Euripides Phoen. V. 397, γυμνασίοις ἐντραφῆναι. But ἐντρέφ. does not necessarily lead to this metaphor, and besides it is removed further back by the παραιτοῦ to which γυμν. forms the immediate antithesis. For the understanding of εὐσέβεια De Wette refers us to vi. 11, 12; 2 Tim. ii. 22. Comp. also 1 Tim. i. 4, 5.

Ver. 8.—The exhortation to *godliness*, which has its seat principally in the heart, but from this as its centre extends to the whole life of the man, is now in ver. 8 confirmed by the negative statement which the apostle had already in his eye when he wrote γυμν. ver. 7. Opposed to that godliness which has its root in the heart, and from thence diffuses a sanctifying influence over what is without, is the asceticism which aims at reaching the inward man through what is outward, or, in its most degenerate form, abides merely by what is outward. This is evidently the light in which the apostle views the

opposition between *εὐσέβεια* and *σωματικὴ γυμνασία*. He has not here, however, in his mind that extremely degenerate form of asceticism which he has described in ver. 3, but the appearances of the present; for, only with respect to these, could Timothy be warned, who, as we learn elsewhere, was not without a leaning to them (comp. v. 23). Ἡ *γὰρ σωματικὴ γυμνασία* he says quite generally, therefore not naming special errors. The words *πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος* = is profitable unto little (the opposite of *πρὸς πάντα*) is the opinion which he pronounces upon this tendency as a whole, as opposed to the *exercise unto godliness* which has its seat in the inner man. If we keep in view that the apostle in the expression *σωμ. γυμν.* aims at denoting the substantial nature of this tendency, the fundamental idea of all asceticism, though it is occasioned by actual occurrences on account of which Timothy is warned, we shall then not be surprised with De Wette and others, to find him ascribing a certain profit to this exercise, because, as De Wette adds, it belongs to the doctrines of devils, ver. 1, on which objection we do not need to say anything farther. How could the apostle have entirely rejected *σωματικὴ γυμν.* to which fasting, refraining from marriage or from conjugal intercourse for a season, 1 Cor. vii. 5, etc., belong? But it is likewise easy to be accounted for that the apostle generally, and here in an especial manner, while he has the abuse of it in his eye, restricts the advantage of this bodily exercise to an *ὀλίγον* in comparison with the exercise of godliness, which is directed to faith, love, etc. Secondly, De Wette and others stumble at the contrast here made between *εὐσέβεια* and *σωματ. γυμν.* and their respective results. The small profit which attends *bodily exercise* must, it is said, be also of a moral kind, and therefore belong to *godliness*. How can this then be placed in opposition to the other? Only the *πνευματικὴ γυμν.* can be rightly opposed to the *σωματικὴ γυμν.*—But *εὐσέβεια*, which can be viewed only as something internal, forms an apt antithesis to an exercise which refers to what is external, to the *σῶμα*. Regard is not to be had here to the good effects which may possibly flow from bodily exercise, and which belong to the sphere of *godliness*, but to the specific fundamental idea of ascetism as expressed by *σωμ. γυμν.* in its opposition to that heart-piety which sanctifies the life. *But godliness is profitable unto all things*, continues the apostle; by this contrast the sense of *εὐσέβεια* here is determined as signifying what is internal, which also the word in itself implies. The words *unto all things* are explained and amplified in the following—*having the promise of life, the present and the future*. Godliness, therefore, comprehends also the small advantage to be derived from *bodily exercise*, as it is profitable unto all things. Πάντα is not with Bengel, to be understood as meaning omnia in corpore et anima: for *πρὸς ὀλίγον* cannot be understood of

bodily advantage, inasmuch as ascetism has no regard to such an advantage, but to moral perfection. Calvin well: Qui pietatem habet isti nihil deest, etiamsi careat istis adminiculis. There is therefore no ground for maintaining, with De Wette, that "at all events, the writer has thought and written indistinctly." The view of many of the ancient expositors, as Chrysostom and Theophylact, who, out of respect for asceticism, understood the *σωμ. γυμν.* of bodily gymnastic exercises, and with whom, in more recent times, Mack and De Wette have coincided, which makes only a verbal connexion in the thought, as such a species of exercise in reference to Timothy could not be conceived of—this view is refuted as a mere make-shift, by the very difficulty of connecting with it an intelligible interpretation.*—The objection of Schleiermacher, that if Paul were the author, we should have a more full description of the *exercise unto godliness*, is obviated by the remarks in the Gen. Introd., § 4. He who reads the epistle consecutively can, moreover, be in no doubt as to what the apostle means.—*Ζωῆς τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς μελλούσης* explains the *πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλ.* The genitive denotes the import of the promise, comp. 2 Tim. i. 1; 1 John ii. 25. This *life* promised to godliness is separated into the two parts *ἡ νῦν καὶ ἡ μέλλουσα.* On the article comp. Winer's Gr., § 18, 7. This construction, which, by the repetition of the article before *μελλ.*, represents the two parts as independent—as also the allusion to *πρὸς πάντα*—shews that it was not the apostle's intention to say: godliness has the promise of the life which is a present, and at the same time a future life (= *τῆς καὶ νῦν καὶ μελλούσης*); in which case *ἡ νῦν ζωή* would itself signify "the true life of godliness" (Matthies), or "the true life of blessedness" (Mack), while *ζωὴ ἡ νῦν*, as De Wette has already observed in opposition to these, is evidently intended to represent the reward or fruit of godliness. Thus *ζωὴ ἡ νῦν* can only be (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 19) the present life in contradistinction to the *ἡ μέλλ.*, that which follows it. With the *ζωῆς τῆς νῦν* are then to be associated such promises as we find in Deut. iv. 40, v. 33; Matth. vi. 33, xix. 29; Mark x. 29 (comp. also Eph. vi. 2, seq.) It does not exhaust the import of the expression, as De Wette observes, to explain it merely of *bona et commoda hujus vitae*, as the proper rendering of the genitive shews (comp. above); it is rather to be understood of a long and happy life, as Eph. vi. 2, seq. The sentiment receives its necessary limitation through the following *καὶ τ. μ.*, as also through the point of view from which the Christian regards life as a whole. Harless aptly observes on the passage in Ephesians: "Thus then the Christian knows that the cross is his first good, the earthly blessing which

* Huther also adheres to this interpretation; "the apostle sets in opposition to the *γυμνάζειν* which he enjoins upon Timothy the *γυμνάζειν* which was practised with much earnestness among the Greeks, although it *profited but little.*"—It is, however, of Timothy not of the Greeks, that the writer of the epistle is here speaking (*γάρ*).

God gives him in any measure, the second good in which he is to rejoice ; or if he knows not this, then he must consider every earthly joy as a curse, which hinders him from participating in his best good."*

Ver. 9.—This assertion with regard to *godliness*, by which the admonition to Timothy to exercise himself therein is confirmed, is now itself corroborated in the words: *it is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation*, comp. i. 15. The emphatical form in which this sentence is expressed, is explained by the prediction, ver. 3, seq., which forms the basis of the admonition, ver. 6, seq. ; this is the true antidote to those ascetic errors.

Ver. 10.—This certainty the apostle further confirms by reminding Timothy of the fact, that they are borne up by it amid all their labour and suffering. For what else—is the sense of the verse—do we endure labour and reproach, than on account of this hope? And the more laborious and reproachful this apostolic calling is, the more strongly does it confirm this hope ; as Baumgarten well observes. I prefer to take *εἰς τοῦτο* as having reference to the following *ὅτι*, not as pointing back to the promise made with respect to godliness in ver. 8 ; in which latter case, the *life which is to come* is generally taken by itself, as the *life which now is* would not agree very well with *we labour*, and *suffer reproach*. The sentence appears to me thus to contain a more strict confirmation of the *πιστὸς ὁ λόγος*. Accordingly, *εἰς τοῦτο* is = "from regard to this that," not = "for this" (namely, for the *promise*). *Καὶ κοπιῶμεν καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεθα*—not *κοπιῶμεν* without *καί*, and *καὶ ἀγωνιζόμεθα*, the former of which is preferred by Tischendorf, though the latter reading has also weighty authorities in its favour (comp. in Tischendorf). *Ὀνειδιζόμεθα*, as passive, might seem strange in the connexion in which it here stands. It is a concise expression of the idea = we suffer it that we are reproached. *Κοπιάω* denotes the *laborious* work of the apostolic calling, a word frequently used by the apostle, 1 Cor. xv. 10 ; Gal. iv. 11 ; Phil. ii. 16, etc. The perfect tense in *ἠλπίκαμεν* (comp. 1. Cor. xv. 19 ; 2 Cor. i. 10), "because we have set our hope," represents the hope in which their laborious calling rests, as the enduring result of the act of mind denoted by *ἠλπίκαμεν*. The expression *θεὸς ζῶν* does not indeed signify : the God who bestows that life mentioned in ver. 8 ; it doubtless, however, contains a retrospective reference to the promise of life, ver. 8. *Ἐπί* as at Rom. xv. 12. The accessary clause, *who is the Saviour*, etc., is expressed not from the point of view occupied by every Christian, but from that of those whose hope is to them an impelling motive to take labour and shame

* Huther differently: "For the present and future life." The idea would then be simple; but the question is, whether, contrary to common usage, the *ζωή* can here signify anything else than the object.

upon themselves in order that they may lead as many as possible to this *salvation ;* this indeed is indicated by the words, *we both labour*, etc.* Schleiermacher has stumbled at the words *all men*, because, according to Paul, only *those who believe* can be saved unto life everlasting. But God is here, as elsewhere, called *Saviour*, because he has provided salvation for all (comp. i. 15, ii. 4), and has opened to them the possibility of everlasting life. *Chiefly of them that believe* it is further said, inasmuch as only in them is the purpose accomplished ; with which Gal. vi. 10, *especially to them who are of the household of faith*, is to be compared, as Baumgarten observes. De Wette thinks the word μάλιστα not quite suitable—but what other word should have been used ?

Ver. 11.—That which the apostle has held up before Timothy as a certain truth, first of all, for his own individual reflection, is to be enjoined by Timothy upon others, and taught to them, (comp. on παραγγ. i. 3).

Ver. 12.—This last injunction leads the apostle again to a series of admonitions, in which he reminds Timothy how he is rightly to wait upon his calling as a teacher.—*Let no one despise thy youth* (comp. Tit. ii. 15), inasmuch as the fulfilment of the commission which has already been mentioned depends upon this as a condition. The exhortation is not addressed to the church ;† but, as the following ἀλλὰ τύπος γίνου shews, to Timothy. He is by his conduct to make himself to be respected in spite of his youth. Some have stumbled at the νεότης here mentioned (comp. 2 Tim. ii. 22). But others have already shewn (comp., for example, Mack), that Timothy, according to the account in Acts xvi. 1–3, was still young when he joined himself to the apostle ; that between this time and the liberation from the Roman imprisonment, eleven years intervene, and therefore that Timothy might still be young ; chiefly, however, that his position at that time must be taken into view ; in relation to the presbyters of the church (comp. v. 1, ὡς πατέρα) reference might certainly be made with the utmost propriety to Timothy's youth. When he, a man of perhaps thirty to thirty-six years of age, ordained presbyters, iii. 1, seq.—or exhorted presbyters of sixty years, and even older, v. 1—or called them to account, v. 19, must not his youth have presented a contrast, especially as it was the custom to connect qualification for the government of the church with age as its condition ; unless his personal conduct procured for him a respect which might have been denied to him on account of his youth ? Comp. besides, 1 Cor. xvi. 11. On the construction of the words, μηδείς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρ. comp. Winer's Gr., § 30, 9, p. 182. We might take the one genitive as genitive of the thing,

* Huther, ὅς ἐστι, etc., for thus only can the hope of life be directed towards him.

† Huther: to the church.

and the other as that of the person, "which, however, is not necessary."—The following words show how Timothy is to secure such a respect for himself as may make his youth to be forgotten: *but be thou an example*, etc. He is to present in his own person a pattern of the believers, and that in speech, in conduct, in love, in faith, in purity. On τύπος., comp. Tit. ii. 7; Phil. iii. 17. Λόγος, in contradistinction to the ἀναστροφή, is word, speech in general. *In faith* and *in love* denote the moral principles from which all right conduct must proceed. As their result purity is denoted. Ἁγνεία, not specially "chastity," but purity generally, comp. 2 Cor. vi. 6, vii. 11, etc. On the omission of the article with the nouns, comp. Winer's Gr., § 19, 1. Ἐν πνεύματι = in manifestation of the Spirit, is wanting in A.C.D.F.G. all. verss. pl. patt. Against Schleiermacher, who explains the transition to the μηδείς σου, etc., as an imitation of Tit. ii. 15, De Wette observes, that these and the following admonitions have a tolerably natural connexion with what goes before, as already from ver. 6 onwards, Timothy's conduct was spoken of.

Ver. 13.—The apostle here urges him to the diligent exercise of his calling itself. Till I come (comp. iii. 14, seq.), he writes, attend to reading, exhortation, instruction. The practice of reading publicly the holy scriptures of the Old Testament had been transferred from the Jewish synagogue to the Christian assemblies; with the ἀνάγνωσις were connected (comp. the passages first adduced) the λόγος παρακλήσεως and the διδασκαλία. The former is the discourse addressed to the feelings and will of the hearers, the latter, to their understanding; both corresponding nearly to our *sermon*. Thus does Justin also describe generally (Apol. I. 67, ed. Oberth, comp. in Heydenreich, Mack) the Christian assemblies. It is impossible definitely to say when the writings of the New Testament were joined to this ἀνάγνωσις of the Old Testament. Their publication, as we gather from 1 Thess. v. 27, Col. iv. 16, was effected by their being read before the church; but the question is, at what period this public reading became customary, for then only were they first annexed to those of the Old Testament, as the continuation of the canon. So much, at all events, we may suppose as certain, that the apostle had here only the scriptures of the Old Testament in his mind—comp. on this point Thiersch. a. a. O., p. 344, seq. It will not do to understand παράκλησις of private admonition, as the apostle could not intend to enjoin merely the ἀνάγνωσις on Timothy with reference to the public assemblies, and as the παράκλησις demonstrably followed the ἀνάγνωσις. We therefore refer the third member also, the διδασκαλία, not to privata institutio, but likewise to public worship; for in this the διδασκαλία as distinct from the παράκλησις, was certainly no less necessary. So also Olshausen. On the asyndeton, Winer's Gr., § 60, 2, p. 475.

Ver. 14.—The foregoing positive exhortation is here again urged in its negative form. Timothy is not to let the gift that dwells in him—what gift is shewn in ver. 13—lie unused. Μὴ ἀμέλει—Bengel well: negligit qui non exercet. The word ἀμέλ. also at Heb. ii. 3, viii. 9; Matth. xxii. 5; 2 Pet. i. 12. Χάρισμα Mack says with truth, except at 1 Pet. iv. 10, is used only by Paul. Comp. on Rom. xii. 6, seq.; 1 Cor. xii. 4, seq.* It denotes the gift of the divine Spirit, that gift which qualifies him for the preaching of the gospel, for the *work of an evangelist* (2 Tim. iv. 5), and which he had to make use of at present in the service of a particular church. On the ἐν σοί, comp. 2 Tim. i. 6, where the gift is represented as a spark of the Spirit lying within him, the kindling of which depends on the will of him on whom the gift is bestowed. So here also the use of the χάρισμα is made to depend on the will of Timothy. Ὃ ἐδόθη, etc. = "which was given thee through prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." Διὰ προφητείας cannot be rendered, as Mack does, on the ground of i. 18, "on account of prophecyings," for what meaning would there be in—"on account of prophecyings which were connected with the laying on of hands, was the gift imparted to him?" The connexion of μετὰ ἐπιθ. with διά rather makes it necessary, as the laying on of hands is to be conceived of as the means (comp. 2 Tim. i. 6), to understand διά = through, by means of; and διά—πρεσβυτερίου, then, as De Wette also observes, denotes the whole process through which the communication of the gift was mediated. It does not sufficiently characterize the ἐπίθεσις τῶν χ., etc., to understand διά merely = under, in. On προφητ. comp. at i. 18. With respect to the *laying on of hands*,† comp. Acts xiii. 3, where we read that hands were laid in prayer on the apostle Paul and Barnabas, by the prophets and teachers at Antioch, in order to separate them *for the work* to which they were called; Acts vi. 6, where we read that, in like manner, hands were laid in prayer by the apostles on the newly-elected deacons, in order to impart to them the gift of the Spirit for their ministry. It is in every case an appropriation of the gift of the Spirit in prayer through the instrumentality of others for a definite object, for a *work* which is undertaken, or a service which is entered upon, whether this service be marked out in a standing office or not. It cannot be directly proved whether this laying on of hands took place in the case of presbyters, but it is to be presumed a priori that it did, and passages such as Acts xiv. 23, xx. 28, strongly countenance the supposition. Not so closely connected with what we have here is that which we find in Acts viii. 17, xix. 6, comp. with Heb. vi. 2; for in these passages indeed it is a *laying on of hands* for the communication of the Spirit

* On the charismata in general, comp. Neander, a. a. O. I., p. 232.

† Comp. Neander, a. a. O. I. 267.

that is spoken of, not, however, for a definite sphere of duty, or a special calling, but for the general calling of the Christian, spontaneously to serve with that which he is and has, and to testify the new life of the Spirit. Comp. Hofmann a. a. Q. II., p. 243.* This use of the laying on of hands belongs, it is well known, to the Old Testament; comp. here chiefly Num. xxvii. 18–20; Deut. xxxiv. 9; passages such as Gen. xlviii. 14; Matth. xix. 13. Mark xvi. 18, Luke xiii. 13, etc., belong only to the idea which lies at the foundation of the laying on of hands in general. Τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου: the eldership of that district to which Timothy belonged laid hands on him (Acts xvi. 1, seq.). The gift of teaching, which is here referred to, was not needed by Timothy for the first time when he was left in Ephesus, but from the beginning onwards; comp. 2 Tim. i. 6, where, as also in the whole epistle, no mention is made of his temporary position in Ephesus. The expression is therefore not to be explained of a consecration to his special calling in Ephesus.† The term πρεσβυτέριον (comp. Luke xxii. 66; Acts xxii. 5) cannot be understood of a number of presbyters then assembled; this were inadmissible, both grammatically and historically. Historically—because the expression was fixed in its application to a united whole, as the passages adduced shew (comp. also Planck, p. 41), and because, as has been shewn in the Gen. Introd., § 8, the existence together of several Christian presbyters cannot be conceived of apart from a collegial union; grammatically—because a number of presbyters cannot, according to the idea of the thing, be called πρεσβυτέριον. Even De Wette observes, in opposition to Schleiermacher, on πρεσβυτέριον, "The institution and the name are, in my opinion, not to be suspected." So also Olshausen. He, in like manner, acknowledges that a comparison with 2 Tim. i. 6, in which the laying on of hands is ascribed to the apostle, presents a difficulty which can be removed in a natural way by the combination of both passages. It will at once be seen, too, why in the passage in 2 Tim. the apostle especially directs the attention of Timothy to the part which he acted in the communication of the gift to him. Comp. the Commentary. We find a similar discrepancy in Gal. ii. 1, seq., comp. with Acts xv. 1, seq.; such differences necessarily arise from the difference of aim which a writer may have in describing the same thing at different times.

Ver. 15.—Ταῦτα μελέτα, and still stronger ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι, con-

* This ἐπίθεσις χειρῶν, which in Heb. vi. 2 is represented as belonging to the *foundation* and the *first principles of the doctrine of Christ*, is that to which our confirmation does not correspond, but ought to correspond. What important results chiefly relating to our church as it at present exists, are connected with the right understanding of that which pertains to the ἐπίθ. τ. χ., others have already shewn, comp. Zeitschrift für Prot. W. K. B. 18, p. 1, seq., Bd. 19, h. 6. Dr. Höfling das Sacram. der Taufe II., § 172, seq.

† Huther is certainly wrong in explaining it of the introduction to office in Ephesus.

tinues the apostle, after referring to the gift imparted to Timothy, which we are to connect with vers. 12–14. Μελετάω is certainly not used by the apostle elsewhere, but it belongs to the New Testament usage, Acts iv. 25 ; Mark xiii. 11. The ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι is the Latin omnis or totus sum in aliqua re, "to be absorbed in a thing," so to speak. "That thy progress may be manifest to all." For πᾶσι, not ἐν πᾶσι, is the true reading, according to the critical authorities. The design of this additional clause appears from the above, *let no one despise thy youth*, ver. 12. Προκοπή only here and Phil. i. 12, 25 ; therefore specifically Pauline. The nature of the *progress* is determined by the reference to vers. 12–14.

Ver. 16.—"Take heed unto thyself and unto the doctrine ; continue in it." The apostle sums up in these words what is said from vers. 12–15. Duo sunt curanda bono pastori, ut docendo invigilet et se ipsum purum custodiat, etc., Calvin. On ἐπέχειν comp. Luke xiv. 7 ; Acts iii. 5. Ἐπιμένειν occurs only with ἐπί in the sense, "to remain with any one," Acts xxviii. 14, in the writings of the apostle only with πρός, 1 Cor. xvi. 7 ; Gal. i. 18 ; on the other hand in a tropical sense, and with reference to things, it is also used elsewhere by the apostle, and only by him, Rom. vi. 1, xi. 22, 23 ; Col. i. 23. The expression must be understood in this latter sense here, for it is not persons that are spoken of by whom Timothy is to abide, but things to which he is to be entirely devoted ; comp. also 2 Tim. iii. 14. Thus also the indefinite αὐτοῖς as neuter, will have reference to the ταῦτα . . . ἐν τούτοις, ver. 15. "If thou doest this thou shalt save thyself and them that hear thee." One cannot comprehend why this, in reference to Timothy, is to be understood of a higher recompense, in reference to others, of the σωτηρία merely (De Wette). The words intimate that it is the same *salvation* in regard to both, and the important truth is here conveyed, that faithfulness in his calling is for the teacher the condition of his own salvation, that in performing his duty to others he is at the same time caring for his own soul's salvation.

§ 5. Directions to Timothy with Respect to his Conduct towards the Members of the Church, According to the Distinctions of Age, Sex, and Position within the Church.

(v. 1–25.)

This section, the contents of which are summarily stated above, consists of several parts. First, in vers. 1, 2, directions are briefly given to Timothy, how rightly to conduct himself towards the members of the church, according to the distinctions of age and

sex. In vers. 3–16 the apostle treats more fully of how he is to act with regard to the widows, and more especially, in vers. 3–8, with regard to the widows in general, and in vers. 9–16 to those who are to receive the ecclesiastical distinction of the viduatus. In vers. 17–19 he treats of the *προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι* in contradistinction to those mentioned in i. 1. In vers. 20–25 of his conduct towards members of the church who fall into sin, their punishment and restoration, with which is interwoven an admonition to Timothy himself.

Vers. 1, 2.—Rebuke not a *πρεσβύτερος*—elderly person—but admonish him as a father; younger persons as brethren; *πρεσβυτέρας*—elderly women—as mothers; younger as sisters, in all purity. On the connexion with the preceding, Leo well observes: quam supra scripsisset, nemini licere ex juventute Timothei ejus despiciendi occasionem sumere, nunc jam ipsum hortatur Timotheum, ut semper memor suæ *νεότητος*; ita se gerat erga seniores uti revera deceat virum juniorem. That *πρεσβύτερος* here, as in Acts ii. 17, is not the official name, but merely the designation of age, is evident from its being opposed to *νεωτέρους* and *πρεσβυτέρας*, as also from ver. 17, where presbyters properly so-called are first spoken of. The expression *ἐπιπλήσσειν*, properly to strike upon = "to rebuke sharply," only here. As it is a stronger expression than *ἐλέγχειν*, and *ἐπιτιμάω* is neither equivalent to it, nor is itself used oftener than once by the apostle (2 Tim. iv. 2), nothing remains of Schleiermacher's objection except that the word is just a *ἅπαξ. λεγ.*, like many other expressions in the other epistles, and a very appropriate word. The same applies, as Planck has already remarked, to his objections against *ὄντως*, ver. 3, against *ἔκγονα*, ver. 4, which Schleiermacher himself sufficiently explains from the Septuagint. The *παρακάλει ὡς πατέρα* is opposed to *ἐπιπλ.* His zeal in the fulfilment of his office must not come into collision with the reverence due to age; and, with regard to those who are younger, must not lead to the violation of that equality which is not removed by his office. In accordance with the position which naturally belongs to him is the servant of Jesus Christ to fulfil his official duties, which have regard to the care of souls. The opposite of this is the *κυριεύειν*. The words *with all purity* are, with the most of commentators, to be referred specially to the last point. Chrysostom: *μηδὲ ὑποψίαν, φησὶ, δῷς.*

Vers. 3–16.—Of the widows.—The passage is difficult, and is variously interpreted by different commentators. The principal difference consists in this—that some separate vers. 3–8 from ver. 9, seq., and regard the former section as containing directions of a more general kind with respect to the duties of widows in their every-day life, and according to their circumstances, the latter as

containing instructions either as to their provision from the church, or their appointment as deaconesses. Others again understand vers. 3–16 as treating of widows in one and the same respect, and that in vers. 3–8, as well as in ver. 9, seq., rules are laid down with reference to the support which they are to receive from the church. Others again understand vers. 3–8 of the church provision, but ver. 9, seq., of the appointment of deaconesses. And these differences assume many shades in the interpretation of the particular parts. As representatives of the first view we name here only Schleiermacher, Böttger, and Matthies, the two former of whom agree also in understanding ver. 9, seq., of the appointment of widows as deaconesses, while Matthies understands the passage primarily of their support. Planck, Baumgarten, and Neander represent the second view, which is the one more commonly taken; while Mack has contended for the third. I confess that I myself was formerly inclined to the second view, that vers. 3–16 treat of the support which the widows are to receive from the church; but a renewed investigation has led me to substantially the view given by De Wette, and which he prefaces by saying, that he thinks he has, by means of it, made clear the interpretation of this difficult passage. So also Leo, Exc. ii. But chiefly does Mosheim deserve here to be gratefully mentioned, who has already given substantially the same explanation, and has so conclusively proved it that we cannot but wonder that it should ever have been rejected. The points from which the differences proceed are the interpretation of ver. 4 and ver. 9, *χήρα καταλεγέσθω*, etc.

Ver. 3.—*Χήρας τίμα, τὰς ὄντως χήρας.* The apostle in these words passes to a new and special relation of life, while in vers. 1 and 2 he was dealing with the differences of age and sex—only, however, in the case of the *παρακαλεῖν*; accordingly, here also, he does not give rules of life embracing the whole conduct. With the mention of the *χῆραι* comes immediately into view the special relation in which Timothy has to do with them—their need of support, comp. Acts vi. 1. We must not, however, conclude from vers. 1 and 2, with Schleiermacher and others following him, that because there the conduct of Timothy towards different persons is spoken of, here also *τιμᾶν* in reference to the widows can only be understood of his conduct in general, as consisting in the shewing of that respect which is due to them. For, on the one hand, *μὴ ἐπιπλ.*, with that which is opposed to it—*παρακάλει*—cannot be said to denote Timothy's conduct in general, and on the other, the mention of the *χῆραι* carries with it the special relation in which he stands towards them. The writer also in vers. 17, 19, 20, 22, and, finally, ver. 23, as well as here, passes suddenly to what is new. Chiefly, however, it is apparent from ver. 4 (comp. below), with

which vers. 8, 16, 17 are to be compared, that τιμάω here must be taken in the definite sense of honouring by providing for. We do not say that τιμάω means precisely "to support," but that it signifies an honour which was to shew itself in giving support to those on whom it was to be conferred, must have been self-evident to Timothy, in accordance with the relation in which he stood to them. Comp. Matth. xv. 4, 6; Acts xxviii. 10. Reference has already been made in connexion with this to Acts vi. 1. This care for the widows was transferred from the Jewish economy; comp. Deut. xvi. 11, xiv. 29, xxiv. 17, 19; Ex. xxii. 22, seq., etc.; Winer, R.W.B., under *widow*. Then Ign. ad Polyc. c. 4, χῆραι μὴ ἀμελείσθωσαν. Just. M. Apol; 1 (al. 2), 67; τὸ συλλεγόμενον παρὰ τῷ προεστῶτι ἀποτίθεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφανοῖς τε καὶ χήραις. (De Wette on the passage). Τὰς ὄντως χήρας the apostle adds by way of more definitely describing the class of individuals of whom he speaks. Schleiermacher maintains that by this expression can only be understood widows of the right character; and he is quite right with his interpretation of τιμᾶν. But with that interpretation this assertion also falls to the ground. Not only is the manifest sense of ver. 16 against it, but chiefly vers. 4 and 5, from which we learn what the apostle means by ἡ ὄντως χήρα.

Ver. 4.—The apostle proceeds: εἰ δέ τις χήρα, etc., but if any widow have children or descendants, they should first learn to shew piety towards their own house, and to requite their parents, etc.—*But if any widow*, stands evidently opposed to the *widows indeed*. From this opposition, the idea implied in the *widow indeed* finds its explanation. But this opposition is overlooked when, with Schleiermacher, Matthies, and others, we find in vers. 4 and 5 a description of the *widow indeed* in these two circumstances, namely, that she has had children, and that she is destitute. Wherefore, then, the πρῶτον, which has meaning only in the antithetical relation to ver. 3? Why is not ἡ ὄντως χήρα the subject? And why in ver. 5 is it said, *but she that is a widow indeed*, implying opposition to what precedes, seeing that according to this interpretation ver. 4 also speaks of a *widow indeed?* In μεμονωμένη alone would there be any opposition to ver. 4. And if the design is to describe the right widow, it is surely altogether incongruous to say, *let them first learn*, for as right widows they must already have learned this. And why then in ver. 5 ἤλπικεν and not the imperative as in ver. 4? Nor may we make the widows the subject of μανθαν., as this interpretation requires. If, on the contrary, we understand the words, *but if any widow*, etc., as opposed to the *widow indeed*, and consequently as determining who is to be regarded as a widow and who is not, which seems to be required by the words ὄντως χήρα placed emphatically at the conclusion of ver. 3, then all is clear. Ver. 4 then

says that she who has children or descendants is not such a *widow indeed* and needing support; such a one is to be referred to her own family, who, ere it falls to Timothy to perform the duty expressed by the τιμᾶν, must first learn to shew piety towards their own household. And in opposition to such a one is the *widow indeed*, ver. 5: she is, therefore, described as one quite desolate, who has no longer any to care for her, exactly as in ver. 16. Schleiermacher gives the true meaning of ἔκγονα in the gloss of Hesychius ἔκγονα, τέκνα τέκνων; comp. p. 61. That the subject of *let them learn* is not the widows, but the *children or descendants*, is clear from the antithetical relation of ver. 4 to ver. 3, not from the verb being plural, which might certainly be employed, as the εἴ τις χήρα represents a case that would frequently occur (although ii. 5 is somewhat different). For, to the direction given to Timothy to support those who are widows indeed, it would be no proper reply; but such widows as have persons belonging to them ought to fulfil their duty towards them—but such widows ought to receive requiting love from them. Even though we should understand τιμᾶν quite generally of mere respect, the antithesis requires that we take τέκνα as the subject. But as the widows could not be referred to their own families to receive this general respect, τιμᾶν must evidently be understood in the sense we have given to it, as is shewn also by the expression ἀμοιβὰς ἀποδιδόναι. Thus πρῶτον receives its definite sense (comp. above); and εὐσεβεῖν is properly applied to the obligation of children to shew piety to their parents, not, vice versa, of parents towards their children. And how far-fetched must be the meaning assigned to the words, *and requite their parents*, if the widow is the subject, for then the only sense that can be given to the words is, that they are to requite the care which they have received from their parents by shewing the same care towards their own children. Are we to suppose then that the widows in Ephesus were so forgetful of their duty, that they required to be exhorted in this way to the first and most natural of all obligations! Εὐσεβεῖν denotes the pious disposition becoming a child which, also in old people, by virtue of the same religiously moral idea that connects the fourth commandment of the decalogue with the third, is so common in reference to parents, magistrates, and honourable persons in general; comp. Passow. Consequently it does not signify here: to be pious in reference to their own family, as those render who make the widows the subject; comp. Acts xvii. 23. But it is said that τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον does not agree with our interpretation. As the writer, however, has no definite family relation in his eye (*children or descendants*) he was under the necessity of using a general expression, and then, as De Wette thinks, the expression οἶκον may also convey the idea that this εὐσεβεῖν denotes a thing of family feeling and

family honour. Τὸν ἴδιον evidently stands in opposition to the relation in which the widow stands to the church from which she is to receive support, which is to her in a relative point of view—strange. On πρόγονοι, finally, which has likewise been found unsuitable, De Wette observes: "πρόγ. parents and grandfather and grandmother, is used of those who are still alive, Plat. legg. XI., p. 931, seq. It is plural because used of mother or grandmother." The expression, *let them learn*, shews, moreover, that abuses in this respect had crept into the church, and that widows sought support from the church who had relations that were able to provide for them.—*For this is acceptable before God*, comp. ii. 3, from which the καλὸν καί of the received version has been transferred into the text of our passage; comp. Tischendorf.

Ver. 5.—De Wette says well: "*The widow indeed* is now spoken of, and that in special opposition to ver. 4, as one who is desolate; not, however, for the purpose of saying that she is to be "honoured" by the church (for this has already been said, ver. 3), but in order to bring into view the conditions under which this honour is to be given. The words, *but she who is a widow indeed*, can, in opposition to ver. 4, be understood only of her who is wholly bereft and destitute, not of the true widow who is what she should be; and καὶ μεμονωμένη is an epexegetical explanation of ἡ ὄντως χήρα. If with Schleiermacher and others, we take ἡ ὄντως χήρα = the right widow (in respect to disposition and character) and καὶ μεμονωμένη not as an explanation but as an additional characteristic, we should then have the false antithesis according to which the widow described in the preceding verse would be not a right widow in point of character, or rather the words ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα would form no antithesis at all, and this would only be formed by the supplementary expression μεμον., which is logically impossible. It is objected to our interpretation, that if μεμον. were explanatory it would have the article. (Matthies.) And why should it not also have the article if μεμον. forms an additional characteristic? The reason why καὶ μεμον. is placed after ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα appears to me to be, that the writer wants to connect ἡ ὄντως as before, immediately with χήρα, and not to place μεμον. directly beside ἡ ὄντως; but if μεμον. had been placed before instead of after, it would in no case have received the article, as it would have formed one and the same idea with ἡ ὄντως. But it is further objected to this interpretation (Leo), that the ὄντως χήρα could not have been opposed to the σπαταλῶσα, ver. 6, if ἡ ὄντως χήρα were not vidua pia et proba. In reply to this we have simply to say, that σπαταλῶσα, ver. 6, is not opposed to ἡ ὄντως χήρα, ver. 5, but to the ὄντως χήρα described in ver. 5, who hopes in God and continues in prayer. As ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα, ver. 5, is opposed to the widow, ver. 4, so ἡ δὲ σπατ. is opposed

to the widow as described in ver. 5. But if the apostle meant to be connected with ἡ ὄντως χήρα only the idea of destitution, it is asked, how could he have added the words, *trusteth in God and continueth*, etc., seeing that these apply to a widow not as destitute, but as a right widow? In reply to this reasoning it will suffice to refer to 1 Cor. vii. 33, 34; *he that is unmarried careth for things that belong to the Lord . . . but he that is married careth for the things of the world.* As the apostle in that passage, viewing the work of one's life as determined by the circumstances of one's life says, *he careth for*—so in the passage before us, he says, *she trusteth in*, although he knows, ver. 6, that there are also such as *live in pleasure* The work of an ὄντως χήρα, *i. e.*, of one who is bereft and desolate, as determined by the removal of all that once bound her to life, is denoted by ἤλπικε, etc., and by the indicative form is represented as a thing which is self-evident. The design of ver. 5, however, as is also to be well considered, is not farther to explain the idea expressed in ὄντως χήρα, and to add another characteristic to that contained in ver. 4; for the idea in ὄντως χήρα has already been made sufficiently clear in ver. 4. Nor would it correspond to this, that ἤλπικε, etc., denotes what is self-evident in regard to every desolate widow, but ver. 5 would then rather have to be explained on the supposition of its being opposed to such widows as are indeed desolate, but do not trust in God. But the design of ver. 5 is rather, as De Wette has already remarked, after it has been laid down in ver. 4, what is meant by a *widow indeed*, to specify the conditions under which the apostle lays on Timothy the charge to *honour those who are widows indeed.* "The condition," says De Wette rightly, not *the reason;* for then, either the widow, ver. 5, must have been described in opposition to ver. 4 as standing in need of support, which is not the case, or ver. 5 must be viewed as affording an additional characteristic, of the *widow indeed*, and must be understood of her worthiness, as a reason why she should receive support, against which what is necessary has already been said. What reason the apostle has for specifying this condition, appears from ver. 6, and from the injunction to Timothy: *these things give in charge that they may be blameless.*—Ἤλπικεν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, here the accus., above at iv. 10, the dative; see Winer's Gr., § 49, 1, p. 363. The accus. denotes the direction of the mind towards God; the dative, on the other hand, denotes God as the being on whom the hope rests. On the perfect, comp. on iv. 10 and Winer's Gr., § 40, 4, p. 244. That ἤλπικεν ἐπὶ. θ. is not to be understood as limited to temporal provision, and thus, as opposed to ver. 4, is evident from what follows, and from the antithesis in ver. 6. Καὶ προσμένει—Leo well: nam ex fiducia in Deo sponte fluit ardor precum.* On the differ-

* Huther connects this aptly with the case of Anna. Luke ii. 37.

ence between δέησις and προσευχή = asking and prayer, comp. on Phil. iv. 6. On the repetition of the article, see Winer's Gr., § 19, 5, p. 117

Ver. 6.—In opposition, not to the ὄντως χήρα merely, but to the ὄντως χήρα as just described, the words of this verse are to be understood. *She who lives in pleasure is dead while she lives.* Quippe quæ nec naturaliter jam nec spiritualiter frugi sit, as Bengel observes. On σπαταλάω, comp. Jam. v. 5. On the whole verse, Matth. viii. 22, etc. As the apostle does not in ver. 5 give an additional reason for giving support, so also is ver. 6 not to be regarded as containing a reason for withholding support, but rather as the negative side of that which the apostle looks for in a *widow indeed*, and which Timothy is to enjoin, ver. 7.

Ver. 7.—Καὶ ταῦτα παράγγελλε (= command i. 3). Ταῦτα is referred to vers. 3–6, or to vers. 4–6, or to vers. 5 and 6. The last is the correct way, as De Wette has already observed. The connexion with ver. 8 certainly seems to be in favour of referring ταῦτα to vers. 4–6. It seems that if ταῦτα is extended to ver. 4, then the apostle might naturally go on to say in ver. 8 : but if any one in spite of your command does not do this, etc. Then also the much stronger expression in ver. 8, in comparison with the *blameless*, ver. 7, would receive a more natural explanation, although De Wette does not admit this. Nevertheless it appears to me more suitable to refer ταῦτα only to vers. 5 and 6, and not to make the subject of ὥσι to to consist of elements so different, namely, children, and descendants, and widows. The ταῦτα παράγγ. has then a much more definite reference, and shews plainly the design of what is said in vers. 5 and 6 respecting the *widow indeed.* It terminates at ver. 7, and the apostle in ver. 8 turns back to ver. 4. The real widows are to be supported by you ; those who are not real, by their own family. If they do not this (ver. 8), then, etc.

Ver. 8.—" But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever." It is now quite evident that τίς ver. 8, is not to be understood of the widow, but of those belonging to her, on which see ver. 4. The ἴδιοι and οἰκεῖοι differ from each other in the same way as relations in general from those of the same house in particular ; of course there is no allusion here to the οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως, Gal. vi. 10, as is plain from the context, and from τῆς πίστεως not being added. Comp. Eph. ii. 19 ; qui ad domum Dei pertinent, the inmates of his house ; so here also in the natural sphere of bodily relationship. The sense of προνοεῖν is explained by ver. 4. The word is used again by the apostle only at Rom. xii. 17 ; 2 Cor. viii. 21. *Hath denied the faith*, namely, by his works, inasmuch as he practically disowns the obligation to love, which springs from the

essence of faith, even in regard to those who are corporeally most nearly related to him. The Protestant expositor must heartily subscribe to what Mack here so aptly observes, "Faith in the apostle's sense of the term, cannot exist without having love in it; for the subject-matter of faith is not a mere thing of the intellect, but the Divine grace and truth to which he who believes yields up his mind, as he who loves yields up his heart (he who believes is eo ipso he who loves, and therefore yields not merely the mind but the heart: *for with the heart man believeth*, Rom. x. 10); the subject-matter of faith is also the object of love, etc." On *ἀρνεῖσθαι*, comp. on Tit. i. 16. On *ἀπίστου χείρων*, comp. on Matth. v. 46, 47.

Ver. 9.—The interpretation of this verse will determine that of the following passage vers. 9–16. Does the apostle still speak of widows here in the same point of view as in ver. 3, namely, with reference to the provision to be made for them, or does he here pass to something else with respect to widows, and if so, to what else? Each of the views that are here possible to be taken—and especially the first, according to which, ver. 9, seq., is to be understood in the same respect as ver. 3, seq., namely, of the provision to be made for the widows by the church, and which is found in Theodoret, Chrysostom (hom. in h. l), Œcumenius, Theophylact, and Hieronymus (comp. De Wette)—has found its representatives in the most recent time, as has already been observed above. In the first place—to go at once into the principal question, whether something new begins here or not—every one must admit that the words *χήρα καταλ.* etc., have very much the appearance of being a transition to something new. We have found in vers. 3–8, which are evidently connected with each other, a close concatenation of the particular sentences even outwardly indicated; why is this all at once broken off here, seeing that if vers. 3–16 form a whole, vers. 3–8 contain the preliminary conditions of what is stated in ver. 9? Why is there no *οὖν*, or, better still, *δέ* in opposition to ver. 8? Why the sudden change of expression in *καταλεγέσθω*? Why is nothing more said about the *ὄντως χήρα*, if indeed vers. 3–8 were intended to explain what is meant by this, with a view to what is said in ver. 9? Further, if vers. 3–16 are to be understood of widows, only in reference to their being provided for by the church, why is there in ver. 5 a twofold criterion of their worthiness, and then again in vers. 9 and 10, and consisting of qualifications as independent of each other, as if they were not at all related? Would it not at least have been much more natural in this case, if with a *ἡ δὲ ὄντως χήρα* at the beginning of ver. 9, the result of vers. 4–8 had been summed up? And does not the expression *χήρα καταλεγέσθω* itself point to another purpose of this *enrolment?* For *χήρα καταλεγέσθω* is, as Winer shews, § 66, 4, p. 663, to be so construed as that *χήρα* is the predicate, and

nothing is to be supplied: "as widow let one be enrolled who is not under sixty years old." That the object of this enrolment was only the receiving support, is a mere presumption on the part of the commentators, and is not warranted by ver. 16 (see below). If it can be proved from history that there was an enrolment of widows as such, that as widows they were promoted to a place of ecclesiastical distinction, then we must regard the passage before us as referring to this practice; and it is difficult to see why rich widows, who in other respects possessed the necessary qualifications, should have been excluded from this distinction. And are the qualifications themselves laid down in vers. 9 and 10 suitable, on the supposition of their having special reference to the receiving of support from the church? There are a thousand things against this, says Schleiermacher; and when his opponents, as Planck, Baumgarten, and others say in reply, that there is no necessity to understand that all of these qualifications together must have been possessed by every widow to be taken into the list, they forget the true point of view, namely, that it is not widows in general, but those who were needy, that are exclusively spoken of, and regarded from this point of view, the qualifications there laid down cannot but appear strange. And why should the church fulfil the duty of charity only towards widows who were sixty years old? Might there not have been younger ones in a much more necessitous condition? And why only towards a widow who had been the *wife of one man?* Was the widow to whom this did not apply, but who in other respects was blameless, to receive no support? And similar questions might be put with reference to the having *brought up children*, and the qualifications that follow. But it may be said in a general way, that the apostle here makes the ecclesiastical support of such widows as were helpless and destitute to be dependent on their former conduct. Even in ver. 5 he does not do this. This were quite contrary to the spirit of Christian charity; and it would be pronounced foolish were any one in the present day, in the case of any similar institution in behalf of widows, to insist on the qualifications which the apostle has here laid down. And not only are vers. 9 and 10 inconsistent with this interpretation, but the following verses also—ver. 11, *but the younger widows refuse*, and ver. 14, *I will therefore that the younger widows marry:* for neither could the younger widows be all at once refused, if the receiving of support is what is referred to, nor could they be reasonably enjoined to marry again, if thereby all prospect of support from the church should be withdrawn (*ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή*). Nor, in what is said of the younger widows in these verses, is there the slightest indication of any want of the necessary means of subsistence on their part. Mosheim has already estimated aright the force of these considera-

tions. In short—the subject must be regarded from still another point of view (as it has been also by defenders of this interpretation), that, namely, according to which the receiving of support from the church is considered as at the same time an honourable distinction. But these two points of view do not necessarily coincide. Not every widow who required support would eo ipso also merit ecclesiastical distinction; and not every widow, who stood in no need of support from the church, could on this ground be shut out from ecclesiastical distinction. There must have been reasons of one kind for receiving support, and of a different kind for receiving distinction in the church. What the former were, we learn from vers. 3–8, and what the latter, from ver. 9, seq. Thus the poor widow, or the widow who had become poor, might certainly be also promoted to a place of distinction in the church (a kind of *πρεσβυτέρα* beside the *πρεσβύτερος*); but she would then only receive support when she was *ὄντως χήρα*. That history bears us out in supposing such an order of ecclesiastical widowhood to have existed, a *τάγμα χήρειον* may be proved from the passages in Tertull. de vel. Virg. c. 9. Ad quam sedem (viduarum) praeter annos LX. non tantum univirae, *i. e.*, nuptae aliquando, eliguntur, sed et matres et quidem educatrices filiorum; to this also probably belongs: Herm. Past. L. I. vis. 2 (Grapte autem commonebit viduas et orphanos), and in Lucian de Morte Peregrin. Op. III. 335, Reiz: *ἔωθεν μὲν εὐθὺς ἦν ὁρᾶν παρὰ τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ περιμένοντα γραΐδια χήρας τινὰς καὶ παιδία ὄρφανα.* Then Chrysos. hom. 31, in div. N. T. loc; Epiph. haer. 79, 4, etc. These references are given most in detail by Mosheim, p. 452, seq., who also gives the literature of his own time on this subject, p. 451. Comp. also Baur a. a. O., p. 48, seq.; Leo, a. a. O., and De Wette on the passage. We can certainly point to no other passage in the New Testament, besides the one before us, which proves the existence of this institution for widows, or even of its first beginnings in the apostolic era. So much, however, may be inferred from the passages adduced and similar passages, chiefly in Tertullian and Clemens of Alexandria—that such an institution had already been long in existence at the end of the second century, and that it was universally traced back to the apostolical arrangement contained in the passage before us. And De Wette says: "It is not improbable that from the very beginning pious widows received a place in the church; but it betrays perhaps a somewhat later period, to find this already represented here as a regular office resting on a formal election." But surely if such a place of distinction as that referred to existed at any time, there must have been election to it. "It is to this description of widows in the earliest period of the church," says the excellent Mosheim, "who in contradistinction to the others may be called the spiritual, who are also in the phraseology of the

church called πρεσβύτιδες, presbyterae, presbyterissae, partly, because they were old and stricken in years, at least sixty years old according to the express testimony of Tertullian, partly, because they resembled the elders of the church in the respect paid to them and in certain parts of their office"—(Tertullian expressly says that their business was—ut experimentis omnium affectuum structae facile norint ceteras et consilio et solatio, and at least at a later period there was intrusted to them a kind of superintendence over the poor widows and orphans of the church, comp. the passages in Hermas and Lucian)—"it is to this description of widows, beyond all question, that the rules laid down by the apostle, which it is our object to explain, are to be understood as applying."* And who can help agreeing with him when he farther shews, how uncharitable and altogether impracticable the following qualifications are if they are to be viewed as conditions of receiving support from the church; how suitable, on the contrary, if regarded in the light in which he explains them.

With respect to the qualification, *not under sixty years old*—if such ecclesiastical widows, presbyteresses, are meant, it is only necessary, in order to understand this, to bear in mind, that even in electing to the office of a presbyter, age was the first condition, and that these widows doubtless from the very first, as Tertullian and others shew in reference to a later period, were expected to exercise an influence on the younger persons of their sex. The context itself, however, ver. 11, indicates another sufficiently definite reason for this, namely, that whoever was once enrolled as a widow was always to remain such, and not to degrade this honourable rank by a subsequent marriage; the apostle therefore, fixes an age in which this was no longer to be feared. Does he, nevertheless, on the ground of what he had experienced, ver. 14, enjoin on the younger widows to marry, he does not thereby exclude them, if they follow his advice, from the care of the church, but only from a distinction which indeed they did not deserve, if they were of the character which the apostle specifies in ver. 11, seq., as a reason for their marrying again. Another condition is given in the words ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή. On the meaning of this expression comp. on Tit. i. 6, and above on iii. 2–12. It can mean nothing else here than the univira, she who has been only once married. For, apart from polyandry in the proper sense of the term which cannot with any reason be supposed to be meant, we must either explain this sufficiently definite expression of conjugal fidelity in general, and separate γεγον. from the preceding to connect it with this, which would not do, or we must suppose a reference here to the singular case of a widow who has illegally separated herself from her husband and married

* Huther also has agreed with him.

again. According to this latter interpretation the expression *ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή* might include the widow who had been twice married, if only everything had been lawfully done. Such artificial and inconceivable explanations are not less opposed to the simple sense of the words and the context than to all ecclesiastical tradition on this point, on which what is said on Tit. i. 6 is to be compared. Why then—if the apostle is speaking here of special distinction in the church—might he not require as a qualification what appeared so necessary, if for no other reason than from a regard to the heathen (comp. what is said on Tit. i. 6, and here on ver. 14) ? The reason of this qualification then entirely corresponds to the ground on which the same qualification is required in presbyters and deacons, iii. 2–12, and along with it belongs to the *ἀνέγκλητος* and *ἀνεπίληπτος*, which denotes the chief point of view from which the apostle regards fitness for ecclesiastical distinction. In this respect then the widow stands on a level with the presbyter and deacon ; but this is precisely a proof of the correctness of our interpretation ; while, if the apostle were speaking here of poor widows who were to be supported, the qualification would be unsuitable and contradictory to the *βούλομαι οὖν*, ver. 14. Comp. Tertull. ad. ex. i. 7 : praescriptio apostoli declarat, cum digamos non sinit praesidere, cum viduam allegi in ordinationem nisi univiram non concedit (De Wette). Further, the following qualification fully corresponds to the interpretation just given : *ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς μαρτυρουμένη*, not = through good works having a good report, but = in good works—as the object or the sphere (Winer's Gr., § 48, a. 3, p. 345). On *good works*, Tit. ii. 7, and the Gen. Introd., § 4. What Mosheim says on this is excellent, and proves the correctness of his interpretation : "The apostle lays weight on this, in order that such a widow may be publicly acknowledged as a godly person." In this also there is a correspondence to what is required of the presbyter ; comp. on Tit. i. 6; 1 Tim. iii. 2, seq. *Εἰ ἐτεκνοτρόφησε* can, as Leo observes, hardly be understood of the bringing up of her own children. The connexion with what precedes, as well as with what follows, shows that *ἐτεκνο.* must here be regarded as a *good work*. Such, however, is not the bringing up of one's own children in itself ; in order to be so, some such word as *καλῶς* must be added ; comp. above, iii. 4, 12. That bringing up of children, then, which is here described as a *good work*, must be understood of the bringing up of strange children. This qualification must indeed be pronounced unsuitable in reference to widows needing support, but all the more suitable in reference to a place of distinction in the church. The same remark applies to the next qualification—*if she have lodged strangers*, and also to the two following—*if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have relieved the afflicted*, which latter, according to ver. 16 and the general usage,

must be understood of ministering relief to poverty. And if it should be said, that in order to be hospitable and to take an interest in those who are in straitened circumstances, there is no necessity for being opulent, it must still be acknowledged that these qualifications are inexplicable when regarded as conditions of receiving support from the church, while they are self-evident, when viewed in reference to a widow who is to attain a place of distinction in the church, and who is to give assistance by word and deed to others of her sex; for it is first the proofs of a kind, humble, benevolent charity which the apostle here requires, and indeed proofs of such a nature as cannot be viewed in the light of a condition of church support, but only of church distinction. With regard to the first of these qualifications, comp. the *φιλόξενος* which is required of him who is to be a presbyter, iii. 2; Tit. i. 8. The *ἅγιοι* here are the *ξένοι*; in the conduct towards them they imitate the example of our Lord, according to John xiii. 14. The grammatical doubt which Schleiermacher has expressed with reference to *ἐπήρκεσεν*, he himself removes when he says, that the word is a *ἅπαξ λεγ.*; and so also with the following word *ἐπηκολούθησε*. As an exhaustive summary of what precedes, the apostle adds: *εἰ παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ ἐπηκολούθησε* where *ἐπακολουθεῖν* is used in the same sense as *διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν*, 1 Thess. v. 15, etc. The word itself, though not in this particular application, occurs besides in Mark xvi. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 21.

We have still to consider the interpretation of our passage, which even already in Mosheim's time was the current one, and which has still many advocates—that, namely, according to which ver. 9, seq., treats of the appointing of widows as deaconesses. Principally Schleiermacher has again set up this interpretation, and he has been followed by Mack and Böttger. In supporting his view, Schleiermacher has satisfied himself with refuting that which explains the passage of receiving support from the church, and adducing as positive proof two passages which are evidently intended to bear against our interpretation: Sozom. vii. 16, comp. with Cod. Theod. L. xvi. Tit. ii. Lex. xxvii., and Basil. ep. can. c. 24. But Planck has already (a. a. O., p. 204, seq.) justly replied to the first of these references, that it only shews the interpretation which was at that time given to our passage, which was certainly the same as that which Schleiermacher has advocated, and to the second, that it is not at all applicable, and has been adduced only from a misunderstanding of the word *διακονουμένην* which occurs in it, and which does not mean: quae in diaconatum suscepta est. Schleiermacher has here proceeded from the same false premise which Mosheim has objected to, namely, that if *καταλέγεσθαι* cannot be understood of enrolment in a poor's list, it must necessarily be explained of entering on the list as deacons, as if no third meaning were possible. It is farther taken for granted

in this interpretation, that what the writers of the second and third century inform us concerning widows is at once to be understood of deaconesses, as if widow and deaconess could signify one and the same thing; and further, either then must all deaconesses have been widows, or virgins must also be called widows. "But the widows of the earliest church are quite different persons from the female ministers. In the fourth century the widows began to be confounded with the female ministers," observes Mosheim, as Bingham has already shewn (Orig. Eccl. III., p. 109). Further—"we can prove by incontestible testimonies, that in the earliest period of the church virgins were appointed as female ministers" (Mosheim, comp. Constitt. ap. VI. 18, etc.); but that virgins were called widows, is alike incapable of being proved from history and inconceivable in itself (comp. the Gen. Introd., § 3, and Böttger, a. a. O., p. 67, seq.)

And now let us look again at our passage, and see whether we can understand deaconesses as spoken of in it. The expression: let one be entered on the list as a widow—could only be understood of deaconesses if it had already been proved that χήρα and deaconesses are synonymous terms. Then, *not under threescore years old.* Is it to be supposed that the care of the poor and the sick should have been committed to persons so far advanced in years? Has not experience itself proved that this is a misunderstanding of the apostle's appointment, when we find the decree of the Emperor Theodosius that all deaconesses must be sixty years old, which sprung out of this misunderstanding, immediately after abrogated by the synod of Chalcedon, and the age of the deaconesses reduced to forty years? Further, it can neither be believed nor proved that the deaconesses, to the number of whom also virgins belonged, should have been honoured for continuing in an unmarried state. Further, the ἀργαί, ver. 13, will not correspond to this interpretation; for as deaconesses it is supposed that they must have gone from house to house; if, on the other hand, the καταλ. were an honourable distinction in the sense in which we have taken it, then this ἀργαί can be much better understood, as it could devolve the duty of rendering only such friendly services as those for which widows of sixty years of age were well adapted. Finally, rules for deaconesses would have a much more appropriate place in chap. iii. than here, where the apostle's design is only to show how Timothy is to act towards the various members of the church, from whence the occasion arises to shew what kind of widows are qualified for that place of honour in the church. Moreover, the subject of deaconesses has already been handled in chap. iii. 12. To me, therefore, there remains no doubt that our passage treats neither of deaconesses nor of widows who need support. Mosheim has shewn, p. 454, how it could happen

that in the fourth century and later, the passage came to be understood of deaconesses, and to be applied without distinction to those ecclesiastical widows.

Ver. 11.—"But younger widows refuse; for when they are become wanton against Christ they will marry." Νεωτέρας, as opposed to those in ver. 9, means widows under sixty years of age; and in like manner παραιτοῦ (comp. on Tit. iii. 10) as opposed to καταλέγεσθαι, signifies they are not to be entered on the list. The reason is—it is to be feared that they will marry again. Γαμεῖν, as 1 Cor. vii. 39, of marrying again. *They wish to marry*, as the consequence of *having become wanton against Christ.*—Στρηνιάω, properly: to be over-strong (from στρῆνος, strength); the Lat. luxuriari; and κατα—"against," as elsewhere κατακαυχᾶσθαι is used by the apostle, Rom. xi. 18. This wantonness is opposed to their duty towards Christ. The sense is given in the main correctly, though too strongly, by Jerome, in the words: quæ fornicatæ sunt in injuriam viri sui Christi. On καταστρ., comp. Rev. xviii. 7, 9.

Ver. 12 shews what is implied in this *wishing to marry*: ἔχουσαι κρίμα, etc. Κρίμα signifies here also, as at iii. 6 (comp. on the passage) judicium; in wishing to marry they have brought upon themselves this judgment of God, so that it weighs like a load upon them, viz., that they have broken their first faith. The expression πίστιν ἀθετεῖν has already by the Fathers been explained to mean not the falling away from the faith, but the violation of a promise made not to marry again. Πίστιν τὴν συνθήκην λέγει, observes Chrysostom, and similarly others, comp. in De Wette, Heydenreich, etc.; and so almost all the more recent expositors. The expression ἀθετεῖν, which is also used of something objectively fixed, and is generally found in this very connection (comp. Passow) as also the epithet πρώτην, and the connexion with ver. 11, confirm this view. If those widows did not bind themselves, either aloud or in silence, on their enrolment, to remain always widows, then their wish to marry again cannot be called a forsaking their first faith. But if they did this, then there can be no question as to what is meant by πρώτη πίστις. And this qualification of not marrying again is already implied in the ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή. Leo well: viduæ illæ γαμεῖν θέλουσαι fidem dabant sponso. Sed quia ad ordinem viduarum ecclesiasticarum pertinebant, jam sponsæ quasi erant, nimirum Christo. Hanc igitur fidem quam primum dederant Christo, nunc fallebant. Mosheim has shewn that we are not here to understand an inviolable vow in the later sense.

Ver. 13.—By way of confirming the παραιτοῦ, the apostle here mentions another thing to be feared in younger widows, namely, idleness with its natural consequences. There is some difficulty in

the word *μανθάνουσι*, which cannot signify "they go prying about," but is to be connected either with *ἀργαί* or with *περιερχόμεναι*. The latter construction has this against it, that *μανθάνειν*, when connected with a partic. which refers to the subject, always signifies "to see into, to perceive," which is not suitable here, while the signification "to be wont" is connected with the præterite. It would therefore be grammatically more correct to connect *μανθάνουσι* with *ἀργαί*: they learn idleness inasmuch as they run about, etc. Comp. on this Winer's Gr., § 45, 4, p. 310.* It is certainly more natural, however, that the running about be represented as the consequence of idleness, than *vice versa* idleness as the consequence of running about. And is the *running about* so self-evident a characteristic of younger widows? It appears to me, therefore, more advisable to suppose with De Wette, a less common use of *μανθάνειν*, in connexion with the partic., and to render: but at the same time also being idle they learn to run about in the houses. The apostle, however, corrects himself—he has still something to add to the *ἀργαί*: *καὶ φλύαροι καὶ περίεργοι, λαλοῦσαι τὰ μὴ δέοντα*, the first two predicates describe the manner and way of the *περιέρχεσθαι*, the last still further explains the two preceding predicates. On *φλύαρος* comp. 3 John, ver. 10; on *περίεργος* Acts xix. 19, and by the apostle 2 Thess. iii. 11, *περιεργαζόμενος*. The latter expression is = male sedulus, mischievously busy, inconsiderately curious. The *λαλοῦσαι*, etc., is well explained by the remark of Theophylact's cited by Leo: "going about from house to house, they carry the affairs of this house to that, and of that to this—they tell the affairs of all to all."

Ver. 14.—The younger widows are therefore to be rejected; but not only that; in such circumstances (*οὖν*) it is the apostle's will that they marry again, as a means of counteracting *idleness*, and as the best antidote to what is noticed in ver. 11; for—as confirming the *βούλομαι*—examples (ver. 15) shew indeed that those are no mere fancied dangers which are connected with remaining single. Those who attend to the *οὖν*, ver. 14, and the *γάρ*, ver. 16, will see here no contradiction to what the apostle says 1 Cor. vii. 7, 8, 26, 32—34, 40; if there is any contradiction, it must be acknowledged that the very same is found in vers. 2 and 9 of this chapter as compared with the other verses adduced; for our passage says nothing else but what is said there. The universal form of the expression here used by the apostle corresponds to that of vers. 11 and 12, although he would assuredly not deny, that there might be among the younger widows some of a different character. As in ver. 5 compared with ver. 6, so also here, the apostle specifies the consequences which naturally though not necessarily result from the

* Huther connects it with *ἀργαί*.

circumstances. The apostle's injunction has thus its limitation in itself. "He does not impose a law, but points out a remedy to the younger widows," says Chrysostom. It is his will then that they marry again (*γαμεῖν*, as at ver. 11), bear children, superintend the house, and thus give no occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully, such as would be given by the conduct described in vers. 11–13. *Τεκνογ.* as at ii. 15. *Οἰκοδεσποτεῖν*, a word belonging to the later Greek, occurring only here: but *οἰκοδεσπότης* is found frequently in the New Testament, comp. Winer's Gr., § 2, 1, p. 24; Schleiermacher, p. 62. If *οἰκουρεῖν* does not denote the same thing, and *οἰκοδεσπότης* is of frequent occurrence, is there anything surprising in the formation of the verb? And may not the occurrence of such latinized expressions as this, and *πρόκριμα* in ver. 21, warrant the supposition that the epistles were written after a considerable time's stay in Rome? By the *ὁ ἀντικείμενος, who speaks reproachfully*, we are not to understand the devil, on account of the additional clause *λοιδορίας χάριν* (comp. on iii. 7. Ver. 15, as De Wette also observes, by no means requires this interpretation), but the adversary of Christianity (Phil. i. 28; Tit. ii. 8) among Jews and heathen. The clause *λοιδορίας χάριν* is to be explained of speaking against Christianity, not against the widows; comp. the similar passages vi. 1; Tit. ii. 5, 10. There is room for difference of opinion as to whether it should be connected with *ἀντικ.* or with *μηδ. ἀφ. διδ.* The latter appears to me the more proper: they are not to give to the adversary occasion to speak reproachfully. *Ἀφορμή* is again a word which is elsewhere used only by the apostle.

Ver. 15.—For with some this has already been the case. "For some are already turned aside after Satan." These words being confirmatory of the preceding, must refer to such aberrations as were to be prevented by the injunction in ver. 14, *I will therefore;* this injunction, however, is represented as an antidote to the excess of the sexual passion, and the consequences of idleness. It is of such aberrations, therefore, not of a falling away from the faith or the doctrine in general, that we are to understand the expression *have turned aside.* On *ἐκτρέπω* comp. 1 Tim. i. 6, and Gen. Introd., § 4. *After Satan:* he is the seducer whose enticements they have followed through sensual lust.

Ver. 16 may at first sight appear to be a mere repetition of what is said in vers. 4 and 8. The context, however, as well as the words themselves, justify us in adopting a different interpretation. De Wette has already given it aright by directing attention to the fact, that the expression *τὶς πιστὸς ἢ πιστὴ ἔχει* denotes not merely the same relation as ver. 4, that, namely, of children and grandchildren to their parents and grandparents, but a wider relationship. To this also corresponds the term *ἐπαρκεῖν* as compared with *προνοεῖν*, see

ver. 10 ; the position of the verse, however, will warrant our interpreting it with special reference to what is said concerning the ecclesiastical widows, either thus—that the apostle gives this injunction, because younger widows sought, from motives of economy, to be received into the viduatus (De Wette), or thus—that the apostle would press this also with reference to the ecclesiastical widows, that the church was to be burdened with their support only in the case of there being no relative on whom any obligation rests to assist them. The reading *πιστὸς ἢ πιστή* in preference to the other which omits *πιστὸς ἤ* (codd. A.C.F.G., 17, 47, etc.), has been retained by Tischendorf with reason, in opposition to Griesbach and Lachmann ; comp. De Wette. On *βαρείσθω*, comp. 2 Cor. i. 8, v. 4. With such widows the church is not to be burdened, in order that it may be in a condition to afford assistance to the real widows in the sense described, vers. 3–5.

Dr. Baur has offered a solution entirely new of the difficulties contained in this section about the widows, vers. 3–16, which has already in the Introduction, § 3, been considered in a historical point of view. Here we shall only, in addition, briefly shew how little his interpretation can be justified in an exegetical point of view. He understands, vers. 3–8, of "holding widows in honour" in general, ver. 9, seq., of their support as ecclesiastical persons. The *τὰς ὄντως χήρας* are, according to him, real widows in opposition to merely so-called widows, *i. e.*, widows in the ecclesiastical sense, who might also be virgins. But the real widows are, according to vers. 4 and 5, either such as have children or such as are solitary. But in reply to this, we would observe that the meaning of *τὰς ὄντως χήρας* is shewn by that to which it is opposed in ver. 4, and again in ver. 5 ; namely, only the widow who is quite desolate. Ver. 4 does not speak of an *ὄντως χῆρα* ; but ver. 5 first speaks of this in opposition to ver. 4. Here, however, it will be seen that the opposition which Dr. Baur has made between real and so-called widows is one which he himself has introduced. Ver. 9, then, according to him, describes a particular class of the *ὄντως χῆραι*, those, namely, to whom the *καταλέγεσθαι* was applicable, which of course implies that the widows were not ecclesiastical widows, as being *ὄντως χῆραι*, or again, that they belonged to the *ὄντως χῆραι* only as real, not as ecclesiastical widows. To this it may only be objected that it can by no means be maintained with certainty, that the apostle thought merely of the *ὄντως χῆραι* in the *καταλέγεσθαι* (*ὄντως* in the sense of ver. 5). But is it not the merest petitio principii when it is further said, the ecclesiastical widows, vers. 9 and 10, differed from the *ὄντως χῆραι* mentioned before, in so far as that to the former might belong such as were not really widows ; whence is it that *χῆραι* obtains this ecclesiastical signification ? Whence then does our opponent learn,

that such widows might belong to those mentioned in ver. 9 as were not really widows (in his sense)? Does not Dr. Baur clearly put his own presupposition into the words, and then bring it out again as the conclusion? Then again, the assertion that the *νεώτεραι χῆραι*, ver. 11, are widows in the ecclesiastical sense, and especially virgins, wherefore they are called simply *νεώτεραι* in ver. 14—floats entirely in the air, and has in the context not only nothing for it, but everything against it. For, if Dr. Baur himself must admit, that in the *χήρα καταλεγέσθω* the apostle has real widows in his eye (real in our opponent's sense of the word), and determines which of these are to be enrolled as ecclesiastical, so that they should be at the same time real and ecclesiastical, this does not in the least degree imply, that such as were not widows were also enrolled, but only that there were widows who were not enrolled. And when he says further: *but the younger widows refuse*, and thereby specifies those who are not to be enrolled, this can, according to the context, be understood only of the widows who are not to be enrolled, as what is said before is to be understood (according to Dr. Baur's admission) of those who are to be enrolled. And how then could those who are not to be enrolled—if virgins are to be understood—be called *χῆραι*, seeing that the apostle will have them to be rejected? Only such *νεώτεραι*, then, can be meant as are already *χῆραι*, consequently only real widows, as the opposition to ver. 9, according to Baur's own interpretation of this verse, also requires. Baur must here, and at ver. 16, take for granted, according to his interpretation, that such virgins were ecclesiastical widows independent of the enrolment, and in spite of *being refused*. If, however, ver. 11 be rendered thus: "younger persons reject as widows," still by these younger persons could only be understood widows, from the opposition to ver 9. And what then has Baur to object to our interpretation? That *γαμεῖν*, as used by the apostle, signifies to marry again, cannot be disputed. That the apostle could not have reasonably asked the widows to marry again if thereby they would be excluded from the *καταλέγεσθαι*, can be maintained only when ver. 9, seq., is incorrectly understood of ecclesiastical provision; but all difficulty disappears when the passage is understood of ecclesiastical distinction; comp. on ver. 9, seq., and De Wette on ver. 14. And with respect to the difficulty arising from the circumstance that the apostle here enjoins marriage, if it is one, it belongs to Baur's interpretation (of virgins) as well as to our own. Comp., moreover, what has already been said on this above. Olshausen has interpreted vers. 3–8 of the ecclesiastical support of poor widows, ver. 9, seq., of the appointing of widows as deaconesses.

Vers. 17–19.—Of how the presbyters are to be treated. If the widows spoken of in the verses immediately preceding are a kind of

female presbyters, the transition here to the presbyters is then easy and natural. It is quite evident that they are here spoken of in a different respect from chap. iii. The apostle mentions two things in which the right appreciation of the presbyter is to shew itself: 1. *Let them be counted worthy of double honour*, ver. 17; and, 2, *Receive not an accusation against them but before*, etc., ver. 19. In ver. 17 it is said that the elders who rule well are to be counted worthy of double honour, especially those who labour in the word and doctrine. Τιμή here, in like manner as at ver. 3, is not to be understood merely of reward, stipendium; it is honour, but an honour which finds its expression in giving, as ver. 18 proves. There is no necessity then for taking διπλῆς in the most literal sense, and understanding by it a salary twice as large, as in the Constitt. ap. II. 28, etc., comp. Baur, p. 129; but the idea is: if a presbyter is already as such worthy of honour, this is doubly true of one who *rules well*. I regard, therefore, *the presbyter who rules well* as opposed not to the one who does not rule well, but to the presbyter as such. Has he a claim to *honour* already in virtue of his official standing, he has a double claim in the case which the apostle specifies. Thus also, the μάλιστα, etc., which comes after will distinguish between presbyter and presbyter. If the *presbyter who rules well* is interpreted as if opposed to the *presbyter* in the sense of ver. 1 as the designation of age, then either καλῶς would have no proper place here at all, or, if it has, it just introduces the same antithesis as we have supposed the words to imply; besides, the special signification of τιμή here, and at ver. 3, is opposed to such an interpretation; for nothing was said before of giving such *honour* to the presbyters (as the designation of age). That the injunction to bestow such an honour does not indicate a post-apostolic period, may be seen from Gal. vi. 6; 1 Cor. ix. 14; 1 Thess. v. 12. This is especially to be given to the presbyters who labour in the word and doctrine. On κοπιάω comp. iv. 10; 1 Thess. v. 12. Ἐν denotes the object (Winer's Gr., § 48, a., p. 345); *word* and *doctrine* will therefore be designations of the object; *and in doctrine* is added epexegetically, to denote the *word* as the doctrine which is to be communicated. De Wette: "in word and doctrine—the former including every discourse, the latter denoting properly instruction." It is evident that the apostle here distinguishes between two kinds of *ruling presbyters*—those who labour in the word and those who do not. Both are *ruling* presbyters, and from this it already appears that it is not lay presbyters, as many have thought, that are here spoken of in contradistinction to clerical presbyters; for by προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι can be understood only presbyters merely as they are already known to us. It is therefore not at all necessary to look for still another special emphasis in κοπιῶντες: those who labour hard, in contradis-

tinction to those who do not; for κοπιάω denotes here as elsewhere the laborious calling of the teacher in itself. Compare the remarks made by Rothe in opposition to this arbitrary distinction, a. a. O., p. 223, seq. If Dr. Baur can perceive, in the circumstance of its being here represented as desirable that the presbyter should be at the same time a teacher, the transition to the presbyters of the later constitution in which teaching was the principal thing that belonged to the calling of the presbyter (Constitt. ap. III. 20), we, on the other hand, perceive in this circumstance (comp. on iii. 2; Tit. i. 9, and the Gen. Introd., § 4), with Neander, a mark of the later apostolic period (Nean. a. a. O. I., p. 259, seq.) And we have nothing to object to the remark, "that we must here already suppose the existence of a college of presbyters in one and the same large congregation;" nay, we see in this a proof of the correctness of our view (Gen. Introd., § 3). But when Dr. Baur further infers from these premises that, "although in these epistles the πρεσβύτερος, in respect of the office, is still identical with the ἐπίσκοπος," we must notwithstanding suppose here that there was a πρεσβύτερος besides the ἐπίσκοπος, and that the writer omitted to speak of the πρεσβύτερος along with the ἐπίσκοπος already in chap. iii. only because he would be able to speak of him in chap. v.,—we reply, that the latter assertion is altogether groundless, because chap. v. treats of ecclesiastical persons in quite a different respect from chap. iii. (where it is the qualifications for office that are spoken of), and that the whole reasoning consists again merely of taking for granted the thing to be proved. For, as little can it be inferred from the distinction made between presbyters who teach, and those who do not, as from the existence of a college of presbyters, that besides these there was an ἐπίσκοπος, "although in respect of his office identical with the presbyter."

Ver. 18.—By way of confirming what he has said, the apostle now further refers to the words of the Old Testament, Deut. xxv. 4, as he does at 1 Cor. ix. 9; comp. the Comm. on the passage. The words, *and the labourer is worthy of his hire*, are nowhere to be found in the Old Testament, but we find the same maxim in Luke x. 7 and Matth. x. 10, with the difference only of τῆς προφῆς instead of μισθοῦ. That the apostle intends by ἡ γραφή in our passage something else than the Old Testament, is inconsistent with the fact, that this phrase is uniformly employed by the apostle to denote the Scriptures of the Old Testament, Rom. ix. 17; Gal. iii. 8, 22, etc. If he had intended to confirm this saying by an authority, he would have appealed, as in Acts xx. 35; 1 Cor. ix. 14, to *the Lord*, and not to the gospel of his helper, Luke, including this along with the Old Testament under ἡ γραφή, as if this gospel had already at that time been acknowledged as an integral portion of the γραφή. The

words, *as the scripture saith*, are therefore not to be connected with this citation, and Calvin is right when he says, "he cites as it were a proverbial saying which common sense dictates to all. In the same manner as Christ also when he said the same thing, declared nothing more than a sentiment approved by the consent of all."

Ver. 19.—The apostle here enjoins upon Timothy a further rule to be observed in his conduct towards the presbyters as distinguished from others: he is to receive no accusation against them except before two or three witnesses. According to the context, it can only be presbyters in the ecclesiastical sense that are spoken of. What the apostle here prescribes was already prescribed in the Old Testament, as a rule to be observed in judicial proceedings generally; comp. Deut. xvii. 6, xix. 15. On the application of this part of the law is founded the passage in 1 John v. 6, seq.; the apostle writes in 2 Cor. xiii. 1, that he will act on this principle, and that in every case (*πᾶν ῥῆμα*, etc.); and our Lord himself adverts to this scripture of the Old Testament in Matth. xviii. 16; John viii. 17.* "But," asks De Wette, "is Timothy not to observe the same rule of justice also in regard to the accusation of others?" I apprehend that an accusation brought before Timothy cannot properly be placed in the same category with those to which that rule in Deut. xix. 15 extends. If what was necessary was not so much to punish in the judicial sense, as to admonish and set right, why ought not Timothy to receive the accusation also without two or three witnesses. If, on the contrary, the accusation was of such a kind as to call for a judicial punishment, I do not think that the *μὴ παραδέχου* in our passage excludes the application of the Old Testament rule also in the case of others. Only, with reference to a presbyter, an accusation in general is then only to be received when several witnesses come forward against him. The presbyter when most faithful in the discharge of the duties of his office, and most earnest in his efforts to *convince the gainsayers* (Tit. i. 9), would precisely then be most exposed to false accusations on the part of such as thought themselves injured by him. How prejudicial to the dignity of the office, how obstructive to the efficient discharge of its duties, how paralysing to the zeal of those intrusted with it, how morally injurious to such accusers themselves, if they were listened to! And were not those presbyters men to whose christian and moral character the church in which they had lived, and from which they had been taken, must have borne a favourable testimony? How emphatically does the apostle insist on such a testimony (*ἀνέγκλητος—ἀνεπίληπτος*, Tit. i. 6; 1 Tim. iii. 2, seq.)! It would have been both unwise and unjust to have made such a man the victim of

* Huther thinks that the sense of the passage is this: Timothy is not to receive an accusation alone, but in the presence of others; of which Heb. x. 28 affords no proof.

the selfish accusations which any one might bring against him.—The pastor of our own day is certainly not the presbyter in the apostolical sense; not taken from the church itself over which he is called to preside, not approved by his previous life among the people, not marked out for the office by them as having been found worthy from the proof of his moral and Christian character, in general, called to the office far less (and indeed generally too little) from regard to his christianly moral qualities—he cannot lay unqualified claim to the privilege implied in the rule laid down in our passage. On the other hand, it is not to be denied, that the office being substantially identical with that of the presbyter, there is still the same possibility of unjust accusations, and the same injury to the office, the accused, and the accusers, will follow in the case of such charges finding a ready hearing. These two things, then, must be taken into account—on the one hand, the difference between that period and the present, on the other, the substantial sameness of the office—in order rightly to estimate the manner in which this rule laid down by the apostle is to be applied in the present time. On *παραδέχεσθαι* comp. similar compounds, Mark iv. 20; Acts xxii. 18. In the former passage there is an express difference between *ἀκούειν* and *παραδέχεσθαι* (to enter into). Ἐκτὸς εἰ μή used again by the apostle only at 1 Cor. xiv. 5, xv. 2; on the fulness of this expression, comp. Winer's Gr., § 65, 3, p. 533. On *ἐπί*, Winer's Gr., § 47, g. p. 335.

Ver. 20 treats of what is to be done to those members of the church who fall into sin. They are to be rebuked before all, that others also may fear. The words, *them that sin*, are not, as is generally done, and as Olshausen also does, to be referred to the presbyter, ver. 19, but are to be understood generally, of all members of the church who sin. In the former case the change of number would be unsuitable; we should expect rather that the apostle would say: but if he has sinned, or if he is convicted. And how should the apostle, who in ver. 19 has expressed so high an opinion of the presbyters, proceed forthwith to say in ver. 20: *them that sin*, etc.? And, at all events, had there been any such antithetical relation between vers. 19 and 20, the particle *δέ* would have been used; comp. other passages connected in this way, as 1–8, 9–15; vi. 1, seq.; while this particle is always wanting where there is evidently a transition to something new, vers. 3, 9, 17, 19, 21, 22; vi. 1, 3, 17. Finally, as De Wette has already observed, ver. 22 is against this interpretation (comp. infra). *Them that sin*, says the apostle without any limitation; such, however, lies in the nature of the thing; comp. Matth. xviii. 15–17 (only the last mentioned case comes here into consideration), 1 Cor. v. 9–13. As in the passage last adduced, so also in the one before us, it is not an immediate ex-

clusion that is spoken of, but only a rebuke before the church—a public disclosure, and a conviction accompanied with a rebuke (comp. Harless on Eph. v. 11–13). Not until this rebuke was not received (*if he shall neglect to hear*, Matth. xviii. 17), or produced no fruit, was the sinful person to be excluded, as those passages shew. *Before all* and *others*, are therefore not to be understood of the assembly of the presbyters, but of the church. The moral effect of this rebuke with respect to all is, that they are to fear ; the exhibition which is thus made of the judicial strictness of the law is designed to make an impression on their consciences, so that they may feel a salutary fear of their own sins, and may work out their salvation *with fear and trembling*.

Ver. 21.—The reading here varies ; still there can be no doubt that κυρίου is to be omitted before Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, and that the true reading is not πρόσκλησιν but πρόσκλισιν ; comp. Tischendorf, De Wette. The solemn protestation with which the observance of the rule just laid down is enjoined upon Timothy, is similar to that in 2 Tim. iv. 1. Διαμαρτύρομαι = obtestor, obsecro, to conjure with entreaty ; comp. Luke xvi. 28 ; the word is used elsewhere by the apostle, 1 Thess. iv. 6 ; comp. also Eph. iv. 17, and Harless on the passage. The sense of the whole is, as Chrysostom observes : μάρτυρα καλῶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, etc. They will testify against thee if thou actest contrary to what is enjoined upon thee. Bengel well : repræsentat Timotheo suo judicium extremum, in quo Deus revelabitur et Christus cum angelis coram conspicietur. This is the most natural interpretation of the additional words, *the elect angels*. Comp. Jos. B. J. II. 16, 4 : μαρτύρομαι . . . τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἀγγέλους θεοῦ.* Schleiermacher was the first to stumble at this expression, ἐκλεκτοὶ ἄγγελοι, and he thinks it strange that the man who is so very zealous against the *genealogies* and profitless questions should here recognize special ranks of angels, as is evident from his using the article. Nothing, however, can be certainly inferred from the use of the article here, although Leo lays weight upon this ; for if the writer intends to denote the entire company of the angels, he could not do this without the article ; comp. Winer's Gr., § 18, 1. The only question then will be, can ἐκλεκτοί be applied as an epithet to the angels generally, in contradistinction to other creatures, or only in contradistinction to other angels, whether it be to the *angels that fell*, 2 Pet. ii. 4, or only to those of a lower rank, which last view would be supported by passages such as 1 Thess. iv. 16 ; Eph. i. 21 ; Col. i. 16 (Leo comp. also Harless, a. a. O., p. 112, seq). Against the latter interpretation as a whole, as it appears to me, it may be objected that, according to it, the epithet ἐκλεκτοί has no proper meaning. For if it is used to denote the good angels in

* Huther ; because the throne of God is encompassed by angels.

opposition to the bad, it is then quite superfluous ; for the *ἄγγελοι* are understood to be the good angels, without any such epithet ; and in the other case it is difficult to see why only the angels of a higher rank should be taken as witnesses ; chiefly, however, against this interpretation is the unsuitableness of the expression *ἐκλεκτῶν*, which is certainly not explained by a reference to the distinction indicated in Eph. i. 21, etc. Could a portion of the angels be designated as not *chosen*, according to the usual signification of this word ? I therefore agree with those expositors who understand *ἐκλεκτοί* as a general epithet of all the angels, just as much so as *holy angels*, *angels of light*, etc.* Comp. Calvin : electos vocat angelos, non tantum ut a reprobis discernat, sed excellentiæ causa, ut plus reverentiæ habeat eorum testimonium. So also Bengel, Matthies, Böttger (p. 166); Olshausen, too, decides for this interpretation. With respect to the participation of angels in the events that take place on the earth, comp. on Luke xv. 10 ; 1 Cor. iv. 9, etc. Baur's reference to the *ἡλικιῶται τοῦ σωτῆρος ἄγγελοι*, and the like, among the Gnostics, is accordingly altogether superfluous.—Thus the apostle conjures Timothy to observe this rule without prejudice, doing nothing from partiality. The *ταῦτα* is referred to, vers. 1–20, 17–20, vers. 19 and 20, and to ver. 20 alone. I refer to De Wette, who has defended the last interpretation in opposition to the others, and as it appears to me justly ; for it is difficult to see why ver. 21 should have been placed between vers. 20 and 22, if what is said in ver. 20 needed no such emphatical enforcement. *Πρόκριμα* is the Latin præjudicium, properly what is fore-judged, a preconceived opinion, prejudice. According to Leo, it corresponds to *προκρίνειν τινά τινος*, and signifies *preference*, which would do well enough if it were *πρόκρισις* ; but it cannot be proved that this signification belongs to *πρόκριμα*. Planck and others have already said what is necessary in opposition to Schleiermacher ; comp. also our remarks on ver. 14. *Πρόσκλισις*, not *πρόσκλησις* which scarcely yields any sense (comp. Leo, De Wette, Matthies), occurs only here ; comp., however, *προσεκλίθη*, Acts v. 36. *Κατὰ πρόσκλ.* = partium studio ductus, Wahl.

Ver. 22.—"Lay hands suddenly on no man, and be not partaker of other men's sins. Keep thyself pure." On this follows the advice, ver. 23, *drink no longer water*, and in vers. 24 and 25, the statement that neither the sins nor the good works of men can remain hid. The connexion of the ideas—for some such there must be—is here difficult, and its discovery is left over entirely to the reader. No wonder that Schleiermacher, according to his general opinion of this epistle, finds here "an extraordinary confusion." With regard, first of all, to ver. 22, it cannot be understood of the

* Also Huther, "The angels as objects of the Divine love," 1 Pet. ii. 4.

ordination of presbyters. This would do only in the case of ver. 20 referring to the presbyters (comp. above); but even then it might be objected to this interpretation that such an injunction is not in its right place here, but belongs to chap. iii. (Baur), that there, in fact, what is necessary to be said respecting the conditions of appointing to office, has already been said, and more exactly than here, and that according to the qualifications there laid down the case here indicated in the words, *be not partaker*, etc., cannot well be supposed in reference to a presbyter, as De Wette has also observed. If the transition has already been made at ver. 20 from the presbyters to the members of the church generally, then ver. 22 can also only be understood of receiving into the Christian fellowship in general, or of restoring to this fellowship those who had fallen. I prefer the latter view, with De Wette, from regard to ver. 20, and on account of the *be not partaker*, etc. Ver. 20 does not indeed treat of exclusion from the church; but the ἔλεγξις there is the next step to this (comp. Matth. xviii. 17), and the words, *be not partaker*, etc., evidently find a more natural explanation in accordance with this supposition. Meanwhile I admit that I do not regard these reasons as decisive. Olshausen has assented to that interpretation of this verse, which is the most ancient, and which is still the common one, according to which it is understood of ordination. On the *laying on of hands*, comp. on iv. 14. According to the view which we have taken, it is to be supposed that this laying on of hands was repeated on the restoration of any one to church fellowship, which was certainly the practice at a later period; comp. the proofs of this in De Wette. Baur explains the passage principally of the restoration of heretics, of which he adduces examples from a later period which involve, however, no proof whatever against the apostolical character of our passage. On μὴ ταχέως Chrysostom observes: πολλάκις περισκεψάμενος καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσας.— *Be not partaker:* Timothy adopts the sins which he overlooks, he becomes a partaker of these sins, inasmuch as he does not place himself towards them in the attitude of a rebuker. On the dative, comp. Winer's Gr., § 30, 8, p. 180. Σεαυτὸν ἁγνὸν τήρει: here, as De Wette rightly observes, σεαυτόν is placed first with emphasis; it forms the antithesis with, *be not partaker of other men's sins.* For this very reason the clause cannot be explained to mean: keep thyself pure from such sins, but: thyself keep pure; for in order to be able to rebuke the sins of others, Timothy must above all be pure himself. Thus the subject turns to the person of Timothy, as ver. 23 also shews; a circumstance which it is also of importance to observe in reference to ver. 24, seq. Ἁγνός is therefore not to be taken in the special sense = chaste, but = pure, as at 2 Cor. vii. 11: vi. 6.

Ver. 23.—The words, *keep thyself pure*, as addressed to Timothy personally, have prepared the way for the transition to what is said in this verse; but this "medicinal advice," nevertheless appears on this account very strange. What is there in the words *keep thyself pure*, that could lead the writer even by any association of ideas to this counsel? This association will be found to be not so remote when those passages are called to mind, iii. 3, 8, in which the apostle insists on moderation in the use of wine by a presbyter or deacon, chiefly, however, that which contains the warning against *bodily service*, iv. 8. Timothy may have been ascetically strict in this point to an improper degree; ver. 23 would thus be a limitation of the words, *keep thyself pure*, in ver. 22. With respect to abstinence from wine, one has only to call to mind the Nazarenes of the Old Testament, Num. vi. 1–21; the Essenes, Luke i. 15; Rom. xiv., in order easily to understand how there might be an ascetical tendency in this direction in the apostolic period; and we by no means, therefore, need to suppose in the words any opposition to the Gnostics of the second century (Baur). Thus also does Olshausen understand the connexion, and so do many of the more ancient and more modern commentators, comp. Leo, De Wette. The passage, therefore, will not deserve to be characterized as "an awkwardly introduced particularity" (Schleiermacher). Ὑδροποτέω, not aquam bibo, as Wahl, = ὕδωρ πίνειν; but, to be a water drinker = to drink only water, comp. Winer's Gr., § 55, 8, 442. On *use a little wine*, Chrysostom says: "as much as is needful for health, not for luxury." Timothy's state of body is assigned as the reason of this advice: for his stomach's sake and his frequent indispositions.

Ver. 24, seq., follow again without any indication of the connexion. Do they belong to the warning against making himself partaker of other men's sins, or to the *keep thyself pure*, and ver. 23? For the determination of this point, we have in what precedes no further clue than is given in the circumstance, that the apostle seems in the word σεαυτόν to have made the transition to the person of Timothy; the point must therefore chiefly be determined by the sense of the verses themselves. The apostle specifies in ver. 24 two kinds of sins; those which are *manifest* and those which *follow after;* those which are manifest are further explained in the words *going before to judgment*. The opposition here then is, between sins that are open = going before, and sins that are hid = following after, as is evident also from ver. 25, where in like manner (ὡσαύτως), *the good works* are divided into those that are *manifest* and those that *are otherwise*, by which latter, as Schleiermacher has already observed, are not to be understood such as are the opposite of *good* but of manifest, so that of both kinds it is said, that they are brought to

light ; those which are *manifest* are so already, and *those that are otherwise cannot be hid.* The sense, therefore, can only be this—the sins, as also the good works, cannot remain hid in the judgment, the only difference being that some (sins as well as good works) go before, others follow, or, according to ver. 25, some are before the eyes of all, others are not, but shall then be made manifest. Πρόδηλος only here and at Heb. vii. 14. One may judge whether the family to which the word belongs, δῆλος, etc, is in a great measure strange to the apostle (Schleiermacher) on comparing 1 Cor. xv. 27 ; Gal. iii. 11 ; 1 Cor. i. 11, iii. 13 ; Col. i. 8. That πρό, as used by the apostle elsewhere, is never without meaning (Schleiermacher) may be true enough ; but that it must always, when used by him in these compounds, mean "before," is a groundless assertion ; comp. for example only προγράφω, Gal. iii. 1, προίστημι, and the like. Moreover, many expositors take πρόδηλος here in the sense "manifest beforehand," against which comp. De Wette on the passage. I agree with him in the opinion that πρόδηλος is here to be taken in the common acceptation as an intensified δῆλος, the same as at Heb. vii. 14 (the πρό, intendens, in like manner as propalam). For, looked at more closely, the word πρόδηλοι in the sense "open beforehand," *i. e.*, before the *judgment*, would give no suitable meaning, as the opposite of this would be "open afterwards," after the judgment, which cannot be what is here meant. The apostle rather conceives of the *judgment* as the goal towards which all sins and good works are proceeding : some before their owner, others after him ; some before the eyes of all, others hid ; there, at the judgment, they come all to light, it matters not whether hitherto they have been open or hid. De Wette is therefore right in maintaining, that the opposition between *before* and *after* comes in first with προάγουσαι, and that the *judgment* denotes the point aimed at, not in respect of time, but of place. Προάγειν = to go before, as heralds ; therefore = crying sins, which accuse their owner, or rather their slave. Τισὶ δέ opposed to τινῶν : the other kind of sins. Of these he says, ἐπακολουθοῦσιν, an expression especially opposed to the προάγουσαι ; in special reference to πρόδηλοι, it can therefore not mean, "open afterwards," as the opposition to προάγ. εἰς κρίσιν shews, but something like κρυπταί ; if the apostle had used this expression, however, he must have here also added (comp. ver. 25) κρυβῆναι οὐ δύνανται ; but all this is concisely expressed in ἐπακολουθοῦσιν, sc., to judgment. These sins do not go beforehand, loudly accusing ; but they come also to judgment ; the difference is only, that they follow their owner. This not merely *is to be* so in the judgment, but *it is so*, according to the words of the apostle. How can it be here said, with De Wette, that observations are here made respecting the various ways in which one can perceive the actions of

men? The apostle plainly says that in the *κρίσις* everything comes to light.

Ver. 25.—This is fully evident from ver. 25. The particle *ὡσαύτως* places this other case of the good works on a level with the former. The same is true of these—the good works also are manifest, and those that are not, namely, not manifest, cannot remain hid. Some are already open to the eyes of all, others will be open. When this is to be, is shewn by the relation of this verse to ver. 24—namely, in the *κρίσις*. And what is this *κρίσις* in which all good and evil works, all crying and secretly following sins, all open and hidden works of godliness come to light? The question thus put—and we are at liberty to put it in no other form—can be satisfactorily answered only by reference to the Divine judgment (the just judgment (*κρίσις*) of God, 2 Thess. i. 5). So also Schleiermacher. On the other hand, the most of commentators, understanding ver. 22 to refer to the ordination of presbyters, take this *κρίσις* to mean the trial preceding the election of these office-bearers.* Apart, however, from what has been said on ver. 22, *κρίσις* is an unsuitable expression for *δοκιμάζειν* (iii. 10), and it must first be shewn that this word is so used in the New Testament. Further, the whole passage would then properly belong to the 3d chapter. Moreover, the general form in which the sentiment is expressed, is inconsistent with this interpretation; it is good works and sins in general that are spoken of (comp. ver. 25); how could it in this case be said that they go before to judgment, or follow after, if it is the trial previous to being chosen as presbyter that is meant? And do all sins and virtues really come to light in this trial? And what relation then has this idea—namely, that all comes to light—to the words, *lay hands suddenly on no man, be not partaker of other men's sins.* It does not intimate how Timothy is to act (De Wette); the relation must rather be traced, as Leo does, thus: it is shewn how much need there is of circumspection and consideration in the laying on of hands, or with Mack: how the application of the necessary caution will protect the church from unworthy ministers. But Leo's interpretation is founded on an incorrect understanding of the *τισὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσιν*, which cannot mean (comp. above): admoti jam muneribus, quales revera sunt cognoscuntur; and so also is Mack's view, which assigns to the words this signification: they follow after, so that they can remain hid only from precipitancy and frivolity, which, as De Wette has already observed, neither affords a definite antithesis to *πρόδηλοι*, nor corresponds to ver. 25 (comp. above). De Wette's interpretation is not much better, according to which ver.

* Huther understands it of the judgment passed by others quite generally. The sense then will be: Timothy is to be cautious in reference to ver. 23.

† The passages adduced by Planck do not prove this.

22 is explained of restoration to the fellowship of the church, and in reference to this, ver. 24 is understood of the moral judgment pronounced by the church; for, apart from every other consideration, it is not true that everything good as well as bad comes to light in this judgment, nor can it be seen what end the sentiment was designed to serve, as it contains neither a direction as to the right procedure, nor an admonition to caution. Hence also De Wette, instead of referring ἐπακολ. to εἰς κρίσιν—as that to which it is opposed, namely, προαγ. εἰς κρίσιν, shews he ought to do—takes it quite indefinitely: "there are some whose sins are known afterwards when they have passed over their (longer or shorter) way." What way then? According to the preceding, it can only be the way to the κρίσις. And how can ἐπακολ., if it is not referred to the κρίσις, signify: they are afterwards known, seeing that, on the contrary, from its being opposed to πρόδηλοι, it can only mean: they are hid? And the whole of ver. 25 is superfluous on the supposition that it refers to the laying on of hands, ver. 22, in whatever sense this is taken. If vers. 24 and 25 accordingly can be understood only of the Divine judgment, it may be asked in what connexion does this stand with what precedes? The reasons for referring vers. 24 and 25 exclusively to ver. 22, *lay hands suddenly*, etc., fall to the ground when it is understood, that it is neither the trial for the election of presbyters, nor the moral judgment of the church, of which they speak. The words are to be referred, then, rather to Timothy himself, of whom the apostle has been led to speak. He has been admonished to keep himself from the sins of others as well as from his own sins. This admonition is then explained and enforced in vers. 24 and 25, in which it said, that there are not merely open but also hidden sins, as well as open and hidden good works; but the one class as well as the other is made manifest in the light of the judgment, only, that the one class go before as loud witnesses, the other as silent ones follow. Ver. 23 is indeed inserted between; but I do not venture to guess here at any more strict connexion; it could only be in this, that the apostle perceives even something impure beneath that ascetical ὑδροποτεῖν, which was practised by Timothy. Schleiermacher, who justly dissents from Theodoret with his εἶτα τὸν περὶ τῆς χειροτονίας ἀναλαμβάνει λόγον on ver. 24, seq., and refers ver. 24, seq., strictly to ver. 23, explains the sentiment thus: the writer aims at consoling Timothy under his delicate health, by holding up before him the consideration, that all good works are not equally manifest through the rewards which they bring, but still that they cannot always remain hid. But wherefore then ver. 24? And not a word is here said of reward. And, indeed the critical authorship is but too apparent in the entire explanation. Olshausen finds in ver. 24, seq., the idea: that nothing in the man can be al-

together hid ; on a careful consideration it will appear ; he is then for referring ver. 24 to the election of presbyters, and vers. 22 and 25 more to the person of Timothy, in which the apostle hints that he knows well how faithful and zealous Timothy is—a double reference which is certainly not admissible.

6. Instructions to Timothy with Regard to Slaves.—Warning against the Desire to become Rich after the Manner of those who Teach Otherwise.—Charge to be Addressed to the Rich.—Concluding Exhortation.

(vi. 1–22).

"In the last chapter again you have want of connexion in abundance," is the judgment expressed by Schleiermacher. On comparing chap. vi. with chap. v., so much at least is self-evident, that the directions which are there given to Timothy with regard to the different members of the church are here continued, and, in particular, that it is the distinctions of civil rank that are here specified ; first of all, in vers. 1 and 2, that of the slaves, then, vers. 17–19, that of the rich. Between these, in vers. 3–16, stands what certainly at first sight seems strange, namely a description of the doctrines of those who taught otherwise in their nature, their results, and their inmost source in the disposition of their authors, vers. 3–5. One feature only, however, is selected from the rest for farther application and reflection to Timothy, namely, the avarice of these seducers, and Timothy is warned against this, vers. 6–10, while in vers. 11–16, he is exhorted to follow after everlasting possessions, and referred to the glorious appearing of the King of kings and Lord of lords who only hath immortality. Accordingly, vers. 3–16 may be viewed as a transition to ver. 17, seq., which go on to treat of the right use to be made of riches ; the admonition to Timothy will thus be inserted here precisely in the same way as at Tit. ii. 6–9 though more fully, or, as immediately before, at vers. 22 (the latter half), between that verse and vi. 1. The concluding exhortation, vi. 20–22, vindicates itself as a comprehensive summary of what lay nearest the heart of the writer. If we come to this epistle with not too high expectations respecting its method, and regard it as an official letter to a confidential helper of the apostle, in which he gives free expression to his feelings towards the person to whom he writes (comp. the General Introduction, § 4), we shall be very well contented with such an arrangement as has been pointed out. With respect to the alleged unfortunate compilation from the epistle to Titus and the second to Timothy, it will suffice to refer, against Schleiermacher, to Planck, p. 217, seq.

Vers. 1 and 2.—Of the Slaves. Comp. Tit. ii. 9 on the reason of this so frequently occurring exhortation in the epistles of the apostle. It shews itself, meanwhile, in the passage before us plainly enough. "As many as are under the yoke as slaves"—thus De Wette rightly renders the words, taking δοῦλοι as the predicate; for the distinction cannot be intended to be drawn between such slaves as are under the yoke and such as are not. A slave is as such under the yoke; the expression therefore does not imply harsh treatment, for to this the following exhortation given in quite general terms would not correspond; nor can it in itself mark the distinction between such slaves as serve heathen and such as serve Christian masters. The expression is rather used by the apostle in opposition to the false ideas that were held on the subject of emancipation; whosoever is under the yoke is to conduct himself according to this his position. The term ζυγός used in this sense only here; comp., however, Lev. xxvi. 13, and especially the expressions ἑτεροζυγεῖν and σύζυγος used by the apostle, from which it will be seen that this figure is not strange to him. Of these the apostle says: they are to count their masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and the doctrine be not blasphemed. One can easily conceive what danger there was, lest the Christian slave should inwardly exalt himself above his heathen master, and look down upon him. To meet this danger there is here required of him not merely outward subjection, but inward esteem; for this is the import of the expression; and from this feeling will spring spontaneously the right outward conduct. Ἴδιος δεσπότης, in like manner as ἴδιος ἀνήρ = husband, comp. Winer's Gr., § 22, 7, p. 139. On the ἵνα μή, comp. Tit. ii. 5, in a positive form ii. 10. Ὄνομα θεοῦ; with reference to the confession of the Christian. These masters are not to have it in their power to say: what kind of god is the God of the Christians, if those who confess him, etc.

Ver. 2 now treats of Christian slaves under Christian masters, the apostle having had in his mind in ver. 1 Christian slaves under masters who were not Christian, as appears from the words *that the name of God*, etc. As to those a warning against exalting themselves above their masters is addressed, so to these is addressed with the same propriety, a warning against falsely placing themselves on a level with their masters. "Those, however, who have believing masters are not to despise them because they are brethren, but they are to serve them all the more, because they are faithful and beloved who receive the benefit." The sense of the whole then is: such slaves are not to see, in the fact of their masters being their brethren in Christ, a reason for despising them (for to place themselves on a level with those to whom they owe subjection is already to despise them); but they are rather to find in this circumstance a

motive to serve the more, *i. e.*, to do all the more what their position as slaves lays upon them. It is represented as objectively true that *they are brethren*, but it is a false inference from this that they are to be despised; it rather follows that the slaves are to serve the more. Instead of despising them, they are rather all the more to serve them. Μᾶλλον in opposition to the preceding, and, as the following ὅτι shews, is not = "rather," but = "so much the more." On the sense of the following ὅτι there can hardly be any doubt. It must certainly be the intention of the apostle to shew, in opposition to what precedes, how the truth expressed in *they are brethren* lays under obligation to precisely an opposite conduct (comp. Schleiermacher). What sense can be obtained by explaining the ὅτι, etc., thus: because the slaves who are devoted to their duty are *faithful* and *beloved?* which in itself is a strange idea. Or thus: because the masters who are studious to bestow benefits are faithful and beloved? Or thus: because the masters who enjoy the favour = χάρις (= are fellow Christians), are faithful and beloved? And, if we descend to particulars, much might be said against each of these interpretations. How does εὐεργεσία come to have the signification of χάρις? And why this strange circumlocution for the simple κοινωνοὶ τῆς χάριτος, which the words according to this interpretation ought to express, but which they in reality do not express? And, as regards the interpretation mentioned before this, can the expression οἱ τῆς εὐεργ. ἀντιλ. (= who are studious to bestow benefits) be all at once applied as a principle to all Christian masters? And must not then εἰ have been used instead of ὅτι? But εἰ could certainly not have been used; for the apostle will not, assuredly, make the performance of duty on the part of the slaves to be dependent on any such condition, comp. De Wette, Mack. Commentators have allowed themselves to be misled by the expressions εὐεργεσία and ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι from the right interpretation, which is furnished by the context itself. Already Schleiermacher thinks we are not at liberty to suppose, that the expression εὐεργεσία is used of slaves towards their masters. But why not, if by this is to be understood a service all the more zealous as proceeding from Christian love to the master as one who is a *believer* and *beloved* (in the sense of Rom. i. 7, *beloved of God*)? De Wette says well, "the clause is parallel with the preceding, *because they are brethren* . . . . only the subject which is there suppressed is here expressed, and it is so with reference to the *service* which is to be done from a Christian motive (μᾶλλον), and which, as concisely denoted by εὐεργεσία, is delicately indicated instead of being plainly said: but they are the more to serve, and to perform their service with good will (Eph. vi. 7) as a benefit, because those to whom they perform it are believers and beloved." There is, moreover, in a gram-

matical point of view, nothing to hinder our taking *εὐεργεσία* in its general signification = "kind act," and thus referring it to the *μᾶλλον δουλεύειν* (comp. Passow). The passage Acts iv. 9 is also no proof against this. *Ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι*, however, occurs twice (Luke i. 54 and Acts xx. 35), with the genitive of the person, = to take care of, and in connexion with the genitive of the thing (for example, *φιλοσοφίας*) it generally signifies "to be diligently intent on a thing;" but the signification = participem esse, percipere, is, as De Wette remarks, perfectly consistent with the general use of the word = percipere by the senses (comp. Passow), and is confirmed by Elsner in a citation from Porph. de abstin. 1, 46: *μήτε ἐσθίων πλειόνων ἡδονῶν ἀντιλήψεται*. Or may we not suppose, that the apostle, glancing at the reciprocal relation subsisting between the master and the slave, and going back to the original signification of the compound verb, uses *ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι* in the sense "to receive in return" in like manner as *ἀντιάω* (comp. Passow)? This is not so unlikely with Paul especially, who forms new compounds just as he needs them. The oft-recurring *ταῦτα δίδασκε*, comp. Tit. ii. 15; and iv. 11, iv. 7 of our epistle, reminds us that we have before us epistles addressed to fellow-teachers of the apostle.

Vers. 3–16.—Those who teach otherwise—their eagerness after gain—with respect to whom Timothy is warned and admonished. When we observe how the writer pauses at the words, *thinking that gain is godliness*, ver. 5, and directs against this the whole admonition that follows, we shall either have to suppose with the critics, that it happens to him as to those "who speak without motive and without call, and just because they have no definite aim, are not able to come to a conclusion" (Schleiermacher), and that therefore he is led by the words of ver. 5 to make this diatribe against avarice; or, on the other hand, that in connection with the *δίδασκε*, and in opposition to it, he adverts again to the teaching of other things, in order that while he pourtrays to Timothy its frightful form as a whole, he may single out and give prominence to one feature, that of the love of gain, and warn Timothy especially against it. The opinion which any one forms on this point will be determined by the impression which the epistle makes upon him as a whole.* If Paul is the writer, we may well conceive that *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ*,—as also De Wette and Leo observe,—stands in opposition to the foregoing *δίδασκε*, without having to suppose that the apostle in this loses sight of his proper

* Leo (p. 57) notices the apostle's manner towards the end of his epistles—solutiori ordine singula cumulare præcepta. But chap. vi. in no way differs in this respect from the other sections of the epistle; the particular points are there handled, ver. 1, 2; 3–16; 17, seq., just in the same manner as those in the preceding parts. Leo's remark, however, is certainly applicable to the Pastoral Epistles as a whole.

object in the mention of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν. It is certainly the apostle's manner elsewhere to take up and pursue a word in this way, and yet at the same time not to lose the train of thought as a whole. Comp. Schleiermacher, p. 160, seq. "If any one teach differently, and consent not to the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the doctrine which leads to godliness, he is surrounded as with a fog," etc. Εἴ τις = "every one who;" a case is supposed which already exists in concreto, i. 3, seq. The apostle then has this definite form of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν in view, and not a teaching otherwise in general. The ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν is to the apostle quite a definite idea (comp. on i. 3); from which it is at once apparent, how he can with propriety in the apodosis of the sentence, which certainly begins with τετύφωται (De Wette), connect with the general and hypothetical protasis εἴ τις, etc., so definite a description of the ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν according to its source and its results. That this source and these results do not correspond to "every imaginable heresy" (De Wette) is self-evident; the only question is, do they correspond to the definite thing which is denoted by ἑτεροδ. We are therefore not at liberty, with Mosheim and Heydenreich, to understand ἑτεροδ. in strict opposition to ταῦτα δίδασκε as a teaching of something different respecting this particular point (the slaves). But that it is by no means "heresy" in general (De Wette) that is here spoken of, is evident from the following explanation of the ἑτεροδ. (comp on i. 3): *and consents not to sound words*, etc. Προσέρχεσθαι = accedere, to assent to; comp. the proof for this signification of the word in Leo. Ὑγ. λόγοι = ὑγ. διδ. Tit. ii. 1; by this is not meant heresy (comp. the remark on Tit. i. 9, ii. 1, and on i. 3 of our epistle), but sound doctrine in opposition to that of the seducers, which is unsound through profitless science and moral weakness, as also De Wette himself admits, inasmuch as he takes the expression to be synonymous with ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλία. The opposition, therefore, is directly only that between a doctrine which leads to godliness and one which has in it no power of godliness. Comp. also the Gen. Introd. The very expression, *the doctrine which leads to godliness*, is unnecessarily added in our passage as a more especial explanation of the preceding; comp. on the expression our observations on Tit. i. 1, ἀλήθεια ἡ κατ' εὐσέβειαν = quae ad pietatem ducet (Leo).

Ver. 4.—The *apodosis* begins with this verse, and not with ἀφίστασο, ver. 5; all ground for the latter supposition, so unnatural in itself, disappears when εἴ τις ἑτεροδ. is rightly interpreted. Compare, moreover, De Wette. Τετύφωται = he is surrounded with fog, comp. on iii. 6. This is further explained by μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, and in a positive form ἀλλὰ νοσῶν, etc. De Wette gives rightly the connexion of the thought thus: he is encompassed with proud con-

ceit, without at the same time understanding anything, etc. Such persons are wanting in the knowledge of the truth which leads to godliness, consequently in that knowledge which is wholesome; in its place come *ζητήσεις*, questions of controversy, and *λογομαχίαι*, verbal altercations, which do not lead to godliness, and thereby to spiritual soundness; hence *νοσεῖν*. This metaphor, and particularly its use here, is explained by the peculiar form of this *ἑτεροδ.*; comp. the Gen. Introd. *Ζητήσεις*, controversial questions, comp. on Tit. iii. 9, and above, i. 4. *Λογομαχίαι*, = verbal altercations, de verbis magis quam de rebus (Calvin); a controversy which can spring only from selfishness, and not from love to the truth, as the results also show. On *περί* as denoting the object about which, so to speak, anything moves = circa, comp. Winer's Gr., § 49, I, p. 361. Leo and De Wette are for understanding *νοσεῖν* = "to suffer in the mania for." The opposition to *ὑγ. διδασκαλία, ὑγιαίνειν ἐν πίστει*, Tit. i. 13, does not point to such a meaning; the signification itself, however, is demonstrably correct. This is the state of mind belonging to those who teach otherwise. The consequences of their questions and word-strifes are then stated in the words that follow: *ἐξ ὧν γίνεται*, etc., = from which proceeds envy, dissension, slanders, evil suspicion, lasting contests of men of corrupt minds and destitute of the truth, who look upon godliness as gain. The identity of the persons here characterized with those elsewhere referred to in the epistles is evident from the features in this description, comp. the Gen. Introd., and on Tit. i. 14. By the *βλασφημίαι* are to be understood not blasphemies against God, but, as the other characteristics show, mutual slanders; in like manner the *ὑπόνοιαι πον.* are to be taken in the sense = malevolæ de iis qui alias partes sequuntur . . . . suspiciones (Leo.) The word occurs only here; *ὑπονοέω* frequently in the Acts of the Apostles.

Ver. 5.—*Παραδιατριβαί* is the common reading; the best accredited (comp. Lachmann, Tischendorf) is *διαπαρατριβαί*. On the signification, comp. Winer's Gr. § 16, 4, B., p. 92: the former = useless disputations, the latter = lasting enmities, contests. That the latter also corresponds better to the context—inasmuch as vanæ disputationes have already been denoted by *λογομ.* and it is strife that is spoken of in the context—has been shown by Leo in his excellent investigation of this word, p. 60. Olshausen too is of the opinion here preferred. The inmost source of these pursuits in the disposition of those men is then indicated in the words *men of corrupt minds*, etc., substantially the same as in ver. 4, *he is proud*, etc. The description is the same as elsewhere, comp. on *διεφθ.*, Tit. i. 15; on *ἀπεστερημένων*, etc., above on i. 19; Tit. i. 14. This last predicate shows plainly that that teaching of other things, against which Timothy is warned, did not emanate from those who from

the first insisted on the Pharisaico-judaistic stand-point, but from those who, after they had come into the possession of the true knowledge, knew neither how to value nor preserve this possession, in consequence of this deficiency, and thus were led into the by-paths of a pretendedly deeper gnosis and higher ascetical holiness of which they then made a trade. And if they were Jewish Christians (Tit. i. 10, etc., comp. the Gen. Introd.), it was most natural that they should connect their secret wisdom with the Old Testament, after the manner of the Cabbala, the elements of which were already in existence at that time. The sense of the passage before us is—that such were inwardly already destitute of the truth, for the reception of which they had not enough of moral integrity; but it by no means follows from this, that their doctrines must therefore have been heresies properly so-called. How far this inward destitution had gone with them, is shown most clearly by the last feature in the description, namely that they look upon and treat piety as a means of gain, comp. Tit. i. 11. How very striking here again is that which by many is always characterised as a defect, namely, that so little is said by way of refuting the *errors!* Here nothing more is necessary than a description of this pursuit setting before us its source and its aim; comp. the Gen. Introd. This last feature it is which the apostle keeps in his eye, and which in my opinion he had in view from the first, only he could not refrain from holding up before Timothy, a complete picture of this teaching against which he warns him. The last words of this verse, *ἀφίστασο ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων*, are suspicious; they are not found in A.D.*F.G. 17.67.**93. (comp. Tischendorf), and were accordingly added in order to mark the transition to the following warning in ver. 6. The plural also, *τῶν τοιούτων*, disturbs the connexion, as afterwards at ver. 6 only one feature is brought into prominence. The most recent critics have cancelled it.

In vers. 6–10 there follows the warning against such a *love of money;* which, as ver. 11 shows, is also specially applied to Timothy. It would be difficult to show how it could come into the mind of a later writer, a disciple of Paul, belonging to the first or the second century, to introduce into his forged epistle admonitions such as this addressed to Timothy, irradiated as he would be with the splendour of the apostolic time. The warning, however, and afterwards the admonition, ver. 11, seq., is so tenderly and sparingly expressed, that one has but to suppose, that the apostle did not consider Timothy to be exalted above the reach of every temptation of this kind, in order to feel noway disturbed in the conviction of its apostolic origin. It is indeed not to be denied, that the second epistle to Timothy, amid all the tenderness of its admonitions, shows that there must have been on the part of Timothy, a certain tendency to indolence and to shrinking from the conflict.

Ver. 6.—Ἔστι δέ is opposed to the νομιζόντων, ver. 5 ; but it is *really*, etc.* But godliness with contentment is a great gain (= means of gain) ; accordingly, in opposition to the preceding, that godliness is meant which makes the heart contented, and which banishes from the heart the thirst for perishing treasures inasmuch as it offers higher treasures, and just in so far as it does this is it great gain.† Leo cites similar sentiments to this from Seneca ; this difference, however, is well to be observed, that there *contentment* in itself is called riches, here *godliness with contentment;* and thus the heart amid every outward want is then only truly rich, not merely when it feels no need of what it has not, but when it has that which exalts it above what it has not. On αὐτάρκεια comp. Phil. iv. 11.

In ver. 7 the words, *with contentment*, are confirmed by the sentiment that of earthly treasures we can take nothing away with us from the earth. This sentiment is, however, itself represented as an inference from another certain truth, namely that we have brought nothing with us into the world, Job. i. 21 ; Eccles. v. 15. Hamann, "the earth makes no soul rich." Δῆλον is wanting in several codd., A.F.G. 17 ; I think with De Wette that for the sake of the sense it should be received as genuine ; Tischendorf also has again received it. For, the principal idea must certainly be, that we take nothing away with us ; but without δῆλον this would appear as the reason of what goes before.

Ver. 8.—"If, however, we have food and covering let us therewith be content." The ἔχοντες δέ is in opposition to the οὐδὲ ἐξεν. τι δυν. The expressions διατροφή and σκέπασμα are ἅπαξ λεγόμενα in the New Testament. Several commentators understand *dwelling* as included in the σκέπασμα ; certainly with reason, comp. Leo. On the conjunctive which several codd. have here, comp. Winer's Gr., § 13, i. p. 70.

Ver. 9.—In opposition to the contented, ver. 8, the apostle goes on to say : but they who wish to be rich (βουλόμενοι, not θέλοντες, comp. Leo) fall into temptation and a snare, and many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. The πειρασμός, temptation to unjust gain, already in itself denotes a sinful state (James i. 14), which contradicts the command not to let ourselves be drawn away of lust. They do not stop, however, at the temptation merely, but go also into the snare, *the snare of the devil*, iii. 7 ; and the one sin becomes the fruitful parent of the

* Eleganter et non sine ironica correctione in contrarium sensum eadem verbo retorquet. Calvin (Huther).

† De Wette thinks it wrong that the baseness implied in perverting what is holy into a means of gain is not expressly rebuked. If the apostle had been rebuking those adversaries, he would not have omitted this. But he is dealing with Timothy.

others ; with the one evil lust many others join themselves : for so are the *ἐπιθυμίαι* to be understood, as ver. 10 shows, in which the sense of these words is confirmed by *root of all evil*, etc. Ἀνόητοι —for this, and not *ἀνόνητοι*, must be taken as the true reading, comp. Tischendorf—and *βλαβεραί*, noxiæ, are the epithets applied to these *lusts, foolish* and *noxious*, noxious, namely, to those who are ensnared by them ; one has but to call to mind Eph. iv. 22, *ἐπιθυμίαι τῆς ἀπάτης* : they deceive unto death. But our passage itself explains the epithet in the words *αἵτινες*, etc., which sink (the word in its proper signification, Luke v. 7) men *εἰς ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν*. By this is not meant destruction in the moral sense (De Wette) for they are already in this, but destruction in the emphatic sense in which *ἀπώλεια* is elsewhere used by the apostle, Rom. ix. 22 ; Phil. i. 28, etc.; *ὄλεθρος*, however (used only by the apostle in the New Testament, 1 Cor. v. 5 ; 1 Thess. vi. 3 ; 2 Thess. i. 9) denotes destruction in general (as well temporal as eternal, comp. the passages) to which the more definite idea of *ἀπώλεια* is added to make it stronger. Olshausen understands *ὄλεθρος* exclusively of temporal destruction.

Ver. 10.—That these are the consequences of desiring to be rich is now confirmed, in like manner as at ver. 7, by a general, and as it would seem proverbially acknowledged truth : for the love of money is a root of all evil. When De Wette objects that an avaricious man may yet possess certain virtues, and also, that other lusts may quite destroy a man, he stretches the sense of the words too far : for in these no more is said, than that a germ of all evil lies in the love of money, by which it is neither, on the one hand, maintained that all evil must manifest itself in every lover of money, nor on the other hand, is it denied that there are other vices which likewise carry in them the beginnings of all evil. Fortunately, man is inconsistent also in evil. Ἧς τινες, etc. In proof of this sentiment, the apostle mentions examples of those whom the love of money has made to err from the faith. Much has been made of the impropriety in the connection of *ἧς ὀρεγ.*, on the ground that the *φιλαργυρία* itself is an *ὄρεξις*. That the expression is inexact—as *ἧς* refers only to the idea of *money* implied in the *φιλαργυρία*—is true ; but it is strange that any attempt should be made to draw from this impropriety a proof against the Pauline origin of the epistle. Analogous examples, as Baumgarten has observed, are to be found in Rom. viii. 24 ; Acts xxiv. 15, where *ἐλπίς* denotes at one time the hope, at another the object of the hope. I think, with De Wette, against Leo and Matthies, that it is incorrect to take *ὀρέγεσθαι* (comp. iii. 1; Heb. xi. 16) = deditum esse. Ἀπεπλανήθησαν, etc. (comp. Mark xiii. 22), in a reflex signification ; they are turned away from the faith. The open departure from the faith is to the apostle the

strongest proof of that assertion. "And have pierced themselves through with many pains." By these pains are to be understood the gnawings of conscience, the harbingers of the future *ἀπώλεια*, ver. 9. The expression *περιπείρω* only here; the same figure occurs at Luke ii. 35. In the same manner as here it is used in Josephus, B. J. III. 7, 31; Diodor. Sic. etc., comp. Leo, Wahl.

Ver. 11.—The writer now passes to the positive side of the subject—from the warning against desiring to be rich, to the exhortation to strive after the attainment of those possessions in which alone true riches consist. The Christian is not required, on the one hand, to renounce anything without having offered to him, on the other, a rich compensation; that which he gives up for the sake of Christ, he shall receive again in him an hundred fold, Matth. xix. 29; Mark x. 30. This positive side forms the specific character of the Christian exhortation; comp. on ver. 6. But thou—the apostle thus turns to Timothy—O man of God, flee this, and follow after righteousness, piety, faith, love, patience, mildness. *But thou*, in opposition to *some*, ver. 10. The whole of the following exhortation, not merely ver. 11, but vers. 11–16, does not extend beyond what belongs to Christians in general, and accordingly has no reference to the special calling of Timothy. From this it will at once appear that the title which is here given to Timothy, *ἄνθρ. τοῦ θεοῦ*, which certainly stands in a real connexion with the following exhortation, is not to be referred to the official calling of Timothy, and in this sense to be placed along with the אִישׁ־אֱלֹהִים of the Old Testament (1 Sam. ix. 6, etc., comp. with 2 Pet. i. 21); this designation in reference to the prophet implies an allusion which is not applicable to the *διδάσκαλος*; the expression is not used differently here from 2 Tim. iii. 17, and its sense is given in such passages as Jam. i. 18: *ἀπεκύησαν ἡμᾶς*, etc. He who thus belongs to God as his *creature* cannot regard the earthly as his highest good; only the *man of this world* can do so. But it also follows from the above remark that *ταῦτα* in the words *ταῦτα φεῦγε* is not, as many think, to be referred to vers. 3–10, but specially to the above-mentioned *φιλαργυρία* together with its results, ver. 10. The whole of the following exhortation, chiefly also vers. 15 and 16, shews that the apostle has this point in view (comp. infra), and ver. 17, seq., shews this in like manner, as De Wette has already observed. *Διώκω*—frequently used by the apostle in this sense, comp. on *ἐπακολουθέω*, v. 10. *Δικαιοσύνη* in the same general sense as *δικαίως*, Tit. ii. 12, where likewise *δικαίως* and *εὐσεβῶς* are connected; comp. on the passage. Special aspects of this are then denoted in the following characteristics: faith, love, patience (comp. on Tit. ii. 2), mildness (= mansuetudo, comp. on Tit. iii. 2). We have but to compare Matth. v. 5 in order to understand why these are here spe-

cially mentioned. *Φιλαργυρία* and *πραότης* cannot exist together. Instead of *πραότητα* A.F.G., etc., have *πραϋπάθειαν* which Tischendorf has adopted (= meekness). On the omission of the article, Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, p. 109.

Ver. 12.—"Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life, to which thou art called and hast professed the good profession before many witnesses." Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 24, seq.; Phil. iii. 12, seq. If we have the same author before us here as in these passages, then here too he has in his mind the figure of the agonistic contests. Leo admits that in the preceding verses it is Christian striving in general that is spoken of, but he finds in ver. 12 a transition to those qualities which more immediately belong to a minister of the church. I can see nothing of this, and the comparison of the passages just adduced, as also 2 Tim. iv. 7, likewise shews nothing of the kind, and by *ἐντολή*, ver. 14, is to be understood even according to Leo the Christian commandment in general. We have here therefore not to do with Timothy as an evangelist, but as an individual, as also De Wette perceives; only that he from his critical point of view draws from this another objection against the author, as if nothing of a purely personal nature could properly find a place in this epistle. At the expression *ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰων. ζ.*, Schleiermacher has taken offence on the two following grounds: 1, because Paul never uses the word elsewhere, and it occurs here twice in immediate succession—to which we have already replied in the General Introduction with examples from other epistles; and 2, because it is strange to find the imperative in connexion with *ζωῆς αἰωνίου*, inasmuch as eternal life can only be expected from God. This objection will disappear if only we keep in view the words, "in and through the fight;" for to him who faithfully fights, *eternal life* is sure as the crown of victory. Comp. Winer's Gr., § 43, 2, p. 279: "the *ἐπιλ. τῆς ζωῆς* is to be represented as the result of the conflict, but as the thing which is to be striven after, and *ἐπιλ.* does not signify to obtain, to receive; the asyndeton is not without effect." In the expression *εἰς ἣν ἐκλήθης* (*καί* after *ἣν* is to be cancelled, comp. Tischendorf) the figure is not to be retained; it is quite the same here as at Phil. iii. 14 (comp. on the passage and De Wette on the present passage). Leo and others are for referring *εἰς ἣν* also to what follows, but the reference would not be homogeneous, and the *ὡμολο.* does not need it. De Wette is therefore right when he says, that *καὶ ὡμολ.* is simply placed co-ordinately with the preceding. All that is necessary to account for the use of the expression *ὁμολογεῖν ὁμολογίαν* may be found in the writings of Paul, as Schleiermacher himself acknowledges; but the *καλὴ ὁμ.*, as he thinks, looks very strange. It must be supposed that the words *ὁμ. κ. ὁμ.*, as they stand so closely connected with the *ἐκλήθην*, denote a particular fact, as does also

the expression *ὁμολογία Χριστοῦ*. This is unquestionably true; and he who does not wish to know more than can be known, may learn from the passages, i. 18, iv. 14, and 2 Tim. i. 4, to what fact he is to refer this *ὁμολογία*. Comp. Matthies, p. 417. In those passages, it is true, only the laying of hands on Timothy and the prophecies concerning him are spoken of; the passage before us supplements those statements in precisely the same way as 2 Tim. i. 6 supplements 1 Tim. iv. 14, and this again 1 Tim. i. 18. If *there*, it is the calling of Timothy, and *here* his personal character and conduct which the apostle has especially in view, it will at once be evident, why here it is the *ὁμολογία*, and there the *ἐπίθεσις* and the *προφητεία*, which the apostle holds up before him. If due attention then be given to the difference in the context (comp. also Böttger a. a. O., p. 12, seq.), no reason will appear for going beyond the allusion which we find in other passages to Timothy's entrance on his official calling; no reason, therefore, for supposing any allusion to his baptism, still less to a confession made by him before his enemies in a time of persecution, to which indeed, apart from every other consideration, the expression *ὁμ. τ. καλ. ὁμ.* does not well correspond (comp. Leo and also De Wette). If any one thinks that this expression "savours of a later date," he must just be allowed to think so; there is nothing in it at which any one can justly find reason to stumble. This confession is called *good*, not on account of the prompt courage with which Timothy made it, but on account of its import; it is the Christian confession as such that is meant;* only, this must not be supposed to imply any definite formula; comp. on the following verse, ver. 13. "The exhortation rises as in ver. 21; 2 Tim. iv. 1, to a solemn protestation," De Wette. I give thee charge—the apostle writes—in the sight of God, who keeps all things alive, and Christ Jesus, who under Pontius Pilate witnessed the good confession, that thou keep the commandment without spot, unrebukeable, etc. It is of importance here to decide whether the reading is *ζωογονοῦντος* or *ζωοποιοῦντος*. The codd. A.D.F.G., etc., are in favour of the former (comp. Tischendorf); it is also easier evidently to account for the more common *ζωοποιοῦντος* having arisen out of *ζωογονοῦντος*, which occurs again only twice, Luke xvii. 33 and Acts vii. 19, than vice versa to account for the latter having arisen out of the former. Further, as *ζωογονεῖν* in the Scripture phraseology, both of the Old and New Testament (comp. Leo), is = vivum conservare, such a sense might seem to involve a difficulty when compared with Rom. iv. 17, etc. In fine, *τὰ πάντα* is also in favour of *ζωογονοῦντος*, for *ζωοποιεῖν τὰ πάντα* can nowhere be shewn in the sense of raising to life. If, accordingly, we take the reading to be *ζωογονοῦντος τὰ πάντα*, we shall not find in the words an allu-

* So also Huther assigning its proper force to the article.

sion to the resurrection, but only to the all-preserving power of God. The apostle here points Timothy to the present manifestation of the power and glory of God, as afterwards at ver. 14, seq., to the future revelation of this, in order to encourage him—the *man of God*—to the right conduct, ver. 14. He belongs to him who bears and preserves all; by him has he been called to eternal life on condition of faithfully fighting the fight of faith; how should he depart from him who is the Lord of all life, and turn again to that which is naught? Those who adopt the common reading *ζωοποιοῦντος* (De Wette and others), find in the words encouragement not to shrink from death in the cause of Jesus Christ. But, as we have already seen, it is not the conduct of Timothy in his calling, that is here spoken of, comp. vers. 11–13, 14. We must rather therefore connect *ζωοποιοῦντος τὰ πάντα* with the exhortation to lay hold on eternal life. ver. 12. Still less will that interpretation do, if with Mack we take *ζωοπ.* = from whom is all life, and in whose hand the life of every creature stands; in which sense the other reading is decidedly to be preferred. *Καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, etc. These words also are variously interpreted. With respect, first of all, to the construction, De Wette has rightly shewn in opposition to Mack and Matthies, that *τὴν καλὴν ὁμολογίαν* cannot be separated from *μαρτυρήσαντος* and connected with *παραγγέλλω*: 1, the verb does not correspond to this; 2, *τ. καλ. ὁμ.* has nothing pointing back to this verb; 3, nor does the following idea, expressed by the *ἐντολή*, which is not implied in the *ὁμολογία*, agree with this. We must therefore take *μαρτ.* and *την κ. ὁμ.* together. What then is the sense? It has already been said of Timothy that he has made the good confession, and on the ground of this he is in ver. 12, as also in ver. 14 exhorted to the right conduct. He does not need therefore an example of a good confession, as is generally supposed in explanation of this passage, for what is required of him is not to confess, but on the ground of the confession made by him *to keep the commandment.* And is it to be supposed, asks Matthies with reason, that what has just been ascribed to Timothy, should now in so entirely similar a form be predicted of Christ? And why is not here also *ὁμολογήσαντος* and not *μαρτυρήσαντος*? Non differt *μαρτυρεῖν την ὁμ.* from *ὁμολογεῖν τὴν ὁμ.*, observes Leo. But wherefore then the change? And where else shall we find *μαρτυρεῖν* synonymous with *ὁμολογεῖν*? The former is everywhere = to testify, to bear witness to the truth of a thing, the latter is always to confess, which has directly nothing to do with the truth or untruth of a thing, but only with its relation to the person confessing, its acknowledgment or rejection by the individual. Comp. only a passage such as Rom. x. 2, ix. 10, and it will at once be seen, how widely the two expressions are distinguishable from each other. Thus then the words *τοῦ μαρτ. . . . τὴν*

καλὴν ὁμ. will mean not: "he has laid down a good confession," but, "testified, given testimony to its truth;" and Timothy who has laid down this good confession, is accordingly referred here to the certainty of this confesssion, in so far as Christ has given testimony to it. Thus by the ἡ καλὴ ὁμολογία, ver. 12 and ver. 14, is to be understood one and the same thing, namely, the Christian confession, which is in itself good.* On this also will depend the interpretation which is assigned to μαρτυρήσαντος ἐπί Π. Π., which according to the one view will be understood specially of the testimony of Christ before Pilate (John xviii. 35, seq.; Matth. xxvii. 11), according to the other, of the testimony to the truth in his sufferings and death, ἐπί = under (comp. for this, passages in De Wette); the second of these interpretations is accordingly to be preferred.

Ver. 14.—Thus then Timothy—being reminded that it is the Lord of all life who hath called him, that it is a sure confession by which he hath bound himself—is exhorted *to keep the commandment without spot*, etc. We have as yet seen no reason to depart from the supposition founded on ver. 11, that it is not Timothy's calling which is here spoken of, but his personal conduct. How can ἐντολή here signify munus demandatum (Bretschneider), or the doctrine which is committed to him (De Wette), especially as the word is without any pronominal reference back to Timothy? And as this signification does not agree with the context, so neither is it grammatically well founded: for in the passage John xii. 20, ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ has the sense = "doctrine which has been laid down," only in virtue of its reference back to ver. 49. And in fine, τηρεῖν τὴν ἐντολήν has, according to constant usage, as Schleiermacher already observes (comp. Wahl on τηρεῖν), invariably the sense "to observe, to obey a command." There is no reason here for departing from this the usual signification. Ἐντολή then is not the Christian doctrine in general, but as Leo and others (Olshausen = all that Christ hath commanded) understand it = the Christian doctrine in its morally binding and disciplining aspect, Tit. ii. 11, as also 2 Pet. ii. 21, iii. 2, as νόμος for the Christian; comp. John xiii. 34.† "The exhortation then is confined to morality," urges De Wette as an objection; but that it should be so is precisely what the context requires. Ἄσπιλον and ἀνεπίληπτον are not then, as many think,‡ to be connected with ἐντολήν as its predicates, but with σε, and denote the effect of *keeping the commandment*. This construction is sufficiently justified by the σε which immediately precedes, and by the definite sense of τηρῆσαι τὴν ἐντολήν, while it by no means confuses

* Huther takes μαρτ. = ὁμολογεῖν, and understands by the ὁμολογία the confession which we find in John xviii. 37. He ought to have adhered to his interpretation of ver. 12.

† So also Huther, = παραγγελία, i. 5. ‡ Also Huther.

the whole, as Schleiermacher thinks. For ἄσπιλος (vitii expers) Schleiermacher himself refers to Eph. v. 27 ; comp. besides James i. 27 ; 1 Pet. i. 19 ; 2 Pet. iii. 14. On ἀνεπίλημπτος see at iii. 2. *Until*, etc., a thoroughly Pauline connexion of ideas, comp. 1 Cor. i. 8 ; Phil. i. 6, 10, etc. Leo well : ultimum terminum, ad quem usque Timotheo ἡ ἐντολή servanda sit, ponit apostolus ; comp. on Phil. i. 6. On ἐπιφάνεια = παρουσία comp. on Tit. ii. 13, and 2 Thess. ii. 8.

In vers. 15 and 16 the apostle describes this future *appearing* as what God is to bring about, whose majesty and glorious riches are represented in the epithets which are added. On καιροῖς ἰδίοις comp. Tit. i. 3. Schleiermacher finds in the unusual form of expression ἐπιφ. δείξει a decided specimen of patchwork. But if ἐπιφάνεια, in contradistinction to παρουσία, gives especial prominence to the element of visibility in this revelation, why should the connexion with δείξει have an appearance of patchwork ? What other word should have been used instead of δείξει ? It is farther alleged by Schleiermacher, that such a description of God passing into a doxology is not consistent with what precedes. I apprehend, however, that this description of God, as the only one who is glorious and rich, who alone hath immortality, carries in it plainly enough an antithetical reference to the eager striving after earthly riches which is censured in the preceding verses. To come to particulars, Schleiermacher thinks that the words of this passage are borrowed from a hymn, while Baur (p. 28) endeavours to shew that we have here a gnostic form of expression. The former opinion, which Mack also expresses, we may leave undecided, as in a critical point of view it is inconsiderable ; at all events, such a supposition has more in its favour in connexion with the passage iii. 16 than here ; comp. Matthies against it. In opposition to the other opinion, others have already proved that a reference to the gnostic style of expression is not necessary to the explanation of the predicates here used. On μακάριος, comp. on i. 11 ; Tit. ii. 13. Corresponding to that which God is in himself will be the *appearing* which he will at a future time shew, and its results for those who *keep the commandments*. Καὶ μόνος δυνάστης is likewise designed to shew the greatness and majesty of God, from whom the ἐπιφ. proceeds. The word δυνάστης is, in its general application, not foreign to the New Testament usage (Luke i. 52 ; Acts viii. 27); applied to God as here, it occurs at least in 2 Macc. iii. 24, xii. 15, xv. 23. The epithet μόνος is used in a similar way here to Rom. xvi. 27 : μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ ; Jude 25 ; Rev. xv. 4. He is δυνάστης in a way in which no other is. No one surely will maintain that it is necessary to suppose here any polemical allusion to the polytheism or dualism of the Gnostics. Expressions parallel to the following epithets, βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων, κύριος

τῶν κυριευόντων (comp. i. 17), which determine more exactly the μόνος δυν. may be pointed out in the Old and New Testaments; Deut. x. 17; Ps. xcv. 3; 2 Macc. xiii. 4; 3 Macc. v. 35; Matth. v. 35; Rev. i. 5, xvii. 14, xix. 16. Comp. also passages such as Eph. i. 21, iii. 10; Col. i. 16; Rom. viii. 38; 1 Cor. xv. 24.

Ver. 16.—*Who only hath immortality.* Οὐσίᾳ γὰρ ἀθάνατος, οὐ μετουσίᾳ, Theodoret. He is therefore the source of immortality to all who are partakers in it; out of him is *death.* (With reference to the Son, John v. 26). On the relation which this predicate bears to the subject treated of in the context, see above. The idea is not expressed by the apostle in the same form anywhere else, but we certainly do not need the gnosis of the second century in order to its explanation. The expression ἀθανασία is used again by the apostle only at 1 Cor. xv. 53. The predicate which comes last expresses also the exceeding majesty of God: φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον, ὅν, etc., on which Theophylact observes: ᾧ οὐδεὶς προσελθεῖν δύναται διὰ τὴν ἄγαν λαμπρότητα, and Theophilus ad Autol., p. 72 (ed. Col.): εἰ τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐλαχίστῳ ὄντι στοιχείῳ οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἀτενίσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν θέρμην καὶ δύναμιν· πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ ἀνεκφράστῳ οὔσῃ ἄνθρωπος θνητὸς οὐ δύναται ἀντωπῆσαι (cited by Heydenreich, p. 321). Baur thinks that this expression bears a peculiar resemblance to the gnostic cast of conception; the designation, however, is derived from the Old Testament, comp. Ps. civ. 2; Ezek. i. 26, seq., and passages such as Eccles. vii. 26, and 1 John i. 5; Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 15. The words are not to be understood as merely intimating the incomprehensibleness of God, but agreeably to the context, as descriptive of his majesty, in respect of his essential nature, as the consequence of which is then specified in the relative clause the absolute invisibility of God. Mack is altogether wrong when he takes the words in connexion with *in due time,* and understands them of the unsearchableness of the Divine counsels. Comp. on the relative clause, John i. 18; 1 John iv. 12. Further, Col. i. 15; Heb. xi. 27, where God is described as ἀόρατος. Our passage says nothing else than what we find in these passages. The last words of this verse form a doxology with which the apostle winds up this description of God: *to whom be honour and power everlasting,* comp. 1 Pet. iv. 11, v. 11; Rev. i. 6, v. 13; Jude 25. Κράτος is power in its application outwards, comp. Harless on Eph. i. 19; hence the connexion with τιμή.

Vers. 17–19.—Concerning the rich. Some have considered the foregoing doxology as properly the conclusion of the epistle, and these verses, together with what follows, as a mere supplement. Without reason; for a doxology does not necessarily stand precisely at the conclusion of the whole epistle, as may be seen in i. 17; Rom. xi. 36, while ver. 17 stands in quite a natural connexion with ver.

5, seq.; from speaking of the desire to be rich the apostle proceeds to speak of those who are rich. Similarly already Schleiermacher, p. 227. Even the manner in which the apostle expresses himself in this passage shews that he has this connexion in view. *Τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι* placed at the beginning of the sentence, evidently involves an opposition to another kind of riches (not therefore to ver. 19, as De Wette thinks), those riches, namely, to which the apostle has directed the attention of Timothy in the preceding, where he reminds him of the *appearing* which the blessed God will in due time shew. *Ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι* (comp. Winer's Gr., § 20, 2, p. 123) is to be connected with *τοῖς πλουσίοις*, so as to form one idea. Other MSS., D.E., some versions and church Fathers, have *τοῦ νῦν αἰῶνος*, comp. Tischendorf. The apostle now shews in a few brief sentences what disposition ought to be cherished by those who have riches, what use they ought to make of their riches, and the consequences of their making such use of them. In ver. 17 the apostle warns the rich against a twofold danger: against haughtiness (*ὑψηλοφρονεῖν* the opposite of *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, comp. Rom. xii. 20, *τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονεῖν*), and against that which lies at the root of haughtiness, namely, trust in riches. *Μηδὲ ἠλπικέναι* (on the Perf. comp. iv. 10), *ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι*: the expression itself represents this trust as misplaced, in so far as it is trust in what is uncertain and changeable. On this mode of giving emphasis to an idea by means of the substantive comp. Winer's Gr., § 33, 2, p. 211. *Ἄδηλος* properly non manifestus—uncertain, insecure, occurs besides at Luke xi. 44, and is used by the apostle again only at 1 Cor. ix. 26, xiv. 8. Theodoret: "the possession of riches is indeed insecure, for now they accompany this person, and now they pass over to that, and that which has many masters is possessed by none." Confidence is rather to be placed and reposed in the living God (*τῷ ζῶντι* is perhaps not genuine, comp. Tischendorf; instead of *ἐπί* as before, *ἐν* = upon, in) for he it is who giveth us all things (transfertur ejus officium ad divitias, si spes in iis locatur—Calvin) and who giveth them *εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν* for enjoyment, not that the heart may cleave to them.

Ver. 18.—As the right use which is to be made of riches, Timothy is to enjoin the rich *to do good* (*ἀγαθοεργεῖν*, comp. Acts xiv. 17 = *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*) to be rich in good works (a stronger expression than the foregoing, with allusion to the being *rich in this world*), liberal, ready to communicate (both expressions only here). Some have understood the expression *κοινωνικός* to mean "social, affable," which is little suited to the foregoing predicates, and is against the *usus linguæ;* comp. Rom. xii. 13, xv. 26; Gal. vi. 6; Heb. xiii. 16. The signification "sympathising" (Matthies) in the sense which we generally attach to this word, cannot be justified grammatically, and,

as connected with the foregoing predicates, is far too general an idea. Substantially, the two expressions run into each other—they express the same thing in different points of view: the former εὐμεταδ. applies more especially to one whose heart does not cleave to what he has, and who therefore gives easily and cheerfully; the latter κοιν. to one who gives what he has because another stands in need of it.

Ver. 19.—Of such giving to others the giver himself enjoys the best fruits; he thereby lays by a treasure for himself (ἑαυτοῖς θεμέλιον καλὸν εἰς τὸ μέλλον. Θεμέλιον everywhere else signifies foundation, base; it is arbitrary to understand it as = θέμα, treasure, and still more so to substitute as an emendation κειμήλιον (Cleric.), or θέμα λίαν καλόν (L. Bos), as the reading does not in the least degree fluctuate. Schleiermacher indeed maintains, that "the apostle does not deal with metaphors in this confused manner." The expression, however is not confused but only concise. The *foundation*, namely—which is the sure reversion to a future possession—is itself represented as a possession, and so connected with ἀποθησαυρίζοντας. De Wette rightly refers to iii. 13, βαθμὸν ἑαυτοῖς καλὸν περιποιοῦνται. On the whole passage comp. Luke xvi. 9. In order that —continues the apostle—("with their feet so to speak on this foundation," De Wette) they may lay hold on the true life. Τῆς ὄντως is, according to A.D.*E.*F.G., etc., decidedly to be preferred to the other reading, τῆς αἰωνίου as at ver. 12.

Ver. 20–22.—Concluding Exhortation and Benediction. Vers. 20 and 21 evidently stand as a comprehensive concluding exhortation, in which the main point is again brought into notice, similar examples of which we find in other epistles of the apostles (comp. for example 1 Cor. xvi. 13; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Eph. vi. 10; Phil. iv. 4). This main point which the apostle here again brings into notice, and earnestly enjoins on Timothy personally (O Timothy) is—that he guard the doctrine which has been committed to him, and meddle not with the pursuits of those ἑτεροδιδάσκαλοι, which in the case of many have already led to an entire falling away from the faith. The principal clause is, *guard that which is committed to thy trust;* what the apostle means by this, what danger he has here in view, is shewn by the following explanatory words, *avoiding*, etc. What are we to understand as meant by παραθήκη (for this is the true reading, not παρακαταθήκη, Winer's Gr., § 16, 4, B, p. 93), which occurs again only in the passages 2 Tim. i. 12, 14? The signification of the word is clear = res deposita apud aliquem vel curæ ejus tradita; comp. 1 Tim. i. 18; 2 Tim. ii. 2. By comparing the passages last adduced, in which we find the verb, having for its object ἐπαγγελία and ἃ ἤκουσας παρ' ἐμοῦ, it will at once be seen that here also, by the possession entrusted to Timothy, we are to un-

derstand the doctrine which he has been called to preach. The same may be inferred also from the opposition to the *science falsely so called*, which leads to a falling away from the faith, as also from the parallel passages, 2 Tim. i. 14. So the most of commentators, also Olshausen. De Wette (p. 32) has been led to another interpretation, inasmuch as he considers that 2 Tim. i. 12 furnishes the criterion according to which we are to determine the sense of our passage, and because he understands *παραθήκη* there to mean the apostolic office, he thinks that here, and in 2 Tim. i. 14, it denotes the office of evangelist. With this, however, neither does the *φυλάσσειν* well agree (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 5), nor does it yield a strict opposition to what is named afterwards, for this appears only when *παραθήκη*, in opposition to the gnosis falsely so-called, is understood to denote the true doctrine, or as it is elsewhere called, *the sound doctrine*.* Comp. on this point what is said on these passages. Schleiermacher's opinion—that while at 2 Tim. i. 14 the meaning of the *παραθήκη* is rendered plain enough by the context, the term is quite enigmatical here, and that it is impossible to know rightly what it is intended to mean—is refuted by what has been already said. There is much more appearance of a difficulty on comparing 1 Tim. i. 14 with ver. 12, than in comparing it with our passage. Timothy, then, according to our interpretation, is to guard the true doctrine as a possession committed to his trust (*μὴ μειώσῃς· οὔκ ἐστι τὰ σά· τὰ ἀλλότρια ἐπιστεύθης· μηδὲν ἐλαττώσῃς*—Chrysostom),† turning away from (= avoiding, Winer's Gr., § 38, ii.,

* Huther also agrees with De Wette: Timothy is to guard the office, and he is to do this by avoiding the errors.

† We may here also give a place to the memorable words of Vincentius Sirinensis on this passage in his Commonitorum, as already cited by Mack, p. 395. O Timothee, inquit, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates (see above). O! Exclamatio ista et præscientiæ est pariter et caritatis. Prævidebat enim futuros, quos etiam prædolebat, errores.—Quid est "depositum custodi?" Custodi, inquit, propter fures, propter inimicos, ne dormientibus hominibus superseminent zizania super illud tritici bonum semen, quod seminaverat filius hominis in agro suo. "Depositum," inquit, "custodi." Quid est depositum? id est quod tibi creditum est, non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii sed doctrinæ, non usurpationis privatæ, sed publicæ traditionis; rem ad te perductam, non a te prolatam, in qua non auctor debes esse sed custos, non institutor, sed sectator, non ducens, sed sequens. "Depositum," inquit, "custodi;" catholicæ fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. Quod tibi creditum est, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. Nolo mihi pro aliis alia subjicias. Nolo pro auro aut impudenter plumbum, aut fraudulenter aeramenta supponas. Nolo auri speciem, sed naturam plane. . . . Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plane, et maximus . . . Sid ita tamen, ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectionem pertinet, ut in semetipsa unaquæque res amplificetur, ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat tam singulorum, quam omnium, tam unius hominis, tam totius ecclesiæ aetatum ac seculorum gradibus intelligentia, scientia, sapientia; sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate,

p. 227; comp. i. 6, v. 15; 2 Tim. iv. 4) profane talk and the oppositions of the gnosis falsely so called. On *βέβηλος*, 1 Tim. iv. 6. The expression *βέβ. κενοφ.* occurs again at 2 Tim. ii. 16. The reading *καινοφωνίας* is neither sufficiently authorized, nor is it to be preferred on internal grounds, for nowhere else does the writer indicate the novelty, but everywhere the emptiness and real nothingness of what was brought forward by the opponents. The expression *κενοφ.* (= empty talk, such as needs no refutation), points precisely to those errors which the apostle has already characterised and rejected as mere *strifes about words*, as *questions* which produce no moral fruit, as *foolish talking*. If then it be a settled point, that the *κενοφ.* refers to the pursuits of the *vain talkers*, which are censured elsewhere in this, as also in the other epistles—as indeed it is not at all conceivable that the apostle should at the conclusion of the epistle begin all at once to speak of something entirely new,—there can in this case be no doubt as to the meaning of the *ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψ. λ.* It is evident that *κενοφ.* and *ἀντιθ.* as one article serves both, and both are therefore equally designated as *βέβηλοι*, can grammatically be considered only as forming together one whole, or rather, as *κενοφων.* is itself a part of a whole, only as two designations of one subject (comp. Winer's Gr., § 19, 4, p. 116, seq.); and we are warranted, therefore, in applying the *ἀντιθέσεις* to the Marcionitic antitheses (Baur), only in so far as these are spoken of in the foregoing parts of the epistle. That which is spoken of, however, in the preceding parts of the epistle, and spoken of as something then present, is only a teaching of other things which, by its fables, and genealogies, and legal requirements, forms an *opposition* to the *sound doctrine*, inasmuch as it thereby leads away from the true objects of knowledge, and thus hinders faith from producing the fruits of morality, nay, in the case of many, leads to a falling away from the faith. These people are in Tit. i. 9 expressly characterized as *ἀντιλέγοντες* in ver. 10 as *ἀνυπότακτοι ματαιολόγοι* in 2 Tim. ii. 25, as *ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι*; why then may not their *ἀντιθέσεις* be here spoken of? Ἀντιθέσεις is not then any more than *κενοφωνίαι* the objective designation of the thing, but like *βέβηλ. κενοφ.* is an expression of the apostle's opinion regarding it, and thus involves the reason why he enjoins Timothy to avoid it. How heterogeneous would be these two expressions which are here placed together, if *ἀντιθέσεις* were a purely objective designation used by those traders in wisdom themselves. The following words, *τῆς ψευδ. γνώσεως*, are also against the interpretation, according to which the *ἀντιθέσεις* are to be understood

eodem sensu, eademque sententia. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum, quæ licet amorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent, eadem tamen quæ erant permanent, etc. (Given in full by Löhe in his work, "Ueber unsere kirchliche Lage," p. 28, seq.)

of assertions definitely expressed in the form of antitheses. For as this genitive is grammatically to be connected also with *κενοφων.* (Winer's Gr., § 19, 3), we must in consequence suppose, that there were in like manner certain definite *κενοφωνίαι* of the gnosis falsely so called, which no one will for a moment imagine. In short, the exegetical investigation of this passage, as also the other parts of the epistle show, that we are not here to understand any allusion to the Marcionitic antitheses. I shall merely add, that it is difficult to explain how a forger in the second century should have fallen into the anachronism of representing the apostle as warning Timothy against the antitheses of Marcion; comp. on this and on Baur's view generally, the Gen. Introd., § 3 and 4. Olshausen also adopts the interpretation which we have here given, and likewise Matthies and De Wette,* who observes, that the apparent coincidence of this passage with the historical fact of the antitheses of Marcion between law and gospel, must not be so much insisted on as Baur does. Leo understands the expression as equivalent to *ζητήσεις*, questiones ad disputandum propositæ. But why then was not this term used here also as elsewhere? And *ἀντιθέσεις* certainly implies more than that other term. Mack's interpretation = contradictions in which were sought to be represented particular doctrines of the common faith, has much more in its favour grammatically; but the other parts of the epistle contain no allusion to such antitheses, while the objective signification thus assigned to the word is forbidden by the context (comp. above). The objection against our interpretation—that Timothy was not at liberty to avoid, but was under obligation to refute what contradicted the sound doctrine—has already been removed by De Wette when he says that the writer only intends to say here, as at iv. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 16, 23; Tit. iii. 9, that Timothy is not to adopt such errors, not to let himself be misled by them. With regard to *τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως*, which belongs to both the foregoing substantives, and denotes a (pretendedly) higher knowledge, which deserves not this name, and is therefore falsely so called, I perfectly agree with Dr. Baur that *γνῶσις* here is the current name by which a certain tendency and manner of teaching then existing was designated. It is pre-supposed that the "heretics came forward under this name and publicly bore it." But how should this name create any surprise when we can "point out even already in the New Testament an idea very closely allied" to the later gnosis (Baur, chr. Gnosis, p. 90. seq., where he refers to 1 Cor. viii. 1, xii. 8, xiv. 6); when, further, we turn to Col. ii. 8, 18, 23, where we read of a *συλαγωγεῖν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας*, etc., so that

* Also Wieseler: contrary assertions in reference to the *παραθήκη*. Huther differently: their dialectic reasoning against the evangelical doctrine. Rather might it be supposed to mean their mutual controversies.

"the apostle, as Matthies justly observes, elsewhere also shows himself to be acquainted with this γνῶσις not merely in its difference from the faith, but also in its opposition to it, *i. e.*, in the conceited subjectivity by which it was characterized;" chiefly, however, when we learn from the general import of this epistle and cognate passages in the other two, that the parties from whom this mischief proceeded, against which the apostle here warns Timothy, were Jews who trafficked in a secret wisdom of a pretendedly superior kind, and incongruously mixed with certain ascetical requirements? On what grounds did they look for money, if they had not a higher knowledge to offer, a science concealed from the multitude, accessible only to the initiated? What then could be more natural than that the apostle should characterize this γνῶσις as falsely so called—as indeed in the three epistles he designates the knowledge of those teachers of other things as foolish and profitless. (Not knowing what they say nor whereof they affirm, i. 7.) We are accordingly saved from the alternative which Dr. Baur has put before us, either of supposing that the apostle had a purely prophetical glance into the time of Marcion, or of placing the composition of the epistle in that period. "The expression ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις was afterwards transferred to the Gnostics." Olshausen.

Ver. 21.—The danger connected with these pursuits is now again held up before Timothy, inasmuch as the apostle here specifies the worst evil to which they can lead, and to which in the case of several they have led, namely a complete aberration in respect of the faith. The words are properly rendered thus: "which some making a profession of are gone astray with respect to the faith." For the apostle does not mean to say that some make a profession of these things, and are in virtue of this gone astray in regard to the faith. Timothy knew already that several professed these things, and if these had already, in virtue of this profession, fallen away from the faith, then the warning here addressed to Timothy would be unintelligible, for the apostle will not surely suspect him of an open departure from the faith. We have already seen elsewhere that the apostle considers the being occupied with these things, not as in itself a falling away, but as the possible occasion of this, inasmuch as it weakens the conscience, and thus tends to bring about apostacy from the faith. Comp. on i. 3, seq., 19, etc., and the Gen. Introd., § 4. If this be so, it is again inconceivable that a forger in the second century should have expressed himself thus, and not rather have represented the profession of the Marcionitic Gnosis as directly and eo ipso apostacy. Ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, as at ii. 10. Ἀστοχεῖν, as at i. 6. Περί = in respect of, comp. on i. 19.

Ver. 22.—Ἡ χάρις μετὰ σοῦ, so Tischendorf according to D.E.I.K., etc. Lachmann, according to A.F.G., 17 versions, makes it μεθ'

ὑμῶν, comp. 2 Tim. iv. 22; Tit. iii. 15. Even in the case of the latter reading being adopted as genuine,—though it bears distinctly the appearance of being an emendation,—nothing could be inferred from it in proof of the epistle's having been addressed to the church along with Timothy; comp. on Tit. iii. 15. Ἀμήν is a later addition.

The subscription . . . *from Laodicea* is derived as it appears from tradition. According to Wieseler indeed, p. 298, it has arisen from Col. iv. 16; which, however, appears very doubtful, as Theodoret knows nothing of this identification, and Theophylact is the first who notices it. The subscription deserves our notice, in so far as it proves the agreement of tradition with the opinion that there was a second imprisonment, as De Wette also acknowledges when he says: "The epistle is, according to the subscription, said to have been written from Laodicea, therefore probably after the first imprisonment, when the apostle visited Laodicea, which before his imprisonment was unknown to him" (Col. ii. 1). On Laodicea, comp. Winer R.W.B. The designation Παϰατιανῆς first arose in the 4th century; comp. Wieseler.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Contents.

I commence by exhibiting the contents of the epistle, that I may connect with this my further investigations. These divide themselves into two principal parts. The one consists of admonitions addressed to Timothy as a preacher of the gospel; the other treats of his personal relations to the apostle. The apostle's habitual reserve in regard to personal matters leads him first of all to discuss the obligations imposed on Timothy by his assumption of the office of evangelist; and this subject occupies four clearly distinguishable sections of the epistle. He is reminded (ii. 1–13) that as a soldier of Christ he is not to shrink from the dangers and sufferings attendant on the proclamation of the gospel, and pointed to the reward which accompanies fidelity. He is secondly (ii. 14–26) admonished diligently to enforce what the apostle has held out to him as the hope of the Christian, and to shew himself an approved labourer in his calling by impressive warning against useless logomachy, and by guarding himself against this propensity. It is the error, known from the other epistles, of a useless strife about things alien from the truth which is according to godliness, nay, which gradually seduce from this into impiety, that the apostle has in his eye, and in respect of which he urges on Timothy his duty, alike in respect to himself, and to those whom it threatens or has already seized. But there is still another error (iii. 1–17) which Paul lays open to Timothy by pointing prophetically to the moral character of the last time. It is to be rather hoped that it will soon by its own folly annihilate itself; but all the more faithfully is Timothy to adhere to the truth which he has known and received, and for which the example of the apostle and the word of the Old Testament taught him in his youth, are a certain pledge. A comprehensive, impressive exhortation to unwearied fidelity in his calling is con-

tained, finally, in the fourth section (iv. 1–8), by pointing on the one hand to the coming evil time, when men no longer enduring sound doctrine, will turn themselves eagerly to falsehood, and on the other, to the approaching departure of the apostle, which urges on Timothy all the greater zeal, and holds out to him a pattern for imitation. This reference to the apostle's position leads naturally to his personal concerns. He directs Timothy to come to him, and assigns his reasons for the request; adds commissions to be discharged in case of his coming; refers to events of his trial; and closes with the customary salutations and benediction. Chap. i. thus appears as a preliminary outline of the entire epistle. For the apostle having followed up the customary address by the expression of thanksgiving and his desire to see Timothy, unites with his conviction of his moral soundness, the exhortation to stir up the gift (of teaching) that is in him, and to be ashamed neither of the gospel nor of himself, the apostle imprisoned for its sake. But precisely this forms the theme of the whole epistle, which thence from chap. ii. treats first of the general duty of Timothy as an evangelist, and then of his special duty and service of love to the apostle.

Occasion and Object.

After this general survey of the contents of the epistle, we shall easily determine its occasion and object. It is above all clear that it is not like that to Titus and the first to Timothy, a business-letter, but unlike them is, as already maintained by Schleiermacher, a strictly personal epistle. This distinctive character marks the very introduction with its utterance of thanksgiving; it reveals itself in the many personal allusions "which impart to it a life and vivacity unknown to the two others" (Baur, ut supra, p. 72), and characterizes its entire tone and tenor. This sharply defined distinction of form in these epistles, corresponding so exactly to the difference of their subject-matter, while otherwise most intimately related, to the unprejudiced mind strongly attests their genuineness.

But while its entire tenor and contents prove it no mere business letter, but one "entirely friendly and confidential," they also prove still more. It has to do throughout with Timothy personally; not the Timothy whom the first epistle presents as the substitute of the apostle; still less a bishop Timothy, who is unknown in the New Testament (so rightly Wieseler, p. 462); it is Timothy the evangelist, the apostle's beloved and confidential assistant, who is admonished not to neglect his gift of teaching, not to fear the shame of preaching the gospel, alike personally and officially in the face of all error to adhere to the truth; and who, finally, is summoned to a ser-

vice of love toward the imprisoned apostle. "This epistle distinguishes itself essentially from the first, by having reference no longer to Timothy's temporary connexion with the churches of Ephesus and Asia Minor, but by exhorting him to resume with fresh zeal the preaching of Christ, in which the apostle is his pattern, and from which afflictions are not to deter; and no longer to allow the gifts which adapt him to this work, to slumber. The first step toward this is to come to Rome, and aid the imprisoned apostle in his sacred work" (Zeitschrift für Prot. u. Kirche, Sept. 1849, p. 137). This indicates at once the occasion of the epistle; it is primarily a summons to Timothy to join him in his imprisonment. But the apostle knows (perhaps through Onesiphorus) that, with all Timothy's love to himself and unfeigned faith, he yet does not at present exhibit the requisite zeal and devotion to his calling; that he shrinks from the danger and shame of publishing the gospel, and needs a fresh incitement to fidelity and zeal amidst the sufferings and heresies which encompass him. And precisely because of his conviction of Timothy's firmness in the faith, he summons him to fresh proofs, first of his devotion to his public calling, then of personal attachment to himself. To such an assumed occasion the epistle itself perfectly corresponds. We shall not then, with De Wette, regard the summons of Timothy to Rome as its single object, and then seek what portions of it may perchance prepare the way for this invitation, or how otherwise it may be brought into connexion (as De Wette assumes in regard to i. 6–18, ii. 1, 3–13, iii. 10–12, iv. 5, 6–8), still less regard its injunctions under this point of view, as they then rather divert from the assumed object. We shall rather regard as the purpose of the main portion of the epistle (ii. 1–48), the admonition to Timothy's faithful fulfillment of his calling, and of the other portion (iv. 9–22), the invitation to Rome, as in fact at i. 8, its twofold purpose is already indicated. That the invitation to Rome was the primary, does not prove it the *exclusive* purpose of the epistle, and all that does not bear on this as foreign; rather the contents of the epistle must determine its purpose, and the proof of its adaptedness must be found in the degree of its adjustment to the objects indicated by its contents—a problem which the writer has made easy for the interpreter. It is with this precisely as with the Epistle to the Philippians, in which, while its immediate purpose is to acknowledge a benefaction, yet none will dream of judging its entire contents by their relation to this object. Why should not the apostle, who in the Epistle to the Philippians blends with his expressions of gratitude, admonitions and warnings, connect also with his invitation to Timothy exhortations to fidelity in his office?

§ 3. The Place, Time, and other Historical Relations in the Composition of the Epistle.

It is first clearly established that the apostle wrote this epistle from Rome (comp. i. 17, ἐν Ῥώμῃ; iv. 6–8, 16, seq., passages which describe a position conceivable only in Rome; iv. 21, Roman names), and as a prisoner who, after passing successfully his first judicial defence, still looks death in the face (iv. 6–8, 18).* The abode of the receiver of the epistle is indicated by iv. 19, compared with i. 18 (the greeting to the house of Onesiphorus), as Ephesus. To this points, as De Wette concedes, the mention of the conduct of the Asiatics i. 15; the remark "how he ministered to me in Ephesus, thou knowest;" i. 18; the similarity of the errors here mentioned to those assailed in 1 Tim.; the request to bring Mark who (Col. iv. 10) was at Colossæ; the commission to bring the articles left in Troas; and most directly the warning against Alexander (iv. 14), and the greeting to Aquila and Priscilla (iv. 19). At all events, it is beyond doubt that Timothy is dwelling in Asia Minor, and is expected thence: iv. 12, 20, are not against the Ephesian residence; see the exposition.

The first difficulty is suggested by the date of the epistle. Although it was undoubtedly written during an imprisonment of the apostle at Rome, it becomes a question whether it was near the beginning or the close of the imprisonment mentioned in Acts, or in a later one. Thus much, however, is certain, that it was not written contemporaneously with the other epistles which date from the known Roman imprisonment, as at the time of their composition Timothy was with the apostle (Phil. i. 1, ii. 19, seq.; Col. i. 1; Philem. 1), so Demas (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 10, with Col. iv. 14; Philem. 24), and Mark (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 11, with Col. iv. 10; Philem. 24).

As to the *first* view, which assigns it to the beginning of the Roman imprisonment (so Baronius, Petavius, Lightfoot, Hammond, Rink, Schrader, Matthies, etc., while to the Epistle to the Ephesians, in the scantiness of its historical notices, they give a different place), the profound investigations of Wieseler seem to me to have established, that if written during this imprisonment, it must have been not before, but after the other epistles of this period, and after the period mentioned in the Acts. Wieseler's main proof is drawn from the apostle's entire situation as indicated by the epistle. He points to the fact how little the anticipations of death in our epistle accord with the expectations expressed in the others (Phil. i. 25, ii. 24;

* Oeder's and Böttger's assumption that the epistle was written in Cæsarea is justly rejected as contrary to the account i. 17, and the entire situation of the apostle. Comp. Wieseler, p. 461.

Philem. 22); how much worse in general has become his position, and how his friends have proportionably diminished in number and courage; how the judicial process of 2 Tim. iv. 16, does not allow our referring the epistle to the two first years of that imprisonment, as "neither the Acts nor the other epistles of that period allude to it." We are particularly indebted to Wieseler for the pointing out, specially in reply to Böttger's position that Paul remained at most but five days in imprisonment at Rome (comp. the Introd. to Phil.), from the Roman judicial procedure, how his trial could be deferred for a period of two years. It has been particularly urged that the apostle's allusion to his stay in Troas (iv. 13), requires our referring the composition to the commencement of his Roman imprisonment; but if this allusion allows the composition at the commencement of that first Roman imprisonment, it does surely so, as shewn by Wieseler, at its close. Further, the *πρώτη ἀπολογία* to which this view appeals, rather makes against it. If again it be alleged that Mark and Timothy are in our epistle (iv. 9, 11) summoned to Rome, while yet Col. i. 1, iv. 10, etc., shew them there, we can conversely, says Wieseler, appeal to Col. iv. 10; Phil. ii. 19, and maintain that as they are here indicated as sent away, so in 2 Timothy they are still absent and expected from precisely the districts whither they had gone (except indeed Timothy); nor can any stress be laid on the fact that Timothy and Mark, who in 2 Timothy, are sent for to Rome, did not come to Rome with the apostle, since 2 Tim. iv. 9–12, i. 15–18 shew that others are with him who did not originally accompany him to Rome. It is certain, on the contrary, that Aristarchus came with him, but according to 2 Tim. iv. 11, he is no longer with him; that Timothy who (Col. i. 1; Phil. i. 1) was in Rome, according to Phil. ii. 19, has been sent to Philippi, with which, if our epistle was written at a later period, his being found in Ephesus well accords. It is strikingly against that view also that Demas, who at Col. iv. 14; Philem. 24 is in Rome, in 2 Timothy has abandoned the apostle from love of the present world. It is surely more natural to assign this event to a later date. And how improbable in general the perpetual shifting of personages, and the crowding of events which this hypothesis compels us to assume. While only Luke and Aristarchus have accompanied Paul to Rome (Acts xxvii. 2), yet a considerable company has soon gathered about him; but at the date of our epistle (the commencement of his imprisonment!) all have abandoned him except Luke, and then assemble themselves anew. Tychicus, who had been sent to Ephesus, is according to Colossians again with him; Aristarchus, absent in 2 Timothy, is present in Colossians; Mark is present, but about to be again dispatched (Col. iv. 10), to the region whence he has come with Timothy (2 Tim.

iv. 11), although he was summoned as useful to the apostle; the faithless Demas too, is present, and many others. Of these a part had already again left the apostle when he wrote the Epistle to the Philippians (as Mark and Tychicus, Col. iv. 10, 7); others are on the point of leaving him, as particularly Timothy (ii. 19), and even Luke seems now absent, who is present Col. iv. 14; Phil. 24; comp. at Phil. ii. 19–21. And if Timothy was to come yet before winter, the first according to this view which the apostle spends in Rome, what must have been the rush of events between the spring in which he reached Rome and the winter! The entire circle of companions named iv. 9, seq., must have assembled and scattered before the writing of the letter which Timothy is to receive before he comes to Rome, while yet he is to come before winter! Those of Asia must have been at Rome, Timothy have had accounts of them, received the apostle's letter, and yet had time to reach Rome before winter! Still, as Wieseler justly maintains, the proof rests mainly not on these facts regarding persons, but the situation of the apostle; and this cannot, according to all the indications furnished by the Acts and the other epistles in connexion with the judicial processes of Rome, have been such as is here exhibited. We pass in silence the fact that this view refers the other Pastoral Epistles to an entirely different period, and makes ours contemporaneous with that to the Ephesians, and prior to the others, which were written during the apostle's confinement at Rome.

With far more probability have others (as Hemsen, Kling) transferred our epistle to the close of the recorded imprisonment in Rome, and regarded it as the last of Paul's Epistles; to this view Wieseler has lent his sagacious advocacy. He rests his position on the refutation of the opposing theories; on the accordance of the general state of things pourtrayed in the letter with that period; and finally on the fact that while no individual statement in the epistle contradicts his hypothesis, some are decidedly in its favor. His argument against the hypothesis of its composition during a second Roman imprisonment, I reserve until the exhibition of my own view. As respects, secondly, the general circumstances of the apostle, I readily grant that the course of events may be conceived such as Wieseler represents it; yet his representation utterly fails of historical authentication. In proof that after the lapse of two years of imprisonment the apostle's situation became less favourable, Wieseler attaches great weight to the close of the narrative in the Acts. But this "reading between the lines" is liable to great suspicion. If, when Luke wrote, a definite change for the worse had already taken place, why does he fail to inform us of it when "the interest of the reader centres so intensely upon the final result of the process?" And if no such change had taken place, how can we find in the record what

was unknown to Luke himself? How feeble the support which this view seeks to gain from the death of Burrus, the extinction of the influence of Seneca, the accession to office of Fenius Rufus and Sofonius Tigellinus, and the dawning influence of the Jewish proselyte Poppæa, "who not unfrequently interceded for the Jews!" How feeble, especially against the expectations so definitely expressed by the apostle in the Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon, in which he anticipates his certain and speedy release, and return to his readers, and even bespeaks for himself lodgings (Philem. 22.)! Just, therefore, as is Wieseler's view that the condition of the apostle, in our epistle, is far less favourable than it appears in the other epistles and in the Acts; decisive as is his argument against the hypothesis which assigns its composition to the early part of his imprisonment, he is still far from demonstrating that this change for the worse took place at the period which he assumes, and is not rather to be explained by the hypothesis of another and later imprisonment. And special difficulties, too, arise which admit no satisfactory solution. Here belong above all, iv. 20, etc., a notice under his, as under the preceding views, inexplicable (see at the passage); then the commission respecting his effects which must have lain unsent for some five years, though this might have been done, if not from Jerusalem or Cesarea, assuredly from Rome, as *e. g.* through Tychicus, Eph. vi. 21. Again, iv. 12, "Tychicus I have sent to Ephesus," presents a difficulty, as Tychicus must have been sent to Ephesus twice in the same imprisonment, at the time of the composition of the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians, and now already again at the composition of this. And how does the timorous conduct of Timothy accord with the praise but recently (Phil. ii. 19) awarded to him? Whence all at once the new names, iv. 21? Why is the epistle so dissimilar to the others belonging to the same imprisonment, in thought and style, and so closely allied to the first to Timothy and that to Titus? Wieseler, in fine, cites as decisive for his view, i. 4, "remembering thy tears," which he claims is rendered clear only by Phil. ii. 19–23; yet it rather conflicts with it. For the apostle sends Timothy to Philippi in order to learn through him the state of things at Philippi: Timothy, therefore, cannot have gone to Ephesus and remained there until again summoned by the apostle. He purposes to send him ὡς ἂν ἀφίδω τὰ περὶ ἐμὲ ἐξαυτῆς:—according to Wieseler he must have sent him before he could ascertain this; even before the decision; precisely toward the time when his situation was becoming more distressful—which is contradictory. And so also Wieseler's acute remarks on Alexander (iv. 14), in whom he discovers a witness appearing against the apostle; on Erastus and Trophimus (iv. 20) who, he thinks came to Rome to witness for him; on the

naturalness of his apprising Timothy of Alexander's behaviour and of the *actio prima*, are such as scarcely to furnish decisive support to his position: and the mention of Erastus and Trophimus has at least a very doubtful reference to the judicial procedure; comp. iv. 20.

This solution fails to prove satisfactory; the old hypothesis, contained in the subscription, that the composition dates from a second Roman imprisonment, therefore, recurs, especially as our inquiries in regard to 1 Timothy and Titus have already carried us beyond the period of the one with which we are acquainted. Nay, not merely the second epistle to Timothy, but the first, and that to Titus, compel us to the assumption of a second imprisonment, each by itself, and all in their otherwise inexplicable relationship. And it is a favorable testimony that these epistles so easily and naturally (see the Gen. Introd. § 4) adjust themselves to the period of a journey made by the apostle after his release, over Crete, Asia Minor, and Greece, back to the West, and on this hypothesis accord with each other and with the dates of the other epistles. Eusebius, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, etc., have already referred our epistle to a second imprisonment; more recently, Mosheim, Michælis, Bertholdt, Mynster, Flatt, Heydenreich, Böhl, Guerike, Mack, Gieseler, Neander, etc., and finally, Huther. The intimations at iv. 20, iv. 13, seem to point decidedly to another journey than those at Acts xx. 3, seq., xxvii. 2, seq., and, of course, to a journey made by Paul after his liberation. The allusions in both the above passages (to the leaving of Trophimus in Miletus, and of the cloak in Troas) scarcely admit any other even tolerable solution; but they gain still greater significance by their concurrence with references to the same journey in the other epistles (see Gen. Introd. § 4). We point, secondly, to the changed position of the apostle, which inconsistent as it is with his anticipations of speedy deliverance in the first imprisonment, is natural on the supposition of a second. This, too, gives us an unforced explanation of the changed conduct of Timothy, of the impressive admonition to him to suffer for the Gospel, and of the apostle's abandonment by his former companions. We are transported to a period in which the persecutions by Nero already rendered a Christian profession exceedingly dangerous. The changed personal relations, taken in conjunction with the new names appearing in iv. 13, 21, and the Crescens and Titus of iv. 10, render it almost impossible to refer the epistle to the imprisonment recorded in the Acts. But especially the internal affinity of our epistle with the first to Timothy and that to Titus; the recurrence here of the same *κενοφωνίαι* and *λογομαχεῖν* which are found in 1 Tim. (said to have been written at least six years before!); the close connexion of all the three in thought, expression, and their general manner; their common devi-

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

ation from those other epistles which some would interpose between them, argue for their nearly contemporaneous composition. Each of these epistles carries us beyond the limits of the Acts: all harmonize on the assumption of the apostle's deliverance, and unitedly point to a new journey, in constructing which they supplement each other, and which the intimations of the other epistles lead us to suppose the apostle would make in case of his deliverance; and, finally, all stand so closely related in contents and form, that in the failure of express historical documents of this period, no further proof can be demanded; as respects, particularly, the harmonious relation of our epistle to the two others, mark how naturally the apostle's second residence in Rome accords with his route of travel over Crete, Asia Minor, and Greece; how Timothy's place of abode accords with the historical antecedents of the first epistle; how the "remembering thy tears" (i. 4) is most naturally explained by a reference to this epistle; how Mark is expected from the region whither (Col. iv. 10) he had gone; how Titus is with him, as Tit. iii. 12, leads us to expect.

The *objections* to this view are essentially but conjectural improbabilities. Hug urges the agreement in several circumstances, while yet the apostle's general condition is widely different. Why, he asks, is in both cases Timothy absent at the beginning, but afterwards joins him? But this objection assumes that the epistle was written in the early part of the recorded imprisonment, which is at all events inadmissible. Luke, he says, is both times with the apostle: and why not? Mark is present in the first imprisonment, and here he is sent for. This objection, too, presumes the composition early in the known imprisonment. But if we transfer it to the close, then the return of Timothy and of Mark, and the two-fold sending of Tychicus to Asia during it, are not a whit more probable than the recurrence of these events in a second imprisonment; while Titus, Crescens, and others are here with the apostle, who do not appear in the first imprisonment. But they object further, the improbability of the deliverance, and with this of a new apprehension, and granting this, of a new defence (iv. 16), of a repeated acquittal (17), of a state in which he could write letters, receive friends, dispatch messengers,—in fine, the improbability of a lengthened confinement. Why, it is asked, has nothing of all this, and of Paul's labors previous to his second imprisonment come down to us? Why does he himself leave unmentioned these labors and this fresh arrest, when at iii. 11, it was so natural? It is conceived, finally, especially by Wieseler, that this view derives no support from the fathers, as their appeal to iv. 16, 17, rests on a false interpretation which refers *πρώτη ἀπολογία* to a defence of the apostle in his former imprisonment, and *ἵνα δι' ἐμοῦ τὸ κήρ. πλ.* to his preaching after his liberation from that first imprisonment. It is, however, utterly gratuitous to

assume that the opinion of the fathers rests purely on this misconception. Eusebius appeals rather to tradition, and confirms it by the μαρτυρίαι of the apostle. An error in this deprives his view, indeed, of a single support, but does not invalidate it. Our main proof, however, is the peculiar character of the epistles themselves. As to the apostle's silence regarding his liberation and subsequent fortunes, it suffices that Timothy during a part of this interval was with the apostle, and may have already learned what had afterwards happened, as he is presumed to know the behaviour of those in Asia. What Timothy now *needs* to know the apostle informs him of; and in none of his letters is he wont to indulge in narrative for narrative's sake, but only to meet a definite practical end. Why iii. 11 makes no mention of the later events of his life will be shown in the exposition. And to the inquiry why nothing has been transmitted to us from other sources regarding the apostle's acts and fortunes after his first imprisonment, I reply: where are the historical records of that period which should mention these events, admitting their reality? And that we have no reason to set aside what is preserved to us thereon in Clement, in the Canon of Muratori, in Eusebius, we have shewn more at length in the General Introduction. Finally, as to the *improbability* of the liberation, and then of a second imprisonment, such as this epistle indicates. The liberation itself, if it occurred before the conflagration in Rome (the summer of 64) is in no way improbable. The charge on which he was apprehended had been already (Acts xxvi. 31) proved a nullity; the entire tenor of the narrative in Acts, and of the letters points to no calamitous result; and the assumption of an unfavorable turn in his condition during that imprisonment is sustained only by an arbitrary resort to historical events whose influence on the case of the apostle is pure hypothesis, comp. Neander Apost. Zeit. i. p. 546. The explanation of the mild treatment in conjunction with the darkened fortunes of the apostle in his second imprisonment presents a more difficult problem. But the first rage against the Christians may have been followed by a relaxation of violence, and circumstances are easily conceivable which specially favored the apostle. "The condition of individual prisoners depended on so many circumstances that no safe conclusion can be drawn from the general state of things. Individual Christians might obtain special favors even amid the most violent persecutions." Neander, Apos. Zeit. p. 547.

We abide, therefore, by the view which assigns the composition of this epistle to a second imprisonment. The weight which we have attached to the testimony of Clement, obliges us to assume that the apostle, after returning from the east, fulfilled his expressed purpose (Rom. xv. 24, 28) of visiting Spain. In approximating the date of our epistle we must, on the one hand, not separate

it too widely from the two others to which it is allied in character, and yet not bring it too near the first to Timothy, as it makes no allusion to the special commission with which the first shews Timothy as charged. The common hypothesis, as given also by Neander (Vide sup. p. 547, seq.), is that this imprisonment and, of course, the composition of our epistle, belongs to the period after the conflagration of Rome, and the consequent persecution of the Christians (summer of 64), the apostle being apprehended either in Spain or on his return thence to Rome. Huther, however, would date his second arrest and this epistle before this persecution, assuming that he was liberated in the spring of 63 (perhaps more correctly than in 64, as assumed p. 229), that in this and the beginning of the following year he made his journey to the east, in the same year visited Spain and returned, submitted to his trial a short time before the persecution, and soon after it broke out yielded up his life. This hypothesis renders, indeed, more explicable the favorable treatment of the imprisoned apostle and his silence regarding the persecution (which it doubtless was originated to explain); but it brings the second epistle to Timothy into altogether too close proximity to the first, and crowds too much into the narrow space between the spring of 63 and July 64. For if the apostle went back, as Huther supposes, from Nicopolis to Ephesus, he must (1 Tim. iii. 14) have lingered there a considerable time: and apart from this, he cannot surely from the close of the winter in the beginning of 64 to May or June of that year, have travelled from Nicopolis by Ephesus, Miletus, and Corinth to Spain, and thence to Rome. This view is inconsistent also with the tradition regarding the mode of the apostle's death, and it is specially incomprehensible how those Asiatics (2 Tim. i. 15–18) should have been in Rome during his imprisonment, and Timothy been already informed of it when the epistle was written.

§ 4. Genuineness.

The special critical objections raised against this epistle are stated comprehensively by De Wette (Ex. Hand., p. 23, seq.). They relate (ver. 1) to its historical discrepancies. His arguments against its composition in the early part of Paul's imprisonment at Rome, need no further attention. Beside the points already answered, he urges against our view, ii. 9, iv. 17, etc., comp. with Acts xxviii. 31, regarding the repetition of this circumstance as incredible. But ii. 9 refers by no means to the personal preaching of the gospel by the apostle (comp. the Exposition), and iv. 17 is to be differently taken. He further deems it surprising that Paul expresses distrust regarding Timothy's resolution and capability of suffering,

instead of reminding him, as one well tried, of former services: in reply to which we point to remarks § 2 and 3. On De Wette's regarding iv. 12 as incompatible with the residence of Timothy, see at the passage. Another separate argument which he adduces is that 1 Tim. i. 20, comp. with 2 Tim. ii. 17, leads us to regard the first Epistle to Timothy as written later than the second, since in the latter the heresy of Hymeneus is mentioned as of recent development and unknown to Timothy, while in the former he appears as adjudged and excommunicated; that hence the second epistle must be transferred to the period of the first imprisonment, and we must give up the necessary contemporaneousness of the epistles. The utter weakness of this argument is clear from the fact, first, that it assumes, what cannot be proved, the identity of the two Hymeneuses; that in the two passages the persons named are alluded to simply by way of warning, and the question of time therefore is wholly irrelevant; and, that even granting De Wette correct in his position, we need not relinquish the theory of the contemporaneousness of the epistles; since the three still followed each other in time, so that if 1 Timothy was written at the close of the first imprisonment, in the beginning of 63, Titus and 2 Timothy might still fall within the same year. In this respect, therefore, we might readily adopt De Wette's hypothesis; the other arguments, however, against such an arrangement are decisive. To these historical inconsistencies he adds, secondly, the obvious unadaptedness of the epistle to the character of the receiver and to its purposes. In the former respect are its warning against youthful lusts, its reminding him of his grandmother and mother, of his own instructions, of the use of the Holy Scriptures, his exhorting him to "understand," as if doubtful of his intelligence, and to devote himself to the gospel, and the inappropriate reference (iii. 11) to the fortunes of the apostle. These objections are abundantly met in the Introduction to 1 Timothy, and the exposition of the several passages. If a forger of the epistle could in view of passages like 1 Cor. iv. 17; Phil. ii. 19, be supposed to light upon these utterances so "unworthy" of Timothy, much more might the apostle who had associated with himself Timothy as a young man, now after some ten or twelve years, as a *πρεσβύτης* (Philem. 9) regard, and paternally admonish him as "a beloved son." Nor is it inconceivable that in the calamitous times in which the epistle was penned, in the perilous position of the apostle, in the aggressive prevalence of error, Timothy should fail in resolution and confidence, and should need consolation. Several of the above difficulties are instantly dissipated by the exposition.

On the inappropriateness of the epistle to its object, we commented at § 2. On its character in other respects, as marked by common-places, by want of grammatical and logical connexion, by

the use of other letters of Paul, and the supposed ecclesiastical formula of ii. 8, comp. the exposition. I merely recall further the statement of the General Introduction of the impossibility of explaining the origin of this letter from the purposes of a fabricator. The purposes assumed as the ground of the other epistles, viz., the refutation of gnosticism and the support of the hierarchy, cannot be attributed to this which deals with Timothy personally ; it must therefore be assumed that the author has lost sight of his object, and a paternal letter of admonition sprung up under his hand —a letter which in such regular method as is shewn § 1, 2, holds up before Timothy his present duties as an evangelist, and exhorts him to a service of love toward the apostle.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

§ 1. Introductory.

(i. 1–18).

The inscription (ver. 1, 2), is followed by the usual introductory language of thanksgiving, in which the apostle mentions at the same time his desire to see Timothy again. The ground of his thanksgiving is the unfeigned faith of Timothy, of which the apostle is persuaded (3–5); on this conviction he bases his admonition to Timothy to arouse himself, not to be ashamed of the gospel and of the imprisoned apostle, but to suffer with him for the gospel; and he points to the power of God which Timothy has already experienced, and to his own example as one whom Timothy sees suffering as apostle of the gospel (6–12). In his conscious fidelity as an apostolical model, he exhorts Timothy to remain faithful to the doctrine which he has received from him, faithful to his teacher, and to receive at once warning from the example of the unfaithful, and encouragement from that of Onesiphorus. These admonitions prepare the way for all his subsequent instructions to Timothy as to what is becoming him as an evangelist, and what duties of love he owes to the imprisoned apostle.

Vers. 1, 2.—Inscription and greeting. *Paul—by the will of God*, is Paul's usual designation, at the opening of his epistles, of himself in his divinely appointed position: entirely so 1 Cor. i. 1 (except κλητός), 2 Cor. i. 1; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1. It expresses here the consciousness under which the apostle writes, not the design of establishing his apostolical dignity; as the epistle is a purely private communication to Timothy. This passage shews how groundless the assumption that the term *apostle* at 1 Tim. i. 1; Tit. i. 1, implies a joint destination of the letters also to the churches; for here anything of the kind is utterly out of the question. The words κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν ζωῆς is, after the analogy of Tit. i. 1, where κατά cannot be rendered "according to," = *for, to*, of *purpose;* comp. Winer's

Gr., § 49, d. p. 358 (Matthies denies this signification). Κατά is to be connected, as there, with ἀπόστολος; apostle by the will of God (hence his independence of men), for (*i. e.*, for the purpose of), the promise of life. Against constructing κατά with διὰ θελ. are Tit. i. 1, the above cited parallel passages, 1 Cor. i. 1, etc., the absence of the article τοῦ, the inappositeness of the preposition κατά.—Ἐπαγγελία ζωῆς is not "announcement" (Wahl), but as elsewhere, "promise of life" (comp. Wahl's ἐπαγγέλλομαι, ἐπαγγελία; the active ἐπαγγέλλω, *annuntio*, is not found); for ἐπ. ζωῆς we further point, with Matthies, specially to 1 Tim. iv. 8; Tit. i. 2. Thus, κατ' ἐπ. properly, for the purpose of the promise of (announcing) life, as 1 Tit. i. 1, κατὰ πίστιν for the purpose of (producing) faith. So also De Wette. Ζωή is more strictly defined (the article τῆς marking clearly the determining connexion; Winer's Gr., § 20, 4), by τῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰης. It is eternal life which in Christ Jesus is promised to the world; comp. Tit. i. 2. Justly Theodoret, "so that I should proclaim to men the promised eternal life."—*In Christ Jesus;* objectively existing and proffered in him; not as Mack, gained by *union* with Christ; for this is a result of what is here stated. The promise of life in Christ held out to the dead world, thus appears here as the purpose of the apostle's calling. We have seen at Tit. i. 1, that the subjoined determinative epithet ἀπόστολος was not accidental. So here it is explicable from the scope of the epistle, which is that Timothy after the example of the apostle, who is in chains for the gospel's sake, should renounce all the pleasures of this life, and freely submit to peril and suffering for the gospel. How fitting this designation of the office of the apostle, whose coworker Timothy is—a designation which at once directs the glance of Timothy to that life for whose sake he is to surrender the advantages of this life! Hence also the repeated express references to the *life in Christ Jesus*, and participation therein, i. 10, 12; ii. 5, 8, 10–13; iv. 1. Similarly Chrysostom, εὐθέως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ποιεῖται τῆν παραμυθίαν κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν λέγων τῆς ζωῆς τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

Ver. 2.—*To Timothy my beloved son.* Τέκνον as 1 Tim. i. 2; here not γνήσιον—ἐν πίστει as there (comp. Tit. i. 4) but ἀγαπητόν as 1 Cor. iv. 17. Mack improbably supposes that Timothy no longer deserves the name of a "genuine" child; rather, the term here employed is one of more intimate personal affection (Heydenreich), the other of honor. The blessing as 1 Tim. i. 2.

Vers. 3–5.—Of the three epistles this alone has the usual preliminary expression of thanksgiving, which is wanting elsewhere only in Galatians, which for εὐχαριστῶ substitutes θαυμάζω. Even in this feature we see the peculiarity of our epistle in contrast with the two others. It is not like them a business letter, but as expressed by Schleiermacher, strictly friendly and confidential: hence

springs at once into view the personal relation between the two parties, comp. 1 Tim. i. 3. The introduction expresses gratitude for the faith of Timothy, and a longing to see him again—the two emotions, as it were, interpenetrating each other. The similarity of this introduction to Rom. i. 8–11, is worthy of remark. Its essential feature is that there, as here, the apostle speaks of his gratitude to God, as of his prayer to him that he may yet see the receivers of the epistle, and there connects his unceasing remembrance of them, as here of Timothy, with his thanksgiving and his prayer. The same train of ideas might easily arise under like circumstances. The details are so entirely diverse, that our passage must be regarded as perfectly independent, and wholly discountenances the suspicion of a clumsy imitation.

Ver. 3.—"I thank God whom I serve from my ancestors with a pure conscience, how unceasingly I remember thee in my prayers day and night, longing to see thee," etc. The construction here is difficult, yet not without grammatical and logical consistency, as De Wette thinks. Wherever the apostle begins with a thanksgiving having reference to the readers, he indicates the ground of his gratitude; and this is their then Christian position. But he connects immediately with his *εὐχαριστῶ* on what occasion he gives thanks, viz., on *μνεία* in his prayers, and then subjoins the ground of it. This clue will easily unravel the passage. The *ὡς ἀδιάλειπτον, κ. τ. λ.*, will thus not, in violation of his usual custom, contain the ground of the thanksgiving, but only state its occasion. Nor is *ἐπιποθῶν* or *μεμνημένος* to be referred back to *χάριν ἔχω*, since the former would in no way apply to it, but connects itself clearly with *δεήσεσιν*, and the latter, as shewn by the clause *ἵνα κ. τ. λ.*, belongs to *ἐπιποθῶν*. Ver. 5 then adduces the *ground* of the thanksgiving ("calling to mind the unfeigned faith," etc.), viz., Timothy's position of faith. The passage then stands in construction similar to Philem. 4, 5, "I give thanks—making mention of thee in my prayers—hearing;" Eph. i. 15, seq.; Col. i. 3, seq.; 1 Thess. i. 2, seq. The single difficulty that distinguishes our passage, is that to the *δεήσεις* there is subjoined (as at Phil. i. 4) a clause, *ἐπιποθῶν*, and to this again *μεμνημένος*. The introduction Rom. i. 18, seq., contains similar elements, but with a clearer structure. For there the subject of thanksgiving follows immediately on the *εὐχαριστῶ*, and then with the *μνείαν ὑμῶν* is subjoined the subject matter of the prayer; here, on the contrary, this is inserted between the expression of thanksgiving and the reason (*ὑπόμνησιν λαμ.*) assigned for it. Similarly also Eph. i. 15, where *ἀκούσας* precedes, then *οὐ παύομαι εὐχαριστῶν* with the *μνείαν ὑμῶν ποιουμ.* etc., follows, and to this is subjoined the substance of the prayer. This result, reached by the analogies of the other epistles, will be confirmed by examining the details.

Χάριν ἔχω—commonly εὐχαριστῶ ; comp 1 Tim. i. 12. To τῷ θεῷ the apostle attaches "whom I serve from my forefathers in a pure conscience." Πρόγονοι natural, not "spiritual progenitors or models" (Matthies) as is clear from ver. 5, which stands with this in undeniable connexion. That this would require μου (Matthies), is erroneous ; comp. 1 Tim. v. 4, where πρόγονοι is used as here ; nor do we see any purpose in referring to the πρόγονοι of the Jewish people. That for the sake of the Judaists he should represent himself here as a good Israelite, is an extraordinary hypothesis ; and equally so that he would remind Timothy of his superiority as a Hebrew of the Hebrews to him, the son of a Jewish mother, but Grecian father. Rightly Bengel, De Wette, Winer (Gr., § 47, b. p. 333 "from my forefathers [Polyb. v. 55, 9] with the disposition inherited from them"). That ἀπό is not = instar, and ἀπὸ προγόνων not = ἐκ παιδός needs no proof ; comp. on the former point Winer, ubi sup., on the latter De Wette, Matthies, etc. Ἐν καθαρᾷ συνειδήσει = in pure conscience (comp. at 1 Tim. i. 5, 19); the apostle inherits not merely the service, but the moral state. His relation to God he represents as a transmitted blessing, by him merely preserved. The statement has been regarded as involving on the one hand a denial of the superiority of Christianity to Judaism, on the other, an incorrect judgment, and one contradictory to 1 Tim. i. 13, regarding the conduct of the apostle before his conversion ; comp. De Wette to whom the passage is but a disjointed compilation from Rom. i. 9 ; Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 14, seq. But how does the apostle place here "the worship of God in Judaism and Christianity on the same level?" He certainly held (Acts xxiv. 14), that his fathers, and he as a Christian served one and the same God ; the equalization therefore must lie in the subjoined ἐν καθ. συνειδ. But this involves no such consequence ; for it merely affirms that alike he and his fathers have served God according to their best knowledge and conscience ; and it is precisely this moral disposition which serves God according to its knowledge, that has been transmitted from them to him. Unquestionably his knowledge of God as a Christian is more perfect, his moral consciousness more profound, his pure conscience more deeply grounded ; but this advancement no more does away with that essential equality of disposition, which makes our attained knowledge the rule of moral conduct, than does the equality implied in the ἐν καθ. συν. exclude that advancement. For what is this καθ. συν. but that οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα (1 Cor. iv. 4) of which our present knowledge must be our only standard ; hence also the ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ, *but in this I am not justified*, of that passage. Nor is the statement here at all at war with the earlier conduct of the apostle, nor with his declaration regarding it, 1 Tim. i. 13, seq. He here declares that he did it ignorantly ; and although

as a Christian he acknowledges that his ignorance was grounded in unbelief, yet his conscience was unstained by this lurking error of his heart; comp. at 1 Tim. i. 13. So also Acts xxiii. 1, "I have conducted with all good conscience toward God until this day;" comp. xxiv. 14. The two passages abundantly vindicate our passage. Or would the apostle boast, in opposition to the Jews, of a good conscience if he knew himself in fact guilty? Guilty indeed, he undoubtedly recognizes himself, of having been a blasphemer, and wanton persecutor, but not of having had a defiled conscience (*ἀγνοῶν ποιήσας*, etc).

And why, finally, regard our passage as an unconnected compilation from Rom. i. 9; Acts xxiii. 1; xxiv. 14, seq.? Rom. i. 9 annexes indeed *whom I serve* to *God* as here; but the connexion and the general scope and purpose of the clause are different. The two other passages can be adduced only as expressing a similar thought. Even were the design of this clause less ascertainable; did we with Matthies regard it merely as the grateful utterance of a profound religious feeling and experience; or with Bengel, defungi paratum juvat memoria antecessorum, ad quos aggregatur, etc., such a judgment would be still too hasty. But ver. 5 sheds, I think, a decided light on the entire expression. The apostle there expresses his confidence that the faith which dwelt in the grandmother and mother of Timothy has been transmitted also to him; and his subsequent exhortation is to be faithful to his inherited gift and to his calling. Thus as he himself serves God from his forefathers and has maintained a pure conscience, so of Timothy he hopes that the unfeigned faith of his maternal ancestors may have descended to him, and be maintained in a pure conscience. This personal parallel corresponds entirely to the familiar, intimate tone of the entire epistle.

Ὡς ἀδιάλειπτον ἔχω τὴν περὶ σοῦ μνείαν cannot, we have said, comparing the apostle's manner elsewhere, express the ground or subject of the thanksgiving. This is also clear from a grammatical examination of the passage. For to translate: I thank God that (*ὡς* = *ὅτι*) I unceasingly think of thee, etc., taking *ὡς* as marking the subject of the thanksgiving, is grammatically inaccurate, and yields a wholly inapposite sense, as all recent interpreters acknowledge, comp. De Wette, Mack, Matthies. Nor can *ὡς* in reference to *χάριν ἔχω* be taken as = *as* (ut), comp. Acts x. 28 (Winer's Gr., § 53, 5, p. 390). De Wette, Matthies, etc., find the ground of thanksgiving not in the clause with *ὡς* but in general in his remembering Timothy, and hence take *ὡς* = *quippe, siquidem* (De Wette, *since;* Matthies, *inasmuch as*), *ὡς* thus explaining *χάριν ἔχω*. But a longing memory of Timothy seems but a poor explanation of the *χάριν ἔχω*; the emphatic *ἀδιάλειπτον* would seem to require a *πάντοτε* or the like with *χαρ. ἐχ.*; and finally the expression

of thanksgiving would surely, if no proper reason of it were to be stated, require an *ὑπὲρ σοῦ*, as a mere *χάριν ἔχω* followed by a siquidem is intolerably bald. With Winer therefore (Gal. vi. 10). I regard it = *ut, prout.*—I thank God, in proportion as I unceasingly think of thee, *i. e.* unceasingly. This relation preserves the ordinary relation in meaning of *μνεία* to *εὐχαριστῶ*, comp. Eph. i. 16 ; Phil. i. 3, seq. ; 1 Thess. i. 2, seq. ; Philem. 4. So also Huther : *ὡς* = as, expresses the parallel relation of the subordinate to the leading clause. *Ἀδιάλειπτον*, (*incessantly*, Rom. ix. 2) the apostle prefixes as predicate to intimate that his thanksgiving is incessant. *Μνεία*, *remembrance*, *thinking upon*, as Phil. i. 3 : connected with *ἔχειν* as 1 Thess. iii. 6 (Huther). *Περὶ σοῦ* : Timothy the central object of his remembrance, Winer's Gr. § 47, e. *In my prayers :* he has this perpetual remembrance in his prayers. *By night and day :* better with De Wette referred to the preceding, than with Mack, Matthies, etc. to the following *ἐπιποθῶν* with which an adverbial limitation comes in awkwardly.

Ver. 4.—"Longing to see thee, while remembering thy tears, that I may be filled with joy." *Ἐπιποθῶν* states definitely how the apostle remembers him in his prayers. Along with this remembrance the desire to see him expresses itself in his prayer, a longing kindled by the remembrance of his tears (qu. parting tears ?) See the Introd. The participial clause, *μεμ.* etc. is parenthetical, as ground of the explanation, so that *ἵνα* again refers back to *ἐπιποθῶν* ; desiring to see thee that I may thus be filled, etc. *Ἵνα* forbids our constructing *μεμ.* with *χάρ. ἔχω* : this would require not a final but causal clause. "This expression of desire prepares the way for his invitation to Rome ; yet a reference like that Rom. i. 11 is wanting." De Wette. It certainly does not follow necessarily that this thought must also be found here : still it occurs, comp. ver. 8 ; iv. 9, seq.

Ver. 5.—"Remembering the unfeigned faith which is in thee." *Ὑπολαμβάνων*, the recepta and Tischendorf after D.E.I.K. etc. : while Griesbach and Lachmann prefer *λαβών* after A.C.F.G., etc. To me, apart even from the fact that, on account of what precedes, the change of *λαβών* into *λαμβ.* is more easily explicable than the reverse, *λαβών* seems preferable, as thus the expression *ὑπόμ. λαμβ.* admits a more natural explanation, and *ὑπόμνησις* is elsewhere also transitive (comp. 2 Pet. i. 13 ; iii. 1, as *ὑπομιμνήσκω*) ; although doubtless the explaining of *ὑπόμ.* by *recordatio*, has its analogy in *λήθην λαμβ.* 2 Pet. i. 9. This conjecture renders our passage similar to Eph. i. 15 ; *ἀκούσας τὴν καθ' ὑμᾶς πίστιν . . . οὐ παύομαι εὐχαριστῶν*, etc. In this case the apostle would refer to accounts received regarding Timothy (as in fact the epistle shews him acquainted with Timothy's position) and which he may have obtained through Onesiphorus. Then *μεμν. σου τῶν δακ.* be understood not of tears of

separation, but of tears shed at a distance for the absent apostle. The analogy of other passages led us to connect *ὑπόμν. λαβ.* with *χάριν ἔχω*. A closer examination seems to preclude every other construction ; alike that of Matthies who makes it the *ground* of the definite expectation of joy, since it can belong to *ἵνα χ. πλ.* only as determining it in manner or in time ; and that of De Wette, who regards it as an added motive to *ἐπιποθῶν*, for the entire construction thus involves an awkwardness which might have been easily avoided by placing *ἵνα* before *μεμ.* and adding *καί*. De Wette himself is dissatisfied with the construction, but attributes the fault to the author. On *ἀνυπόκριτος πίστις*, see at 1 Tim. i. 5, and Phil. ii. 21, seq. As in his own case, the apostle deems it a blessing to have descended from pious and conscientious parents, so in that of Timothy. He is strengthened in the conviction that the unfeigned faith, which seems a maternal inheritance in the family of Timothy, has descended also to him : comp. at ver. 3, and as to the matter of fact, iii. 15, "thou knowest from a child the holy scriptures," of course through his mother's care. Acts xvi. 1. This view of faith as an inheritance is clearly expressed in the following words "which dwelt first," etc. This faith is the one subject which dwelt in his grandmother, mother, and now in himself (supply *ἐνοικεῖ* ; De Wette). The "in thee," however, is uttered with less objective certainty : it is a conviction, strengthened by the above adduced facts, but which he indeed summons Timothy still further to strengthen by his conduct. This propagation of faith is a divine blessing on the parents, but presupposing certainly a susceptible spirit in the child. The word *ἐνοικεῖν* (so only with Paul ; comp. Rom. viii. 11 ; 2 Cor. vi. 16 ; Col. iii. 16) represents faith, regarded objectively, as derived from without, viz., from God. *Πρῶτον* here in its strict sense "first" (Matthies) : not "sooner than in thee" (De Wette, comparing Rom. xv. 24). Critics take offence at the representation of Timothy as a youth, on which see at 1 Tim. iv. 12. If we compare i. 3 of our passage this idea is done away. D. Baur regards this mention of his grandmother and mother as very singular, and believes that the author has woven in the names, furnished probably by tradition, in order to give to the contents of his epistle a more concrete and individual form. Our interpretation renders, I trust, this hypothesis superfluous. Comp. against it, Matthies.

Vers. 6, 7, summons Timothy not to leave unemployed the gift imparted to him. "For which reason" refers to "I am persuaded." This persuasion gives alike to the admonition and to the duty to which Timothy is summoned, their proper prerequisite and foundation. All activity for the kingdom of God must spring from the power of faith in the individual performer. *Ἀναμιμνήσκω*, re-

mind (1 Cor. iv. 17), with the included idea of exhorting. Ἀναζωπυρεῖν (only here in the New Testament: on its use elsewhere see Wahl), to rekindle, revive. The χάρισμα is conceived as a "slumbering spark" (De Wette) which in Timothy needs rekindling. "He was not fervent in spirit, Rom. xii. 13" (see also Acts xviii. 25) justly remarks De Wette; and this is intimated also in the following admonition. For representing the χάρισμα as a fire, comp. Acts ii. 3; Matth. iii. 11. The admonition implies too that the use of the imparted gift depended on the will of Timothy. Ἐν ἡμῖν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ σβέσαι καὶ ἀνάψαι τοῦτο, Chrysostom.—But what does this χάρισμα denote? The term itself in its wide signification (Rom. i. 11, v. 15, vi. 23, xi. 29, comp. with xii. 6; 1 Cor. xii. 4, seq.), leaves it undecided; yet we may perhaps determine it from the connexion, as vers. 6 and 7 manifestly introduce ver. 8 seq. (οὖν), and from the comp. of 1 Tim. iv. 14, and i. 18. As there χάρισμα can be understood only of his definite gift for the vocation of teacher, so also here. And the whole tenor of the epistle (to which ver. 6 is, as it were, the key), points to Timothy's vocation as a teacher, not to his Christian deportment, the δι' ἣν αἰτίαν of ver. 6, in fact, assuming his *faith* as ground of the admonition to fidelity in his official calling. Then the reference is not to the gift of the spirit in general (Matthies, etc.), but with Chrysostom, Mack, De Wette, to the specific gift requisite for his calling; and this not, with Mack, that of *government*, but that of evangelist. So also Olshausen. The relative clause, "which is in thee," etc., refers to the same act as in 1 Tim. iv. 14, viz., Timothy's reception of his evangelical calling by prophecy and imposition of hands. Regarding as every unprejudiced person must do, the two passages as having a like reference, we see how groundlessly this setting apart is regarded as a consecration of Timothy to the bishopric of Ephesus, a formal inauguration to the office of priest or bishop (Mack). To any presiding over the Ephesian church, or any other church, there is not the slightest allusion; see the Introduction. If here the imposition of hands is ascribed to the apostle, then to the presbytery, the two admit, as even Dr. Baur concedes,* of being easily united; comp. at the above passage. It is obvious, however, why *here* the apostle specifies his own agency. It accords not only with that character of intimate relationship between the two, which pervades the entire epistle as its foundation and subject, but also with the immediately following summons to Timothy, to exercise fearlessly his gift on behalf of him through whom it was imparted. On ἐπίθεσις χειρῶν, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 14, v. 22. Διά, Mack,

* Dr. Baur employs indeed this liberal concession (timeo Danaos, etc.), in order to bring out a complete bishop's consecration, as fixed by the Conc. Cath., a. 253, and the Alex. Const. But of the setting apart of a bishop there is not a syllable. And the laying on of hands would still doubtless have its analogies, even though we could not appeal to Acts xix. 6. See Matthies, p. 479.

in opposition to Flatt, justly explains of *means: per hominem dat Deus*, Augustine. The apostle knows that in consequence of the imposition of hands, the Divine gift has been bestowed upon Timothy. Yet Mack manifestly errs in supposing that it follows from this certainty, that the communication of the Spirit is connected *sacramentally* with the act (*i. e.*, ex vi ipsius actionis—a Deo ad hoc instituta). Still more untenable is his reasoning from this passage to the *indelible* character of ordination: for 1, ordination in its later sense is in no way referred to, and 2, it by no means follows from the exhortation to Timothy to rekindle the spiritual flame, that it may not be entirely extinguished.

Ver. 7 assigns a reason for the requisition; for God hath not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, love, and self-control. Πνεῦμα is not here = *χάρισμα*. Rather ver. 7, as confirming, stands parallel to *δι' ἣν αἰτίαν*, ver. 6; since Timothy has received such a *spirit*, he must not allow his *χάρισμα* to lie unemployed. The Spirit is imparted to him as a Christian; the right employment of his gift is referred to his personal conduct as a Christian. The terms which limit *πνεῦμα*, as *οὐ δειλίας ἀλλὰ δυνάμεως, κ. τ. λ.* (comp. Rom. viii. 15, *δουλείας—υἱοθεσίας*), are adapted doubtless to the defects perceived in Timothy. Δειλίας (Matth. viii. 26; Rev. xxi. 8; John xiv. 27), timidity; as Timothy is not to fear dangers and sufferings for the sake of the gospel. In contrast: *δυνάμεως*, *of power*, which makes strong for *ὑπερνικᾶν*, Rom. viii. 37, comp. Eph. vi. 10; Phil. iv. 13. Overpassing the simple contrast the apostle adds, *καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ*. Love fears no danger or sacrifice, and gives to *power* its constant impulse and right direction. Σωφρονισμός not transitive (= are sobering, comp. *σωφρονίζω*, Tit. ii. 4), but, with most interpreters, reflexive, "self-control, sobriety in conduct;" comp. Theodoret, "that we may chasten the disorder of our passions;" see at Tit. i. 8. The following admonitions seem to betray a certain earthly propensity in Timothy. On the absence of the article, see Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, 2.

Vers. 8–12.—Application of the above to the present case. Timothy is not, therefore, to shrink from sharing the shame of the gospel and of the imprisoned apostle, but to unite with him in enduring for the gospel, in view of its undeserved and glorious richness, as he sees the apostle do. Ver. 8 discloses what the apostle had specially in mind in the preceding general admonitions. Timothy is to be admonished not to shrink from the shame and danger of publishing the gospel. Mark the twofold character of the injunction: "the testimony of the Lord and of me his prisoner;" which thus suggests the double purpose of the epistle, viz., to remind Timothy of his duties to the gospel and to the imprisoned apostle. The positive clause *ἀλλὰ συγκακοπάθησον* shews the ground of Timothy's shame; it sprung

not from the divine foolishness of the gospel, but from the sufferings to which it exposed him. On *ἐπαισχυνθῇς*, comp. Rom. i. 16. *Τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ κυρίου, κυρ.*, gen. of obj., comp. Winer's Gr., § 30, 1, 1 Cor. i. 6, ii. 1; John xv. 26; Acts iv. 33; Heb. iii. 5. On *τὸν δέσμιον αὐτοῦ* = whom Christ—the cause of Christ, has imprisoned and holds in bonds, see Winer's Gr., § 30, 2, p. 170, and there also the other explanations of the construction. This added clause suggests at once why Timothy *might* be, *and should not* be ashamed. *Συγκακοπάθησον* (here only: *κακοπαθέω*, ii. 3, 9, iv. 5; James v. 13, comp. with 10: thus *κακουχέω*, Heb. xi. 37, xiii. 3), suffer with me for the gospel; as the analogy of Phil. i. 27, iv. 3, *συναθλέω*, Heb. xi. 25; Rom. viii. 17, etc., teaches. In this construction *ἀλλά* corresponds to the preceding, and that which follows stands with it in natural connexion; for the clause then embraces the two previously named points (*μαρτύριον, ἐμέ*), and the connexion of 11 and 12 is naturally explained. So Chrysostom and Wahl, Mack, Matthies; De Wette is undecided. *Κατὰ δύν. θεοῦ* is erroneously, I think, explained, with reference to ver. 7 of the power of God imparted to Timothy ("thou art not wanting in power," Mack, De Wette, etc.); for the *οὖν* renders this addition superfluous, and without the natural reference in the expression; but particularly the contents of ver. 9 oppose this view, which points us to the saving act of Divine compassion, and in this discloses that *δύναμις*; so also the *ὅτι δυνατός*, ver. 12, which likewise speaks not of a power dwelling in the apostle, but belonging properly to God. This verse, however, corresponds precisely, in the general train of thought, to the language before us. Thus, the sense is: suffer with me according to the measure of God's power displayed in our salvation, *i. e.*, thy submitting to sufferings must, like mine, correspond in willingness and confidence to the power of God.

Ver. 9 is then not "a purely general, superfluous mention of the facts of salvation;" not "a common-place which serves only to introduce the mention of the apostle's vocation" (De Wette); but a necessary and more exact characterization of this *δύναμις*: "who hath saved us," etc., the sense is: he who has experienced the power of God in his own salvation and calling, must not, in view of this power, shrink from sufferings; with an answering confidence he must be ready to suffer for the gospel. "Saved and called," mark not something specially imparted to the apostle and Timothy, but to every Christian; while its primary reference here is to himself and Timothy. *Σώσαντος* as shewn by the epexegetical *καὶ καλέσαντος*, denotes the individual saving act, which necessarily implies the grace, "manifested through the appearance of the Saviour." On *θεός* as "Saviour" see at Tit. i. 3. "With Paul God never appears as Saviour," says De Wette. Who is he then in passages like

Rom. v. 9, "*We shall be saved through him* (*Christ*), 1 Cor. i. 21, "*It pleased God . . . to save*"? At καλέσαντος De Wette himself points to the fact that even with Paul it is God who calls. Gal. i. 6; Rom. viii. 30. On the expression καλεῖν κλήσει, 1 Cor. vii. 20; Eph. i. 4. This calling, the apostle styles holy, not barely as issuing from God—for then every thing must be alike holy—but from its character. It is a call to a separation from the world and an entrance into the fellowship of his kingdom: hence the name saints (ἅγιοι). Here where the individual is to suffer for the gospel, the term is peculiarly appropriate. The apostle portrays before Timothy the power of God in their personal experience of salvation, but enhances the obligation by the added "not according to our works" (comp. Tit. iii. 5); this experience of the divine power is one of pure, unmerited grace, and demands their grateful love in return. Κατά, "by virtue of," comp. Tit. iii. 5. The true incentive to it (*properly*, with Huther, the "measure, standard") is furnished in the words, "according to his own purpose and grace," etc. The "purpose" as the essential ground is defined by the "grace" as its mode of manifestation; see Tit. iii. 5, "not of works—but according to his mercy." Πρόθεσις, therefore, is not a purpose in reference to individuals = ἐκλογή, κατ' ἐκλογὴν προθ. Rom. ix. 11; viii. 28 (Mack), but the decision accomplished in ver. 10: comp. Eph. i. 9, "his good pleasure which he purposed." Eph. iii. 11. That πρόθεσις is not = predestination but = resolution, decision (προτίθεσθαι, properly, to purpose, resolve) is clear, from passages like Rom. i. 13; iii. 25; Eph. i. 11, comp. Harless at Eph. i. 9. Ἴδιος in contrast with an impulse from without (ἔργα ἡμῶν). The substance of this purpose, proceeding from God, is marked by the following χάριν τήν, κ. τ. λ.—"By virtue of the grace given in ancient times in Christ Jesus he has saved us." Each individual act of salvation has its ground in this grace bestowed on the world in Christ. In Christ—for from eternity he holds the position of Mediator between God and man, so that all God's love and grace can reach the world only through him: comp. Harless at Eph. i. 4, p. 13; i. 6, 7, 28, 29. Ἐν, not *per*: but *in* (comp. Winer's Gr., § 48, a, p. 347, note), = in his person; not in fellowship with him, as Mack, against which comp. Harless above p. 29. In this case χάρις would denote the grace conferred on individuals, which view, besides our remarks on πρόθεσις, conflicts with ver. 10, and would involve the incongruous idea that this grace is bestowed on those already enjoying fellowship with Christ. Πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων = πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων (1 Cor. ii. 7) or = πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, Eph. i. 4, comp. with iii. 11, see at Tit. i. 2. Δοθεῖσαν not "destined," as Heydenreich, but "given," so that it needs only to become known to us in time by the manifestation of him in whom it is bestowed. This manifestation in all its stages is but the actual realization in time of that eternal act of love.

Hence, ver. 10, "but now manifested," etc. The term *φαν.* represents that "gift" as hitherto concealed from the world, "the mystery hidden from ancient times," Col. i. 26, "kept secret since the world began," Rom. xvi. 25; which notwithstanding the predictions of the Old Testament has now first become revealed (comp. the contrast of *ἐπηγγείλατο* and *ἐφάνερωσε*, Tit. i. 2, 3). Since prophecy, although a revelation for the present, has the revelation of future salvation as its essential burden. *Νῦν* fixes the present point in the course of the ages: Eph. i. 10; Gal. iv. 4. This grace is revealed through the appearance of our Saviour Jesus Christ who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light, etc. *Ἐπιφάνεια*, not merely of the *adventus* of Christ to earth (Wahl) but as *ἐπεφάνη*, Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4., of his entire manifestation and ministry on earth, as the two following clauses shew. Comp. at the above passage in Titus, as also on the gnostic sentiment, which Baur detects in the expression. "Abolishing death and bringing to light life and immortality," are the two capital points which here mark the *ἐπιφάνεια* of our Saviour. The term *καταργέω* belongs to that class of words specifically Pauline, of which we have met with several in the pastoral epistles. It is used in its present signification, apart from Heb. ii. 14, only by Paul, and by him twenty-one times: Luke xiii. 7—the only other case of its occurrence in the New Testament—does not belong here. "In Græcis scriptoribus hoc sensu legere non memini," Winer in Gal. iii. 17. Its meaning is "vi sua privo, tollo." As to the general expression we might compare with our passage 1 Cor. xv. 26, *ἔσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος*, which differs however in making the "abolishing" of death future, and completed only when all are made alive again in Christ, and all the consequences of sin removed. Perfectly correspondent in sense and illustrative of our passage is Heb. ii. 14, that through death he might abolish (*καταργήσῃ*) him that hath the power of death, etc. In the present passage death appears as the power which Christ has destroyed, and so destroyed, as shewn by the positive *φωτίσαντος*, that it no more shuts out life and immortality. In this contrast with life and immortality, death appears here, as also elsewhere, *e. g.* Rom. vi. 23, not as strictly bodily or spiritual death (dead in trespasses, Col. ii. 13), but the power which, in consequence of sin, has seized alike on body and soul, and inflicts natural, as the precursor of eternal death. Its sting is sin: it is nullified when this is taken away; for it is then no longer a denial of life and immortality. There remains but the form of death, until this also is annihilated, and death is no more (Rev. xxi. 4, death shall exist no more, etc.). Some, connecting with *καταργ.* the *διὰ τοῦ εὐαγ.* have taken it subjectively, of the annihilation of the fear of death. But with this the context is at war, which describes as the ground of all individual

salvation the grace objectively imparted to us through the appearing of Christ, as well as the expression itself. But if καταργ. denotes deliverance from death by the death of Christ, φωτίσαντος, which by δέ is placed in direct contrast with it, must denote not a mere knowledge imparted by him to mankind, but that actual victory of his life over death, which was achieved by his resurrection. Φωτίζειν, "bring to light" (1 Cor. iv. 5), is a term suggested by death as the power of darkness (Matt. iv. 16; Luke i. 79). "Immortality," epexegetical of "life," pointing to its eternal, imperishable character in contrast with death—(thus Rom. vi. 23, "eternal life" as opposed to death)—not specially, as Heydenreich, of the immortality of the body; comp. Rom. ii. 7. This is found only, and repeatedly in Paul.

The clause διὰ τοῦ εὐαγ. may seem adverse to our explanation of φωτίσαντος; since if we connect this with φωτ. as a strict designation of the *means*, φωτ. can refer only to the enlightening effect of the gospel. This, however, leads to the above censured false relation of καταργ. and φωτ., and with Huther, we should then secure a consistent construction by referring διὰ τοῦ εὐ. equally to both participles. But to this the words and context are alike opposed, as also De Wette acknowledges; "the idea of the annihilation of death is scarcely separable from the relation to the death of Jesus." I conceive it better, therefore, to regard διὰ τοῦ εὐ. as a looser appended clause, comprehending the διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, and thus determining φανερωθεῖσαν, etc. The writer, having ver. 11 in mind, comprehends the general preceding thought under the διὰ τοῦ εὐ.; to which he can thus subjoin his εἰς ὅ. "Through the gospel" thus indicates in relation to διὰ τῆς ἐπιφ., the remoter means of the revelation. Comp. in confirmation of this view, Tit. i. 3, but particularly 1 Tim. ii. 6, where τὸ μαρτύριον καιροῖς ἰδίοις, in a similar manner comprehends the preceding by way of apposition, and similarly also εἰς ὃ ἐτέθην follows. Death and life then are not here thus distinctly adverted to by the apostle, merely because the one exhibits the concentrated action of sin, the other of grace, but specially in connexion with the summons to suffering; since what has he to fear for whom death is annihilated, and life and immortality actually brought to light? On the article before δοθεῖσαν, comp. at τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ, i. 1. Its omission before καταργ. has its ground, perhaps, in the fact that this participle with the following assigns the ground for φανερωθεῖσαν, being = *in that he*, etc. (Winer's Gr., § 20, 1. c.) The article before θάνατος indicates this as the well-known previously reigning power, while ζωή and ἀφθαρσία, represented as newly succeeding to it, are without it.

At ver. 11, comp. the parallel 1 Tim. ii. 7. The design of the expression, however, is in the two cases different. In the one the

apostle points in his calling to the universality of Divine grace; in the other, his aim is to induce Timothy to suffer with him for the gospel. Of this gospel he is ordained a preacher; for this he suffers, and that without shame; and so also should Timothy do and suffer with him. It is thus not merely the joyful certainty of the fullness of grace which brings the apostle to his calling, but his requirement of Timothy to suffer with the gospel, ver. 8. The reading *ἐθνῶν*, opposed only by A. 17, is rightly retained by De Wette.

Ver. 12.—"*For which cause*," etc. His apostolic calling is the cause of his sufferings. *Καὶ ταῦτα, even this*, refers to the intimation, ver. 8. *Οὐκ αἰσχ.* also clearly refers to the admonition to Timothy, ver. 8, not to shrink from the shame attendant on the gospel, and thus places beyond doubt the purpose of this mention of himself. And so also the ground of the apostle's exemption from shame corresponds to the above referring of Timothy to the power of God, with our interpretation of the expression. He knows in whom he has believed, and is persuaded that he is able, etc. *I know in whom I have believed*, = I have the most unquestionable proof of the power of God; the proof mentioned ver. 9, seq.; 1 Tim. i. 12, seq. *Ὧι πεπίστευκα* (of course not = *εἰς ὅν*), in whom I have believed; comp. at Tit. iii. 8; Acts xxvii. 25. This is not Christ, but as the context shews, which speaks of the power of God, God. *I am persuaded*, viz., in consequence of this. At *δυνατός* De Wette remarks rightly; this is the *δύναμις* of ver. 8; for *δυνατός*, used of God, he points to Rom. xi. 23, xiv. 4; 2 Cor. ix. 8. The following *τὴν παραθήκην μου φυλάξαι*, etc., while the individual expressions are simple and intelligible, is as a whole difficult. On *παραθήκη, depositum*, see at 1 Tim. vi. 20. On *ἐκείνη ἡ ἡμέρα* (= *ἡμέρα κυρίου*), comp. 2 Thess. i. 10; Matth. vii. 22, etc. On *εἰς* = *until*, Phil. i. 10. Winer's Gr., § 49, a., p. 353. Looking to the connexion, the clause must contain the conviction which strengthens the apostle to meet the hardships of his calling. Wholly inconsistent with this purpose is De Wette's explanation of *παραθήκη* as his office; "God will keep his office for him until that day!" The apostle is specifying that which inspires him with courage in fulfilling his office; he cannot surely then say that God preserves for him his office. If De Wette means that God will impart to him power to execute his office in persecution and death, he abandons his own interpretation. To refer with Flatt and others the *παραθήκη* to the gospel, is still more objectionable. Looking to the other passages of our epistle which express the writer's sources of consolation under present distress and humiliation, we find them alluding uniformly to the "crown," to "life," to participation in the "kingdom." In the "crown of righteousness," iv. 8, reserved for him in that day, he

himself suggests the clue to the solution of our passage. The specific idea here, indeed, is rather "life" than a "crown" (ver. 10), because life is not a thing absolutely future, but already present, and being as such committed to the individual's guardianship, may be styled a deposite. Why the apostle makes the keeping of this deposite dependent on God rather than on himself (comp. 1 Tim. vi. 12), is shewn by the context. He is stating the consoling assurance which he has in his conduct as a sufferer for the gospel; as such he has the certainty that in spite of all his shame, God will preserve for him his deposite. De Wette has been drawn away from this obvious explanation by the unwarranted supposition that παραθήκη can signify here nothing other than at ver. 14, and 1 Tim. vi. 20, and for the sake of embracing all these passages under one interpretation, he refers the παρ. to the calling of the apostle, a meaning suited neither to this nor to the others. And assuredly it stands here in a relation widely different from that of the other passages. There the "keeping" is attributed to Timothy; here to God: there its reference is clearly to doctrine; here it is a personal good, to be preserved to the day of judgment: there the question is of right action in Timothy; here of consolation in right action. It cannot then be objected with De Wette, that the author would not without warning have so suddenly changed the signification of the word; the connexion itself indicates the change. Rather, how could the apostle, who in his own case has just committed the keeping of his deposite to God, immediately at ver. 14 admonish Timothy to keep the καλὴν παρ., if the term signified one and the same thing, viz., their vocation? Nay, De Wette himself regards the admonition (13, 14) to fidelity in his official work, as unconnected with the preceding, and might well therefore have inferred that it treats of a different subject. Huther like De Wette. That μου is not gen. of the subject, is clear from the other two passages where παραθ. can only denote something entrusted to Timothy; from the term itself, in which παρά primarily indicates the following genitive as genitive of the object; and, finally, from the untenableness of all the views which rest on this construction. For παραθ. can denote neither his reward, nor his soul, nor his soul's salvation. To refer it to the first or the last would be to render his salvation self-achieved, instead of a gift of grace; referred to the second, it would yield, if taken in the sense of life, a sense totally unsuited to the εἰς ἐκ. τὴν ἡμ.; and otherwise, this view coincides with the third of those named above. The interpretations which understand παραθ. of the Holy Ghost, or Paul's disciples, need no refutation.

Vers. 13–18.—The apostle has just admonished Timothy to suffer after his own example in behalf of the gospel. Sensible of his own office and fidelity in discharging it, he now further summons

him not merely to resolution in general, but specially to a steadfast adherence to the doctrine received from the apostle, and to personal fidelity to him, adding by way of warning, examples of unfaithfulness, and for encouragement, examples of faithful service. These are the fundamental thoughts of the epistle to which its entire further contents are devoted.

Ver. 13.—"Hold fast the form," etc. Ὑποτύπωσις, as 1 Tim. i. 16, so here, pattern, norm, not outline, much less written outline (Herder, Schrader), as shewn sufficiently by ἤκουσας. Chrysostom rightly; καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ζωγράφων ἐνετυπωσάμην, φησὶν εἰκόνα σοι τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . ὥσπερ τινὰ κανόνα καὶ ἀρχέτυπον καὶ ὅρους καταβαλὼν ἐπὶ τὴν σὴν ψυχήν. Ταῦτα νῦν ἔχε, κ. τ. λ, Similarly Theodoret. Ἔχε = κατέχω, as 1 Tim. iii. 9, comp. Passow. Ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι, the same as Tit. i. 9, ἡ διδ. ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα; ii. 1, 1 Tim. i. 10, etc. We see that the danger of error, mentioned in the first epistle, was not yet past.—"In faith and love" (to be connected of course with "hold,") denotes the frame of mind in which alone the true doctrine can be maintained; comp. 1 Tim. i. 6, 19, etc. "Which is in Christ Jesus," *i. e.*, founded in him, and hence springing from union with him. The article is wanting, as De Wette justly remarks, before ὑποτυπ., because it is limited by the following genitive; before ὑγ. λόγ., because, like νόμος, the phrase has become familiar with the writer. On its omission before πίστις and ἀγάπη, see Winer's Gr., § 19, 1.

Vers. 14 connects ἀσυνδέτως, with rhetorical emphasis, the parallel injunction: "keep the noble deposite through the Holy Ghost," etc. For καλὴ παραθ. is as 1 Tim. vi. 20, to be understood of the possession of right doctrine entrusted to him; comp. afterwards ii. 2, "What thou hast heard—that commit," etc., and at 1 Tim. vi. 20. The Holy Ghost, who dwells in him as in the apostle, and is ready for his emergencies, is the means of preservation. Τοῦτο τεῖχος ἡμῖν, τοῦτο φρούριον, τοῦτο καταφυγή, Chrysostom. On the article τοῦ, see Winer's Gr., § 20, 16.

Ver. 15, seq., refer back, as Heydenreich and others have perceived, to the other part of the injunction primarily given in ver. 8, "Nor of me his prisoner." Instead of directly urging on Timothy his obligations of love, the apostle gently suggests examples which may sufficiently instruct him in his duty. "It is truly natural," says Schleiermacher, "that in exhorting one to steadfastness and courage, he should hold out examples of timidity and irresolution." The facts mentioned in ver. 15 are cited as already known to Timothy, perhaps through Onesiphorus. The design then, is not to impart information, but to give a hint for the conduct of Timothy. It is commonly supposed that persons from Asia Minor, who for some reason had come to Rome at the time of the apostle's imprison-

ment, had been ashamed of him, and treated him with neglect. So Chrysostom and Theodoret. Such must be the import of the *ἀπεστράφησάν με*, as the contrast in ver. 16, and the entire context shew. It denotes therefore not falling from the faith, but the same, perhaps, as *ἐγκατέλιπόν με*, iv. 16 (comp. Tit. i. 14 on the expression). This construction would seem (see Mack) rather to require *οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ἀ.*, than *οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀ.* The only explanation seems to be that of De Wette and others, that the persons mentioned had already returned home, and hence are denoted as *οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀ.* The *πάντες οἱ* presupposes Timothy's cognizance of the matter; though Mack thinks that the apostle speaks of a formal apostacy, occasioned by his imprisonment. But such a "turning away" does not harmonize with the connexion, and even then, apart from what is here said, *πάντες* must assuredly be subjected to the necessary restriction. Those particularly adduced, perhaps as better known, are otherwise unknown to us. On "Asia," comp. Winer's R.W.B., Wieseler, ubi supra. p. 31, seq. De Wette says justly: this assumption of Timothy's acquaintance with the conduct of these Asiatics, implies his residence in Asia Minor; ver. 18 points even to Ephesus; comp. the Introduction.

Vers. 16–18.—With the example of the unstable Paul contrasts that of Onesiphorus. This man, mentioned here and at iv. 19, is also otherwise unknown to us. The mode of mentioning him, the Divine mercy being here invoked upon his house, and upon himself only at the day of judgment, and the greeting at iv. 19, being restricted to his house, justify the inference that he was dead. Thus much is clear regarding him, that he had come from Ephesus to Rome, and rendered affectionate service to the imprisoned apostle. The mercy (*ἔλεος*), wished to him, corresponds to his own treatment of the apostle: "he often refreshed me," etc. The word *ἀναψ.* (properly refresh by cool breath of air, then refresh in general: *καθάπερ ἀθλητήν τινα ὑπὸ αὐχμοῦ συνεχόμενον τῶν θλίψεων τῆς ἀναψύξεως ἠξίωσεν*, Theophylact), only here; *ἀνάψυξις*, Acts iii. 19; common in the LXX., and the classics; similarly *ἀναπαύειν*, Philem. 7. There is no ground for taking the "refreshment" as exclusively physical. The added clause, "was not ashamed of my chains," points back to ver. 8, and shews the design of this mention of Onesiphorus. *Ἅλυσις*, as Eph. vi. 20, etc. On *δῴη* for *δοίη*, Winer's Gr., § 14, 1. On the reading *ἐπαισχύνθη* for *ἐπησχύνθη*, id., § 12, at close. While the apostle touches but slightly on the conduct of those who turned away, he lingers with grateful love on the mention of Onesiphorus. On coming to Rome he sought him diligently (*σπουδαιότερον*, not contrasted with the conduct of the wavering, but with the *τὴν ἅλ. οὐκ ἐπησ.* = far from being deterred by his imprisonment, he sought him all the more diligently), and found him. "The Lord grant

that he may find," etc. The reference of *εὑρεῖν* to *εὗρε* is manifest, and entirely in the manner of the apostle. Otherwise, De Wette, against Matthies. The repeated *κύριος* is remarkable, comp. Gen. xix. 24. Neither there nor here is *παρὰ κυρίου = παρ' ἑαυτοῦ* (De Wette against Chrysostom, Mack and others); for the passages to which the advocates of this construction appeal, are of an entirely different character (Winer's Gr., § 22, 2), and it would be a strange form of expression, indeed, if we are to understand but *one* subject, when a different position of the one subject is not indicated in the expression. But if two subjects are referred to, the first is not (as De Wette and others maintain) God and the second Christ, as being the Judge, but conversely, the first is Christ, and the second God. For the first *κύριος* can be understood only as immediately before, at ver. 16, where, according to the prevailing usage of these epistles, which in this also, evince their Pauline origin (comp. Winer's Gr., § 19, 1), it assuredly denotes Christ; comp. i. 2, iv. 8, ii. 7, 14, 22, 24, etc.; 1 Tim. i. 2, 12, vi. 3, 14. It is no argument against this, that Christ is designated as the judge; for although the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son, it still remains the judgment of God (Rom. ii. 5, seq., *δικαιοκρισία τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃς ἀποδώσει, κ. τ. λ.*), and the mercy received is God's mercy (Matth. xxv. 34, "come ye blessed of my Father," etc). But how totally unpauline and unscriptural the opinion that God places himself as mediator between the subject of judgment and Christ as Judge! Olshausen holds our view. *Καὶ ὅσα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ διηκόνησε, κ. τ. λ.* The affectionate remembrance of the apostle leads him even after invoking the Divine blessing, to subjoin this trait. This is not the language of a forger. "Better," sc. than I. *Διακονεῖν*, not of special service to the apostle, but general; *βέλτιον* then points to personal observation on the part of Timothy. The term, finally, in its general import, and connected with *ὅσα*, warrants us not in regarding, with Wieseler, Onesiphorus as a deacon.

§ 2.—SUMMONS TO TIMOTHY NOT TO SHRINK FROM THE TOILS AND SUFFERINGS OF HIS CALLING.

ii. 1—13.

The apostle has, in ch. i., laid on Timothy a two-fold injunction, 1, not to be ashamed of the Gospel, 2, nor of himself, the apostle, imprisoned for its sake. He enters at once, ch. ii., more fully on the first point, the duty of Timothy as preacher of the gospel, and admonishes him, ver. 1, to the strengthening of his own faith, to which he subjoins, ver. 2, the direction to provide for its mainten-

ance and diffusion by competent teachers. Ver. 3, reminds Timothy of the point in which he specially needs strengthening, viz., to suffer as a soldier of Christ. This exhortation he illustrates by the example of the earthly warrior, the prize-combatant, the husbandman from whom he can learn that the attainment of the object is dependent on self-renunciation, devotion, and painful toil. This (ver. 7) Timothy is thoroughly to understand. As a soldier of Jesus Christ he is to have before his eyes his glorified Lord. From him comes power to suffer: in him is presented the high goal whose attainment is the object of his calling, as he sees in the example of the apostle, vers. 8–10. It is an undoubted truth that in him salvation and eternal life are to be attained on condition of fidelity to him, vers. 11–13.

Ver. 1.—Entering on Timothy's first and highest duty, as evangelist, the apostle admonishes him, as the indispensable condition of success, to be strong in the grace which is in Christ Jesus. Χάρις, therefore, is here not to be understood specially of his gift of teaching (χάρισμα, i. 6), as appears from the generality of the expression "the grace which is in Christ Jesus," but grace as the universal principle of Christian life, which is founded in Christ and has faith and love as its inseparable attendants. He only who is thus strengthened can meet the requirements involved in proclaiming the gospel, for in him the power of Christ is mighty, 1 Tim. i. 12. Hence ἐνδυναμοῦ is not middle, but passive as Rom. iv. 20; Eph. vi. 10; Col. i. 11, comp. Winer's Gr., § 39, 2. How such strengthening is attained we are taught Eph. vi. 11, seq. On the term ἐνδ. Phil. iv. 13; 1 Tim. i. 12. That ἐν following is not "by" (as Chrys. etc.) but "in" is clear alike from the nature of the compound verb and from Eph. vi. 10; Rom. iv. 20. Finally, οὖν is by some referred to what immediately precedes, as a moving ground of the admonition; by others to i. 13. De Wette regards its position and the σὺ which places Timothy in contrast with those faithless ones, as sustaining the former view; while in sense the admonition goes back substantially to i. 13. Our view of οὖν must undoubtedly be determined by our view of the subsequent course of thought. Regarding ver. 2 as clearly an incidental admonition, ver. 3 resumes the thought of ver. 1, and shews the purpose of ἐνδυν. viz., Timothy's perfectly fearless and faithful proclamation of the gospel. If then συγκακοπάθησον is here the correct reading, the connexion with the words immediately preceding is undeniable. Σύ marks the transition from what is said of others to what is to be the course of Timothy, and in close connexion with it stands the renewed and conciliatory address, "my son."

Ver. 2.—This verse as remarked above, is incidental to the general train of thought, but suggested naturally by the σὺ οὖν to the

apostle under the conviction of his speedy departure. We have here illustrated that feature of the epistle which allows the apostle to turn readily aside for any incidental and passing thought. Such is not the manner of a fabricator, at once so methodical and so free. The import of the verse is that Timothy is not only to be personally faithful in promulgating the apostolic doctrine, but also to take care that it be in its purity received and propagated by others. What Timothy has heard is the *ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι*, the apostolical doctrine with its knowledge of the truths of salvation and its morally renovating power; Chrys. *ἃ ἤκουσας, οὐχ ἃ συνεζήτησας*. The subjoined *διὰ πολλῶν μαρτύρων* is difficult. It is ungrammatical, with Heydenreich and others, to supply *μαρτυρούμενα*: *διά* belongs to *ἤκουσας*. With this falls the view which understands by these many witnesses the apostles and eye-witnesses generally (as Ols. comp. Heb. ii. 3) or, as Clemens Alex. with Œcumenius, Moses and the Old Testament prophets. For it was not his hearing, but the substance of the communication that could be represented as mediated by them: but the apostle would hardly thus make his doctrine depend on the testimony of others (Gal. i. 11, seq.); or thus have cited as witnesses of his doctrine the prophets of the Old Testament who testified only what was yet to happen, not that *manifested grace* (i. 10) on which all depends. Still less satisfactory is Mack's explanation who takes *διὰ πολ. μαρ.* = *διὰ προφητείας*, 1 Tim. iv. 14. What can be meant by "what thou hast heard under occasion of many witnesses," and these two in no way witnesses of what was heard by Timothy, but of his capacity! Connecting *διά* with *ἤκουσας*, Winer's explanation (Gr., § 47, i. p. 338), becomes the only admissible one, viz., *intervenientibus multis testibus*, unter vermittelung, *i. e.* "in presence of many witnesses." We need not, therefore, take *διά* as strictly = *ἐνώπιον* (1 Tim. vi. 12); the presence of many as witnesses is a constituent element in that act to which the apostle here refers, and which can be no other than that to which throughout the epistle he perpetually recurs as Timothy's perpetual ground of obligation, viz., his solemn investiture with the office of evangelist. As Timothy on this occasion had solemnly witnessed his good confession, we must conceive that the apostle had (previously) delivered and entrusted to him the substance of that apostolic doctrine which he was to announce. Comp. at 1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 14, vi. 13, i. 6. The reference then is not to instruction preceding baptism, but to instruction preceding his entrance on his office of evangelist. This also may be inferred from the following direction. For the instruction which Timothy had received as a Christian he would not need to impart to faithful men; as Christians they must already possess it: but only what had been committed to him as a future evangelist he is required similarly to entrust to others. These others then are such as will

in their turn transmit Christian truth, not mere catechumens, as is shown also by the καί. Our passage therefore contains perhaps the first trace of theological, as distinguished from Christian culture. To teach others requires a different appropriation of Christian truth from that attained by the ordinary Christian. Of these preferred teachers the apostle demands but the single qualification of fidelity. Πιστός not "believing," which would be a superfluous and extraordinary requisition; but "faithful"—a quality on which the apostle elsewhere lays stress (1 Tim. i. 12; 1 Cor. iv. 2; vii. 25) as specially required for "keeping what is committed" to him and being a "steward of the mysteries of God:" 1 Cor. iv. 1). Παραθοῦ corresponds not merely partially, as De Wette maintains, but entirely to παραθήκη, if this be taken not as "calling" but "entrusted doctrine;" comp. Luke xii. 48; Acts xiv. 23; see Passow at παρατίθημι. It is modified by the connexion 1 Tim. i. 18 (observandum trado); Acts xvii. 3 (docendo propono). Οἵτινες, *who* (such as): Passow on the word, g.: the remainder of the clause is not a further requisition, but gives the reason for the πιστοῖς. The future ἔσονται represents their "ability" as dependent on the παρατίθεσθαι. This passage bears on the doctrine of tradition, as shewing how the apostle conceived to himself of the maintenance and propagation of the Christian doctrine. "Still the Lord provided," justly remarks Mack, "that the living word should receive a written attestation;" but the doctrinal inference that *we* accordingly have two sources of truth, independent in their formal principle ("two witnesses," Mack) is entirely unauthorized.

Ver. 3.—Renews his personal exhortations to Timothy. He is to be strengthened to endure suffering as a good soldier of Jesus Christ. Timothy needed the command. He was still deficient in this moral strength; the perils of the gospel made him timorous, and these had augmented; he owed also personal service and devotion to the apostle. The reading σὺ οὖν κακοπάθησον, which makes clear the connexion with ver. 1 must yield to συγκακοπάθησον (Tisch. after A.C.*D*E*F.G., etc., versions, the Fathers. On συγκακ. comp. i. 8, 12; ii. 9; the σύν points to the apostle. Ὡς καλός κ.τ.λ assigns the reason of the injunction: suffering and contending go together.

Ver. 4.—Hence Timothy may learn from the example of the soldier. "None who warreth entangleth himself," etc., comp. 1 Tim. v. 5; 1 Cor. vii. 32, seq. The apostle has reference to the general rule: such is the case with the proper soldier. Στρατευόμενος, performing service in war; the term selected instead of the preceding στρατιώτης to mark the person in the actual discharge of his duty. Dr. Baur discovers in the comparison itself a trace of the latter half of the second century, when the figure was common. But as he himself acknowledges it as Pauline (1 Cor. ix. 7; 2 Cor. x. 4, 5), and

as this doubtless originated its later use, the argument is void of force. The figure is here used in definite reference to the calling of Timothy. The *πραγματεῖαι τοῦ βίου* are "curæ civiles," commercial, legal affairs, etc., comp. 1 Cor. vi. 3, 4; Luke xix. 13. *Ἐμπλέκεσθαι* (elsewhere only at 2 Pet. ii. 20), *to entangle onesself*, need not be pressed as if it referred only to a deeper connexion with such cases. These employments, as interfering with the soldier's duties, were absolutely forbidden. (Proofs with Heydenreich, Mack, etc.) It is a spiritless interpretation which deduces from these words that the Christian warrior must wholly refrain from all secular employment: its proper scope is that in all he must serve and seek to please the Lord, as did the apostle when he wrought with his hands for his support (Acts xx. 33; 1 Cor. iv. 12; ix. 6).

Ver. 5.—As renunciation of personal interest is the point in the image of the soldier, that of the athlete teaches the cheerful assumption and discharge of all the duties of his office. Thus a new figure is introduced, that of the combatant for a prize (*ἀθλέω* later for *ἀθλεύω*); we have an advance on the preceding thought. "And if also one contends, he is not crowned unless he contend lawfully." *Καί* presupposes the thought of ver. 4, that the combatant has devoted himself decidedly to his calling. *Νομίμως* refers to the laws of the games alike in the preparation (Galen. Comm. in Hippoc. i. 15; *οἱ γυμνασταὶ καὶ οἱ νομίμως ἀθλοῦντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀρίστου τὸν ἄρτον μόνον ἐσθίουσι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δείπνου τὸ κρέας κ. τ. λ.* De Wette) and in the struggle itself. Chrys. says well: "It is not enough that one enter the contest; unless he observes all its laws "he is never crowned." The naked import of the language is: we may not dispense ourselves from this or that requirement of our vocation, nor fail, in conformity with our inclination, to encounter any peril or danger which it imposes: neither pleasure nor convenience must be our adviser, if we would win the crown.

Ver. 6.—Bearing in mind the main thought, viz., the summons to suffering of ver. 3, illustrated in vers. 4 and 5, we naturally expect a fresh admonition here—not a promise—under the figure of the husbandman (comp. Matth. ix. 37, 38; 1 Cor. iii. 8). This sense is brought out by laying a stress upon *κοπιῶντα*, as its position also indicates. The *toiling* husbandman has the privilege of first partaking the fruits: not he that fails to toil. The thought then is: if thou wilt enjoy the fruits, labor. It is essentially similar to that of the preceding verse, except that while there the idea of lawful, here that of laborious, striving is made prominent. *Πρῶτον τῶν καρπ. μετ.* is to be taken together: it is the prerogative of the husbandman, the consequence of his toil. Thus, I think, *πρῶτον* may here be perfectly explained without assuming a hyperbaton. Many interpreters (comp. especially Winer, § 61, 4, p. 490) refer back

πρῶτον τὸ κοπιᾶν: thus, the husbandman who partakes the fruits must first labor. This view seems favored by δεῖ: but with the former it yields a good sense: it represents the "first partaking" as a law of equity which applies only to him who toils, 1 Cor. ix. 7, 10. The right explanation were in that other case given by Chrysostom: "As the husbandman labours not unprofitably, but himself before the rest reaps the fruit of his own toils, so should the teacher." Other interpretations have been sufficiently refuted by Heydenreich; as that the apostle would say, that Timothy must let himself be sustained by the church, or he must first make his own the fruits of the Spirit which he demands from others, etc., all of which are at war with the context. On μεταλαμβάνειν comp. at 1 Tim. iv. 3.

Ver. 7.—Νόει ὃ λέγω, "understand (not, consider) what I mean to say," as the further clause shews; "for the Lord will give thee (thus we need not read δῴη, and previously, not ἅ but ὅ, comp. Tischendorf), as I, in this case suppose, understanding in all things." Σύνεσις, Hebrew בִּינָה, is understanding (σύνεσις πνευματική, Col. i. 9), and thus νοεῖν is apprehending with the understanding; comp. Eph. iii. 4, 20, and Harless at the passage. De Wette thinks it strange that the apostle should append this injunction as if comparisons so perfectly clear (except the last), could be obscure to Timothy. The apostle doubtless did not suppose that the last of the comparisons would be easier to Timothy than the preceding. He subjoins the νόει, as it was all-important that Timothy should understand their reference (ὅ not ἅ) to himself; and it is precisely this which νόει enjoins. It is nearly the same as the "he that hath ears," etc., at the close of a parable of our Lord.

Ver. 8.—"Remember Jesus Christ as one risen from the dead," etc. This in its connexion is not uttered in antithesis to error, but as enforcing the exhortation; nor is the risen Christ presented to Timothy as a pattern of suffering, but as the Lord who has triumphed over death. The glance at Christ's victory and glory is to make him an intrepid spiritual warrior, by assuring him of his own. The thought then is essentially the same as i. 8–10. If Christ was to be held forth as an example to Timothy, no reference was made to his sufferings, since it is as risen and glorified that he is to stand before the mind of Timothy; nor can the clause "of the seed of David," refer at all to his humiliation. It stands indeed, doubtless, in contrast with the resurrection; but as at Rom. i. 3 ("who became of the seed of David according to the flesh; who was declared," etc.), it marks only his outward, visible nature in distinction from the invisible; and in both relations, here as there, he appears exalted and glorified; since according to the flesh the promise given to the house of David is fulfilled in him (2 Sam. vii. 12, comp. Rom. i. 2, ὃ προεπηγγείλατο κ. τ. λ)., and as risen from the dead, he is declared the

Son of God in power, κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγ., Rom. i. 4, comp. with Acts ii. 36. As with these two-predicates then which exhibit Christ, under both aspects of his being, as the promised and demonstrated genuine King and Lord, he comprises, as in the above cited passage from Romans, the substance of the gospel, the clause "according to my gospel," becomes perfectly intelligible, and we need neither assume for its explanation, any Docetic or other heresy which the apostle should have in view (ver. 18 lends no support to such an hypothesis), nor refer the expression to the gospel of Luke, as Dr. Baur, for his own critical purposes, fancies that he has shewn to be necessary, in a manner convincing to all competent judges. This view is rejected also by De Wette (comp. at the passage, and specially Matthies, p. 505, seq.; Böttger, p. 15, seq). For what more natural than that the apostle after thus summing up the essential features of the gospel, should add κατὰ τὸ εὐ. μου, and why should the expression (spite of De Wette's counter-position), involve a contrast with another gospel which, according to De Wette's own acknowledgment, it does not at Rom. ii. 16, xvi. 25? The recent defenders of the genuineness of our epistles, as Huther, seem to me too ready to admit antithetical references to heresies, arbitrarily imposed upon the context, as here in relation to ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβίδ.—Mack's explanation of ἐκ σπέρ. Δ., as implying that Christ has risen in his bodily nature, needs no refutation.—Grammatically, we remark further, that ἐγηγ. is to be translated: "as one who is raised," and that ἐκ σπέρματος is not to be taken, as by De Wette, who yet concedes the harshness of the construction, = τὸν γενόμενον ἐκ, κ. τ. λ. Rather, it is dependent, like ἐγηγ. on μνημόνευε with γενόμενον understood. In both relations Timothy is to have Christ before his eyes; for both assure him of his glory, and hence of his own; an assurance which gives to him, as to the apostle, power to suffer. Μνημ. here with acc. as Matth. xvi. 9; 1 Thess. ii. 9; elsewhere with the genitive. With the acc. properly, "to have present in spirit, to hold in memory;" as Luther translates; comp. Winer's Gr., § 30, 10, p. 184.

Ver. 9.—"In whom I suffer unto bonds as an evil doer; but the Word of God is not bound." Paul points Timothy to his own example, in which, as I think, he discloses to him the power of the risen Son of David, as a blessing attendant on this remembrance. This view gives to ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος a natural force of which it otherwise seems destitute. The power of the Risen One makes him, on the one hand, strong to suffer unto bonds as a malefactor, on the other secures his word against any such restriction. Modern interpreters all refer ἐν ᾧ to the immediately preceding εὐαγ. the ἐν ᾧ then denoting not "grounded in" (Matthies), but "in proclaiming which" (De Wette). My own explanation is not incompatible with this con-

struction: still I deem that the more exact construction, and more accordant with the ordinary use of ἐν in such cases, which refers it to the emphatic Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν above. It is, however, elsewhere the manner of the apostle to connect with such an intervening clause, as is here the κατὰ τὸ εὐ. μου, while yet adhering to the main course of thought. Μέχρι δεσμῶν indicating degree, as Phil. ii. 8, μέχρι θανάτου. Stress is laid on ὡς κακοῦργος (as by Wieseler), as pointing to the augmented rigors of the apostle's condition, compared with that indicated by the letters written during his previous imprisonment. Yet the mere chains may suffice to put him on a level with malefactors, and "a chain," "bonds," "prisoner," are terms found in those letters. The worse condition, however, is indicated by iv. 16, etc. "Not bound," in contrast with the chains of the apostle, is = "runs," 2 Thess iii. 1. Chrysostom beautifully says: "the teacher was bound, but the word was flying abroad; he inhabited a prison, but his doctrine ran as if endowed with wings, over all the world." It is also rightly remarked that the οὐ δέδεται need not be referred exclusively to the labours of the apostle; comp. Phil. ii. 12–14.

Ver. 10.—"On this account I endure all things for the elects' sake that they also may obtain salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory." It harmonizes perfectly with our view of vers. 8, 9, that here, in the language of De Wette, "the train of thought reverts back to ver. 8, in order to complete the exhortation by pointing to the Christian's hope." What more natural, if ver. 8 points to the power and glory of Christ (which in the apostle reveal themselves in his sufferings), than now to present as the end of this suffering the attainment of that eternal salvation and glory which is certain in the risen Saviour. Timothy thus learns through the example of the apostle, both whence he receives power to suffer, and what is the lofty purpose of his suffering; but in the eyes of the apostle both present themselves in the risen Christ, who is present to him in Spirit. Διὰ τοῦτο, De Wette and Huther, after Bengel, refer to the immediately preceding; (because the Word of God is not bound, therefore), and take διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς not as an additional reason, but as defining more exactly the διὰ τοῦτο. But διὰ τοῦτο thus taken, seems unnatural; for the reason contained in the Divine Word's not being bound, and that contained in the διὰ τοὺς ἐκ., even though we refer the expression to the positive idea of a wider diffusion of the word, seem still but remotely connected; nor again does the fettered condition of the word form any proper ground for his "enduring all things." For the apostle's readiness to suffer he makes no way dependent on any temporary obstructing (which yet is certainly not without the limits of possibility, and of his expectation, see at Phil. ii. 17), or advancement of the gospel, although he

certainly sees in this latter a proof of the power of his Lord. I prefer, therefore, to refer διὰ τοῦτο at once to what follows, as a comprehensive and emphatic intimation of the thought subsequently set forth. These epistles abound in abrupt transitions. The thought, finally, remains essentially the same. Πάντα refers to his present position with all its sufferings. Ὑπομένω, not merely a passive endurance, but the maintenance of one's position as under an attack (Tit. ii. 2). Ἐκλεκτοί here, as at Tit. i. 1, the chosen of God; thus, neither with De Wette, those exclusively to whom the gospel has as yet not been preached, nor with Flatt, etc., exclusively those to whom it has; to this temporal consequence of the election there is here no reference. For neither can those who are yet unbelieving, in contrast with those already believing, (καὶ αὐτοί, according to De Wette, as already believing), be called the elect; for the latter are still elect; nor can believers, as shewn by the following ἵνα, be exclusively meant, since they are already saved by faith. On the contrary, all is clear, if the apostle, looking away from its temporal realization, has in view God's eternal purpose, whose accomplishment *his calling* is under all circumstances to subserve. For, further, it is not his extraordinary firmness in enduring suffering, and the impression thus produced on the elect, which he here has in view (as De Wette, Huther, etc., think), but, in accordance with his exhortation to Timothy to shrink from no sufferings as a soldier of Christ, the fact that looking to the high purpose of his calling, he cheerfully meets all that it imposes. To shrink were to abandon his apostolic calling, and bring to nought its noble purpose. Καὶ αὐτοί, *themselves also*, besides the apostle. Σωτηρίας, conceived by the apostle positively, as well as negatively, is emphatically determined by the τῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰ. (Winer's Gr., § 20, 4), pointing back to ver. 8. Μετὰ δόξ. αἰων. then brings out the positive feature of σωτηρίας. The grand aim, is to conduct to such glory, as presents itself, and with certainty, in Christ; and hence says the apostle, I endure all things.

Ver. 11.—Πιστὸς ὁ λόγος cannot, on account of the following γάρ, as rightly maintained by De Wette (Matth. i. 18, where γάρ, *namely*, introduces a lengthened explanation, presents a different case), be referred to what follows.* It attaches itself naturally to the foregoing. Having presented the high goal of his apostolical striving, the apostle now declares that this salvation and glory on the promise of which rests his apostolical calling, is certain; that the declaration which assures it is reliable. The following, "for if we be dead with him," etc., is then not a confirmation of this but an explanation. It states the universal condition (here to be specially laid to heart by Timothy), under which alone, yet with certainty salvation can be

* Even Huther regards it as introducing what follows.

achieved. This condition is, to die with the Lord, that we may live with him; to suffer, that we may reign with him—a consequence as certain as that, conversely, our denial of him involves his denial of us, and our faithlessness can never nullify his essential truth and fidelity. We must be dead with him (*ἀποθανεῖν*, Aor., the condition must be first fulfilled); then shall we live with him. This dying is not the spiritual death of the old man, Rom. vi. 3, seq., but the devotion of our life to death with him and for his sake, as at 1 Cor. xv. 31, "I die daily;" 2 Cor. vi. 9, iv. 10, comp. at Phil. iii. 10. Such is the demand of the context—Timothy being called upon to endure suffering—as also of the following *ὑπομένομεν, κ. τ. λ.* On the expression, comp. 2 Cor. vii. 3. On *συζήσομεν*, comp. Rom. vi. 8, 9, and with this the reference of our passage to *ἐγηγερ.*, ver. 8. *Συζήσομεν*, elsewhere only at 2 Cor. vii. 3, thus again specially Pauline. If *ἀπεθάνομεν* appears as a single act (the source of the *καθ' ἡμέραν ἀποθ.*), *ὑπομένειν*, on the contrary, and the following verbs mark continuance. With *ὑπομένω* supply *σὺν αὐτῷ*. On the term *συμβασιλεύειν* (peculiar also to Paul), comp. 1 Cor. iv. 8; on the thought, Rom. v. 17, viii. 17; Eph. ii. 6, though in the latter passage we are also to note (see Harless), the variation in the thought. *Συζῆν*, *συμβασιλευειν* form a manifest climax; to share not only his life, but his glory, his dominion. *Εἰ ἀρνούμεθα*, sc. *αὐτόν*, as shewn by the apodosis; comp. Matth. x. 32, 33. Olshausen gives correctly its import here; it marks the succumbing of feeble faith under suffering and persecution. *Ἀπιστοῦμεν* is not "unbelief," but, as shewn by the apodosis *πιστὸς μένει*, with its explanatory *ἀρνήσανθαι, κ. τ. λ.*, "unfaithfulness;" thus *πιστός* elsewhere with the apostle; comp. at ver. 2, and specially at Rom. iii. 3, and there De Wette. *Πιστὸς μένει* is resolved by the confirmatory clause, "he cannot deny himself;" faithlessness as well as fidelity thus meets a response in the essential truthfulness of the Divine nature. *Ἐκεῖνος—δύναται* thus belong together, as corresponding to *εἰ ἀπιστοῦμεν*; it is obvious why the writer does not proceed *κἀκεῖνος ἀπιστεῖ*, but gives the thought this positive turn. We need not, therefore, with De Wette, subordinate *εἰ ἀπιστοῦμεν* in thought to the preceding, and regard it as a justification of the *κἀκεῖνος ἀρνήσεται*. *Γάρ* after *ἀρνήσασθαι* is retained for external reasons; comp. Tischendorf. On the asyndeta in the union of the preceding clauses, of which the two latter form a contrast to the former, comp. Winer's Gr., § 60, 2. There seems no ground for recognizing here, especially admitting *γάρ*, ver. 13, as genuine, strophes of a Christian hymn; as Heydenreich, Mack, etc., after Paulus (Memor. 1, p. 109), Münter. (Early Christ. poesy, p. 29).

§ 3. DUTY OF TIMOTHY IN REFERENCE TO THE PREVAILING TENDENCY TOWARD EMPTY LOGOMACHY.

(ii. 14–26.)

The apostle having already united the two injunctions to suffer for the gospel, and hold fast the form of sound words in faith and love; after illustrating the former, proceeds now, vers. 14–26, to the second, and sets before Timothy his obligations as a preacher of the gospel, in reference to the prevailing inclination for empty verbal strifes. He is to remind them of that which has just been set before him by the apostle, and to warn against vain strifes of words. If he would have his work approved before God, he must adhere to the path indicated by the word of truth, avoid empty and profane babblings, which as shewn by examples, plunge deeper into ungodliness. If in consequence of this propensity the faith of some is subverted, he is not to be troubled; the foundation of God remains unshaken. In a great house, such as, in fact, the church represents, it is impossible but that diverse and even antagonistic elements should be found blended; yet still it behoves one to purify himself from all that renders him unservicable. Timothy, therefore, must flee youthful lusts, and cultivate all Christian virtues, and especially union; he must avoid foolish controversies which generate strife; for to the servant of the Lord, strife is not becoming, but the opposite conduct.

Ver. 14.—*Ταῦτα ὑπομίμνησκε*, viz., what was said vers. 11–13. That certainty of future glory in case of faithfulness, which has just been suggested to Timothy by way of incitement in his calling, he is to urge in opposition to the tendency to verbal strife. *Ταῦτα* thus forms the transition from 1–13 to 14, seq. Similarly, 1 Tim. iv. 6, 11; Tit. iii. 8. *Ὑπομ.* as at Tit. iii. 1. It is something known, that Timothy is to urge afresh, and that not to the teachers, but to believers generally. At *διαμαρτυρόμενος*, comp. 1 Tim. v. 21; found again at 2 Tim. iv. 1. *Μὴ λογομαχεῖν*, after C.***D.E.F.G.I.K., etc., translations, the Fathers, comp. Tischendorf, I regard, with De Wette, as unquestionably the correct reading; although A.C.* Vulg. It. Aeth., and the Latin Fathers read *λογομάχει* which Lachmann has received, and Matthies and Huther favour, who then connect *διαμ. ἐν. τοῦ κυρίου* with *ὑπομίμνησκε*. De Wette justly remarks that *διαμ.* is wont to introduce exhortations (comp. the passages cited and Eph. iv. 17), and that, with its strong emphasis, it would scarcely accord with *ταῦτα ὑπομ.* It, at all events, connects itself far more appropriately with the following earnest warning against *λογομαχεῖν*. Huther's objection that *διαμαρτύρομαι* never occurs with the infinitive, is, if we

compare the other passages in which ἵνα or the imperative follows, utterly without force ; and, in fact, μαρτύρομαι in the same sense as here διαμ., is at Eph. iv. 17 constructed with the infinitive. Μὴ λογομαχεῖν the same disease as is reproved at 1 Tim. vi. 4 (νοσῶν . . . . περὶ λογομαχίας). The same warning against it is still needed, and Timothy's duty is to encounter it. Εἰς οὐδὲν χρήσιμον, added appositionally to μὴ λογ., comp. Winer's Gr., § 59, 9. We have here the same species of polemics as in the two other epistles ; comp. Tit. iii. 9 ; 1 Tim. i. 4. But this propensity is not barely unprofitable ; it gradually seduces from the faith, "for the subversion of the hearers." Thus μὴ λογομ. has for its subject the authors of these strifes. Καταστροφή in its proper signification, 2 Pet. ii. 6 ; comp. below ver. 18 and Tit. i. 11 ; so εἰς καθαίρεσιν, 2 Cor. xiii. 10. Ἐπί marks not so much purpose as result (Winer's Gr., § 48, c. e., p. 351); for we do not find *here* an error aiming directly at an overthrow of the faith.

Ver. 15.—"Labour to shew thyself approved of God," etc., a warning having reference to the same perverseness as shewn by ver. 16. Δόκιμος, probatus, spectatus, Rom. xvi. 10 ; 1 Cor. xi. 19, and elsewhere with Paul : on παραστῆσαι so constructed, comp. Rom. vi. 13, 16, 19 ; 2 Cor. xi. 2 ; Eph. v. 27, etc. Approved as ἐργάτης ἀνεπαίσχυντος, thus, in his vocation as teacher : on ἐργάτης so used comp. 2 Cor. xi. 13 ; Phil. iii. 2. Ἀνεπαίσχυντος (only here) taken either as "not ashamed" (Mack, Matthies) or not *shamed*, not needing to be ashamed (De Wette, Huther, and Olshausen). For the former signification they point to i. 8 ; ii. 3, seq. ; but this subject is finished at ver. 13 : its immediate connexion with παραστῆσαι indicates the other meaning : in this sense too it is used, as De Wette remarks, by Josephus, and corresponds to the οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσομαι (shall not be put to shame) of Phil. i. 20 ; 1 John ii. 28. It is difficult to fix precisely the signification of the following ὀρθοτομοῦντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας. Ὀρθοτομεῖν signifies "cut straight, in a straight direction." This signification is but remotely applicable to λόγος. It has been applied, "but without any authority from usage" (De Wette), to the cutting of the sacrificial animals, or to the division of bread by the οἰκονόμος. This explanation gives the wholly irrelevant thought, expressed also by Luther's version, of rightly dividing "*i. e.* distributing according to the needs of the hearers, the word of truth" (Matth. xiii. 52). Thus expressly Gloss. ord. Gregor. Naz. (see Heydenreich, p. 152) and Heydenreich. But neither usage nor its contrast with λογομαχεῖν and τὰς δὲ βεβ. κενο. περιίστασο, ver. 16, is compatible with this view. Still less can it be applied to the cutting away of foreign elements, or false doctrines (= νόθα τέμνειν, Chrys., Œcum., Theoph.) since falsehood dwells not with the word of truth; and just as little to the distinction

between law and gospel (as Ols. and Calovius), since the clause does not contain this sense, and the context does not suggest it. Keeping in view the contrasted false teaching of the context, we can apply the term not to appropriate handling of the word of truth, but to *adherence* to the word; it thus becomes similar in sense to the "holding fast to the word" of Tit. i. 9, or as Huther expresses it, the opposite of *καπηλεύειν τὸν λόγον*, Gal. ii. 14; 2 Cor. ii. 17. So with the fathers *ὀρθοτομεῖν* = *ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν*, and *ὀρθοτομία* = *ὀρθοδοξία, ὀρθοδιδασκαλία,* is used in contrast with *καινοτομία*; see Heydenreich, p. 180. We thus with De Wette, etc. regard the word as used (as commonly *τέμνειν*) = "cut" scil. a road, way; thus the word of truth denotes here metaphorically the road which Timothy is to pursue. Euripe Rhes., v. 422, cited by De Wette; *εὐθεῖαν λόγων τέμνων κέλευθον.* The expression is thus closely allied to the *ὀρθοποδεῖν πρὸς τ. ἀλήθ.* Gal. ii. 14. It is further specially observable that the term stands in connexion with *ὁδός* = recti dirigere viam, LXX. for יַשֵּׁר, Prov. iii. 6; xi. 5. Huther objects against De Wette that in the above passages *ὁδόν* is actually adjoined. True; but may not *λόγος τῆς ἀλ.* be designated metaphorically as the *ὁδός*? For even granting Huther's signification of "rightly divide," how does he thence deduce the more general meaning (which is here demanded) of "rightly to deal with a thing so as not to falsify it"? He appeals to *καινοτομεῖν* as authority for lessening the force of *τέμνειν*; yet in this I think the fundamental signification is always visible.

Ver. 16.—The author now characteristically exhorts Timothy to practice himself what he is to urge upon others: "but avoid profane and vain babblings." Of course no open apostacy from the faith is intended, against which it is inconceivable that the apostle should have warned Timothy. *Βεβ. κενοφ.* as 1 Tim. vi. 20, comp. with iv. 7. *Περίϊστασο,* go out of the way, avoid, as Tit. iii. 9. It contrasts naturally with *ὀρθοτ.* as above explained. "For they will advance to more ungodliness." Recent interpreters explain the "they" of persons, from *αὐτῶν* following. *Ἀσεβείας*, gen. dependent on *πλεῖον*, not acc., *προκόπτειν* being always intransitive = progredior. Except at Luke ii. 52, the word, as also *προκοπή*, is confined to Paul. The future form of these errors, (the future should be carefully noted) together with their consequences is exhibited at 1 Tim. iv. 1, seq; 2 Tim. iii. 1, seq.

Ver. 17.—"And their word will eat as a canker." Not with most expositors to be taken of the outward spread of evil, but with Mack of its inward working, and thus a heightened statement of the previous sentiment. This is shewn by the reference to its influence on Hymeneus and Philetus; while the clause "shall overthrow the faith of some," marks no very wide diffusion of the

heresy. The sense then is: "their doctrine leads ever deeper into error." Γάγγραινα properly, perhaps, mortification; comp. Winer's R.W.B. on the disease. Νομὴν ἕξει, comp. Acts. iv. 17, διανέμεσθαι properly = have pasture, feed, a familiar expression for the spread of ulcers (comp. Passow on νομή). Examples are Hymeneus and Philetus; the former named at 1 Tim. i. 20; the latter not elsewhere named.

Ver. 18.—"Who in respect to the truth have erred while asserting that the resurrection is past already, and overthrow the faith of some." Ἀστοχέω, as 1 Tim. i. 6; vi. 21. In what sense they maintain that the resurrection is past, it is difficult to determine. Our surest authority is found in the passages in which the apostle speaks of the false ἄσκησις of these ματαιολόγοι; Tit. i. 14, seq. 1 Tim. iv. 8, and especially iv. 1, as the picture of the future drawn in this passage is taken from the historical present. It was natural for such a tendency, proceeding from a false contrast between flesh and spirit, to deny the resurrection of the body. The positive import of their doctrine then was not that the spiritual resurrection, spoken of at Rom. vi. 3, is the only true resurrection; but they rather designate this as the fruit of their extraordinary wisdom and ascetic practices, since, as our passage shews, their doctrine stands in a specific connexion with their special tendencies, and has developed itself from them. In like manner the later Gnostics: comp. Iren. adv. hær. II. 31. 2. Esse resurrectionem a mortuis agnitionem ejus quæ ab eis (Gnosticis) dicitur veritatis. Tert. de Resurr. c. 19, etc; see at Heydenreich, De Wette, etc. That such a heresy in the apostolical age is not inconceivable, and that hence we are not compelled to refer the language to Marcion, see Gen. Introd., § 3. It is decisive against this reference that the error is not specified as a fixed trait of the profane babblings opposed by the apostle (which according to Baur at 1 Tim. vi. 20 are the gnosis of Marcion) but an exceptional product of them in individuals. Others explain this assertion that the resurrection has already past, of the renewal of the generations by natural birth (τὰς ἐκ παιδοποιΐας διαδοχὰς ἀνάστασιν προσηγόρευον, Theodoret), or of a political restoration, or of the resurrection of some dead persons at the death of Christ (Matth. xxvii. 52, so Schöttgen, Böttger), views all utterly unsupported and hence deservedly rejected by recent interpreters. (Comp. Mack in opp. p. 472). Καὶ ἀνατρέπουσιν τήν τινων πίστιν, adds the apostle as a point of connexion for ver. 19. Ἀνατρέπειν, evertere, as Tit. i. 11. Πίστις, is their Christian faith of whose integrity an essential element is their hope of a future resurrection: comp. 1 Cor. xv. 13, seq.

Ver. 19.—Yet in contrast with the subversion of the faith of some "the foundation of God standeth." Στέρεος and ἕστηκε opposed to ἀνατρέπουσιν. The foundation, therefore, thus unassailable by error

is obviously not individual Christians (*αἱ στερεαὶ ψυχαί*, according to Chrys.) but the church, as the divinely founded structure whose corner-stone is Christ (1 Cor. iii. 10, 11), and whose permanency on earth is pledged by the dominion of his Spirit in it, who ever leads and binds to Christ. Of it as a community, not of the individuals in it, holds unconditionally the promise of Matth. xvi. 18, and the words "pillar and ground of the truth" of 1 Tim. iii. 15. Others have understood by the *θεμέλιος* the "foundation of the *truth*" (Theodoret); or still more definitely, Christ, appealing to 1 Cor. iii. 11 (Bretschneider); or the fundamental doctrine of the resurrection (Michælis etc.); or the promises of God (Ambrose); the unshaken faith of God (Bengel); the election of grace (Calvin, etc.). Decisive against these, as remarked by De Wette, is the fact that the following tokens point manifestly to such as belong to, or wish to enter into, the house of God, as well as the continuation of the figure, "but in a large house," etc. The term *θεμέλιος* (sc. *λίθος*), originally = foundation-stone; must not, as Huther rightly remarks, be taken strictly in this signification, since then assuredly the *οἰκοδομή* built thereon could denote only the church of Christ: nor need we enlarge its signification to that of edifice, palace, as it signifies in fact Jer. vi. 5; Is. xxv. 2, in the LXX. = אַרְמוֹן; it signifies foundation, substructure, and the selection of the term is explained from the contrast with the preceding, which demanded, on the one hand, the designation of the church as something firm and unwavering, and on the other, as those fallen away were undoubtedly a part of the edifice, led of course to a distinguishing of the foundation from that which is built upon it and is liable to fall (1 Cor. iii. 12). For when the apostle speaks of it, not as here in its essential duration, but in its temporal manifestation (ver. 20) he compares it with a great house which contains in itself diverse and even antagonistic elements ("some for honor, others for dishonor"). This *θεμέλιος* adds the apostle, has a seal. The part. *ἔχων* assigns the *reason* of the preceeding, "in that it has," etc. *Σφραγίς* denotes "seal" and "impression of a seal" by which a thing is secured, or designated in its proper nature, or confirmed and ratified. The apostle elsewhere also uses this expression in its metaphorical signification, as Rom. iv. 11; 1 Cor. ix. 2, and so also *σφραγίζω*, Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 2 Cor. i. 22; Rom. xv. 28. This seal is here conceived as consisting in an inscription, borne by the *θεμέλιος*, for which analogies are found in Deut. vi. 9; xi. 20; Rev. xxi. 14. *Σφραγίς*, however, is not therefore to be deemed simply equivalent to *γράμματα*; the words "having this seal" represent the inscription as a pledge that the church founded by God has an indestructible basis. The inscription runs as follows: "The Lord knoweth them that are his:" and, "Let every one who nameth the name of the Lord depart from iniquity." The

first expression is taken from the LXX (Numb. xvi. 5), who take וְיֵדַע for וַיֵּדַע. The inexact citations found elsewhere with Paul prevent this from occasioning any suspicion regarding its authorship by him: comp. e. g. De Wette at Rom. iii. 4. The citation involves no falsehood, as the fundamental thought is in both cases clearly the same. Its import is here made perfectly clear by its historical relation: as there the Lord presides over his church and makes known who are his own, so also with the New Testament church: he knows his own, and distinguishes them in fact from those who do not belong to him. In the church, therefore, of which the Lord is the head, error can never establish itself in the place of truth, and succeed in overthrowing the divinely laid foundation. But again the inscription states the requisition made of those who will be the Lord's. To depart from iniquity is an indispensable prerequisite to being recognized as his own. The words preserve, doubtless, as remarked by interpreters, the historical relation involved in the *ἔγνω κύριος*, comp. Numb. xvi. 26 (Is. lii. 11). That *ἔγνω* marks not an abstract knowing, but an acknowledgment which manifests itself, is clear alike from the historical relation of the passage, and from its use elsewhere: comp. 1 Cor. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 8; and Winer's Comm. on the passage: *agniti a Deo ut qui Dei sint* (*nam Deus, inquit Pelagius, non novit iniquos*) *sc. datis bonis spiritualibus.* Ἀδικία opposed to moral rectitude, involves, but not exclusively, false doctrine, comp. ver. 22. "Every one who nameth the name of the Lord" is not = קָרָא בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה "to call on the name," etc. (ver. 22): to name here = to profess.

Ver. 20.—Having declared that they only belong to the divine foundation who belong truly to the Lord, the apostle turns to the church in its actual manifestation; (comp. on the change to *οἰκία* at *θεμέλιος*, ver. 19). As this in its composition from various and even adverse elements, seems to contradict his view, he proceeds to shew on the one hand that this circumstance, as being virtually involved in a great house which the church, in fact, appears, is relatively necessary; and on the other, to connect with it the admonition to purify onesself from all that which in the house of God can make one a vessel of dishonor. Μεγάλη, *great*, is to be carefully noticed; it expresses the same thought as the parable of the net (Matth. xiii. 47). As this, when thrown into the sea, cannot but enclose fish of all kinds, so the church as a large house, cannot but contain vessels of various value and use. And that this juxtaposition of various and discordant elements is not in conflict with the divine purpose is clear from our passage and still more from Matth. xiii. 24, seq. It needs no proof that *οἰκία* here is not, as understood by Chrysostom, Theodoret, etc., the world; but (with Cyprian, Augustin, etc., comp. in De Wette) the church in its temporal condition: *neque enim de*

extraneis disputat Paulus, sed de ipsa Dei familia—Calvin (otherwise Rom. ix. 21, seq.) There are here two classes contradistinguished, not as of good and less good, but as for honor and for dishonor; although each class again admits subordinate gradations, as of gold and silver on the one side, and of wood and clay on the other; comp. Matth. xiii. 23. Σκεύη the same figure as Rom. ix. 21, seq. Similar in thought but with a different application, 1 Cor. iii. 12. To the distribution by *οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ καί* corresponds the *ἃ μέν—ἃ δέ*. "For honor" and "for dishonor" as Rom. ix. 21, seq., which passage shews beyond doubt that no mere difference in degree is intended. Rightly, De Wette: the honor and dishonor are not that of the house or of the possessor, but of the vessels themselves.

Ver. 21, "returns," says De Wette rightly, "to the admonition by a warning couched in general terms, but intended for the encouragement of Timothy." It declares our duty to purify ourselves from all that makes us vessels of dishonor, and to become vessels of honor. Ἐκκαθαίρω used only by Paul, 1 Cor. v. 7, = expurgo. Ἀπὸ τούτων can refer only to *ἃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν*, which, as shewn by the following *σκεῦος εἰς τιμήν*, we are to understand of persons. Hence we must not, with many interpreters, explain *ἐκκαθ.*, "to separate onesself," but pregnantly, by purification to separate onesself from these; comp. *ἀποστήτω*, ver. 19. "A merely negative condition," remarks De Wette; but what needs there further for members of the Christian church than to separate themselves from that which tends to dishonour, in order to be vessels of honour? And the apostle proceeds indeed to name not the special characteristics of individuals, but what holds in common with all Christians. Ἡγιασμένον, εὔχρηστον without an intervening *καί* (comp. Tischendorf); thus the asyndeton of enumeration. Ἡγιασμένον as consequence of *ἐκκαθαίρειν*; sanctified, viz., in Christ, in whom they stand, by his Spirit. The figure *σκεῦος* by no means requires that *ἡγιασμ.* be taken less spiritually than elsewhere. Εὔχρηστος, *fit for use*, here and iv. 11; found elsewhere only with Paul at Philem. 11. Δεσπότης carries out the figure. Εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἡτοιμασμένον, comp. Eph. ii. 10.*

* Our explanation of verse 19–21 being conceded, it presents the church in a twofold aspect as God's structure visibly established in the world, to which only those belong, who belong truly to him, and as a great house comprising discordant and antagonistic elements. The propriety of distinguishing between a visible church, and an invisible, which forms the immovable basis of the visible, is from this just as clear as the impropriety of reducing, even but approximatively, its actual manifestation (*μεγάλη οἰκία*), to the form of the *στερεὸς θεμέλιος*, and hence excluding the *σκεύη εἰς ἀτιμίαν*. Should the church reach by separation, the position in which it no longer resembles the "great house," must it not again desire to become such, and becoming such, can it be otherwise than every "great house," as represented by the apostle? Is it anticipated, in case of casting the net amidst fishes of every description, that no bad one will be caught? Such a hope were as thoroughly human as the fear that the mass of non-Christians may over-

Ver. 22.—"But flee youthful lusts," as the opposite side of the required fitness for all good. The previously latent reference to Timothy here becomes manifest, and definite. The requisition that he purify himself from all that makes him unserviceable in the house of God, renders the warning against youthful lusts (for the allusion is not to the love of novelty), perfectly comprehensible without our assuming, with De Wette, that it deviates from the general train of thought. Ver. 23 merely resumes the topic from which the writer had deviated, and which, in view of the moral quality of the errors which he reprehended, had led him over into the field of moral conduct. The warning against youthful lusts is intelligible only on the supposition of the youth of Timothy, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 12. He is warned against all the moral dangers of his time of life, which include, as Chrysostom, Theophylact etc., observe, not only fornication, but every inordinate desire; as insolent passion, ambition, avarice, etc. Especially may the apostle have referred to vain glory, strife and the like, as he subsequently gives prominence to *εἰρήνη μετὰ πάντων*, etc. *Φεῦγε—δίωκε* as 1 Tim. vi. 11; 1 Cor. vi. 18; 1 Thess. v. 15. *Δικαιοσύνη* is here also the quality of moral rectitude which springs from faith and love. *Δικαιοσύνην τὴν καθ' ὅλον ἀρετὴν λέγει, τὴν ἐν βίῳ εὐσέβειαν*, Chrysostom. It is the opposite of *ἀδικία*, ver. 19. *Εἰρήνη* is to be connected with the following *μετά*; it is spiritual union and fellowship with those who call on the Lord (as characterizing the Christian also, 1 Cor. i. 2); here, however, is added, as antithesis to the seducers, *ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας*, which is wanting to them; comp. 1 Tim. i. 5, 19, iv. 2; Tit. i. 15.

Ver. 23.—At variance with this pursuit is the occupying himself with questions (1 Tim. i. 4, vi. 4; Tit. iii. 9), as they generate strifes (comp. 1 Tim. vi. 4; Tit. iii. 9); hence Timothy is to avoid them (*παραιτεῖσθαι* as Tit. iii. 10; 1 Tim. iv. 7). *Μωραί*, as Tit. iii. 9. *Ἀπαίδευτος* only here, = untaught, foolish, *insipidus* (Winer's Gr., § 16, 3), frequent with the LXX.; not, = "unserviceable for culture."

Ver. 24.—Such striving (*μάχεσθαι*) is unbecoming to the servant of the Lord; the term referring here, as is shewn by the following predicates, to Timothy in his official calling, not as a Christian;

whelm the Christian element. "The foundation of God standeth firm," says the apostle; and not external separation, but internal purification is named as the means to be employed. If the passage thus comes on the one side in conflict with the false spirit of separation, so on the other with the zeal for union which makes an equal recognition of all that is found in the *μεγάλη οἰκία*; this also takes away the foundation. Both tendencies spring from the common ground of a confusion of the twofold aspects of the church, as a "foundation," and as a "great house." The former class transfer to the church as a *μεγάλη οἰκία*, that which properly applies to it only as a *θεμέλιος*; the latter apply that which holds of the church only in its earthly manifestation to its character as a *θεμέλιος*, or rather ignore this character altogether.

though in itself *δοῦλος κ.* is applicable also to the other relation; comp. 1 Cor. vii. 22; Eph. vi. 6. His appropriate characteristic is paternal mildness and kindness toward all; comp. on *ἤπιος*, 1 Thess. ii. 7. "Toward all"—he must stand above parties; *διδακτικόν*, instructive, not fond of controversy, comp. 1 Tim. ii. 2; *ἀνεξίκακον* (Wisd. ii. 19, the substantive), not irritable, not lightly influenced by reproach and reviling.

Ver. 25.—And where he has to do with gainsayers, he must meet them with *πραότης* (mansuetudo erga alios, animus naturâ sedatus, qui ægre ad iram incenditur, Winer, at Gal. v. 25), and in such gentleness admonish (so *νουθεσία*, Tit. iii. 10, comp at 1 Tim. i. 20), those who oppose themselves (*τοὺς ἀντιδιατιθεμένους*), *i. e.*, as De Wette remarks, not qui veritati resistunt, but those who frame *ἀντιθέσεις* (1 Tim. vi. 20); *ἀντιλέγοντες*, Tit. i. 9, not *ἀντικείμενοι*, or open unbelievers, as 1 Tim. v. 14. "This mildness," says De Wette, "toward the false teachers is indeed surprising; but they are conceived as yet recoverable; only where past the hope of improvement are they given over to themselves, Tit. iii. 11." More correctly; the apostle regards these *ἀντιδιατ.* with their *ζητήσεις*, not as proper heretical teachers, as we have repeatedly perceived; but as diseased in the faith, who are to be brought back to health. Their error has a moral basis; hence *μήποτε δώῃ αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς μετάνοιαν*, *whether God may not perchance*, etc. (*δώῃ* not *δῷ* is given by the best Codd., here evidently a conjunctive). Change of mind, moral conversion is their grand need, that they may attain to the *ἐπίγνωσις*, full knowledge of the truth, and, ver. 26, they be recovered to soberness out of the snare of the devil, being caught by him at his (God's) will. "Their condition is that of spiritual intoxication; comp. *ἐκνήφειν*, 1 Cor. xv. 34, and *νήφειν*, 1 Thess. v. 6, 8. *Ἐκ τῆς, κ. τ. λ.*, constructio prægnans, comp. Winer's Gr., § 66, 2, p. 547. *Παγὶς τοῦ διαβ.* 1 Tim. iii. 7, vi. 9. De Wette's regarding the word *διάβολος* as unpauline, stands connected with his rejection of the Epistle to the Ephesians, comp. Eph. iv. 27, vi. 11, and Harless. The last words *ἐζωγρημένοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου θέλημα*, are, by the latest expositors, Matthies, De Wette, and Huther, conceived as belonging together, which may be regarded as settled; but the pronouns *ἐκείνου* and *αὐτοῦ* they refer to the same subject, *διάβολος*. It seems chiefly in favour of this view that *ἐζωγρημένοι*, thus construed, unites itself better, as explanatory, to the preceding *παγίς*. But to me this explanation seems superfluous, and the thought feeble. And why then the change from *αὐτοῦ* to *ἐκείνου*, even if it is possible (comp. De Wette, who points to Plat. Cratyl., p. 430, E. Kühner, § 629, Rem. 3)? It certainly suggests to our minds a change of subjects, and thus for *αὐτοῦ*, *δοῦλος*, for *ἐκείνου*, *ὁ θεός*, as Wetstein, Bengel, and Mack, explain; for *δοῦλος* is here the principal subject, while *ἐκείνου* would

point to *θεός* in contrast with the immediately preceding *διάβολος*. The term *ἐζωγρημένοι*, precisely as Luke v. 10, = taken alive, would then point antithetically to the being caught by the snare of the devil. From his captivity they have fallen into another, which is defined by the following *εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου θέλημα*; *εἰς* standing in contrast to *ἐκ—παγίδος*. An analogy to the entire passage is then found in 2 Cor. x. 5; *αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. How much more fitting that with this appended clause prominence should at the close be given to the duty of the servant of the Lord. In the sense of "deliverance" to which De Wette objects, we certainly need not take *ἐζωγρ.*; a new, blessed imprisonment has succeeded to the former wretchedness. The *δοῦλος*, although, literally speaking remote, is not really so, as it is the principal subject; neither is the thought unnatural; for the metaphor is suggested by that immediately preceding, and the passages adduced, Luke v. 10; 2 Cor. x. 5 are of a character entirely similar. The reference of *ζωγρέω* to catching fish, is here foreign to the connexion. So to wit, Theophylact, who refers the two pronouns to God. Others with even less of plausibility understand *αὐτοῦ* of *διαβ.* and *ἐκείνου* of God, taking *εἰς* = *κατά*. The interpreter can hesitate only between the two first named views of which the latter appears to me decidedly preferable.

§ 4. Reference to the Phenomena of the Last Time, already Disclosing themselves, for the Purpose of Instructing Timothy in Relation to them.

(iii. 1–17.)

According to De Wette, the author at ii. 14–16 deviated from the purpose of the epistle, but still more here, where he even throws his glance into the future. But what warrants our regarding the summons of Timothy to Rome as the single object of the epistle? This personal matter rather, from ii. 1–4, 8, is subordinated to the admonition to fidelity in his official calling, and reappears only at iv. 9. But neither at ii. 14–26, where he prescribes to Timothy his proper conduct as a preacher of the gospel in the face of the prevailing inclination for empty strifes of words, has he wandered from his purpose, nor here at iii. 1–17, where he points to another error which on account of its immoral character, he designates as the precursor of the last time; which, as being seduously and incurably hostile to the truth, Timothy is totally to avoid (in contrast with the instruction given him ii. 25, seq., in respect to the *λογομαχεῖν*). He characterizes this more fully iii. 6–8; gives Timothy, ver. 9,

the consoling assurance that in consequence of their manifest *ἄνοια*, these seducers shall not push their success far; reminds him, in opposition to this heresy, of his own personal example, to which Timothy has attached himself, and from which he may also derive this, that persecutions are inevitably attendant on a life of godliness, while it is otherwise with those seducers, ver. 13; in order then to summon him (ver. 14), to adhere to that which he has learnt, the pledge for which is the personal example of the apostle, and the word of scripture, 15–17, which can make him wise unto salvation.

Ver. 1.—"But know this" (the reading *γινώσκετε*, according to A.F.G., etc., I cannot with Tischendorf, regard as correct), begins the apostle, passing over to a new and distinct topic, and by instructing Tmothy in regard to the last time, enlightens him in regard to the phenomena of the present. Parallel to this passage is 1 Tim. iv. 1, seq. The design, in each case, of the mention of the future, is to enable Timothy to judge from it of the present, and under such circumstances to determine his duty. Alike there and here the apostle's statement regarding the future form of the Christian life, rests substantially on antecedent predictions of the Divine Spirit; but the definite form under which this general prophecy is conceived, springs from the apostle's power to read the future in the present (comp. 1 Tim. iv. 1, seq). In our passage, however, it is not, as there, future apostacy to which the apostle points, but immorality as it will disclose itself under the Christian appearance and name; for it is this immorality which constitutes the affinity between the seducers specified at 6–8, and the men of the future, and which renders them precursors of that future. "In the last days shall arise *καιροὶ χαλεποί*." The "last days" are not here of course the period of Christianity (as Acts ii. 17; Heb. i. 2), for here there is no contrast with an earlier period; but the last times of that period, as 1 Pet. i. 5; Jude. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 3; for the author speaks of a future time in reference to the present, as shewn by the context (*ἐνστήσονται*, *ἔσονται*), and by a comparison of 1 Tim. iv. 1 (*ὕστεροι καιροί*). On the absence of the article comp. Winer's Gr., § 19, 1, under *καιρός*. Ἐνστήσονται, not, as De Wette rightly remarks, a future in a future, viz., *imminebunt*, but = aderunt, *will arise:* so also *ἐνεστώς* of the present, Gal. i. 4; comp. Winer's Comm. in loc. Καιροὶ χαλεποί, severe, evil times; so Eph. v. 16, *ἡμέραι πονηραί*, Gal. i. 4; 1 John v. 19.

Vers. 2–5 explain the *καιροὶ χαλεποί*; the times will be severe on account of the immorality of men. Ἄνθρωποι describes men in their general character, the majority. The epithets describing them do not strictly pursue one continuous line of thought, although their immediate and particular grounds of connexion are easily dis-

cernible. *Φίλαυτοι* = self-seeking (only here), is prefixed as the root of the following vices; comp. on the contrary, 1 Cor. xiii. 4–7. As immediate consequence *φιλάργυροι*, avaricious, comp. Luke xvi. 14; 1 Tim. iii. 3 (*ἀφιλάρ.*); parallel in sense is Rom. i. 29. As further consequence (comp. on the contrary 1 Cor. xiii. 4) *ἀλαζόνες*, also at Rom. i. 30 = boastful; *ὑπερήφανοι*, proud with contempt of others; similarly at Rom. i. 30, connected with *ἀλαζόνες*; *βλάσφημοι*, not blasphemers (of God), but revilers, a trait springing from their contempt of others; comp. Tit. iii. 2. *Γονεῦσι ἀπειθεῖς* as Rom. i. 30, giving rise to the subsequent traits; *ἀχάριστοι* (Luke vi. 35), ungrateful; *ἀνόσιοι*, impious (1 Tim. i. 9); *ἄστοργοι*, without natural affection (Rom. i. 31). To *ἄστοργοι* attaches itself as Rom. i. 30, *ἄσπονδοι*, implacable (and covenant breakers ?); then, *διάβολοι* (1 Tim. iii. 11; Tit. ii. 3), slanderers, to be distinguished from *βλάσφημοι*, open revilers; again *ἀκρατεῖς*, *ἀνήμεροι*, *ἀφιλάγαθοι*, a group by themselves, and found only here. The first, the opposite of *ἐγκρατής* (Tit. i. 8), thus incontinent, without self-control; *ἀνήμερος*, untamed, wild; *ἀφιλάγαθος*, the opposite of *φιλάγαθος* (Tit. i. 8), not loving good; *ἐχθροὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ*, Theophylact. Further, *προδόται*, *προπετεῖς*, perhaps united from correspondence in sound, as previously the expressions with *a* privative; the former term found also Luke vi. 16; Acts vii. 52; here not traitors to Christianity or to Christ, which would not accord with *ἔχοντες μόρφωσιν*, ver. 5; but, in the usual sense, thus men in whom is no fidelity; *προδ. τῆς φιλίας*, Chrysostom. *Προπετεῖς* (comp. Acts xix. 36), *temerarii*, reckless, foolhardy. *Τετυφωμένοι* (comp. at 1 Tim. iii. 6, vi. 4), wrapt in mist, conceited, inflated. *Φιλήδονοι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόθεοι*—both terms only here—a designed paronomasia, rather pleasure-loving, than God-loving; on the thought comp. Rom. xvi. 18; Phil. iii, 18, 19; James iv. 1. "Having the form of godliness but denying its power." *Μόρφωσις* also Rom. ii. 20, but in another sense; here, form in opposition to substance; appearance without reality. *Ἠρνημένοι*, *having denied*, an act whose consequences they still feel; comp. Tit. i. 16; ii. 12. The entire passage reminds us strongly of Rom. i. 29–31, with which the one before us has in common several words not found elsewhere. The apostle is describing, says Olshausen, "a new heathenism under the name of Christianity." It follows finally, of course, that men are described in their collective character, the particular traits varying in different individuals. Ver. 5 shews that they do not with all this openly renounce the truth.—*Καὶ τούτοις ἀποτρέπου*, connects itself with the first imper., ver. 1, *γίνωσκε* points to the effect which such knowledge is to produce on the conduct of Timothy. The transition to the present is exactly as at 1 Tim. iv. 6. The fully developed character of these future sons of evil, has its harbinger in the people of the present; simi-

larly, 1 John ii. 18. Ἀποτρέπεσθαι only here; in like manner ἐκτρέπεσθαι, 1 Tim. vi. 20, constructed, as here, ἀποτ., with accusative of the thing = aversor. With persons of this class Timothy is to have nothing to do; with them, as precursors of the last time, "instructing in meekness," is of no avail; their destiny, as sedulous adversaries of the truth, is to "wax worse and worse." They resemble in their resistance the magicians of Egypt; but like them they will be arrested in their course, through their manifest and self-destroying folly. With all this, it appears mere caprice to identify the error here denounced with that of ii. 14, seq. The author rather speaks here, in contrast with the foregoing, of a course of action past remedy, in regard to which Timothy's only duty is to keep clear of it on the one hand, and all the more firmly to maintain the truth on the other.

Vers. 6, 7.—The ground of the apostle's admonition τούτους ἀποτρέπου (since he certainly at 1–5 was speaking of the future), he now explains: "for of these are they," etc. Not literally, but in moral relationship, the men whose conduct he is now depicting, belong already to the future. The ἐκ τούτων εἰσίν must be regarded as the principal criterion of these; this teaches Timothy how he is to regard them. We need not then conclude with De Wette, that the features sketched, vers. 2–5, do not point to these false teachers, since it is precisely this immoral character under the outward shew of piety which the apostle specifies as their leading characteristic. Ἐνδύνοντες, stealing into houses, marks the stealthy and dissembling conduct of these seducers (Chrysostom, τὸ ἄτιμον, τὴν ἀπάτην, τὴν κολακείαν ἐδήλωσεν); αἰχμαλωτίζοντες, the consequence of ἐνδύνειν marks their skill in subjecting others to their power (1 Cor. x. 5). Their aim is directed to γυναικάρια (a contemptuous expression, pointing to their weakness and openness to temptation; the art. found only in Minusc.), who are laden with sins (comp. Rom. xii. 20), led by diverse lusts (ἄγεσθαι, led, controlled, as Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 18); ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth (in consequence of their sins, from which all the pangs of conscience cannot force them; ἐπωρώθη αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια, Chrysostom). "This delineation," says De Wette, "of soul-hunters and of their booty is remarkable. We must not, however, with Mosheim and Flatt, distribute the various traits among various classes of individuals, as the specialty of the picture lies in their union." The same phenomenon appears in the later Gnostics; comp. Iren. adv. hær. I. 13, 3, of the Gnostic Marcus; μάλιστα περὶ γυναῖκας ἀσχολεῖται, κ. τ. λ. Further proofs with Heydenreich, p. 181; Baur die Sogen. Pastoralbr. p. 36. Those who assign the Pastoral Epistles to the second century, of course seize eagerly on this point in support of their view; yet none can demonstrate that the same phenomena may not

also have appeared in the age of the apostle. On μηδέποτε (only here) not οὐδέποτε, comp. Winer's Gr., § 55, 5.

Vers. 8, 9.—Glancing back at the admonition τούτους ἀποτρέπου, the apostle, after portraying the employments of these seducers, continues: "but as Jannes and Jambres," etc., for the purpose of disclosing clearly to Timothy his relations to them and theirs to him. Like Jannes and Jambres they are open adversaries of the truth; in relation to whom the only consolation is found not in the hope of their being reclaimed, but of a sure and speedy end wrought by their reckless folly. The ground of comparison with those magicians (Ex. vii. 11, 22, viii. 6, seq.), is first, that these, like them, openly withstand the truth (ἀνθίστανται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), and second, that the two have a like end; both are speedily detected and put to shame. The passage does not assert expressly that these seducers of the apostolical age also practiced sorcery; yet the comparison certainly becomes more forcible, if they are regarded as resembling the others in the form of their opposition, and thus as resorting to magical arts; comp. ver. 13, γόητες. The preparatory conditions of such practices could not be wanting in an age when Chaldean wisdom and art were already widely diffused (comp. Hug, II., § 130). We may refer especially to Simon the Magian, Acts viii. 9; to Elymas at the court of the Roman proconsul, Acts xiii. 6; to the itinerant Jews, Acts xix. 13; above all to the τὰ περιέργα πράξαντες, at Ephesus (id. loc. 19). The existence therefore of such forms of error at Ephesus could by no means surprise us (Hug. II., § 131, 132; Neander apost. Zeitalt. I. p. 359, seq., Winer's R.W.B.; articles Magier and Zauberei). This feature would harmonize perfectly with the immoral character of these seducers; proofs with Baur as above.

The names Ἰαννῆς and Ἰαμβρῆς (also Ἰωάννης—Ἰαμνῆς—Μαμβρῆς) are, according to Theodoret, drawn from Jewish tradition (comp. Targ. Jonath. Exod. vii. 11, etc); according to Origen and Ambrose from the apocryphal book, Jamnes and Mambres liber (comp. Heydenreich, p. 84, seq.) According to tradition they were sons of Balaam and originally teachers of Moses, then his chief opponents, etc. comp. in Heydenreich, who further adds that also heathen writers mention these men, e. g. the Pythagorean Numenius, in the second century after Christ, according to Orig. c. Cels. iv. 51, Euseb. Præp. Evang. ix. 8.—Pliny H. N. lib. xxx. ch. 6, names the former. According to Orig. tract. 35 in Matth. many persons of his time took offence at the apostle's citing from an apocryphal book (unde ausi sunt quidam epistolam ad Timotheum repellere, quasi habentem in se textum alicujus secreti: sed non potuerunt): recently Dr. Baur has done the same. But we have according to Origen, a like case at 1 Cor. ii. 9 (in nullo enim regulari libro . . . invenitur nisi in secretis

prophetæ Eliæ); and—which is still more decisive—can 1 Cor. x. 4 be understood otherwise than by a reference to Jewish tradition? See Meyer in loco; setting aside entirely Jude 14, seq. Why, it is very properly asked, should the apostle, who makes use of heathen writers, not also borrow from Jewish tradition barely the names of two sorcerers, when in all other points he adheres to the record of Moses, and makes not the slightest reference to the monstrous features which tradition has attached to them? It cannot assuredly be maintained that the magic arts form the point of the comparison. The apostle designates these men as *κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν*. This corruptness of mind they have indeed in common with others (1 Tim. vi. 5), as well as their reprobateness in relation to the faith (Tit. i. 16; 1 Tim. i. 19; iv. 1; vi. 21); but their mode of manifestation is different.

The second point of the comparison is given ver. 9, *ἀλλ' οὐ προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον*. Ἀλλά in contrast with *ἀνθίστ.* ver. 8, properly they will not advance further, thence they will not make further progress, *i. e.* in external success. The declaration has been deemed contradictory to the prediction of the perilous times, ver. 1, as well as of the statements, ver. 13 and ii. 17. The latter passage we dispose of by referring it not to outward diffusion; but even were it otherwise we have already shown that the two passages do not refer to the same subject. Also ver. 13 treats of an *intensive* progress in *πλάνη*; and, if the words of ver. 9 be pressed as by De Wette, we might doubtless say with Bengel: "non proficient amplius: quamquam ipsi et eorum similes proficient in pejus:" but this is unnecessary; Chrysostom has given the true explanation: *κἂν γὰρ πρότερον ἀνθήσῃ τὰ τῆς πλάνης, εἰς τέλος οὐ διανέμει.* The more rapid this advancement to the worse (ver. 13), the more speedily will their *ἄνοια* disclose itself. And with the prediction of ver. 1 our declaration stands not in the remotest contradiction; for assuredly the fact that these seducers in their gross immorality foretoken the last days does not warrant the inference that their special form of error (which is not the special ground of their being called precursors) will continue and increase until that period. And why should the forger of the epistle have proved himself so utterly void of sense?—The reason why the course of these seducers will be arrested is that their glaring folly will soon be manifest to all; their iniquitous course will prove its own overthrow, as did that of the celebrated antagonists of Moses. Entirely different is the apostle's mode of regarding the *ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖν* and *λογομαχεῖν*. It behoves Timothy and Titus and the presbyters whom they ordain, to struggle against them with all the force of sound doctrine in order to bring back the diseased to a healthy faith. The term *ἄνοια*, again at Luke vi. 11, applies not merely to their foolish conduct in spreading their error, but also to

its substance as an exhibition of their *amentia*. Ἔσται πᾶσι, marks a near future; as this arrives, their future progress is impossible; but possible, certainly, until its arrival. Even this furnishes a reason why we should not deny to the error all temporary diffusion, and thus bring the passage into conflict with ver. 13. "As was also theirs," comp. Exod. viii. 18, seq.; ix. 11.

Vers. 10, 11.—The connexion is rightly given by Chrysostom: ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἡμέτερα τοιαῦτα. καὶ τούτων σὺ μάρτυς (?). As the proceeding of these men condemns itself, so the apostle can point Timothy to his own conduct as that which commends itself. He reminds him of the impression made by his personal example, which had induced Timothy to attach himself to him. Σὺ δέ, *but thou*, Timothy, in contrast with the above mentioned. Παρηκολούθησας (according to A.C.F.G.: Tischendorf after D.E.I.K., etc. παρηκολούθηκας as 1 Tim. iv. 6) is explained "to follow a thing, to go after it," Timothy being conceived either as an eye-witness, or instructed by others. But Timothy did not know as an eye-witness all the persecutions: to explain with Wieseler, "to follow in spirit," is in the contrast, feeble and unmeaning; and ver. 14, σὺ δὲ μένε, presupposes in like manner a fuller signification of παρακολουθεῖν. The fuller meaning therefore which it has unquestionably (1 Tim. iv. 6) "probo, amplector," must be adopted here. The apostle reminds Timothy of his having yielded to his example and attached himself to him; and taking the Aor. as unquestionably the correct reading, he refers to the original act in which Timothy devoted himself to him, as we see him elsewhere alluding repeatedly to Timothy's publicly declaring for the apostle and for the acceptance of the office of evangelist. Hence we see why the apostle does not refer to the dangers which they had shared in common, but to those previous persecutions in Timothy's own native region which had decided him to unite himself with the apostle. For it is scarcely credible that he should have commenced a complete enumeration of his persecutions—in which case why commence with Antioch in Pisidia—and then so suddenly discontinue it. Wahl, Mack (and apparently De Wette, Huther, and certainly Matthies), explain παρακ. as "imitor" referring it not barely to Timothy's resolution but to his subsequent conduct. To the objection justly urged against this, that Paul mentions only these persecutions, and omits all the later perils in which Timothy was his companion, and might be said with more propriety to have imitated him, it is replied that the sufferings mentioned happened in the native region of Timothy. But this is a fact which seems utterly irrelevant to the subject. The construction too of παρακ. with διωγμοῖς seems, with this interpretation, very unnatural. Mack's interpretation, "thou hast in thy conduct followed my teaching," Matthies, De Wette, and Huther rightly reject.

Μοῦ τῇ διδ.—μου emphatic in its position, comp. Winer's Gr. § 22, 7, Rem. 1. It is constructed with the following nouns. Τῇ διδ. in the same sense as 1 Tim. iv. 6 (whence also the accompanying παρακ. should have a like signification as there). Τῇ ἀγωγῇ comp. Esther ii. 20; 2 Macc. iv. 16. Rightly Theodoret = ἡ διὰ τῶν ἔργων πολιτεία, conduct, vitæ ratio, in general contrast to the immoral conduct of those seducers. Τῇ προθέσει comp. Acts xi. 23 (xxvii. 13) = purpose which controls the conduct of life. Πίστις in its ordinary signification as the ground of all action, as shown by the following ἀγάπη. Μακροθυμία toward the "crooked and perverse generation" (Phil. ii. 15) not as Theoph. specially toward false teachers. Hence the more general ἀγάπη, *love*, shown alike in the "long-suffering" which does not yield to exasperation, and in ὑπομονή which *endures* without terror or exhaustion. This "endurance" (ὑπομονή) leads naturally to the mention of persecutions and sufferings in which it was displayed. But διωγμοῖς is not therefore to be constructed grammatically with ὑπομονή as with ἐν understood, as Flatt maintains referring to 2 Cor. xi. 26, but stands coördinate with the previous terms. To explain παρακ. by "imitari" would certainly make this a very harsh construction, as Timothy could not imitate the sufferings, and that the apostle refers, as Huther thinks, to his mode of enduring them, is unsupported by the context. Παρακ. as explained by us, intimates that Timothy had followed with approval alike the apostle's teaching and sufferings on behalf of the gospel, and moved by his triumphant deliverance from them, had become his associate. "Which befell me in Antioch, Iconium, Lystra": comp. Acts xiii. 50—xxv. 20. On the ground of the specification of these sufferings see above. Baur in remarking that the author in accordance with the previously mentioned reference to the Gospel of Luke, attaches himself to the Acts, and that the fact of these being first mentioned in that part of the Acts which records Paul's missionary journeys, was the reason of his selecting these particular persecutions, disposes altogether too easily of the matter. For this author's acquaintance with the Acts must surely have informed him that Timothy was at that time not with the apostle. We must therefore seek some deeper reason for this selection; and if it is furnished by the context, the entire reasoning in favor of the fabricator falls to the ground. Or if the genuineness of the epistle is compromised by its harmony with the Acts, would the absence of such agreement be an argument in its favor? Comp. Matthies p. 533, Anm. Parallel with the οἷά μοι ἐγένετο, the apostle adds in a relative clause in reference to διωγμοῖς, οἵους διωγμοὺς ὑπήνεγκα = what sufferings I endured (the word ὑποφ. also 1 Cor. x. 13; 1 Pet. ii. 19.)* The apostle lingers on this topic as it in

* Erasmus and several recent scholars, as Heydenreich, Flatt, Mack, and finally

fact furnishes, as shown by ver. 13, the strong point of contrast between his course and that of the false teachers. They knew nothing of persecution, because they knew nothing of godly living: but they also know nothing of the deliverance of which the apostle boasts in the words *καὶ ἐκ πάντων*, etc. Such the walk of the apostle in contrast with that of these seducers.

Vers. 12, 13.—The mention of his own persecutions suggests the remark that "all too who will live godly in Christ Jesus shall be persecuted." What has happened to him will hold universally as an inevitable attendant on godly living. The remark places on the one hand the fortunes of the apostle in their right relation to those of the false teachers, and on the other, intimates to Timothy his own duty. Well, Chrysostom: "be not disturbed if they are exultant and you are in trials: such is the nature of the service." The enmity of the world is always provoked by contrasted piety: comp. John xv. 19, xvi. 33; Matth. v. 11, x. 22, 38; 1 Thess. iii. 3. *Οἱ θέλοντες*, who *will*, have the earnest purpose (comp. Winer's Gr., § 65, 7); hence not superfluous. To his own experience and that of all the godly the apostle now opposes that of the false teachers: theirs is not persecution for the sake of righteousness, and a triumphant endurance of it (such the natural deduction from ver. 12), but are ever deeper plunged into error. So Chrysostom and Heydenreich. De Wette and Huther take the contrast differently, the latter on the ground that sufferings for the sake of godliness, and advancement in evil coupled with outward prosperity—for such is the thought suggested by the adversative position of the clauses—form no proper contrast. They regard ver. 13 not as contrasted with ver. 12 but with vers. 10, 11 (ver. 12 being interposed incidentally), which thus defend and praise the conduct of Timothy in following the example of the apostle, while they on the contrary (13) proceed on to worse, deceiving and deceived. But in vers. 10, 11, the apostle is rather defending his own conduct than applauding that of Timothy; and to take *παρακ.* as intimating that Timothy has *imitated* the apostle in all these qualities and experiences, so that the defence of his own procedure involves a defence and praise of Timothy, is forbidden by ver. 11; for it is then inexplicable why he should have mentioned these persecutions rather than those in which Timothy participated. The relative clauses, *οἷα, οἵους*, are then also without any clear significance; and we should expect, as Huther himself concedes, rather a reference to Paul's *mode* of enduring these sufferings, while the context refers exclusively to their *existence*. And how difficult to sever ver. 13 from its con-

Wieseler, take *οἵους διωγ.* as an independent exclamation; a violent break in the construction for which there is not the slightest necessity. Hence Matthies, De Wette, and Huther have rejected it.

nexion with ver. 12, and put it in contrast with *σὺ παρηκ.* ver. 10! And the clause, "evil men and seducers," etc., can in its general import, much less naturally form the definite antithesis to *σὺ δέ*, ver. 10, than to the general, "and all too who will," etc. *Πονηροί* too points clearly to this contrast. *Καὶ γόητες* defines *πονηροί*; the language, though general, has reference to those named ver. 8. *Γόητες* as connected with *πονηροί* is not merely a simple designation of the subject but involves in itself a judgment, in which the *προκόπτειν εἰς χεῖρον* finds its explanation: it is thus to be taken not in the strict signification of sorcerers, but perhaps "jugglers." We may not refer it therefore with certainty to magic arts, though it is very possible that these errorists resorted to such secret rites. *Προκόψουσι ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον*—on the alleged contradiction of these words to ver. 9, *οὐ προκ. ἐπὶ πλεῖον*, see above. The language here not merely "can" (with De Wette) but *must* (*ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον*) be taken intensively. The mode of this progress is indicated by the words *πλανῶντες* and *πλανώμενοι*: these are to be referred, not with Bengel, to different subjects, but to the same, designated alike by *πονηροί* and *γόητες*. "Deception," says De Wette, "always involves self-deception." *Πλάνη* is to be taken here alike intellectually and morally.

Vers. 14, 15.—*Σὺ δὲ μένε*, *Thou*, Timothy, in contrast with the preceding, and *μένε* with *προκόπτειν εἰς χεῖρον*. The admonition stands in close connexion with ver. 10, *σὺ δὲ παρηκ.*: as Timothy once joyfully attached himself to the apostle, so he is now to abide by that which he has learned, of which he has the double assurance and pledge in the example of the apostle and the testimony of scripture. *Καὶ ἐπιστώθης*, supply *ἅ*; the word must not be confounded with *ἐπιστεύθης* (quæ tibi concredita sunt): but signifies (comp. Passow, De Wette in loco) "in regard to which thou hast been assured:" *ἃ μετὰ πληροφορίας ἔμαθες*, Theoph.; a heightening of *ἔμαθες*. *Εἰδώς* refers not to *ἐπιστώθης* but to the admonition *μένε* and assigns its reason. Instead of *παρὰ τίνος* A.C.*F.G. 17, 71 read *παρὰ τίνων* and if the harshness of a reading is sufficient to vindicate its correctness, then this is here with Matthies to be adopted. The natural reference were then to Timothy's mother and grandmother, and Timothy's early piety were appealed to. To me in view of the context in which *παρὰ τίνος* has so manifest a reference to the apostle's personal example, this reading seems the more probable. For that the apostle does not expressly name himself, if we glance at 10, 11, cannot surprise us; and the reading *τίνων* might readily originate from i. v., united with the consideration that Timothy was a Christian when he joined the apostle. To the "many witnesses" of ii. 2, there can be no possible allusion, as these persons could stand in no such important relation to Timothy. Comp. for the whole 2 Tim. i. 13, ii. 2. Ver. 15 contains another ground for urging the *μένε*;

καὶ ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. Grammatically we may either take ὅτι as a resolution of the preceding participle (comp. Winer's Gr. § 63, II.), with the majority of interpreters, or as dependent on εἰδώς, rather in the sense of "reflecting," as De Wette and Huther. The former construction yields a better train of thought. Ἀπὸ βρέφους comp. Acts xvi. 1, and 2 Tim. i. 5. The collective phrase τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα is found only here: ordinarily ἡ γραφή, αἱ γραφαί, γραφαὶ ἅγιαι, Rom. i. 2.—"Able to make thee wise;" the participle δυνάμενα is to be taken as present, since οἶδας has a present signification: it marks the permanent quality of the scriptures which must determine Timothy to abide by what he has learnt. That quality is that they can make him wise unto salvation through the faith which is in Christ Jesus. They become therefore a testimony to that which is learnt by Timothy. Σοφίσαι (at 2 Pet. i. 16, but in a different sense; as here with the LXX., Ps. xix. 7, cxix. 98; Sir. xxxviii. 24) marks here not the first instruction, but the successively advancing grades of practical knowledge. Its goal is salvation: comp. Theophylact; "not as outward knowledge renders man wise to deceit, and sophistry and verbal strifes, whence the perdition of the soul, so is divine knowledge: for this renders wise unto salvation." Διὰ τῆς πίστεως cannot, as by Heydenreich, be constructed merely with σωτηρίαν, as thus the article must have been repeated: together with the limiting εἰς σωτηρίαν it is to be referred to the verb. "Through faith," etc., marks the necessary condition of the use of the Old Testament: only the believer therefore will find in it the truth of salvation; thus not the unbelieving Jew. To take διὰ πίστεως as expressing the means inhering in Scripture in the sense of passages like Gal. iii. 6, seq., 23, seq., is forbidden by the limiting clause ἐν Ἰ. Χριστῷ with its emphatic τῆς; since πίστις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ never denotes elsewhere "faith in Christ," but "faith which originates in Christ" (comp. Winer's Gr. § 31, 2); this meaning also would require the omission of Ἰησοῦ; and vers. 16, 17 which illustrate the adaptedness of the Scriptures to make wise unto salvation, make no mention of faith but presuppose it.

Vers. 16, 17 illustrate this capability of scripture by declaring it all divinely inspired and profitable for doctrine, etc. Καί, which is wanting only in versions and in the Fathers, must on external and internal grounds be deemed genuine. Θεόπν. as well as ὠφέλιμος is then a predicate of πᾶσα γραφή. For if καί meant "also," and θεόπν. were an epithet adjoined to πᾶσα γραφή, an ἐστί would be indispensable. And taking them both as predicates, we must translate πᾶσα γρ. not "every scripture," but "all scripture, scripture in all its parts," as remarked by Dr. Hofmann, who cites for this use, πᾶσα οἰκοδομή, Eph. ii. 21, and Harless in loco, and πᾶς οἶκος, Heb. iii. 3. The omission of the article is natural in a word like γραφή,

which readily assumes the character of a proper name, and in fact has done so 2 Pet. i. 20; and so also γράμματα, John vii. 15, without the article (comp. Winer's Gr., § 17, 10.) De Wette, "every scripture is divinely inspired," etc.; Huther, "every scripture, inspired of God, is profitable." The latter thinks that no doubt was to be presumed regarding the inspiration of the scriptures, and hence that point needed not to be asserted. But the term θεόπν., as pointing to the Divine origin of the scriptures, confirms the statement of their ability to render wise to salvation. Used here passively (comp. Winer's Gr., § 16, 3), "it attaches itself to the πνεῦμα because the Divine spiritual power was conceived as the breath of life," as De Wette remarks, referring us also to the ideas of the Greeks and Romans regarding the θεία ἐπίπνοια, the *divinus afflatus*. Transferred to things, as here, it marks these as a product of such Divine influence, though wrought through human instrumentality. The entire Old Testament is here specified as such a product, and we have no right to restrict this quality to individual parts (Hofmann, Weiss. u. Erf. I., p. 42, seq). But on the other hand the term does not warrant our building on it a theory of inspiration, and of determining from it the relation of Divine and human agency in scripture. 2 Pet. i. 21 speaks more definitely on this point; it at least places prophecy beyond the sphere of human will; but it speaks only of prophecy, and even in what it asserts, does not exclude human participation. A true theory of inspiration cannot be formed from one or the other passage of scripture, but can only grow truly and livingly out of the consideration of the object which is to be a product of Divine inspiration. See as above on this subject, Dr. Hofmann, 1 Th. § iv., seq. Καὶ ὠφέλιμος is the natural consequence of the preceding attribute; profitable for doctrine: ἃ γὰρ ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐντεῦθεν μανθάνομεν, Theodoret. Πρὸς ἔλεγχον (in A.C.F.G.A., the synonymous ἔλεγμον) = for the conviction and rebuke of human wickedness; ἐλέγχει γὰρ ἡμῶν τὸν παράνομον βίον, Theodoret, and comp. Tit. ii. 15; 1 Tim. v. 20. Πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, only here = emandatio, improvement, properly, restoring to an erect position; παρακαλεῖ καὶ τοὺς παρατραπέντας ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν εὐθεῖαν ὁδόν, referring thus to our moral deficiences and offences. The last expression, "for discipline (παιδεῖαν) in righteousness," sums up the whole; comp. Tit. ii. 12, and at Phil. i. 11. The succession of individual characteristics marks the successive stages in the influence of scripture. The final purpose is that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto every good work. Ἄρτιος, only here = τέλειος, perfect; Col. i. 28. "The man of God," neither here nor at Tim. vi. 11, employed in relation to Timothy's special office. The entirely general term of ver. 16 makes the reference to his calling as an evangelist, assumed by De Wette, wholly irrelevant, while it

is equally unconsonant with vers. 14, 15. Timothy's familiarity with the scriptures is not to incite him to steadfast adherence to them on the ground of their ability to perfect him in his calling, but to make him, as every Christian, wise unto salvation. Thus "the man of God," denotes simply the Christian ;* the condition implied in the *διὰ πίστεως*, ver. 15, in the use of the scriptures, is involved in the expression. The apostle speaks not primarily of Timothy's official character, but of that personal adherence to the truth which is its indispensable condition, and to which he is to be urged alike by the example of the apostle and his acquaintance with the scriptures. "Every good work," is not, therefore, with Bengel, to be understood of the works enumerated in ver. 16, viz., teaching, reproof, etc., for ver. 16 teaches not how the scripture may be used in dealing with others, but how it influences personally him who is conversant with it. The language has the same wide Christian application as ii. 21. *Ἐξηρτισμένος* found also Acts xxi. 5; corresponding in meaning to Luke vi. 10; Rom. ix. 22; 1 Cor. i. 10; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; so *ἡτοιμασμένος*, ii. 21; properly, make complete, thoroughly equip, as of a ship.

§ 5. Concluding and Earnest Admoniton to Timothy, to Zealous, Faithful Fulfilment of his Calling.

(iv. 1–8).

This section closes the apostle's admonition to Timothy in respect to his public calling. It sums up the various previous instructions regarding his duty as a teacher, by urging it on his heart (vers. 1, 2), in the form of a solemn adjuration; by pointing, on the one hand, to the degenerate period (3, 4) which is impending, and on the other, to the apostle's own speedy departure (6–8), both of which alike should quicken the zeal and fidelity of Timothy. The latter reference to the apostle's present condition forms a natural transition to the subsequent personal reference.

Ver. 1.—The readings vary: yet by the unanimous judgment of recent critics (comp. the critical remarks in Tischendorf), alike *οὖν ἐγώ* and *τοῦ κυρίου* are to be cancelled; for *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, we are to read *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, and *καὶ τὴν ἐπιφ.* for *κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφ.* With all emphasis (*διαμαρτύρομαι* = obtestor, comp. ii. 14, and especially (1 Tim. v. 21) the apostle lays the following on the conscience of Timothy. In the presence of God and Christ Jesus (*ἐνώπιον*, 1 Tim. v. 21, vi. 13; 2 Tim.

* Dr. Baur understands the expression of those who in the church occupy the place of God, and compares from the second century Ignat. ad Rom. ch. 6, on which, comp. Matthies, p. 541.

ii. 14), who will yet judge "the living and the dead," *i. e.*, all, whether at his coming they be alive or dead (1 Cor. xv. 51, seq.; 1 Thess. iv. 16, seq.; Acts x. 42; 1 Pet. iv. 5), he conjures him faithfully to discharge his office as preacher of the word. The emphasis laid on this universality of the judgment is to admonish Timothy of his own inevitable responsibility. This admonition the apostle strengthens by mentioning two special points of that decisive event; the *appearance* of Christ, fearful as being the epoch of the judgment (on *ἐπιφάνεια*, comp. at Tit. ii. 13; 1 Tim. i. 16, vi. 14), and his kingdom then revealing itself in glory, and which following his appearance, is the goal of all Christian hope. The repetition of *αὐτοῦ* has a rhetorical ground; each point is conceived independently, and in its own full significance. The change of construction in *καὶ τὴν ἐπιφ.* explains itself; the construction with *ἐνώπιον* could not be continued; hence the accusative is employed which is used either entirely as elsewhere with verbs of swearing (Winer's Gr., § 32, 4), or to be explained from the somewhat modified signification, "later, or call to witness," as De Wette remarks, who refers to Deut. iv. 26, *διαμ. ὑμῖν τόν τε οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν*, but which, since *διαμαρτύρομαι* has not simply the sense of attesting, but of suppliant adjuration (afterwards imperative), is difficult. The reading *κατά* might signify either "at, on the occasion of," or "according to, in consequence of."

Ver. 2 contains that to which Timothy is thus impressively exhorted: "preach the word," etc. On the asyndeton of climax, see Winer's Gr., § 60, 2. The imperative is used, not the infinitive or *ἵνα* to give emphasis to the discourse. "Preach the word;" there is nothing to limit the term "word," as Timothy is only exhorted to fidelity to his once assumed calling of publishing the gospel. Thence the thought advances to *ἐπίστηθι*. The term is thus used only here; elsewhere *adsto* in its primary signification, "stand by, come upon" (also in a hostile sense), then "stand before," = insto, immineo. Here it is commonly taken = insto, be intent on a thing, de personis acriter rem suam agentibus (Wahl), as also Luther renders. De Wette, however, questions this signification; and Huther, concurring, explains it of coming forth to believers and unbelievers with the word of truth, a sense certainly not contained in *ἐπίστηθι*. In my opinion its import is like that of *ἐπίμενε αὐτοῖς*, 1 Tim. iv. 16, in a similar connexion, only somewhat more intensive, like our "to be on hand," to have one's attention and activity directed to a matter (comp. Dem. in Phil. II., p. 70, 16, *ἐγρήγορεν, ἐφέστηκεν* in De Wette). So Theophylact: *μετ' ἐπιμονῆς καὶ ἐπιστασίας λάλησον.* Ἐπίστηθι is then the continuation and strengthening of *κήρυξον*. Grotius and many after him supply *αὐτοῖς* = urge eos, or accede ad eos, sc. coetus Christianos, an addition unsustained by the connexion,

and inconsistent with the general character of the exhortation, and with the accompanying adverbs. Εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως, "an oxymoron," De Wette. On the asyndeton of contrast, see Winer's Gr., § 60, 2. As to the expression, comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 12 with Phil. iv. 10. Rightly Theodoret, "he urges him to regard every season as suitable for this." He is not to wait like the rustic until the stream flows by. The favourable and unfavourable circumstances are spoken of not with reference to Timothy, but the hearers. Huther cites an admirable remark of Beza: nempe quod ad carnis prudentiam pertinet; nam alioque requiritur sanctæ prudentiæ spiritus, captans occasiones ad edificationem opportunas. How this activity of the teacher is to adapt itself to the circumstances, appears in the following imperatives, ἔλεγξον, ἐπιτίμησον, παρακάλεσον, κ. τ. λ., corresponding to the previous statements on the influence of scripture. Ἔλεγξον, first marks conviction and rebuke, spoken of generally, as ver. 16, and hence not to be restricted to error in doctrine; ἐπιτίμησον, "censure," marked by displeasure, a word frequent in the gospels, found further Jude 9. But censure is to be connected with the exhortation to long-suffering love, which ceases not to hope (1 Cor. xiii. 7), and which seeks, not by compulsion, but by teaching and conviction, to bring to the better path. The added ἐν πάσῃ, κ. τ. λ., belongs exclusively to παρακάλεσον. The construction of ἐν, marking the manner of the exhortation, with one word denoting the inward feeling, and with another pointing to the outward form and method, De Wette deems objectionable. But μακροθ. involves, as shewn by πᾶσα, its manifestation, and διδαχῇ is not doctrine, but teaching, as the πᾶσα, which belongs also to it, shews; thus admonish with every manifestation of long-suffering and teaching, which the case demands.

Ver. 3 points as reason for this injunction, to the coming time, which renders necessary this zealous action. Not as Bengel and others, "will be and is now;" the connexion is the same as 1 Tim. i. 3, seq., vi. 3, seq.; 2 Tim. i. 14, seq. The present contains the germs of the future whose characteristic is that men will not endure sound doctrine. Οὐκ ἀνέξονται (2 Cor. xi. 4; so, βαστάσαι, Acts xv. 10), from dislike to the nature and demands of sound doctrine. There is sin in the heart, which will not be brought to light and rebuked. As they will not yield to the self-denial required of them by the sound doctrine, it becomes intolerable, and they settle the controversy by perverting the doctrine, and thus, "according to their own lusts heaping up teachers," etc. Their own lusts (ἴδιαι in opposition to the sound doctrine to which they should submit), are their standard of doctrine: error has the same origin within the sphere of Christianity, as Rom. i. 18, seq., attributes to it in that of heathenism. Ἐπισωρεύειν,, properly, heap up = procure in multitudes, found only here (the simple iii. 6;

Rom. xii. 20), involves the idea of contempt: *τὸ ἀδιάκριτον πλῆθος τῶν διδασκάλων διὰ τοῦ ἐπισωρεύσουσιν ἐδήλωσε*, Theophylact. While *κατὰ τὰς ἰδ. ἐπ.* gives the law of this procedure, so *κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν, having itching ears* (*ζητοῦντές τι ἀκοῦσαι καθ' ἡδονήν*, Hesychius) assigns its reason.

Ver. 4.—The consequence is an entire turning away from the truth, and surrender to the empty fabrications of their own wisdom. The "truth" is the Christian truth presented to them in the "sound doctrine," whose substance is *ἡ οἰκονομία θεοῦ ἡ ἐν πίστει*, 1 Tim. i. 4. In a general contrast with this the "fables" have not the same historical reference as in 1 Tim. i. 4, iv. 7; Tit. i. 14, but are a collective designation of their own wisdom as mere fiction in opposition to certain truth, 2 Pet. i. 16. *Ἐκτρέπεσθαι* as 1 Tim. i. 6, v. 15.

Ver. 5.—In contrast with this the apostle yet again in a comprehensive exhortation urges on Timothy the duties of his calling. "Be sober (*νῆφε*) in all things;" for theirs is a state of spiritual intoxication, comp. ii. 26; 1 Cor. xv. 34; 1 Thess. v. 6. He is to maintain soberness and clearness of mind that he may not himself fall into those snares, and be able to warn and admonish others. *Κακοπάθησον*, comp. i. 8, ii. 3; he must resist a perverse inclination.—"Do the work of an evangelist."—A comprehensive statement of his duty; the explanation is given in ver. 2. *Εὐαγγελιστής* is used Acts xxi. 8, of Philip, as a standing designation, and Eph. iv. 11. Rightly Theodoret: *ἐκεῖνοι περιόντες ἐκήρυττον*; as *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* implies in itself announcing salvation where it was previously unheard; comp. Acts viii. 4, xiv. 7; 1 Cor. i. 17; 2 Cor. x. 16; Harless at Eph. iv. 11. The *διδάσκαλος* on the other hand, is the teacher of a particular definite church, from which he himself may have issued. Timothy had assumed the office of an evangelist, and received first the gift of the Spirit, 1 Tim. iv. 14, when he associated himself with the apostle. To this vocation he is to apply himself, whether in company with or separated from the apostle. The special position which according to the first epistle he occupied at Ephesus, rested on a special commission. Aside from this he is still an evangelist, as even that epistle intimates. Of that temporary commission the present epistle contains nothing; it deals with his general calling as evangelist, designating it as a "work" to be done, as a "ministry" to be fulfilled. We are then no more to infer from it a permanent office of evangelist in the church, than to confound the *ἐπίθεσις χειρῶν* with later ordination to office. (Comp. Zeitschr. für Prot. u. K., Sept. 1849). *Τὴν διακονίαν σου πληροφόρησον*, fulfil (properly, bring full measure, comp. ver. 17; Col. iv. 12), thy ministry (*διακονία* in the same general sense as *διάκονος*, 1 Tim. iv. 6); synonymous with this Col. iv. 17, *τὴν διακονίαν . . . . ἵνα . . . . πληροῖς*; comp. Acts xii. 25; Lösner in loc. The heightening of the thought lies

not in *διακονία*, as referring to any superintendence of the church by Timothy as acting for the apostle, but in *πληροφόρει*. Timothy is neither to be inactive, nor to allow dangers to deter him from perfecting that to which he has put his hand.

Ver. 6.—The apostle now enforces this admonition in another way by a reference to himself. (Ἐγώ emphatic contrast with *σύ*). He is at the goal of his course of life—an admonition to Timothy to all the greater fidelity in his vocation. It remains only that he receive the crown of victory which awaits alike him and all like-minded with him—this latter thought an encouragement to Timothy to follow the apostle. Σπένδομαι, as at Phil. ii. 17, "poured out as a drink-offering;" not sprinkled over, as dedicated for a sacrifice = *κατασπένδομαι*. The choice of this term rather than *θύομαι* is most naturally explained from that passage; his death is to him the drink-offering which accompanies the sacrifice of faith; although here *ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ* is not added, yet the same image as there hovers before the mind of the apostle. The view that *σπένδομαι* is employed rather than *θύομαι*, because only the drink-offerings were entirely offered (so Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, etc.), is justly rejected by recent interpreters. The expression, finally, marks not merely in general the nearness of his death, but as Phil. ii. 17, can be understood only of martyrdom; and *ἤδη* already points to his sufferings as the commencement of the *σπένδεσθαι*, "and the time of my departure is at hand," he adds in explanation. At *ἀνάλυσις* (comp. Phil. i. 23, *ἀναλύειν*), = discessus, comp. Lösner Phil. in Flacc., p. 991, c.; *τὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τελευταίαν ἀνάλυσιν*. The image is not drawn from a banquet; still less is *ἀνάλυσις* a continuation of *σπένδομαι*, which should point to libations at banquets, as the two would have no proper coherence.

Ver. 7.—He resembles the combatant for a prize, who has left behind him the struggle and the race, and awaits only the bestowment of the victor's wreath. "An incidental thought," observes De Wette, "if vers. 6 and 5 stand in connexion," as they most assuredly do. How natural and profoundly true is at this point, the apostle's glad and grateful retrospect of his life! And in this language how powerful the encouragement to Timothy to follow in his footsteps! Τὸν *ἀγῶνα τὸν καλὸν ἠγώνισμαι*, "I have contended in the noble contest," not "a noble," etc.; the reference to the contest of faith (*ἀγὼν τῆς πίστεως*) as he expressly designates it 1 Tim. vi. 12; so *ἡ καλὴ ὁμολογία* at the same place, the Christian confession as such. On the metaphor comp. ii. 5; 1 Cor. ix. 25; Phil. i. 30. "I have finished the course;" the same thought in a figure drawn from the race-course. The weight of the thought lies in the Perfects; hence here, as in the preceding, the terms are left with no specific explanations. The same figure 1 Cor. ix. 24; Phil. iii. 12,

seq.; Acts xx. 24. Without a figure and in explanation of it, he adds, "I have kept the faith," etc., regarded as an entrusted possession; comp. 1 Tim. i. 14. De Wette properly rejects the rendering "fidelity." As *τὴν πίστιν τετήρ.* is the literal expression of what was previously expressed in figure, *πίστις* can here denote only faith. The apostle asserts of himself that to which, as a fundamental condition of all the rest, he repeatedly exhorts Timothy: comp. 1 Tim. i. 19, vi. 12; 2 Tim. i. 5, 13, iii. 14. In these beautiful words which bear the impress of the profoundest truth, criticism finds much to except to. It misses the humility of the apostle (Phil. iii. 12; 1 Cor. iv. 3), and finds here an unsuccessful imitation of Phil. iii. 12, since what there appears as striving, is here unnaturally transformed into a temporal fulfilment. Thus De Wette, and in the last point, Baur, who points at the same time for the words *τὸν καλὸν ἀγ. ἠγ.* to Phil. i. 27, 30, iv. 3, which, however, is repelled by De Wette.

The spirit of criticism is hard to please. While here the want of humility is alleged, Dr. Baur brings at Phil. iii. 12, precisely the reverse charge, and regards it as unapostolical, as evincing an humility which conceals the real character of the apostle. "Humility," says Baur, "is certainly a fundamental trait of the apostle, but where in his humblest utterances has he testified of himself such failure "to have apprehended?" "So run that ye may attain," is his exhortation; "I therefore so run not as uncertainly," etc. (See Tüb. Theol. Jahrbb. viii. p. 526). Thus this criticism mutually destroys itself. And in fact the above passage from Cor. is ample proof that the apostle could say that of himself which is here said. For the passage merely asserts that he has struggled through the good conflict of faith, is at the end of his course, and has kept the faith. There is no special glorying, and this anticipated reward is that which he promises to all true Christians. And could not the apostle, who for the sake of the gospel suffers unto bonds (ii. 9), when in view of death say thus much of himself without offending against humility? This language of Paul can in fact be appropriated, at the close of his course, by every believer. And as to the unsuccessful imitation of Phil. iii. 12, the subject is there that moral perfection, that assimilation to Christ of which that faith, that believing fellowship with him which the apostle declares he has maintained, is only the foundation. Thus that which there appears as striving is *not* here transformed into an unnatural present, or outward fulfilment; the author simply asserts his faithful maintenance of that which appears there as the permanent foundation of moral perfection.*

* Baur, at the last-cited passage, thinks that there can be in the Pauline sense no such moral perfection, since faith with all which it comprehends, cannot assuredly depend on moral perfection, as this would lead us back to the righteousness of works. But I would gladly ask him, how otherwise we can conceive moral assimilation to Christ in the Pau-

Most extraordinary, finally, is the view of Baur, who supposes that the author of our epistle regarded the words of Phil., "not that I have already attained," etc., as having an unquestionably primary reference to martyrdom, and then nevertheless makes the passage before us a remoulding of it for a later time. But how does the perfect tense accord with this primary reference to martyrdom? To the ἤδη σπένδομαι they will assuredly not appeal! The entire resemblance of our passage to that in Philippians, lies in the common figure of the race, which is also met elsewhere; and the preceding terms σπένδομαι and ἀνάλυσις can alone establish any affinity with that epistle; an affinity perfectly explicable on the ground of terms previously employed, now freely reproduced under later circustances.

Ver. 8.—His earthly course is now ended: what remains is the awarding of the prize of victory. I take λοιπόν, with De Wette and Huther = as to the rest, in reliquum; for thus the verse attaches itself most naturally to the preceding, in which the apostle declares himself at the end. The sense of, "henceforth, hereafter," with which the present tense is at variance, Paul expresses by τοῦ λοιποῦ (Gal. vi. 17), or τὸ λοιπόν (1 Cor. vii. 29). To understand it with Matthies = ἤδη is, according to Paul's usage, of questionable propriety. At ἀπόκειται, "is in reserve, lies ready," comp. Col. i. 5, and Olshausen in loco; for the thought, 1 Pet. i. 4. The expression stands connected with the previous figure of the prize-race; as for the victor in the games the prize of victory lies ready, so for him, "the crown of righteousness," 1 Cor. ix. 25. The analogous passages, Jam. i. 12, "the crown of life," 1 Pet. v. 4, "the crown of glory," have led Huther to regard the genitive also here as specifying that in which the crown consists, thus denoting "the righteousness recognized in the future judgment." But would the apostle recognize righteousness as the reward of righteousness? Does he not elsewhere always point to "life," "glory," etc., as the future reward? And how inconsistent this explanation with the figure employed! The right view is doubtless given by Chrysostom, who is followed by De Wette; δικαιοσύνην ἐνταῦθα τὴν καθόλου φησὶν ἀρετήν (*i. e.*, righteousness is here put generally for virtue). Δικαιοσύνη points back to ver. 7, and is here to be taken precisely as at ii. 22, iii. 16, thus: the crown which rewards the righteous course depicted ver. 7. Ὃν ἀποδώσει, comp. Rom. ii. 6, = "render, pay," applied to things which considerations of duty require to be rendered. Such is the force of the following δίκαιος, *i. e.*, because, and so surely as he is a just judge. De Wette regards this sentiment as incompati-

line sense, than as proceeding from believing fellowship with him, and, so far as it is conditioned by truth and vitality of faith, again conditioning this itself with all which it comprehends, as portrayed in that passage. The passage treats not of a complete moral perfection, but of the unceasing striving for it.

ble with the apostle's doctrine of grace ; since the kindred passages, he says, as Rom. ii. 5, seq. ; 2 Thess. i. 5, where in like manner a reward is anticipated from the divine righteousness, regard it from a purely objective point of view, while subjectively regarded, humility and self-knowledge can only fear it. But how could the apostle at 2 Thess. i. 5, console his hearers with the *δικαία κρίσις*, if, subjectively regarded, the divine righteousness were only an object of dread ? And what would become of the "peace" of faith (Rom. v. 1), if this contrast still existed in the Christian consciousness. The apostle refers here not to the righteousness of God in contrast with grace, but *within* the relations of grace in which he himself has placed us ; he thus simply brings out his conduct toward us, under and in accordance with those relations, and which is, therefore, but another aspect of his faithfulness to himself. This faithfulness is to be feared, then, only, if we are unfaithful (ii. 13); otherwise it is a source of consolation and hope ; comp. 1 John ii. 28, iv. 17. "And not to me only"—the apostle corrects the impression that he might in the preceding be claiming some special reward for himself ; it is the reward, within the sphere of grace, which every one may anticipate, who loves and longs for his appearing ; comp. on the contrary, Luke xxiii. 30, "they will begin to say to the mountains, fall on us," etc. On the Perf. *ἠγαπ.*, in its relation to the present, comp. Winer's Gr., § 40, 4, p. 244. On *ἐπιφάνεια* of the future advent, Tit. ii. 11, 13 ; 1 Tim. vi. 14. On *ἀγαπᾶν* as denoting the longing of love for something future, 1 Pet. iii. 10.

§ 6. DIRECTIONS FOR TIMOTHY'S SPEEDY COMING.—SALUTATIONS.

(iv. 9–22).

Vers. 6–8 serve the apostle as a natural transition for urging and enforcing the personal wishes intimated in ch. i. 4, 8, 15–18. Timothy is to come to Rome to the imprisoned and forsaken apostle. He describes his deserted condition, gives some special commissions in the event of his coming (9–13), recounts the progress and condition of his affairs, (14–18), adds the salutations which Timothy is to deliver (19), adds some further notices regarding his solitary condition, and renews the injunction to a speedy coming (20, 21); adds the salutations with which he is charged to Timothy, and closes with the customary blessing.—This constitutes the second main division of the epistle, which the apostle, according to his custom of reserving the more personal matters to the close, subjoins to his official exhortations. It bears in this respect a close analogy to the epistle to the Philippians; see the Introduction, § 2.

Ver. 9.—*Σπούδασον ἐλθεῖν.* De Wette's critical objection that the blissful feeling of perfection transports above the necessities of life, may be safely left to itself. *Ταχέως* is explained ver. 21, by *πρὸ χειμῶνος.* On the pleonasm *σπούδασον—ταχέως*, see Winer's Gr., § 65, t., p. 531.

Ver. 10.—The apostle grounds this request on his deserted condition ; comp. i. 4, "For Demas has left me," etc., the aorist participle denotes the ground of the act, "in consequence of loving." Justly Chrysostom : *τουτέστι· τῆς ἀνέσεως ἐρασθεὶς τοῦ ἀκινδύνου καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς μᾶλλον εἵλετο οἴκοι τρυφᾶν, ἢ μετ' ἐμοῦ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι καὶ συνδιαφέρειν μοι τοὺς παρόντας κινδύνους.* "Loving the present world," involves perhaps an allusion to ver. 8. This passage also, compared with ver. 16, and i. 15, seq., as well as the exhortations to Timothy to *κακοπαθεῖν*, indicate a period in which it required no slight courage to acknowledge the apostle ; comp. the Introd. The words, finally, do not assert an entire apostacy of Demas, but only unfaithfulness to the apostle from undue worldliness, comp., perhaps, Phil. ii. 21 ; Col. iv. 14, and Philem. 24, where he is styled *σύνεργος*, salutations are sent by him. It is the natural supposition that what is here said of him belongs to a later period. *Καὶ ἐπορεύθη εἰς Θεσσαλονίκην*—why precisely thither, we know not. An ancient tradition (Epiph. hær. 51, p. 427), makes him to have assumed the office of priest to an idol.—*Crescens* appears in none of the letters written during the first imprisonment, and is not further known. Titus, if our hypothesis regarding the date of the Pastoral Epistles is correct, had come from Crete, having been succeeded there by another, to Paul at Nicopolis, and thence, perhaps, gone with him to Rome (Tit. iii. 12); he also is unmentioned in the epistles which date from the previous imprisonment. On Dalmatia, a province of the Roman Illyricum, comp. Winer's R.W.B., and Rom. xv. 19.—"Luke alone is with me"—he also was with him (Col. iv. 14 ; Philem. 24), in the first imprisonment. The omission to name him in Phil., I prefer, with Meyer, to refer to a temporary absence (particularly on account of Phil. ii. 20, seq.), rather than with Wieseler, to group him among the *οἱ σὺν ἐμοὶ ἀδελφοί.* "But if he alone was with the apostle where then was Aristarchus (Acts xxvii. 2 ; Col. iv. 10 ; Philem. 24)?" justly asks De Wette, in opposition to those who transfer this epistle to the commencement of the Roman imprisonment, before the above-named epistles ; so also Wieseler, p. 425.

Ver. 11.—"Take and bring with yourself Mark" (*ἄγαγε* for *ἄγε*, c. A. 31, 71, al., Theodor., Dam., Tisch.). On *ἀναλαβών*, comp. Acts xx. 13, 14, xxiii. 31. Mark appears with the apostle in the Epistles to Col. (iv. 10), and to Philem. 24 ; the former passage, however, intimates his anticipated presence with the Colossians. He is also, according to those passages, with the apostle in company with Demas

and Tychicus, who are here mentioned expressly as absent. This epistle therefore, must, if it belonged to that earlier imprisonment, have been written before or after those; but both hypotheses are involved in difficulties which force us to assume a second imprisonment. We then suppose that Mark, who had gone to Colosse, still lingers in that region, whence Timothy, who is at Ephesus, is to summon him, and bring him with him. "For he is useful to me," *εἰς διακονίαν*. *Εὔχρηστος* = serviceable, useful, ii. 21; Philem. 11. *Εἰς διακ.*, not of the apostolical office, but of the personal service of Mark, though, doubtless, in the vocation of the apostle, comp. Acts xiii. 5, xv. 38. If the epistle was written at the commencement of the Roman imprisonment, we cannot see how the apostle comes to this judgment regarding Mark.*

Ver. 12.—"And Tychicus I sent to Ephesus." As our epistle cannot possibly be contemporaneous in composition with that to the Ephesians and Colossians, the sending mentioned here, must be different from that mentioned Col. iv. 7; Eph. vi. 21; and hence the same mission, must, assuming but one imprisonment, have been laid upon Tychicus twice, or else it must have been repeated in a second imprisonment; comp. the Introd. The mention of him forms not, perhaps, as Wieseler supposes, a contrast to the words, Luke alone is with me; for overleaping Mark to recur to Luke, seems wholly unnatural. It seems rather occasioned by what is said of Mark; he wishes Mark as being useful *εἰς διακονίαν*, because he had sent off Tychicus his faithful *διάκονος* in the Lord (Eph. vi. 21). The express naming of Ephesus is regarded by some (among them De Wette), as proof that this was not the present abode of Timothy. Were Tychicus, as supposed by Wieseler, the bearer of this letter, the language would indeed be unnatural (comp. Tit. iii. 12, *πρὸς σέ*); but if the mission had no immediate reference to Timothy, and as is very possible, preceded the composition of the epistle, the mention of the name is in no way surprising; *πρὸς σέ* would then, in fact, be scarcely appropriate, comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 8, where the apostle also names Ephesus, although he himself resides there.† Besides the above-cited passages, Tychicus is named Tit. iii. 12; Acts xx. 4, 5.

Ver. 13.—On the supposition that Timothy comes in compliance with his wish, the apostle commissions him to bring the effects which he had left in Troas at the house of Carpus. *Τὸν φελόνην*. What *φελόνης* = *φαινόλης* (pænula) and *φαιλόνης*, as some read, here

* Baur traces this mention of the Pauline Luke, and the Petrine Mark to the conciliatory purpose of the epistle; an acute remark no doubt from his point of view, but by no means established unless it be also proved that the state of facts exhibited in the epistle cannot be historical.

† True, but the passage itself implies that he resides there. More to Wiesinger's purpose perhaps would be 1 Cor. xv. 32.—[K.

signifies, whether travelling-cloak, or portmanteau, port-folio, it is difficult to determine. Even Chrysostom says: *τὸ ἱμάτιον λεγει· τινὲς δέ φασιν τὸ γλωσσόκομον ἔνθα τὰ βιβλία ἔκειτο.* I regard Chrysostom's view as the more probable; as he would in the other case have been more likely to say, "the books *in* or *with*," etc. Nor can we attach weight to the objection that Paul would hardly have left a travelling cloak in Troas, and then have needed it when approaching death; for granting our view that his residence in Asia Minor intervened between his visit to Crete in the spring, and his sojourn during the following winter in Nicopolis, he might well dispense with his cloak in his intervening journey to Macedonia whence he purposed to returned to Ephesus (1 Tim. i. 3, comp. with iii. 14); and now that he anticipates Timothy's coming before the winter, the desire for his cloak is perfectly explicable. *Καὶ τὰ βιβλία, μάλιστα τὰς μεμβράνας*—the former written on papyrus, the latter on parchment (Hug, § 11), and, as shewn by *μάλιστα*, more valuable to the apostle. Of Carpus in Troas, we know nothing further. Comp. further the Introduction.

Ver. 14.—The apostle now gives information regarding his condition and the position of his cause. For it is a mere makeshift to regard with Matthies, ver. 14 as an incidental reminiscence of his last mission-journey, whether we refer it to the occurrence Acts xix. or xxi. 27 (see against both De Wette), or imagine some special act for ourselves. As our epistle cannot possibly be dated at the beginning of the Roman imprisonment, these are all too remote, and could not, finally, be now first communicated to Timothy. But the language is clearly a narration, and the warning against Alexander, ver. 15, is purely incidental. We must, therefore, refer the occurrence to that imprisonment of Paul in Rome, in which the epistle was written, just as i. 15, seq., and immediately after, iv. 16, seq. Although the identity of the Alexander here named with that of Acts xix. 33, cannot be positively asserted (on this point, and on his relation to the one mentioned 1 Tim. i. 20, comp. in loco), yet I incline to the view maintained by Hug, Wieseler, etc.,* that this Alexander was from Ephesus, had come thence to Rome, and had returned again to Ephesus. It accords best with this, that Paul speaks of him as a person well-known to Timothy, and warns Timothy, who dwells in Ephesus, against him. The occasion of his coming to Rome these scholars find, in connexion with ver. 16, where Paul speaks of his "first defence," in the fact that he came there as a witness against the apostle. Admitting this sagacious conjecture as truth, the de-

* Wieseler conjectures on account of the epithet *χαλκεύς*, that this Alexander belonged to the Ephesian craftsmen, Acts xix. 24, seq.; or otherwise, that he belonged to those Asiatics who had thought they saw the Ephesian Trophimus go with him into the Temple, Acts xxi. 27–29.

claration regarding him *πολλά μοι κακὰ ἐνεδείξατο*, and *λίαν ἀνθέστηκε τοῖς ἡμετέροις λόγοις* acquire a more definite import; they both refer to the judicial proceeding, and connect themselves naturally with ver. 16. At all events, the former indicates personal enmity. On *ἐνδείκνυσθαι*, comp. Tit. ii. 10.—"May the Lord reward him according to his works;" the reading varies: A.C.D.*E.*F.G., many others, versions, and the Fathers (comp. Tisch.), read *ἀποδώσει*; while D.***E.**I.K., etc., read *ἀποδῴη*. In the natural repugnance felt at the sentiment of the optative, its origin from *ἀποδώσει* is as inexplicable as the opposite is the reverse. So judges De Wette with Wolf. And in case of the Opt., while it is unsatisfactory to say with Theophylact and others, that it is rather a prophecy than a curse, we have still no ground for charging the apostle with a revengeful spirit, and with self-contradiction (Rom. xii. 17, "rendering to none evil for evil"). In regard to the former point, Chrysostom justly observes that it is not the utterance of passion, and in regard to the latter Justin says (quæst. 125 ad Orthod.): "if indeed Paul had rendered harm in turn to Alexander who harmed him, it might be said that he practiced the opposite of what he taught." Justin explains rightly in saying that "it became an apostle not to avenge himself, but to give place to wrath;" comp. Rom. xii. 19; 1 Pet. ii. 23. The apostle merely carries out the spirit of these passages; he withholds himself all further judgment, and commits the matter to him who judges righteously. He manifestly reckons him among those incorrigible opponents whose hostility springs not from misapprehension, but from malice and from hatred of the truth. Thus the language admits an easy explanation alongside of the forgiving gentleness of ver. 16, and the grateful love of i. 16. The words of the Lord, Luke xxiii. 34, "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do," cannot be brought in opposition to this language of Paul. On *ἀποδῴη* comp. at ver. 8.

Ver. 15.—"Of whom do also thou beware," refers most naturally to the present, in which case Alexander is now in Ephesus; others refer it to Timothy's future sojourn in Rome. "For he has greatly withstood our words," is by some (as Matthies and De Wette), referred to his teachings; by others (as Heydenreich, Mack, Wieseler, and Olshausen), to his judicial defence, mentioned in the following verse. That it is uttered as a warning to Timothy is no argument against the latter view; for from this Timothy could infer what he was to guard against in this man, and the *καί* in *ὃν καὶ σὺ φυλ.* seems rather to point to personal safety. But the strongest support of this view is in ver. 16.*

* The natural reference of this verb would seem to depend on the reading. *Ἀνθέστηκε* (as read by Tisch., etc.), *he resists*, more naturally refers to his habitual opposition to their teaching; *ἀντέστη*, *he withstood*, as read by Lachmann, would more easily refer to his course in Paul's trial.—[K.

Ver. 16.—The apostle now gives an account of his first defence. These details are evidently still unknown to Timothy; and as the epistle cannot have been written at the commencement of that imprisonment which is known to us, this *πρώτη ἀπολογία* can denote only an event which transpired after the letters written during that imprisonment. Hence Phil. i. 7 furnishes no parallel to the present passage; there, too, the apostle speaks not of a definite *actio*, as here (comp. Wieseler p. 429, seq.), where, as Wieseler has strikingly shewn, we are to understand by *πρώτη ἀπολογία*, the *prima actio* which, as Paul was neither acquitted nor condemned, must have had for its result a "non liquet." How these proceedings were conducted, especially under Nero, comp. Wieseler, pp. 409 and 464. *Οὐδείς μοι συμπαρεγένετο*—"None stood by me," as witness or advocate. For the term *συμπαρ.* Luke xxiii. 48, here = adesse alicui. "But all abandoned me," an entirely different condition of the apostle from that depicted in the epistles dated from his previous imprisonment. "May it not be reckoned to them," their conduct being the result not of malice but of weakness. His pardon assumes the form of a supplication to God who alone can pardon.

Ver. 17.—"But the Lord stood by me," in contrast with the companions that had forsaken him. The presence of the Lord was evinced alike in strengthening and in rescuing him. On *ἐνδυναμόω*, Phil. iv. 13; 1 Tim. i. 12, Chrys. *παῤῥησίαν ἐχαρίσατο.* The object of this strengthening appears in the *ἵνα, κ. τ. λ.*, that through me the preaching might be fulfilled and all nations hear it. Others take *πληροφ.* as "confirmed, brought to perfect certainty;" of this, however, Rom. iv. 21, xiv. 5, where the word is used of personal conviction, is no proof. In its connexion with the following *καὶ ἀκούσῃ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*, it is much more naturally taken in the same sense as above, iv. 5; Col. iv. 12 = *πληροῦν*, Rom. xv. 19; Col. i. 25 (comp. iv. 5), as, in fact, some codd. read *πληρωθῇ.* On Luke i. 1, comp. Meyer's explanation. *Κήρυγμα* also accords better with our view. This *πληροφορηθῇ* together with *ἀκούσῃ* will then refer, according to the context, to the same event to which belongs the *ἐνεδυνάμωσε*; it does not then refer to the apostle's preaching in Rome, or to any further missionary journeys—a view discountenanced alike by vers. 6–8, which assert his approaching death, by *καὶ ἐῤῥύσθην* which represents deliverance as a new and subsequent stage in the matter, and by *καὶ ῥύσεται*, ver. 18, in which the eye of the apostle is already fixed on the end. Rather it is his defence in the capital of the world, the representative of the nations, before the supreme tribunal and the encircling multitude of people, which Paul regards as the crown and consummation of his apostolic preaching, and as preaching in the hearing of all nations, comp. Acts ix. 15, xxvi. 16. So also Wieseler (who remarks justly that *ἵνα* would, on the other

supposition, have applied better to *ἐρρύσθην*), Huther, Olshausen, etc. "And I was delivered out of the mouth of the lion," added, as a fresh point, to the "strengthening." On the Aor. Pass., comp. Winer's Gr., § 39, 7. Regarding the figure "mouth of the lion," Huther, after Calvin, states rightly that it must be taken sa a whole, "lion's jaws," and denotes simply the peril of death; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 32, *θηριομαχεῖν*, at which Wieseler cites Ign. ad Rom. c. 5, *ἀπὸ Συριάς μέχρι Ῥώμης θηριομαχῶ*. To refer the "lion" definitely to Nero (Chrys. etc.), or to his representative Helius Cæsareanus, or, with Wieseler, to the principal prosecutor, is wholly unnecessary. Mosheim takes the expression literally, nor is Neander disinclined to it.

Ver. 18.—Beside the *ἐρρύσθην* the apostle places the *ῥύσεται*; beside the momentary rescue, the prospect of his final deliverance and transfer to the heavenly kingdom. The relation of the thought is as vers. 8 to 7. In the *ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔργου πονηροῦ* he embraces assuredly the event first recounted under the category of an evil work. It is such in the purpose of the enemy; and thus every evil work denotes all the acts and designs of his adversaries toward him. To this assumption we are also led by the similar use of *ῥύεσθαι*, to which we can give no other signification than in the previous passage where it manifestly means "to rescue." The rendering "all evil, evil occurrence," is contradicted by the constant use of *πονηρός* in the moral sense, as Eph. v. 16, vi. 13 (comp. Harless); Gal. i. 4 (Winer). What the apostle here hopes for, therefore, is neither outward deliverance from the peril of death which would ill accord with *σπένδομαι*, ver. 6, nor the guarding of his person against evil action, which is likewise inconsistent with vers. 6–8, and, as Matthies rightly remarks, forms an abrupt transition from the objective to the subjective; Matth. vi. 13, to which De Wette appeals for this view, is not parallel. My view is also strikingly supported by the following *καὶ σώσει*, which defines the sense in which *ῥύσεται* is employed, viz., the saving, transfer to the heavenly kingdom. On the frequent connexion of *σώσει* with *εἰς*, comp. Winer's Gr., § 66, 2, p. 547.

On *τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπουράνιον*, De Wette remarks: "The term 'heavenly kingdom,' and the idea are alike foreign to the apostle, who knows only of a kingdom of God, which Christ will introduce at his coming (Credner, p. 470, against whom ineffectually, Matthies)." But the comparison of Phil. i. 23, to which Matthies has already appealed, shews at all events, that the apostle anticipates for believers immediately after death a life of fuller fellowship with Christ, a being with him, in accordance with which life in the flesh appears as a relative separation from him; but notwithstanding which the day of the Lord's coming remains still the day of proper decision alike in Phil. (i. 6, 10, ii. 16, iii. 20, seq.), and in this epistle (i. 12, iv. 8), and of this day the Christian is always to be ex-

pectant (Phil. iii. 20). But as to the phrase "heavenly kingdom," a glance back, ver. 1, shews that the author is perfectly familiar with the so-called Pauline doctrine of the kingdom of God and Christ (Eph. v. 5). Nor can we regard it as unpauline that this kingdom of God is here not represented as absolutely future; comp. Col. i. 13, "translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son." But this kingdom is here, we are told, conceived as a heavenly one, in opposition to the earthly kingdom which is entered by faith, and to which the apostle already belongs. But what is the future manifestation of that glorious kingdom, but the revelation of *His* hidden mighty working, who is exalted from lowliness to supreme rule, is enthroned at the right hand of God (Rom. viii. 34; Eph. i. 20; Col. iii. 1), beneath whose feet all things are subjected, and who must now reign until the last enemy is subdued under him (1 Cor. xv. 25), and then yields up the kingdom to God and the Father when it is consummated by the overthrow of every hostile power? Why then, even though the precise expression does not occur elsewhere, regard the idea as unpauline, when the apostle recognizes elsewhere a being with Christ after death, regards Christ as reigning in the heavens, and the establishment of his kingdom on earth, to which he naturally adverts when he would mention the closing period, as but the manifestation of the sovereign authority with which he is already invested? Ὧι ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, comp. Gal. i. 5, and Phil. iv. 20. De Wette takes offence at the reference of this doxology to Christ, as not found elsewhere with the apostle; he concedes, however, that it occurs probably Heb. xiii. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 11, certainly, 2 Pet. iii. 18; Rev. i. 6. For proof that it is in harmony with Paul's doctrinal system, see at Tit. ii. 13.

Ver. 19.—The closing salutations to be extended by Timothy to Priscilla and Aquila, and to the house of Onesiphorus. The two first named are known from Acts xviii. 2, 26; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Rom. xvi. 3. We find them, from these passages, residing successively at Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, and again at Rome. As they can here be neither at Rome nor Corinth, the salutation unquestionably marks Ephesus as the destination of the epistle, where, from 1 Cor. xvi. 19, it is probable they possessed a house of their own. The salutation to the house of Onesiphorus is still more decisive; see at i. 16.

Ver. 20.—"Erastus remained in Corinth, and Trophimus I left in Miletus sick." The former name occurs also Acts xix. 22; Rom. xvi. 23 (ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως sc. Corinth). The Erastus here mentioned may very probably be identical with the one named in Acts. That he is also identical with the one mentioned in Romans must be matter of uncertainty (comp. Winer, R.W.B.), since that the city chamberlain of Corinth should be reckoned among Paul's διακονούντων (Acts xix. 22) is so improbable, that it cannot be established by the

mere identity of their places of residence ; and even apart from this, I know no ground for Wieseler's assertion that the Erastus here is "unquestionably" the same as the one Rom. xvi. 23. Ἔμεινε, says the apostle of him, not ἀπέλιπον as immediately after. We cannot, therefore, determine definitely that the apostle was there the last time actually with him : thus much only is clear, that Paul had wished to have him with himself in Rome ; he was to come, but remained behind. Trophimus, on the other hand, the apostle himself fully discharges ; he was sick. We have information regarding him at Acts xx. 4, xxi. 29. He was a gentile Christian of Ephesus, and the innocent occasion of the storm raised at Jerusalem against the apostle. That the apostle did not touch at Miletus on his journey to Rome (Acts xxvii. 1) and there leave him behind on that occasion, we know : neither had he left him there on his preceding journey (Acts xx. 15, seq.): for according to Acts xxi. 29, Trophimus was actually with him in Jerusalem. The allusion then in this passage is totally inexplicable on the assumption of the epistle's dating from the first Roman imprisonment, unless with Hug, followed by Hemsen and Kling, we take ἀπέλιπον as 3 plur.; or, with Weiseler, assume that Trophimus accompanied Paul only to Myra in Lycia and from there in the Adramyttian vessel sailed still on to Miletus; or, with Baronius substitute capriciously ἐν Μελίτῃ for ἐν Μιλήτῳ after the Arabic version; or, even suppose a reference to the Cretan Miletus, which the apostle would have defined by τῆς Κρήτης, and which he had not as yet visited. We need only name these views to see that they are mere make-shifts. Who then, taking Trophimus as the 3 plur., were those who had left Trophimus behind ? The apostle speaks in the immediate context of none who had come to him ; to the coming of Onesiphorus, of whose house he had spoken there is no allusion, nor would the plural be thus explicable. Hug supposes that the Asiatics named i. 15, 16, are meant who had been committed for the judicial aid of the apostle, and were taking with them Trophimus, the occasion of the uproar at Jerusalem, as a person necessary to the trial. But Wieseler himself acknowledges that there is no evidence that they were so committed; for Paul speaks in chap. i. of Timothy's "knowing" (οἶδας) that they had abandoned him, while yet of the trial itself he manifestly had not been informed. Further, it is clear that the persons there named, ch. i. 15–18, did not form one travelling party, but Onesiphorus stands contrasted with "all those in Asia"; and if Onesiphorus was committed for judicial advocacy and discharged his duty, why does the apostle maintain an utter silence regarding it in ch. i., and say in ch. iv. that all forsook him ? As to Wieseler's explanation; to explain the simple "left in Miletus sick" of Paul's separating from Trophimus in Myra, and the latter's thence sailing

away to Miletus, is intolerably forced and harsh, and the more improbable as the change of terms, "remained," "left," indicates exactness on the part of the writer. His view also contradicts Acts xxvii. 2, which purports to mention his travelling companions, and which becomes thus not only inexact but erroneous. The passage can be explained simply and naturally only of a personal presence of the apostle at Miletus, which must then have been subsequent to the first imprisonment. But, it is objected, why should Paul further give this information to Timothy who was in Ephesus and must have known of Trophimus's detention in the neighbouring Miletus? The essence of the opposing explanation—says Wieseler of ours—consists precisely in making Paul to be *relating* to Timothy incidents in the supposed journey which followed his liberation. He believes, then, that he can perfectly do away the difficulties which cling to his explanation, if he can show that on his hypothesis it is not the purpose of his notice to inform Timothy of something unknown, but simply to explain why he at the trial vainly expected Trophimus in Rome. The ground, he adds, on which both Trophimus and Erastus were expected, assuming the composition of the epistle during the imprisonment recorded in Acts, was that they were to aid him in his judicial defence, Trophimus as having been the immediate occasion of the affair with the Jews, and Erastus as one who in his high civil position could aid him as *deprecator* (why then not also in the second imprisonment?) or perhaps also as a witness for the charge, Acts xxiv. 5, and even with reference to the depositions of the Ephesian witnesses, in case our Erastus is identical with the one mentioned Acts xix. 22: and can it be demonstrated that these two, and particularly Trophimus, would be equally necessary to Paul in the conduct of his defence in his supposed second imprisonment? To all this we reply; subtle as are these combinations, resting on a living survey of the course of Roman criminal trials, they still cannot be relied upon so far as to remove the difficulties inherent in Wieseler's explanation of the text, nor in the case of Erastus can they present anything striking. In the assumption of a second imprisonment we must unquestionably renounce such combinations, since the points of support are wanting; yet still we need but suppose that in a new judicial prosecution resort was had to the previous charges, or in general to his former life, in order to give here also legitimate scope and application to these combinations. Again the intervening salutations of ver. 20 render it extremely problematical whether the statements regarding Erastus and Trophimus have any reference to the judicial proceedings of ver. 16—a fact which jeopardizes the whole argument.* Finally,

* Neander also doubts whether the testimony of Trophimus was important to the apostle: ut supra, p. 534, seq.

our own view by no means makes it necessary that these statements should be intended to give *information* to Timothy. We can explain them as above on Wieseler's hypothesis that they point back to ver. 16, and merely *remind* Timothy that those whom he would naturally look for were not present at the trial; or, as this reference seems forbidden by the intervening ver. 19, we connect them more naturally with 19 and 21. The salutations to absent friends naturally reminds him of those absent companions whose anticipated presence in his confinement he does not enjoy. Especially the memory of Onesiphorus, who had come to him, might well recall that of those, who, though expected, had failed to come. And the object of the statement is explained by the following exhortation to Timothy to hasten before winter. Ver. 20 is then in effect but supplementary to ver. 10, just as ver. 21 is but a pressing repetition of ver. 9. And the reason why, at ver. 10, he does not speak of these two is, that there he is enumerating those who had been with him in Rome, and had left him to feel the need of others, to which number these did not belong. But at ver. 20 they are naturally mentioned alike as suggested by the memory of other friends to whom he sends salutations, and as thus introducing and enforcing his request to Timothy to come and supply their place. Wieseler, finally, urges against our view that in travelling from Asia Minor to Rome one would not go first to Corinth and thence to Miletus; and again that the reader could surely hardly refer the statement to this journey of the apostle. But, first, we need not suppose that in mentioning the persons he followed the course of his journey; he may rather have made Rome the starting-point of his reckoning, or have been guided by some other principle of arrangement; and, secondly, although the reader is not referred of necessity to the journey of the apostle, could Timothy fail to think of it, when having, by remaining in Ephesus, been parted from the apostle who has journeyed to Rome, and of course by way of Miletus, the apostle writes to him from Rome, that he had left Trophimus in Miletus?

Ver. 21 concludes naturally the summons to a speedy coming. At ver. 10 he stated that all but Luke had forsaken him; here that wished-for friends had not come to him; hence, in both cases, the σπούδασον, κ. τ. λ. "Before winter" explains the "quickly." Wieseler supposes that though the feeling of solitude dictates ver. 9, yet here the emphasis lies on the πρὸ χειμῶνος, as urging him to avoid the perils of a winter voyage, such as he had himself encountered. But how else could the apostle have expressed the wish simply that he would hasten to him before winter? Though πρὸ χειμῶνος is emphatic, it is not therefore to be rendered "winter storm," rather than simply "winter." According to Wieseler, vers. 19, 20, and 21, would alike stand isolated the former coming in most awk-

wardly to separate ver. 20 from its proper connexion, and the two latter united only by a psychological thread.

Next follow salutations to Timothy from persons otherwise unknown. That they do not occur in the letters written during his first imprisonment is naturally explained by the supposition of a second. The Latin names point to Rome. The name Linus has not failed to give scope to the critical sagacity of Dr. Baur. It is but reasonable that Linus, the subsequent bishop of Rome, should not be forgotten on this occasion, as his rival Clement had been named in Phil. by the apostle himself, and yet Linus belongs properly to the school of Paul, Clement to that of Peter! What consequences flow from this discovery! The relation of dependence on the Epistle to the Philippians becomes palpable; we are transported into the midst of the second century, and see there the rivalry of the Pauline and Petrine sects brought to a happy adjustment: and all this accrues to us from the simple naming of Linus as of one who sends salutations in company with three others who likewise send them. These forgers spun their threads finely; but not too finely for our critics. Although the entire remaining epistle contains nothing which points to this relation of parties—a single name suffices it to bring to light the hidden and profound secret!

Ver. 22.—The blessing at the close reads with Tischendorf, *ὁ κύριος* without *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* (comp. his critical remarks): we have commonly *ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου*: an imitator of the apostle would probably have written thus. "With thy spirit," as Gal. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 23; Philem. 25. This clause is also peculiar in subjoining a second blessing which applies not merely to Timothy, but to his associates: *ἡ χάρις μεθ' ὑμῶν*. We are not thence to assume a common destination to the church (in fact the epistle makes absolutely no mention of a church); comp. at Tit. iii. 15. The natural and immediate application of the words is to those saluted at ver. 19. *Ἔῤῥωσο ἐν εἰρήνῃ* and *ἀμήν* are a mere addition.

The subscription to the epistle indicates it as written from a second Roman imprisonment.

THE EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

INTRODUCTION.

The occasion and object of this epistle are unmistakable. Onesimus, the slave of a Christian master named Philemon, at Colossæ, in Phrygia, had escaped from him and come to Rome, where he became known to the imprisoned apostle, and was converted by him. On occasion of the dispatching of Tychicus to Ephesus (Eph. vi. 21), and Colossæ (Col. iv. 7–9), Paul sends him back to his master with a letter whose purpose is to procure for Onesimus a favourable and fraternal reception with his master. Paul requests at the same time that lodgings may be provided for himself.

Equally clear and transparent are the contents of the epistle. After its opening address, vers. 1–3 (on its joint-direction to others along with Philemon, comp. at ver. 2), there follows as usual, the expression of thanks for the good which Paul hears of Philemon, especially for his active love, 4–7, then the presentation of his request itself, 8–21, and, in conclusion, the announcement of his own intended coming, salutations, and the usual blessing.

Of Philemon and Onesimus personally, we know nothing beyond what is contained in this epistle and that to the Colossians. In the latter Onesimus is expressly named as belonging to Colossæ. But the question rises whether, as assumed above, Philemon also belonged there. Ver. 2 of this epistle specifies Archippus as a joint-receiver of the epistle, whence he must certainly have sustained a near relation to Philemon, and have resided in the same place. The same Archippus, it can scarcely be doubted, is named Col. iv. 17, and many expositors (so especially Wieseler, Chronology of the Apostolic Age, p. 452), find in the *καί* by which ver. 17 is connected with vers. 15 and 16, which speak of the Christians of Laodicea, a ground for making Archippus also a resident of Laodicea; and in conformity with this, the Const. Apost. vii. 46, designate him as bishop of Laodicea. In that case Philemon's residence and the destination of our epistle would also be Laodicea. It is urged in support of this view, that if Archippus exercised his *διακονία* in Colossæ, the

apostle's exhortation would have been directed to him personally, rather than through others. To this Meyer has replied, and I accord perfectly with him, that that argument drawn from the connecting *καί* would have force only if ver. 17 followed immediately on ver. 15; and that it is unnatural to suppose Paul requiring Archippus to be admonished by a foreign church. Again, from the position of the places, Tychicus with Onesimus came from Rome first to Laodicea, and then to Colossæ. If, therefore, the letter indicated by the *τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας* be understood as the one to Philemon, we must assume from this as well as from Paul's speaking of that letter as a thing known to his readers, that Tychicus had already been to Laodicea, and had delivered the letter to Philemon. But there then arises the difficulty why Onesimus did not remain with his master in Laodicea, and how Paul could take for granted that Onesimus would accompany Tychicus to Colossæ, and also (Col. iv. 7–9), remain there a considerable time. For the traditions regarding Philemon and Onesimus, see Winer, R.W.B.

With the untenable supposition of Philemon's residence in Laodicea, is (as intimated above) closely connected another, that our epistle is the long-lost Epistle to the Laodiceans, a view earlier propounded (see De Wette, and Wieseler p. 451), and recently defended by Wieseler and assumed by Thiersch. It, of course, is overthrown along with the hypothesis which places Philemon in Laodicea. And if we are not authorized in assuming that the Epistle to Philemon was designed for the whole church at Laodicea (comp. Philem. 2, and Col. iv. 15, which give us two *κατ' οἶκον ἐκκλησίαι*), we surely cannot suppose that it would have been required to be read to a foreign church, and that when it is essentially a mere commendatory epistle. Onesimus was certainly sufficiently commended to the church in Colossæ by Tychicus, and the epistle to themselves (iv. 9); for this purpose, therefore, the reading of the other was unnecessary. The epistle to the Laodiceans too, seems from all indications to have sprung from a like occasion, and to have been similar in contents to that to the Colossians. Hence De Wette and Meyer justly, as I think, dissent from this theory.

The view, moreover, which we have expressed regarding the *time and place of the composition* of our epistle, though guaranteed by the tradition of the ancient church, has not been unassailed. As the Epistle to the Philippians has been transferred from the imprisonment in Rome to that in Cesarea, so also, and with a wider consent, those to the Ephesians, the Colossians, and to Philemon (comp. Ols. Introd. to Eph.). It belongs not to this place to discuss this question in its full extent. The main objection to the hypothesis alluded to has been urged by Olshausen, viz., that the apostle has a freedom of religious action conceivable only in his condition at

Rome ; comp. Eph. vi. 19 ; Col. iv. 3, 4, with Acts xxviii. 30, 31, and Acts xxiv. 23 ; comp. also Wieseler, p. 420, who thoroughly investigated and weighed the reason for Cesarea and against Rome ; Harless, Introd. to Eph., Neander Apost. Zeitalt., p. 506.* The question can be discussed here only so far as the present epistle was made to minister to Böttger's hypothesis. It is deemed improbable that Onesimus should have gone to Rome ; he would have been more likely to go to Cesarea. We can most certainly say in reply (with Harless, Neander, Wieseler, etc.), that Rome is precisely the place to which he would most naturally be drawn, and where he would deem himself the safest. Again, the number of Paul's companions is deemed greater than would be likely at Rome (Philem. 24). But Aristarchus and Luke certainly accompanied him to Rome, and the letter to the Philippians, which most persons admit to have been written in Rome, shews him surrounded by brethren ; and those who admit the genuineness of 2 Timothy, which unquestionably was written from Rome, will mark also the same phenomenon. The argument drawn from *πρὸς ὥραν*, ver. 15, as implying too short a time for Onesimus' reaching, and conversion in Rome, may be regarded as abandoned (comp. Meyer). Again, Meyer and Wiggers (Stud. u. Krit., 1841, p. 436, seq.), find the reason for Onesimus' not being mentioned in the Epistle to the Ephesians as in that to the Colossians, in the fact that from Cesarea Tychicus would travel by Colossæ to Ephesus ; but the circumstance is abundantly explained, first, by the fact that Onesimus appears as from Colossæ (*ἐξ ὑμῶν*), and secondly, the utter absence of personal references in the Epistle to the Ephesians. Neither, finally, is the direction about lodging an argument for Cesarea. The connexion into which Meyer himself brings this charge with his preceding prayer for Onesimus, explains, I think, how the apostle is led to it, although Colossæ is far from Rome, and his liberation is still somewhat remote. It is also an argument against the Cesarean hypothesis that Paul in his last journey before his imprisonment, had taken a solemn and final leave of the churches of Asia Minor. Is it credible that he had, in so short a time changed his determination, and made arrangements to visit them ? Can he have again repressed his longing after Rome, his definite purpose to go thither (Rom. xv. 23 ; Acts xix. 21); nay, even have delayed voluntarily the fulfilment of the promise given him by God (Acts xxiii. 11), by a new residence in Phrygia, and then, certainly, also in Asia Minor ? And if the direction to prepare

* The most thorough assault against the common view has been made by Böttger (comp. the Introd. to Phil. § 3), in attempting to make out from the Acts and from the Roman judicial proceedings that Paul's imprisonment at Rome continued, at most, but five days. I rejoice in being able to refer to Wieseler's decisive refutation of it, pp. 407–415, as confirming and completing my argument in the above-named Introduction, but with which I was unacquainted when I composed it.

lodgings points to a speedy coming, where could he have anticipated this in Cesarea? Meyer, indeed, states that Paul could have conceived the idea of coming to Asia quite as easily in Cesarea as in Rome, and even more so, as he might hope to take Asia in his way in his journey to and from Cesarea to Rome. And if, asks Meyer, we know from Phil. ii. 24, that he wished from Rome to retread the scene of his former labours, why not also from Cesarea? But it must assuredly be conceded that the length of time is an important element in the matter, and the change of the purpose intimated in Acts xx. 25, finds a much more natural explanation, if the Roman imprisonment with all its vicissitudes had intervened between that intimation and the announcement of his return. The conversion of Onesimus also accords better with his position at Rome than at Cesarea.—There is absolutely no stringent ground in our epistle for departing from the ancient tradition which assigns these epistles collectively to Rome. And that this cannot be separated from the others is indisputable. For it is brought into inseparable connexion with the Epistle to the Colossians by Col. iv. 7–9, in which Onesimus appears as the companion of Tychicus; by the identity of Paul's entire condition; and especially by the identity of the friends who in each epistle surround him; while again their contents, their common bearer Tychicus, and the like situation of the apostle in both, evince an equally close relation between the Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians. We thus abide by our view expressed in the Introduction to the Philippians, in regard to the date of the composition of these epistles, and in particular to that before us. We cannot, however, fix the dates with more precision than we have there done.

The *genuineness* of this epistle has not been called in question either within or without the church; for Jerome's notice of some who denied its apostolic validity from its failure in matter of doctrinal edification, we need scarcely mention. Its genuineness is attested by the canon in Muratori, by that of Marcion, by Tertullian, and others after him. Dr. Baur is the first, who after denying the genuineness collectively of the other epistles which date from the Roman imprisonment, has classed this with them primarily on account of its historical relation to them. The fate of our epistle then is bound up with that of those. Still Baur recognizes the propriety of the claim that if not the probability, at least the possibility of its non-apostolic origin is made out from the epistle itself. Such a possibility he finds partly in the language, and still more in the contents of the epistle. "The objections on the score of language," remarks De Wette, "have but slight significancy." Nay, they could not even, in most cases, have been made by Baur, unless he had assumed in advance the spuriousness of the other epistles

which date from the Roman imprisonment, viz., the first and the second; so that this argument thus assumes no independent form, but stands connected with the relation, critical and historical, of this epistle to them. Nay, criticism has, by its assumptions, created the very problem of explaining how our epistle bears in its use of language, such a relation to them and to the undoubtedly genuine ones, that nearly all the cases excepted to by Baur are explained from them and from them alone. Thus *συστρατιώτης*, besides, only at Phil. ii. 25; *ἀνῆκον*, Eph. v. 4; Col. iii. 18, and Philem. 8; *ἐπιτάσσω*, the verb indeed not elsewhere, but *ἐπιταγή*, seven times in Paul; and the combination *τὸ ἀνῆκον ἐπιτάσσειν*, certainly contains nothing remarkable. *Πρεσβύτης*, besides, only Tit. ii. 2 (and Luke i. 18); *εὔχρηστος*, further only 2 Tim. ii. 21, iv. 11; *ἀπέχω*, except Matth. vi. 2, seq.; Luke vi. 24, in the sense of Philem. 15, only further Phil. iv. 18; *προσοφείλω*, only here; but the simple is common with Paul, and here the context abundantly explains the compound. *Ξενία*, besides, only Acts xxviii. 23: but Rom. xvi. 23, *ξένος*, and if the apostle has the idea of *ξενία* to express at Philemon, why should he not use the word? *Σπλάγχνα*, as here, frequent with the apostle, as Baur himself acknowledges. There remain *εὔχρηστος*, *δύνασθαι*, *ἀποτίω*. In respect to the two former, the use of a much rarer word would be explained by the verbal allusion (on the use of rare words in Paronomasia and verbal allusions, see Winer's Gr., § 68); but they are not specially rare. *Ἀποτίω* is vouched for by *τίω*, 2 Thess. i. 9; *ἀποδίδωμι*, Paul's ordinary word, would be here inappropriate, and so *ἀναπληρόω*, *ἀνταναπληρόω*, *καταρτίζω*. We might, were it necessary, adduce still other examples to shew the specific relationship, in language, of this epistle to those of Paul. Comp. *ἀναπαύειν τὰ σπλάγχνα* with *ἀναπαύειν τὸ πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. xvi. 18; 2 Cor. vii. 13; *ἐνεργής*, with 1 Cor. xvi. 9, and the frequently recurring *ἐνεργέω*, *ἐνέργεια*, *ἐνέργημα*. So *συναιχμάλωτος*, found besides only Rom. xvi. 7; Col. iv. 10; *τάχα* only Rom. v. 7, etc.

But the non-apostolic origin of the epistle is inferred mainly from its contents. If the Pastoral Epistles are too general in their contents, this is too concrete. The object of the epistle is "too extraordinary not to furnish ground of doubt and suspicion." The epistle, it is said, makes use of the special case only as a text for Christian reflections. That the returning slave has become a Christian is the main thought, and its further contents are only the development of what was conceived to lie in the very idea and essence of Christianity. Christianity involves the beautiful conception that those whom it invites are brought into a real essential fellowship, so that one recognizes in the other his real self. As such, too, we are informed, Christianity is conceived in the pseudo-Clementina, and as these are justly styled a Christian romance, our epistle becomes but

"the germ of a spiritual poem." Thus we have safely reached the Clementines, that sure harbour for all the productions of the apostolic age that encounter the storm of negative criticism. True, negative criticism has hitherto found this epistle unassailable; but positive criticism takes pity on it, and assigns it in advance its place; and that, let it be observed, to the decided advantage of the epistle. For it now acquires an instructive and influential significancy, while previously it passed for a mere "valueless document, admirably exhibiting the amiable benevolent character of the apostle." But the assertion that the historical element in this epistle is a mere fiction to illustrate a sentiment, is without a shadow of foundation. Its main purpose is practical, to procure for Onesimus a favourable reception from his master, and all its so-called "Christian reflections," are subordinated to this end. This alone explains alike its plan and execution. And how thoroughly do these bear the impress of Paul's heart and spirit! What admirable blending of dignity, humility and love! What fulness and elevation of Christian thought shed their influence over one of the most familiar events of life, so that while "treating a theme usually humble and abject, he rises *suo more* to a Divine elevation" (Calvin). What force of eloquence! What subtlety of thought, and delicate sharpness of style! The criticism then which seeks to find in this epistle grounds for assailing its Pauline origin, runs the "hazard" of being charged not merely with being "hypercritical," but utterly uncritical.

For the *Literature* we may name: L. Chr. G. Schmid.; Pauli Ap. ad Philemonem Epistola, etc., Lips., 1786. Storr: interpretatio Epistolii ad Philem. Opusc., ac. II., J. F. v. Flatt; Vorlesungen über die Briefe Pauli an die Philipper, Colosser, Thessalonicher und an Philemon. Herausgegeben von Kling. Tüb., 1829. Hagenbach; P. Ep. ad Philem. Bas., 1829. Maur. Rothe: P. ad Philem. Ep. interpr. hist., exeg. Bremen, 1844. J. Fr. Ign. Demme: Erkl. des Briefes an Philem., Breslau, 1844. Koch: Comm. über den Br. P. an Philem., Zür, 1846. But particularly the Commentaries of De Wette and Meyer.

EXPOSITION

OF THE

EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

Vers. 1, 2.—Address and Salutation.

Vers. 1.—"Paul, a prisoner of Jesus Christ and Timothy the brother." Paul makes no mention of his apostolical dignity, since in fact, at ver. 8, he expressly waves his apostolic prerogative. He presents himself as a prisoner (*δέσμιος*) of Jesus Christ, *i. e.*, one whom Christ, sc. his cause, has brought into and holds in imprisonment (Winer's Gr., § 30, 2, B.); yet precisely thus he hopes to gain more with Philemon than by asserting his authority as an apostle. The second Epistle to Timothy, although likewise a strictly personal letter (not so 1 Timothy and Titus), still designates his apostolic character; but the fact is explained by the different character of its contents.—Timothy, as repeatedly elsewhere (comp. at Phil. i. 1), is named uniting with Paul in the epistle; in what sense, see also at Phil. Here, doubtless, he shares Paul's solicitude for Onesimus and joins in requesting his pardon. The adding of his name must be with Philemon an additional inducement for complying with the request. That Paul employs the designation "prisoner of Jesus Christ," for the reason above assigned, is shewn also in the fact that he does not, as Phil. i. 1, in consequence of mentioning Timothy, seek an epithet (as *δοῦλοι*), which would apply to them in common.

Ver. 2 names the persons to whom the epistle is addressed; first of all Philemon himself—*ἀγαπητὸς καὶ συνεργὸς ἡμῶν* (viz. Paul and Timothy's co-worker). How far he had been their fellow-labourer in the gospel (Rom. xvi. 21, etc.), is unknown; we are immediately informed that he had collected a church in his house, of which he not improbably was presbyter; comp. Gen. Introd. to the Pastoral Epistles, § 3. "Apphia, the beloved," not improbably the wife of Philemon (A.D.*E.*F.G., etc., read *ἀδελφῇ*, used then like *ἀδελφός*, ver. 1). "Archippus our fellow-soldier." *Συστρατιώτης* again at Phil. ii. 25, used as climax to *σύνεργος* of Epaphroditus, the com-

panion of Paul's imprisonment (ver. 23), whose self-sacrificing love had brought him near to death. The term here probably points to certain eventful scenes in which they had mingled together. Of his identity with Col. iv. 17, we can scarcely doubt; but from the term *διακονία* there used, we cannot certainly infer that he was a deacon; comp. 2 Tim. iv. 5. Olshausen regards him as Philemon's son; he must certainly, like Apphia, have belonged to the family. The epistle is also designed, although treating a purely personal matter, for the Christians who assembled in Philemon's house;* a body not limited to the family, but neither embracing the entire church at Colossæ; comp. Rom. xvi. 5; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Col. iv. 15. The closeness of the intimacy which would arise between these explains the apostle's including them in his address. It seems to me not in harmony with the thought of the epistle to suppose that Paul thus indirectly seeks to impose compulsion on Philemon. On the importance attached to these domestic churches for the formation of the church constitution (particularly by Kist.), comp. the General Introduction on the above-cited passage. Ver. 3, the customary greeting, as Phil. i. 2.

VERS. 4–7.—INTRODUCTORY THANKSGIVING FOR PHILEMON'S LOVE AND FAITH.

Ver. 4.—Εὐχαριστῶ—the common introduction in the epistles of the apostle, Rom. i. 8, etc., proceeding from an affectionate recognition of the good found in his readers. "My God," comp. at Phil. i. 3. Πάντοτε belongs to *εὐχαριστῶ*, as the emphatic word, not to the following *μνείαν ποιούμενος*, as shown by comparing 1 Cor. i. 4; Eph. i. 16; Phil. i. 4, etc. Μνείαν σου ποιούμενος (on this Middle, Winer's Gr, § 38, 5, p. 229) ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου states the occasion on which such thanksgiving is offered to God as the author of all good; comp. Eph. i. 16; 1 Thess. i. 2, etc.

Ver. 5.—The exposition of what follows will be influenced by our construction of *ἀκούων*, which by De Wette, etc., is referred to *μν. ποιουμ.*, but by Meyer and the majority to *εὐχαριστῶ*. The parallel passages (as Rom. i. 8; Eph. i. 15; 2 Tim. i. 5), the nature of the case (as prayer can hardly be conceived as first called forth by the reports), the circumstance that the good reports regarding Philemon much more naturally suggest the "thanksgiving" than the "making mention," etc., and above all, the fact that otherwise no subject is assigned for the thanksgiving as elsewhere, all favour the latter construction. Ἀκούων not *ἀκούσας* as Col. i. 4, because the reference is here not to a definite account: he hears of this repeatedly as by Epaphras, Onesimus, etc. The ground of thanksgiving is Phile-

* Ἡ *οἰκία δὲ αὐτοῦ μέχρι τοῦ παρόντος μεμένηκε.*—Theodoret.

mon's love and faith, not love and truth, as Flatt, Hagenbach and Meyer, who thus seek to escape the harshness of referring τὴν πίστιν to πρὸς τὸν κύριον, and τὴν ἀγάπην to εἰς τοὺς πάντας, which however contains nothing extraordinary (Winer's Gr. § 50, 2, p. 365), and is supported by the change of prepositions πρός and εἰς. So De Wette, Demme, Koch, Grotius, Calvin, the Fathers. It is objected that τὴν ἀγάπην has already its limitation in σοῦ. But this may belong equally to τὴν πίστιν, and apparently from its preceding the limited subject *does* belong to it. And ἣν ἔχεις can certainly as well belong also to ἀγάπη as αἴτινες, 1 Tim. i. 5, to μῦθοι. It is an objection to taking πίστις as "truth," that Paul is accustomed always to connect ἀγάπη and πίστις in a doctrinal sense, as the two fundamental pillars of Christianity; Eph. i. 15; 1 Thess. iii. 6, etc., particularly Col. i. 4. From the contemporaneous composition of the two epistles, and the general resemblance of their introductions, I regard it as wholly unnatural to interpret πίστις differently in the two passages. Meyer's remark, in reply, that faith elsewhere takes the precedence in the genetic relation is unquestionably correct: but the apostle could certainly proceed in the reverse order from the fruit to the root, and here love would naturally take the first place, as the principle to which he is specially to appeal. He thus mentions first love and then the root, in order to bring out Philemon's entire moral condition; complectitur totam Christiani hominis perfectionem—Calvin. A further argument against this explanation of πίστις is that immediately after, the signification of the word must be changed (as Hagenbach), or if adhered to (as by Meyer), at the expense of any fitting sense. On ἅγιοι, Phil. i. 1. Πάντας must be noticed as indicating the diffusiveness of Philemon's love, whence we may also reason to its intensity. For the unobjectionable character of the expression πίστιν ἔχειν πρός τινα, see Winer's Gr. § 50, 2, p. 365.

Ver. 6.—Ὅπως, not *ita ut*, but "in order that" (Winer's Gr., § 53, 6, p. 410). But of what does it express the purpose? Ὅπως is referred to μνείαν ποιούμενος, "making mention in order that," etc. (so De Wette, Winer, etc.), or to ἔχεις, marking the striving of Philemon (so Bengel, Meyer). The former construction would require that ἀκούων be connected with μν. ποιού. assigning the reason for this rather than for the "giving thanks": and as the introductory intercession and thanksgiving refer elsewhere to the relative deficiency of the readers, the construction with ἔχεις seems also preferable in sense. But what, it is specially asked, are we to understand by the κοινωνία τῆς πίστεως, and what the sense of the entire clause? Κοινωνία can denote communication (Calvin, De Wette), or share, participation in something (Meyer), or fellowship, in the sense of Acts ii. 42; Phil. i. 5. In the first sense it is taken by Calvin: "fides quum intus non latet otiosa, sed per veros effectus se profert ad homines." So De Wette:

"the communication of thy faith as well in the manifestation of love toward individuals, as in furtherance of the gospel," (the latter is here certainly irrelevant). In the first sense of active communication, the gen. τῆς πίστεως is taken subjectively, and the sense of the whole is "that your faith may by active communication demonstrate its efficacy in everything good." Ἐπίγνωσις is then practical knowledge, experience. So De Wette; "may prove itself influential in the knowledge of every good which (in principle and spirit) is in us (Christians)," adding to Œcumenius, Theophylact, διὰ ἐπιγνῶναί σε καὶ πράττειν τὸ ἀγαθόν. But the πίστις as subjective is opposed to this explanation; for κοινωνία denoting active impartation should be followed by the genitive of the object. Again, this construction involves tautology; for how can an active κοινωνία, revealing itself in love, be conceived otherwise than ἐνεργής? How become ἐνεργής only in knowledge? And if ἡμῖν is without doubt the true reading (according to A.C.D.E.I.K., etc., comp. Tischendorf, since the origin of ὑμῖν may be traced to the Colossians) why the contrasting of σου and ἡμῖν?

Meyer explains the word; participation in something, (as 1 Cor. i. 9, x. 16), and as he consistently renders πίστις here also "truth," he translates: that (ὅπως dependent on ἔχειν) participation in thy truth may prove mighty through, by means of, the knowledge (on the part of the participants) of every good of which we are possessors. This κοινωνία, he remarks, here establishes an experimental knowledge of Christian blessings, as faith, hope, love, etc. While this explanation is grammatically unobjectionable, κοινωνία being taken in its customary sense and construction, and κοιν. and ἐπιγ. being demonstrably referable only to the same subject, it still yields but an unsatisfactory sense. The very expression: "participation in Philemon's fidelity," is obscure; for it would naturally mean that they are as true as Philemon, while here it would seem to denote participation in its fruits. Again, who are these participants? As Meyer constructs ὅπως with ἔχεις, they would seem to be the "Lord" and the "saints," or perhaps only the latter. And is *their* participation in Philemon's fidelity to become efficacious by means of an experimental knowledge of the good which is in Christians? Are they not already Christians, that their participation is to become vital and efficient by means of an experimental knowledge of the good in Christians? We then have the sentiment (of Heinrich and Hagenbach) "whence our adversaries may be able to ascertain how much good our religion generates in us." And was the object of their Christian knowledge to be vital participation in Philemon's fidelity, *i. e.* by the experiencing of its manifestations? For Meyer manifestly perverts the thought if he makes κοινωνία the means. Nor could this explanation gain much by rendering πίστις "faith." The

majority of expositors, as Chrysostom, Theophylact, Luther, Bengel, etc., take *κοινωνία* as communion, and *πίστεως* as genitive of the subject, and render: which you have in common with us. This view is open indeed to the objection of De Wette and Meyer that "with us" is foisted in, and the whole thought is irrelevant: still I hold this as substantially the correct explanation of *κοινωνία*: comp. Acts ii. 42; Phil. i. 5, ii. 1. I translate: "that the fellowship of thy faith may become efficient," and take *κοιν.* as the leading conception which must not be transformed into a relative and subordinate one, and *τῆς πίστεως*, as is obvious from what is said on *κοινωνία*, as genitive of the subject. The apostle with particular reference to the *εἰς πάντας τ. ἁγ.*, declares the purpose of Philemon, viz., that the fellowship of his faith should not remain inoperative and dead, a mere conception of the intellect, unconnected with the heart and the life, but that this fellowship, of course with the saints, the objects of his love—may prove living and operative in the demonstration of love. But in the fullness of his thoughts, in place of repeating the term "love," he expresses in *ἐν ἐπιγνώσει παντὸς, κ. τ. λ.*, the way in which this fellowship of faith becomes operative in love. It becomes operative since it discerns, as only love can, the good which is in another, beholds in him the grace and the power of Christ, and precisely thus becomes living and effectual *εἰς Χριστόν*, whose gifts and graces it perceives in another, and feels itself drawn to him as their source. In his love to the saints, Philemon wishes thus to recognize the riches of Christ himself, and by this recognition be himself strengthened and aided on in his believing fellowship with Christ. This explanation alone gives to *τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν* a definite significance; it refers to the *πάντες ἅγιοι* under whom Paul includes himself. *Ἐνεργής* acquires thus, in contrast with an existing, indeed, but inactive fellowship of faith, an appropriate sense, and *κοινωνία* needs in its relation to ver. 5, no supplement. So Olshausen: Paul wishes that Philemon, in consequence of his believing fellowship with him, may discover more and more how in him and in all believers the true good is deposited. On *ἐπίγνωσις*, full and accurate knowledge, such as springs only from love, see at Phil. i. 9. It need not be styled strictly "recognition;" comp., however, 2 Cor. vi. 9. *Πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν* refers not to moral conduct but, as shewn by *ἐν* (comp. *e. g.* 2 Tim. i. 5), to the good imparted by Christ (1 Tim. i. 14).

Ver. 7.—*Γάρ* therefore assigns not the reason of the prayer (see at *ἀκούων*), but, in accordance also with the sentiment, only the subjective ground of *εὐχαριστῶ*. The reading varies here between *χαράν* (so A.C.D.E.F.G., etc.) and *χάριν* (I.K. Minusc., Fathers) and also between *ἔχομεν* (D***I.K. Minusc. vers. the Fathers), *ἔσχον* (A.C.F.G., etc.), and *ἔσχομεν* (D*E. d. e. Jerome); the critics are of very

various opinions. If *χάριν* is genuine which, however, might through the influence of ver. 4 be taken into the text, it cannot here denote "gratitude," but must rather be taken in the sense of *χαρά*, "enjoyment, joy, pleasure," as remarked by Theophylact. We find elsewhere *χαρά* and *παράκλησις* connected as here, 2 Cor. vii. 4, 13. We may affirm more confidently that *ἔσχον* or (including Timothy) *ἔσχομεν* is to be read, pointing back to the time of the first account regarding him. Παράκλησις in reference to the condition of the apostle as prisoner. Ἐπὶ *τῇ ἀγάπῃ*, comp. on the position of *ἀγάπη* in ver. 4. The apostle now gives the essential ground of his comfort and joy, viz, "because the hearts of the saints are refreshed by thee, my brother!" On *σπλάγχνα* comp. Phil. i. 8; 2 Cor. vi. 12, and below vers. 12, 20. On *ἀναπαύειν*, refresh, so *ἀναψύχω*, 2 Tim. i. 16, comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 18; 2 Cor. vii. 13, and below ver. 20. De Wette: by the enjoyment of thy benefactions which have put an end to their need and care. Calvin: it is a great mistake to refer this to animal nourishment. Meyer correctly remarks that the special instances of this ministry of love are not adduced. "Brother"—an outgush of the heart in remembrance of this kindness.

Vers. 8–12.—The apostle now passes to the object which has dictated this letter; he exhorts Philemon, from that principle of love which has displayed itself so signally in him, to give to Onesimus, whom he sends back, a reception corresponding to the change which he has experienced, and not to deal harshly with him for his former offence.

Ver. 8.—Διό points back to ver. 7; in consequence of my joy, etc., and belongs not to *ἔχων* but to *παρακαλῶν*. Thus: therefore, although I in Christ might have much confidence in enjoining on thee what is becoming, for the sake of love I rather admonish thee. Παρρησία confidence, given, viz. by his apostolic office, and resulting from his fellowship with Christ. Luther strikingly remarks: he renounces his own right to exercise compulsion, that he may constrain Philemon to a like renunciation of his right. Calvin: "we enjoin with authority that which we wish to wrest by necessity even from those who are unwilling: * * * he teaches by his own example that pastors are to seek gently to allure their disciples rather than to draw them. And certainly while, stooping in to entreat, he waives his own prerogative, he is likely to accomplish far more than by commanding." Ἐπιτάσσειν, command: in contrast with it is the *παρακαλῶ* following. Τὸ *ἀνῆκον* general, "what is becoming"; Paul has in mind the proper reception of Onesimus: comp. Eph. v. 4; Col. iii. 18; Rom. i. 28; Tit. ii. 1.

Vers. 9, 10.—Διὰ *τὴν ἀγάπην*, not the love of Philemon or Paul, but love in general: that love, which with thee is so potent, may attain its due. See De Wette, Meyer, etc. Τοιοῦτος *ὤν*, κ. τ. λ.

These commentators are also right in rejecting the view which constructs τοιοῦτος ὤν with the preceding παρακαλῶ, or sets off τοιοῦτος —Χριστοῦ between two colons, and they both refer it to the following παρακαλῶ, which forms otherwise an awkward asyndeton. They differ however in the more definite conception of τοιοῦτος ὤν in that Meyer regards it as a summing up of the quality expressed in ver. 8, πολλὴν—μᾶλλον παρακαλῶ, and ὡς Παῦλος—Χριστοῦ as enforcing the following παρακαλῶ from Paul's personal relation: De Wette, on the contrary, takes τοιοῦτος ὤν as an indefinite designation of the entire character, whose special points are given with the ὡς, and is inclined, in fact, to assume a parallelism between this and the preceding participial clause ἔχων, and find here a like thought as in the preceding, not as Schrader, a threat, but nearly as Wetstein; cum talis sim ut tibi imperare possim, magis tamen hortor; tanquam senex, inquam, imo etiam vinctus hortor. It seems inconsistent with Meyer's view, that ver. 8 furnishes no such description of character which can be summed up in τοιοῦτος ὤν. Since what from special reasons he does once, does not therefore assume the character of a personal quality. And why this summing up which but adds diffuseness to the discourse? It seems to me much more suited to the living language of the epistle not to refer τοιοῦτος ὤν back, nor again to take it as a mere preparatory term to be defined by the words which follow: I regard it rather as a direct, life-like reference to the person of the apostle, "being such an one," sc. as I am, and as a further, but independent, statement of the character of the subject as conceived and represented, ὡς Παῦλος πρεσβύτης, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ δέσμιος (in which the descriptive points are not three but two, Παῦλος not expressing a quality co-ordinately with the others). The necessary reference of τοιοῦτος to what precedes is neither true in itself nor in this particular case; nor does Meyer's doctrine affect our exposition, that ὡς, *as*, presupposes the limitation of τοιοῦτος, for ὡς I do not explain as immediately limiting τοιοῦτος, but a still further, though certainly illustrative, determination of the subject. The example cited by Wetstein from Andocides is therefore entirely similar, except that there τοιοῦτος ὤν points back, here to something presented to the mind outside of the context: in each case ὡς is not subordinately descriptive of τοιοῦτος, but goes back directly to the subject. Thus: I, in my circumstances, (I) whom thou hast to imagine to thyself as the aged Paul, and now further as a prisoner of Jesus Christ, exhort thee. He teaches, he has said ver. 8, where he might command, and by way of emphasis adduces in advance the considerations which enforce the exhortation: compliance with the request becomes a matter of piety. The name "Paul" brings vividly before Philemon the whole beloved person of the apostle. Both usage and the connexion

forbid us to take *πρεσβύτης* as a designation of office. *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* is added to give cogency to the statement. Ver. 10. *παρακαλῶ σε* perhaps purposely follows close on the preceding statements, "I in such circumstances entreat thee," shouldst thou not then cheerfully comply? And equally touching and forcible with his account of the author of the request is now that of its object, "concerning my son, whom I begot in my bonds, Onesimus," as is abundantly obvious in the *ἐμοῦ τέκνου*, etc. On the attraction at *Ὀνήσιμον* see Winer's Gr., § 66, 5, p. 553. The name is, as it were, hidden behind the descriptive clauses which precede it. *Τέκνον—γεννάω*—a mode of designation familiar to the apostle, 1 Cor. iv. 14, 15; Gal. iv. 19, etc.

Vers. 11, 12.—Ver. 10 gives the relation of Onesimus to Paul; the present his relation to Philemon, both the former and the present one, and the request, enforced by both, for his favourable reception. In the "once unprofitable to thee, but now profitable," etc. Paul would seem to endeavour to soften the remembrances which the name of Onesimus must awaken in Philemon. With the "once unprofitable," he meets the thought of Philemon; but the *ποτέ* intimates that a change has taken place which is immediately affirmed positively and expressly in the "but now useful." *Ἄχρηστος* contains as Bengel (erat enim noxius), Flatt, etc., assume, a litotes. The word only here (similarly *ἀχρεῖος*, Matth. xxv. 30; Luke xvii. 10, *ἀλυσιτελής*, Heb. xiii. 17); on the contrary, *εὔχρηστος*, useful, 2 Tim. ii. 21, iv. 11. "And to me," adds the apostle by way of strengthening the thought. As to the fact implied in *ἄχρηστος*, see ver. 18. *Εὔχρηστος* is referred by De Wette, Meyer, etc., to his conversion, in consequence of which Onesimus could be serviceable to Philemon in his spiritual interests, and was so already to the apostle, as his conversion was to him a *καρπὸς ἔργου* (Phil. i. 22, ii. 16). But in that case *εὔχρηστος* must be referred in one sense to Philemon, in another to Paul; and for the latter reference *εὔχρηστος* would certainly be no appropriate term. I prefer therefore to refer *εὔχρηστος* to the same class of relations as *ἄχρηστος*, as is also indicated at ver. 13, comp. 1 Tim. vi. 2. So Flatt: while Christianity fits man for citizenship in heaven, it renders him also the most useful citizen of earth. On the allusion in *εὔχρηστον, ἄχρηστον* to the significance of the name *Ὀνήσιμος*, comp. Winer's Gr. § 68, 2, note.* *Ὃν ἀπέπεμψα*, whom I send back to thee; comp. on the Aor. Winer's Gr., § 40, 5, b. 2. Valuable Codd. add *σοί*.

Ver. 12 contains the request, thus skilfully introduced, for his favourable reception. *Σὺ δέ* (wanting A.C. 17), in contrast with the apostle who sends him. The apostle's interceding love is not satisfied with simply naming the object; he adds as explanatory *τοῦτ'*

* An allusion in *εὔχρηστος*, etc., to the name *Χριστός* (so also Olshausen), is inconsistent with the subjoined pronouns.

ἔστι τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα = my own heart (comp. ver. 7, 20) so in Lat. *corculum*, with Plautus, etc. Against explaining it as "Son," see Meyer. What supplication could be more cogent? Si in servum suum implacabilis fuisset, in Pauli viscera sæviebat. Thus prays the apostle for the fugitive slave, putting himself, as says Luther, into his very place. Since προσλαβοῦ is wholly wanting in important Codd. (A.F.G. 17), and has in some Minusc. and versions a different place, and its omission may also have drawn after itself that of σὺ δέ, it is deemed spurious by the most recent critics, Lachmann, Tischendorf, De Wette and Meyer. The introduction of the relative, caused the construction to be left incomplete, and the verb appears only at ver. 17. With this hypothesis I conceive that the contents of 13–17 admirably correspond. Vers. 13–16 appear then in accordance with their contents, rather as parenthetical and subordinate thoughts, encircled, as it were, and pressed together by the leading thought, and ver. 17, εἰ οὖν ἐμὲ ἔχεις κοινωνόν then connects itself resumptively with τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα above, in order at the close of the whole to bring out with the utmost impressiveness the request, thus diligently and thoroughly fortified. The whole passage gains by this in coherence and energy, and the statements 13–16, assume at once, as further paving the way for the request, their proper and natural relation.

Vers. 13–16.—The expression "my own heart," suggests the following remarks, in which Paul explains why he did not retain one so dearly loved with himself. But he does this in such a way that the sending him back appears, on his own part, as the relinquishment of a right, as a sacrifice; in respect to Philemon, as a tender regard with which Paul believes that he responds to the Divine purpose which controlled the event, and which may have designed to send back to Philemon instead of a slave, a beloved brother. How tender the entire passage, especially ver. 16, which represents the object of his wish, even before he gives formal expression to it, as the possible end of the Divine arrangement! How dear must Onesimus appear to Philemon, who receives him again in such a manner! How perfectly is the way prepared for the request expressed at ver. 17!

Ver. 13.—Ἐγώ emphatic, "I on my part," in contrast with ver. 14 (Meyer). So ἐβουλόμην and ἠθέλησα are contrasted alike in signification and in tense: the former expresses inclination; the latter active will, decision; ἐβουλόμην, the permanent state even after the decision; ἠθέλησα, the decision as a thing of a moment. The final ἵνα justifies Paul's wish to retain him (otherwise he would have absolutely no right to another's slave) and at the same time intimates how dear Onesimus is to him, and what a treasure he surrenders to Philemon. Ὑπὲρ σοῦ = for thee, in thy place, comp. Winer's Gr., § 48, 1, p. 342. Rightly Grotius: ut mihi præstaret quæ tu, si hic

esses, præstiturus mihi omnia esses, thus presupposing the undoubted affection of Philemon. *Διακονῇ* as denoting personal service, comp. at 2 Tim. iv. 11. On *ἵνα* Winer's Gr., § 41, b. 1. "In the bonds of the gospel," indirectly vindicates his *right* to retain him; *ὀφείλεις μοι διακονίαν ὡς μαθητὴς διδασκάλῳ*, Theodoret.

Ver. 14.—*Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς σῆς γνώμης* = without thine approving judgment; so also Polybius as cited by Raphel. "I would do nothing" in the matter. The expression is made delicately general; but the evident reference is to retaining Onesimus. De Wette's explanation therefore in referring it to his manumission is unnatural; for this is neither implied in *κατέχειν* (which would not emancipate him) nor is allowed by the following *ἵνα, κ. τ. λ.*, as it would leave no place for any benefaction of Philemon. For the benefaction here referred to consists clearly in the *διακονεῖν* (ver. 13), and *ἀγαθόν* must therefore (against De Wette) have reference not to Onesimus, but to Paul. We must not then assume that the apostle means to intimate a wish that Onesimus should from free love be sent back to him, see vers. 15, 22. He merely means that in case of his having retained him, the kindness rendered would have been rather a matter of compulsion than voluntary. This *appearance* (*ὡς*), he would avoid by sending him back. And now Philemon, in receiving Onesimus kindly and retaining him permanently, will shew the greatest love to the apostle. The entire thought finally is expressed not in strict relation to the case, but generally: comp. Meyer's excellent exposition, who remarks that *ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἑκούσιον* is inconsistent with a restriction to the present case, as Paul by no means designed to retain Onesimus. On *κατὰ ἀνάγκην, κατὰ ἑκούσιον, by compulsion, of free will*, employed adverbially, see the similar examples, Winer's Gr., § 51, 2; on the use of the adjective *ἑκούσιον* (as Numb. xv. 3), Winer's Gr., § 54, 1. *Κατὰ ἀνάγκην* is purposely placed first (Meyer).

Ver. 15.—*Γάρ* introduces the reason for not retaining Onesimus. He feared he might be acting counter to the intention of Providence. *Γάρ* would stand very awkwardly if the preceding reference were to emancipation, as *ἀπέχειν* stands in manifest contrast to Paul's *κατέχειν*. *Τάχα* perhaps (Rom. v. 7). The apostle ventures not to assert it definitely. Chrysostom and Jerome refer appropriately to Gen. xlv. 5, and Hagenbach remarks strikingly that his cautious appending of *τάχα*, as not venturing to assert posibility the ways of Providence, differs widely from the course of those miserable wretches who with pious speeches ever in their mouths, palm off on Providence the products of their own conceit and superstition. *Ἐχωρίσθη* used euphemistically, says Chrysostom, for *ἐφυγεν*; and again *ἐχωρίσθη* rather than *ἐχώρισεν ἑαυτόν*. Calvin: læta enim catastrophe in malis quasi remedium est quod nobis ad delendas offensas porrigitur .... Et prudenter omnia temperat, quum fugam

vocat discessum et addit illum ad tempus fuisse. Πρὸς ὥραν—αἰώνιον ; this contrast leaves no possible ground for inferring from πρὸς ὥραν that Onesimus had been but a short time absent (comp. Wieseler, p. 417). On πρὸς ὥραν comp. 2 Cor. vii. 8 ; 1 Thess. ii. 17. On αἰώνιον, the adjective expressing an adverbial conception, and referred to αὐτόν—see Winer's Gr., § 54, 2. It denotes here not (as Flatt, referring to Exod. xxi. 6 ; Deut. xv. 17), "so long as you both live ;" but as Chrysostom remarks, "not only in the present time, but also in the future ;" so the recent interpreters. Meyer is ultra-Pauline in explaining it from the assumption of the speedy advent. Ἀπέχῃς indicates complete, perfect possession ; see Phil. iv. 18, and Matth. vi. 2.

Ver. 16 specifies how he is, perhaps, under the Divine purpose, to retain him forever ; "no longer as a slave" (it is wholly against the sense of the writer to supply *μόνον, only*), but above a slave (Winer's Gr., § 49, e. p. 359). The idea of emancipation which some have fancied that they found in the words, in no way belongs to them, and is even inappropriate. The apostle could not mean to intimate it as the Divine purpose that Philemon was to have in Onesimus a freed man ; but as the explanatory "brother beloved" declares, that he should have in his slave a brother beloved, which he may be as a slave equally well as if set free (1 Tim. vi. 2). If, therefore, the apostle desired his emancipation, the words do not imply it. The term "believing masters," and "because they are our brethren," 1 Cor. vii. 21, 22 ; 1 Tim. vi. 2, shew that Paul neither regards the outward relation of the slave as incompatible with that of "brother," nor requires emancipation of Christian masters, as a duty of love ; Col. iii. 22, iv. 1 ; Eph. vi. 5–9. Μάλιστα ἐμοί, inserts the apostle, to testify again his love for Onesimus, and thus establish his claim to the love of Philemon. Μάλιστα compares the love of Paul toward him with that of other Christians (apart from Philemon), with whom he had become connected ; and πόσῳ μᾶλλον, *how much more*, forms a final inference in regard to Philemon to whom he belongs. "Both in the flesh and in the Lord," does not (as De Wette), assign the *reason* for his greater dearness (πόσῳ μᾶλλον) to Philemon, since Paul is not stating what Onesimus already is to Philemon, but what he is to be ; it marks rather two spheres *in which* he is to be to him yet much more a beloved brother, ἐν σαρκί marking the natural, ἐν κυρίῳ the Christian sphere. Ἐν σαρκί then can denote only the servile relation in which Onesimus stands to Philemon. In this also Philemon is to evince to Onesimus that he regards him as a beloved brother. In this too, emancipation is neither necessary nor possibly involved, if our above remarks at ὡς are correct. Nor can ἐν σαρκί refer to community of nation (Olshausen, Flatt, etc.), which would require it to be understood as giving the *reason* of the πόσῳ μᾶλλον.

Meyer explains too generally, "as man and as Christian." Σάρξ cannot denote humanity as such, nor ἐν σαρκί the relation of Onesimus to Philemon as a man; but only the human, natural relation in which he is to be to Philemon a dear brother.

Ver. 17 resumes, after the interruption of vers. 13–16, the σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγχνα. Paul has there styled Onesimus "his heart;" in immediate connexion with this therefore, he proceeds; "if then thou holdest me a partner, receive him as if thou wert receiving me (not, as thou receivest me); he is one with the apostle. If Paul is his κοινωνός he must allow the same place to Onesimus; for they are both one. Philemon, in refusing to receive him, would renounce the fellowship of the apostle. Κοινωνός applies to Christian fellowship in its entire extent. Προσλαβοῦ not merely a receiving, but a kind one; comp. Rom. xiv. 1, 3; Acts xxviii. 2.

Ver. 18.—Εἰ δέ τι ἠδίκησέ σε ἢ ὀφείλει—δέ not simply continuative = not to leave this point unmentioned; it marks the attempt to set aside what might perhaps interfere with such a reception. The construction with εἰ marks the Attic urbanity. Ἠδίκησε refers generally to every wrong of neglect in service or otherwise for which he deserved punishment; ὀφείλει points more definitely to a debt due from Onesimus to his master, from breach of trust. De Wette and Meyer, however, understand ὀφείλει as merely a more definite limitation of ἠδίκησε. In no case is it admissible to refer the words merely to the offence of running away. "Place to my account." Τοῦτο, sc. whether punishment or debt. On ἐλλόγα, in sense = ἐλλόγει (Rom. v. 13), which Tischendorf has received, comp. Meyer.

Ver. 19.—In a playful turn (lepide sane hæc profert, Theophylact), which expresses the confidence of love, Paul now places with his own hand an acknowledgment of the debt: "I Paul have written with my own hand, I will repay." Ἀποτίω (only here), general, "to make good, make restitution, expiate." It is better, perhaps, to suppose that Paul wrote the entire epistle, than that he took the pen to add these words.—"Not to say to thee," continues the apostle. The expositors take σοι with λέγω, and take ἵνα as expressing the design of ἔγραψα—ἀποτίσω. The sense of the whole is then: "not to say to thee that thou owest to me not merely that which I have now declared my readiness to pay, but thine own self also." But what, under this construction, is the force of σοί? So also the καί and προς- have no relation in the context, as Paul has not said that Philemon owes to him that which he himself is going to pay. Ἵνα also stands but harshly with ἔγραψα and ἀποτίσω; this bond stands much more fittingly as an independent document. It is thus perhaps better to connect ἵνα with τοῦτο ἐμοὶ ἐλλόγα; put this to my charge, that is to say, to thine; since not barely this (sc. what I have declared myself willing to pay), but even thyself thou owest to me. Thus

σοί, καί and πρός have their appropriate place and significance. Philemon owes himself to the apostle, as having been converted by him, which, as Paul was not himself in Colossæ, may have occurred during his residence in Ephesus.

Ver. 20.—Ναὶ, ἀδελφὲ, ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην. Ναί confirmatory = our yea. What is confirmed is shewn by the emphatically prefixed ἐγώ, to which Meyer properly calls attention. It is I myself, says the apostle, that would desire advantage from, would have enjoyment of thee, not Onesimus; it is to me that thou provest thy love. The clause is a comprehensive summing up, and refers to the entire form of the request pertaining to Onesimus, in which Paul makes the cause of Onesimus his own (Meyer), not to προσοφείλεις (De Wette), as indicated by the ἐγώ. Ὀναίμην—to rejoice in any one—frequent in the classics, especially of parents in reference to children, is found in the New Testament only here. We may then, with the more probability, infer an allusion to the name of Onesimus (Winer's Gr., § 68, 2), the point of which is purposely heightened by the ἐγώ. The ἐν Χριστῷ marks the desired enjoyment, though referring to an earthly matter, as yet Christian in its character. So immediately after ἀνάπαυσον ἐν Χριστῷ; the relief (ἀναπαύειν), refers to his solicitude for Onesimus; the ἐν Χριστῷ marks it as essentially Christian, transfers the act within the Christian sphere, if Philemon acts in it as a Christian. Comp. Harless at Eph. iv. 1. This is the very aim and business of the Christian to have this Christian direction given to his whole conduct, to have his whole life elevated from its natural degradation into the domain of Christ and thus sanctified; hence the phrase ἐν κυρίῳ so frequently appended by the apostle. The Codd. decide for ἐν Χριστῷ in the second passage (comp. Tischendorf). Ἀνάπαυσον τὰ σπλάγχνα as ver. 7; his heart is troubled about Onesimus.

VERS. 21–25.—CONCLUSION OF THE EPISTLE.

Ver. 21.—"Relying upon thy obedience I have written to thee, knowing that thou wilt do even more than I say." The letter is already written; what is added is merely supplementary. Hence we may not, with De Wette, refer in respect to the Aor. ἔγραψα to ἀνεπέμψαμεν, ver. 11; it merely glances back at the now written letter (Winer's Gr., § 40, 5, 2, p. 249). With these words the apostle gives Philemon to understand what he expects from him. The letter, he says, shews what confidence he reposes in him; Philemon will not disappoint it. The πεποιθὼς τῇ ὑπακοῇ, it is true, points again to his apostolic authority; yet not in any such sense as to be in contradiction to ver. 8. The obedience of Philemon is

presupposed in the letter. He requests, not because he fears that his command would be unavailing, but because he knows it is unnecessary. Nay, he knows and is convinced that Philemon will do beyond what he asks. If *ὑπὲρ ὃ λέγω* refers to emancipation, then it cannot have been involved in the previous request; those who regard it as thus previously involved (as De Wette), must refer this to still additional benefactions. But the words may be understood, without any such specific reference, of increased kindness toward Onesimus.

Ver. 22.—The apostle subjoins to this the request that he would prepare for him entertainment, as he hopes to be "granted" to them. *Ἅμα δὲ καί* presupposes the undoubted fulfilment of his previous entreaty. It is conjectured, perhaps not erroneously, that this request thus immediately subjoined, or rather the promise which it involves, is intended, as a confirmation of love on his part, to support and enforce that entreaty. As to the hope here expressed by the apostle, comp. Phil. i. 25, ii. 24; "Through your prayers," he presupposes in them their prayer for his deliverance (comp. Col. iv. 3, seq.; Eph. vi. 19), and attaches great importance to their prayers, as he ascribes to them his freedom; which with him is assuredly not a mere phrase. Comp. Rom. xv. 30; 2 Cor. i. 11; Phil. i. 19, etc. How closely was the apostle connected with his churches by prayer which he offered perpetually for them and they for him! How widely removed are we from this pattern of the apostolic age! How feeble with us the tie which connects teachers and scholars! On *χαρισθήσομαι*, to be granted as a matter of favour, an expression frequent with the apostle, also in the Pass., comp. for this passage specially Acts iii. 14, xxvii. 24.

Vers. 23, 24.—The *Salutations*. Read *ἀσπάζεται*, singular. Those who send salutations are the same as Col. iv. 10–14; except that Jesus Justus, there named, is here past over. Why, is uncertain; comp., however, Wieseler, p. 417, Anm. Epaphras (on his relation to Epaphroditus, Phil. ii. 25, comp. in loco), is designated here as *συναιχμάλωτος*, on the contrary, Col. iv. 10, Aristarchus. It is probable, as Meyer remarks at Col. iv. 10, and Wieseler, p. 417, seq., that the expression denotes not compulsory, but voluntary imprisonment, thus referring to Paul's companions, who alternately remained with him in his guarded dwelling, and that Epaphras now, Aristarchus before, was performing this service of love. Meyer also remarks that *συναιχμάλωτος*, used only of prisoners of war, designates the apostle, like *συστρατιώτης*, as a soldier of Christ. *Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* expresses more than the genitive; to wit, that he shares the apostle's imprisonment not merely in the cause of Christ, but in a Christian way; comp. Harless at Eph. iv. 1.

Ver. 25.—The closing blessing as Gal. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 23, and so 2 Tim. iv. 22; to wit, not simply "with you," but "with your spirit." It thus designates that position of humanity which is the most immediate subject of Divine influence. The ὑμεῖς are those named ver. 2.

The subscription sustains the prevalent hypothesis of the composition of the epistle during Paul's recorded imprisonment in Rome.

EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

INTRODUCTION.

The Lord Jesus Christ has said: *Search the Scriptures, for they are they which testify of me.* The Holy Scriptures of the old covenant testify of Christ, and that not merely because particular prophecies pointing to Christ are to be found here and there in them. The entire history of the revelation of God in the old covenant is one great preintimation of the future Messiah; and this *fact*-revelation and *fact*-prophecy formed the condition and the basis of the particular *word*-prophecies which God gave in a supernatural manner by his special instruments. It is wrong to overlook this unity of basis; but it is equally so to attempt to derive these particular word-revelations as developments from that basis, and to overlook their properly supernatural character. In the garden of Eden immediately after the fall, God directs the hope of the human race to a son of the woman, who is to break the power of the serpent; Eve exults in her first joy as a mother—she has borne a man child, and with him she has received Jehovah back again; she regards her child as the promised one who is to win back for men the favour, nearness, and possession of Jehovah. She is mistaken. The human race must first go deep downwards in order to be able to rise upwards—yes, it must pursue an ever downward course; all human greatness must be brought low; until humanity is so humbled as to be capable of placing itself in a purely receptive relation towards the salvation provided; then, and not till then, will the woman's seed be *given* to it; for it cannot *produce* that seed.—This is the fundamental law of all revelation and all prophecy in the Old Testament.

After that judicial visitation by which the degenerate race of man was buried and baptized (immersed, sunk) in the flood, Noah, who came forth from this baptism as the father of a new humanity, the second Adam of the old covenant, lays on Shem's head the blessing that the Lord shall be his God; Canaan shall serve Shem, Japhet shall live with Shem in peace and friendship.* And when the

* To dwell in the tents of any one = to be hospitably received by any one.

families of men, five generations after Noah, are *separated* from each other, the promise is made to the Shemite Abraham on account of his faith, that his posterity shall form the central point of a future *reunion* of mankind in the blessing. But *not until after three generations of affliction* will God put the seed of Abraham in possession of the inheritance promised to him (Gen. xv.).

Here begins the operation of that wonderful *principle of delay*, according to which the last part of a promised epoch is extended anew to a period embracing several epochs, and the last of these is again distributed into several epochs, and so forth. The third generation after Abraham, that of Joseph, with which the affliction properly speaking first begins, lengthens itself out again to three generations. On the expiration of these comes the promised redemption of the seed of Abraham from affliction (Gen. xv.), but in such a manner as that the redemption then first begins, and this too only typically and preliminarily. Israel is redeemed from the Egyptian bondage ; as in Noah the human race, so under Moses the seed of Abraham passed through a baptism, and came forth from a baptism in the Red Sea ; Israel was emancipated through Moses, but came not through Moses into its rest, into the possession of the promised land. Joshua conducted it into the land, but the land was not yet entirely possessed, Israel continued to be harassed and oppressed by the heathen, and the last forty years previous to the battle at Ebenezer were truly again years of bondage. Being again delivered by Samuel, the people obtained in Saul a king, but not after God's heart, full of carnal timidity and carnal courage, insolent and faint-hearted. The king after God's heart, David, must again himself reproduce the destinies of the whole seed of Abraham in his own individual life, and, through much tribulation, enter into glory. But yet his reign was one of war and conflict, not of peace, and the triumphing prince of peace, Solomon, was after him.

Doubtless there was given in David a fulfilment of the old promises of salvation, but one that was merely human, therefore lying under the curse of everything human, and liable to pass away. Hence there was opened to David by means of the prophet Nathan (2 Sam. vii.) a second perspective view of the promised salvation, in the fulfilment of which, however, the same law of delay obtains as in the first. *Not David, but his seed after him shall build a house to the Lord;* for him the Lord will build a house, and will be his father, and he shall reign with God forever. David immediately perceives, and rightly (2 Sam. vii. 19 ; comp. chap. xxiii. 1), that this wonderful prophecy "points to the distant future," and represents the form of "a man who is God." And, in like manner, Solomon, when he consecrates the temple of stone (1 Kings viii.

26, 27) acknowledges that that prophecy of Nathan's is not yet fulfilled by this act. Therefore, when Solomon sought, by intercourse with the nations, by marriage and philosophy, to break through the limits of the Mosaic law, he wrongly anticipated a freedom which was to become possible only through the new covenant, plunged himself and his people into idolatry, and brought about a deep national decline; and so his proverbs and his song of songs are placed as monuments, not merely of his wisdom, but at the same time also of his folly, among the Chethubim of the Old Testament canon.

Solomon's temple of stone then, was only a first, a provisional fulfilment of Nathan's prophecy. Under him, and after him, the kingdom, power, and glory of Israel fell more and more into decay, and as ungodliness increased, the prophets, and Elijah among the number, looked around for the judgments of God. But to him it was revealed that the Lord is not in storm and fire, but in the still small voice; and Joel, too, uttered the same truth. The people deserve indeed even now judgment and destruction; but with the judgment the Lord will grant forgiveness; he will first pour out his Spirit, and then come to judgment. Redeeming grace is to go before judicial severity. The eye of hope was now turned to redeeming grace; the promised descendant of David was more and more clearly revealed to the prophets. He is not to be born in palaces; as the first, so the second David must be sought by the daughters of Zion in times of sore travail, of heavy afflictions, by the sheepfolds of Bethlehem (Mic. v. 5). The daughter of the house of David, so haughty under Ahaz, must, by unheard of sufferings, be brought to conduct herself in a purely receptive manner as a maid (עלמה) in order to bring forth the son, and she will then, no longer trusting in her own strength, call him "God with us." Israel, appointed as the servant of God to convert the heathen, but altogether unfit for this work (Is. xlviii.), and himself an idolater (Is. xliv.), is to be again brought into bondage by a force coming from the Euphrates (Assyrian, later, from Is. xxxviii. onwards, Babylonian); in the time of his subjugation the true servant of God will come, will first work out by his atoning sacrificial death the inward redemption, the forgiveness of sins (chap. liii.), then convert the heathen (chap. liv.), and finally, convert and deliver the still hardened Israel (chap. lxiv.—lxvi., comp. Rom. xi.). But here again comes in a delay. Not 70 years, as Jeremiah has prophesied, is the subjugation of Israel under the heathen to last; but as Daniel has revealed, 7×70 years, nay, as is immediately added by way of correction, still longer (inasmuch as from the building of Jerusalem under Nehemiah 7×62 years were to elapse). After 70 years indeed, Israel is to return to their land; but the subjugation under

the heathen is to continue over five centuries.—Accordingly, the rebuilding of the temple under Zerubbabel was again but a type of the building of the temple already promised by Nathan, which God himself was to undertake. And so Malachi, the last of the prophets, directed the eye of the people to the *messenger of the Lord*, who was soon to come to his temple, to visit and to sift Israel, and to separate the wheat from the empty chaff (comp. Matth. iii. 12).

This signification and course of prophecy must of itself have appeared to any one who gave attentive heed to the Old Testament, and who in heart and mind belonged to that covenant; not, however, to the impenitent, not to the mass of the people of Israel. Now the two books of the New Testament in which is represented the insight of the spiritually-minded Israelites into the Old Testament revelation after it was brought to full maturity by the Holy Spirit, are, the Gospel of Matthew and the Epistle to the Hebrews, to which, however, the address of Stephen (Acts vii.) is to be added as a very important passage having the same character. Stephen adduces from the collective history of the Old Testament (in which he points throughout with special emphasis to the principle of delay already noticed*) rather the negative proof—that the law and the temple, although Divine, are not the highest and last form of the revelation and dwelling-place of God. Matthew adduces rather the positive proof—that Jesus is the promised son (seed) of Abraham and David, that in him, therefore, the first prospect disclosed to Abraham (Gen. xv.), as well as the second opened to David through Nathan (2 Sam. vii.) have found their termination. Matthew, too, refers to the same law of delay, when, in chap. i. 2, seq., he shews, that in place of the three דורות, Gen. xv., there came three great periods, that of typical elevation until the time of David, that of decline until Jeremiah, and that during which the house of David was in a condition of poverty and lowliness until Mary. In conducting this proof, however, the Evangelist does not of course take as the frame-work of his particular reasonings an exposition of the Old Testament prophecy, but a record of the New Testament fulfilment. The Old Testament prophecy is by Matthew taken for granted as already known. The Epistle to the Hebrews, on the contrary, starts from the Old Testament, formally developes the component parts of that dispensation in a treatise systematically arranged, and shews how, in all its parts, it points to Jesus. The history of Jesus is here taken for granted as known. This method is more remote, more indirect, and more philosophical than the other.—Stephen's *practical aim* was to defend himself from the charge of speaking blasphemy against the law and the temple; that of Matthew was

* Comp. my Crit. of the Gospel History, 2 ed. p. 689.

to furnish the Jewish Christians with a written substitute for the oral preaching of the twelve. What practical necessity occasioned the writing of the Epistle to the Hebrews ?

No book of the New Testament, and, in general, of the Holy Scriptures, owes its origin to a mere subjective literary choice, to a mere love of writing on the part of the author. The Epistle to the Hebrews, accordingly, however systematic and almost scientific its contents are, was occasioned by a practical necessity. The investigations concerning its author we must refer from the introduction (to which they do not belong, and where they are not as yet even possible) to the close of the commentary ; but, for the better understanding of the epistle itself, some preliminary observations respecting the occasion of it must needs be made.

It is evident from Acts ii. 5, and Acts xv., and Gal. ii., that the Jewish Christians, though not resting their justification before God on the Mosaic law, yet *observed that law* (Acts ii. 38, iii. 19, iv. 12). And this too was quite natural. For that law was not only given by God, and not yet abrogated by him, nay, observed even by Christ himself (Gal. iv. 4, seq.), but besides this, being national as well as religious, it had become so entirely a part of the Israelitish customs and manner of life, it was so wrought into the texture of the whole conduct and life of that people, that so long as they were a people, and so long as Jewish Christians were members of the Israelitish state, a renunciation of those national customs was purely inconceivable. It may, indeed, be doubted whether the Israelites who had become Christians, continued to fulfil those legal observances which bore a more optional character. It can scarcely be supposed, for example, that every one who fell into a sin would bring the guilt or the sin-offering into the temple. On the other hand, the manner of preparing meats, the observance of the Sabbath, etc., remained the same.

Indeed, until the destruction of Jerusalem, when God, by the overthrow of the Israelitish state, put an end to Israelitish nationality and customs, the hope of seeing Israel converted as a whole, although it had been ever lessening, was not entirely given up ; and this of itself was a reason for the Jewish Christians not separating themselves from the Israelitish community. Thus the Jewish Christians, or to speak more correctly, the Israelites who believed on the Messiah, were in the habit of frequenting the temple for daily prayer. But the hatred of the unbelieving Jews towards them grew more and more intense. Towards the end of the fiftieth year they no longer suffer the presence of the apostle Paul in the temple (Acts xxi. seq.), although they dared not yet openly cast him out as a Jewish Christian, but availed themselves of the pretext that he had taken a Gentile Christian into the temple along with him. But

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

that the time came when Christians as such, Jewish Christians also, were no longer suffered to appear in the temple, may be inferred from the Epistle to the Hebrews. The persecution of the Christians under Nero may have emboldened the Jews; their courage rose when they saw the Christians sacrificed also by the Romans. This period of affliction for the church in Jerusalem may have begun in the sixtieth year. There were, however, weak ones in whose minds conscientious scruples might be awakened by this exclusion from the Theocracy of the old covenant. They were not yet able to walk without crutches. They were afraid lest with the privilege of access to the temple and of fellowship with the commonwealth of Israel, they should lose at the same time their claim to the common salvation of God. Such weak ones are not to be sought among the older members of the church who had already grown grey in Christianity, but rather among the neophytes and such as were on the point of conversion. Conversion to Christianity threatened to come to a stand. And yet it was the last hour; and whoever was to be saved from the judgments impending over Israel must be saved now. In these circumstances the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, designed for a certain circle of neophytes and catechumens then existing; useful for all in future times who should occupy an analogous position. The aim of this epistle is to prove from the nature and principal elements of the old covenant itself, that the revelation and redemption through the Messiah promised in the old covenant, is represented even in the old covenant as an absolute revelation, as sufficient in itself, by which the Old Testament types become superfluous.

THE EXORDIUM.

(Chap. i. 1–3.)

While all the rest of the New Testament epistles begin by mentioning the name and office of their authors, as also the churches for which they are intended, this form of introduction which was usual in ancient times is wanting in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Some have sought to account for this circumstance by saying that the author intended to compensate for the effect of a formal superscription by the solemn and highly oratorical style of the introduction. This supposition, however, will not suffice fully to explain the case. The *impression* that would have been made on the readers and hearers by the name of an apostle or some other authoritative person, might indeed be compensated by the impression which the lofty utterance of the heart and mind of such a person could not fail to produce; they could, so to speak, hear the *man* from the force of the *words*, and believe, as it were, that they saw him before them. But the want of the *superscription* itself was not thereby compensated. We can scarcely conceive that any one would have addressed a letter to a church without mentioning his name at all. It only remains therefore to be supposed, that this writing which we hold under the name of the Epistle to the Hebrews was originally accompanied by a shorter epistle properly so called, and therefore that the epistle itself was not one in the proper sense of the term. And this supposition is confirmed by a number of considerations drawn from the substance of the epistle, to which our attention will be directed at the proper time, and of which we will here specify some of the most striking. The hortatory passages are not, as in most of the other epistles, closely engrafted on the didactic, so that the doctrinal parts pass naturally into the practical; but the former are wound up in a strictly scientific manner without any hortatory and practical side-glances, and the latter are abruptly placed between the doctrinal sections (chap. ii. 1–3, iii. 1–19, v. 11, vi. 12, etc.) The practical parts too, show a systematic form, the result of reflexion,—an intended transition to a new doctrinal section is introduced in the form of a short hortatory or personal remark (iii. 1, viii. 1). The particular sections of the doctrinal parts are, however, marked by a pecu-

liar species of *formal superscriptions*, of which we shall soon have to speak, and the nature of which can be seen from the translation which we have annexed to the commentary. Moreover, the course of the investigation and the reasoning in the doctrinal parts is often so intricate, so many ideas are often compressed into few words, that we can hardly suppose the object of the epistle was fulfilled by a single reading before the assembled church (as we must suppose was the case even with the most didactic of Paul's epistles, that to the Romans, which however might easily be understood on a first reading); but it rather appears, that this Epistle to the Hebrews was designed, after having been read, to serve as a groundwork for a formal course of instruction, very probably of instruction for catechumens. This opinion is confirmed also by the passages chap. v. 11, seq., vi. 1, seq., where the writer makes some systematic remarks on the *method* of instruction to be pursued in the Christian Church; with which may be compared also the passage viii. 1, where again in a systematic form a recapitulation is given of what has been said on to that place, as the foundation of what is farther to be brought forward.

After all, then, we shall not be chargeable with undue boldness if we maintain, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was, in respect of its *form*, not an *epistle* in the proper sense, but a *treatise*. That this assertion implies no denial of its having been written with a practical aim is evident from what has been said in the introduction; all that we think and say is, that in respect of its *form*, it goes beyond the nature of an epistle, of a direct effusion in which the writer transfers himself in spirit to his readers, and speaks to them although not without a plan (comp. the Epistle to the Romans), yet always without the consciousness of system and from the immediate impulse of the heart, and that it therefore thoroughly bears the character of a *systematic treatise*. Hence also we account for the absence of the address which is indispensable to every epistle. A mere verbal salutation by the person who conveyed the writing could not supply the place of this address, not even on the supposition of its being a treatise. It would be too strange to suppose, that the author who had written so much should not write a few additional lines with his own name. These accompanying lines, however, in the case before us, would be addressed not to the church, but rather to some individual *teacher* in it, and we can easily see from this how they might come to be lost.

That the writing was intended for a certain limited circle of readers, not for a circle of churches, not even for one entire church, is very evident from chap. iii. 6, v. 12. The persons there addressed form quite a definite circle of persons represented as undergoing a course of instruction. This, of course, does not imply that the

writing was not used for a similar object in all analogous cases, beyond this circle, and that in this way, at a very early period, it may not have obtained a circulation suited to its high importance.

The three first verses, inasmuch as they develop the ground-idea of the epistle, form a sort of introduction to the principal parts which follow from ver. 4 onwards. The structure of the period in these verses has justly been noticed by all commentators as remarkable for its beauty. The period is as perspicuous and clear as it is long, rich, and complicated; a fine succession of thought expressed in a form finished even to the minutest detail, gives it a claim to rank among the finest periods of the Greek authors. The first verse gives forth in a majestic style the ground-theme of the whole treatise. *The revelation of God in his Son is opposed to the revelations of God by the prophets* as the higher, as the one, undivided, absolute revelation. To confirm this the *person* and *work* of the Son are developed in ver. 2, 3.

Ver. 1.—The *subject* with the clauses in apposition to it forms a series of parallel antithesis to the verbal-predicate with its qualifying clauses. "God who has spoken to the fathers by the prophets." Λαλεῖν is used in the sense of דִּבֶּר to denote the *revealing* utterance of God, in which sense it frequently occurs in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 2, ix. 19, etc.), and elsewhere in the New Testament (Acts iii. 24; James v. 10; 2 Pet. i. 21). By the πατέρες here are meant, of course, not merely the patriarchs, but all those former generations of Israel that have preceded the ἡμεῖς, those at present living; in a word: the forefathers. The idea implied in προφῆται is to be understood in a similarly wide sense; even in the Old Testament נביא does not always denote merely the prophet with reference to his special office, but sometimes quite generally, every organ of divine revelation. It is so used here. Προφῆται here, according to the context, comprehends all Old Testament organs of revelation, in so far as they were *mere* organs of God, in opposition to the Son, who, according to ver. 3, was more than a mere organ. It is doubtful, however, in what sense the preposition ἐν is to be understood. The interpretation given by those who take προφῆται to denote the *writings* of the prophets, and refer the ἐν to these writings, is, on account of the parallel member ἐν υἱῷ, altogether untenable. Much more may be said in favour of that explanation which we find already given by Thomas Aquinas, and afterwards adopted by Beza, Carpzov, Alberti, Bleek, and others, that ἐν is to be taken in the strictest and most proper sense in which it is used in Greek. According to this, ἐν cannot be referred immediately to λαλεῖν (for the author surely does not intend to say that God has spoken in the prophets—within them,—he rather says that God has spoken to the fathers by the prophets), but ὤν must be supplied. God was in the prophets and

spoke to the fathers; he was in the Son and spoke to us. But although, in itself considered, it might be proper enough to speak of God being in the prophets (*i. e.* relatively through his Spirit), and in like manner of God being in Christ (by the absolute hypostatic presence of the Logos in him), still it is in the highest degree improbable, that an author whose purpose it was from the outset to mark with the strongest emphasis the *difference* between the Son and the prophets, and the superiority of the former over the latter, should have placed those two entirely different modes of the indwelling of God parallel to each other by means of the same expression. I decidedly agree therefore with the interpretation of Chrysostom, Œcumenius, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Tholuck, that ἐν here in both places has an *instrumental* signification, and is to be understood in the sense of the Heb. בְּ, "by." Granted that this use of the word cannot be shown in the genuine Greek profane literature, there is nothing to prevent our regarding it as a Hebraism. Bleek, indeed, thinks the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews bears a so purely Greek character, that we must hesitate to admit the supposition of a Hebraism; but how easily might such an unconscious Hebraism slip from the pen of a native Israelite, who naturally *thought* in Hebrew what he *wrote* in Greek, however careful he was to construct his periods in genuine Greek! And is not the use of οἱ αἰῶνες in ver. 2 likewise a Hebraism? But are not *unconscious* Hebraisms in the use of prepositions much more easily accounted for in an author who in other respects writes good Greek than *conscious* Hebraisms in the use of nouns for which (as for οἱ αἰῶνες) genuine Greek expressions (ὁ κόσμος, τὰ πάντα) were quite at hand?

The adverbs πολυμερῶς and πολυτρόπως, according to Tholuck and others, have no essential definite meaning, because no ἁπλῶς or ἐφάπαξ stands opposed to them, but are used merely for the sake of amplification. But ἁπλῶς and ἐφάπαξ, as we shall immediately see, would not even have formed a right antithesis. That a writing of which the "tot verba tot pondera" holds so true, begins with an amplification, is a supposition to which recourse will then only be had when every possibility of another interpretation has been cut off. Already several among the Fathers, and then Calvin, Limborch, Capellus, J. Gerhard, Calov, and Bleek, explain πολυμερῶς as pointing to the different *times* and *periods*, πολυτρόπως to the different *ways* and *forms* of the divine revelation in the Old Testament dispensation. This interpretation, however, does not precisely bring out the idea of the writer. Πολυμερῶς does not contain precisely a chronological reference; the antithesis is not that God has spoken *often* by the prophets but only *once* by his Son (according to which less would be attributed to Christ than to them), but the opposition is, between the *distribution* of the Old Testament revelation among

the prophets, and the *undivided fulness* of the New Testament revelation by Christ. Πολυμερῶς means not "many times," but "manifoldly," "in many parts." In like manner, the Old Testament revelation is said to be *many-formed*, in opposition to that τρόπος which was not one among the many, but the one which outweighed the many, the absolute which fully corresponded with the οὐσία. Thus we see how a ἅπαξ or ἁπλῶς could not follow in the opposite member of the sentence. The real antithesis to πολυμερῶς and πολυτρόπως lies in vers. 2, 3.

The time denoted by πάλαι is commonly explained of the time before Malachi, with whom the succession of the prophets ceased. But surely the writer does not mean to say specifically, that God has spoken in times of old, but no more since these times. Πάλαι is rather explained simply from the antithesis ἐπ' ἐσχάτου, etc., without supposing that a remote and unnatural allusion is made to the interval between Malachi and the Baptist.

But the expression ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων (that the reading ἐσχάτων is false may now be considered as fully established) with which we pass to the second member of the sentence—the predicate, —stands in need of being interpreted itself. Here also the supposition of a Hebraism is indispensable, not one that can be said to be either involuntary or arbitrary, but one equally conscious and necessary, inasmuch as it relates to a doctrinal conception specifically Jewish. Formally explained according to the Greek grammar, the words would signify "at the end of these days." But what days are to be understood by these? The ætas of the writer? But the incarnation of Christ took place at the beginning not at the end of the period. Or are we to understand the days of the prophets? But these did not reach down to the time of Christ; and πάλαι too would then form no antithesis. With reason, therefore, have Bleek and others explained ἐπ' ἐσχάτου, etc., as equivalent to the Hebrew בְּאַחֲרִית הַיָּמִים. Conformably to the Old Testament prophecy, the Israelites distinguished the period of the world which then was, as the עוֹלָם הַזֶּה from the period of glorification which was to begin with the resurrection, the עוֹלָם הַבָּא; the advent and work of the Messiah was to form the transition from the one to the other, and this was, therefore wont to be viewed and denoted partly as the *end of this time*, partly also as the beginning of the future. That the Messianic or "last" time would again divide itself into two periods—that of the life of Jesus in his humiliation, and that of his coming again in glory—was as yet not at all known to the Jews, and the Christians of the apostolic age had as yet no intuition at least of the *length* of the intervening period, nay could not have such an intuition; hence they included the whole period from the birth of Christ on to his promised coming again in the ἔσχαται ἡμέραι (Acts ii. 17; 1 John

ii. 18). In opposition to it then, *πάλαι* denotes the whole antecedent period, the *time of the promise of the Messianic prophecy* which preceded the time of the fulfilment.

In the time of the fulfilment has God spoken to us by his Son. The idea expressed in *υἱός* needs limitation on two sides. First, *υἱός* is not simply synonymous with *λόγος* (John i.), it is nowhere in the Holy Scriptures used to denote the only begotten *qua* eternally pre-existent. And therefore, formally at least, the ecclesiastical terminology goes beyond the biblical usage, when it transfers the name Son to denote also the relation which that person holds in the Trinity; this transference, however, is indeed perfectly justifiable, because he who with respect to his incarnation is called *υἱός* in Scripture, is the same who before his incarnation existed from eternity with the Father. Indeed, the doctrine of Scripture (John i. 14) is not that the eternal Logos *was united* to a son of Mary, to a human nature in the concrete sense: but that the eternal hypostatical Logos *became man*, assumed human nature in the abstract sense, concentrated itself by a free act of self-limitation prompted by love, into an embryo human life, a slumbering child-soul, as such formed for itself unconsciously, and yet with creative energy, a body in the womb of the Virgin, and hence he who in the Scripture is called Son as incarnate, is one and the same subject with that which with respect to its relation of oneness with the Father, is called *ὁ λόγος* or *ὁ μονογενής*. Nay, even as incarnate he can *only therefore* be called the Son of God because in him the eternal *μονογενής* became man. And hence, in the second place, we must guard against explaining the idea involved in the *υἱός* from the relation of the incarnate *as man* to the Father, as if he were called "Son" in the sense in which other pious men are called "children" of God. For it is evident even from the antithesis to the *προφῆται*, chiefly, however, from the second and third verses, that *υἱός* is the designation of the man Jesus *qua* the incarnate eternal *λόγος*.

This is apparent chiefly from the absence of the article. Exactly rendered, we must translate the words thus—"God spake to us by one who was Son," who stood not in the relation of prophet but in the relation of Son to him. If it were *ἐν τῷ υἱῷ*, then Christ would be placed as this individual in opposition to the individual prophets; but as the article is wanting it is the species that is placed in opposition to the species (although of course Christ is the single individual of his species).

Ver. 2.—The description of the person of the Son begins in the second verse, from which it evidently appears how God hath revealed himself by Christ not *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*, but absolutely and perfectly. Christ was more than a human *instrument*, he was *himself* God.

The principal question in the interpretation of this verse is whether the clause ὃν ἔθηκεν, etc., denotes the act which preceded that described in the clause δι' οὗ, etc., or one which followed it. The meaning of the second clause is clear; from it therefore we must set out in our investigation.

Οἱ αἰῶνες (as in xi. 3) is used in the sense of the Hebrew עוֹלָם עוֹלָמִים to denote the *worlds*, while in Greek it signifies only the *times*. By the Son has God made the worlds; we find the same in John i. 1, seq.; Col. i. 15–22. The eternal self-revelation of God in himself, through the eternal utterance of his fulness in the eternal personal *word* which God speaks *to himself* (John i. 1) and in the breath of the eternal *spirit*, forms the ground and therewith the eternal (not temporal) *prius* of the revelation of himself proceeding from the will of the Triune in a sphere which is not eternal, but one of time and space, which is not God but creature. And as the will which called creation into being is the will of the one Triune God, the Son and the Spirit were therefore partakers in the work; the world was made by the Father through the Son.

Now in what relation to this act does the act denoted by the words ὃν ἔθηκε κληρονόμον πάντων stand? Were we to regard it as *an act preceding* the creation of the world, we might then be tempted to explain it of the eternal generation of the Son himself. But how in this case can an *all things* be spoken of which the Son receives as an inheritance? How can it be said: *whom* (the Son) *he made heir*, how can the Son be presupposed as *already existing*, if it be his generation that is intimated in these words? The only sense then that can be affixed to the words on this hypothesis is something to the effect, that God already before the creation of the world destined the Son, who was generated from all eternity, to be its future possessor. But what practical aim could such an idea have in the context—not to say that a *before* and *after* can have no place in eternity? We are, therefore, compelled to turn to the other view, that of Tholuck, according to which ἔθηκε, etc., is to be understood of an act of God performed in time towards the incarnate Son of God, namely, that *crowning* of the incarnate one following upon his sufferings, which is afterwards more particularly described in chap. ii. ver. 9, and of which the apostle Paul speaks in Phil. ii. 9–11. The Son of God having, out of eternal compassionating love, laid aside the *glory* which he possessed in eternity (John xvii. 5), and having in his incarnation come under the category of time, and here again having glorified his inner being under the form of a human free will, and under the form of obedience manifested his eternal love (Matth. xxvi. 39; Heb. v. 8, x. 7), forthwith received back again that *glory and honour* (John xvii. 5), received the dominion over heaven and earth from the Father's hand as his

crown and his just reward, and received this as the incarnate, who still continues to be man, not divesting himself of the nature which he once assumed (Heb. vii. 26, comp. with ix. 12, 24). And thus it is shewn at length in Heb. ii. 5, that in him as their head and king mankind are exalted above the angels.* In this then lies the great difference between Christ and the prophets. The prophets were heralds of the promised future *inheritance;* Christ is the *heir* himself, the Lord and King of the Kingdom of God. The inheritance, as it appeared to the prophets, was still more or less limited to the people of Israel; at least the participation of the Gentiles in it appeared as yet under the form of a reception of the Gentiles into the community of Israel; the inheritance as it has appeared in the fulfilment, is that kingdom of Christ which embraces the whole human race (Eph. ii. 19), nay heaven and earth (Eph. i. 20, seq.). Upon

* We must here guard ourselves against a representation of this subject which sprang up in the scholastic period, and passed also into the period of the Reformation, chiefly into the Lutheran theology—a representation which unconsciously leads back to Nestorianism, and from which, if one would escape its consequences without giving up itself, there is no other outlet but Eutychianism. It is this—that the Divine and the human nature in Christ were two parts, or portions, or concreta, which were united in the one person of Christ "as fire and iron are united so as to make redhot iron," and that the one part, the divine, always remained in the possession of the δόξα, while the other part, the human, was only raised to a participation in the δόξα at the exaltation of Christ. When Eutyches taught (Mansi, tom. vi. p. 744): ἐκ δύο φύσεων γεγεννῆσθαι τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἕνωσιν μίαν φύσιν (εἶναι), the acute Leo justly observed at the conclusion of the ep. Flav. that the first clause (Nestorian), was quite as wrong as the second (Monophysite). Tam impie duarum naturarum ante incarnationem unigenitus Filius Dei dicitur, quam nefarie, postquam verbum caro factum est, natura in eo singularis asseritur. The two natures, the Divine and the human, the filius Dei and the filius Mariæ, were not first separately existent, so that their union constituted the entire Christ; but the Logos, retaining his *natura* divina, his Divine *nature*, and laying aside the μορφὴ θεοῦ, assumed in place of this the μορφὴ δούλου, *i. e.*, he assumed the *nature of men* (assemblage of *properties*, not an *existens*), and thus both natures, the Divine and the human, must now be predicated of him. As, if a king's son, in order to free his brother imprisoned in an enemy's country, were to go unknown into that country, and hire himself as servant to the prison-keeper, he would be both a real king's son and a real servant; the nature of a king's son belongs to him (only not the μορφή but also the δόξα and τιμή of such), for he would still be the son of a king; but the nature of a servant also belongs to him, for he really performs a servant's work and endures a servant's sufferings. But such a person could never have arisen through the *union* of a king's son with a servant. Never could it be said of him as is said of Christ in the formula of concord (epit. ep. 8), the unia personalis is not a mere combinatio, quia potius hic summa communio est, quam Deus assumpto *homine* vere habet, or affirm. 6: Quomodo *homo, Mariæ filius*, Deus aut filius Dei vere appellari posset, aut esset, si ipsius humanitas (this is evidently understood as an exigens concretum) cum *filio Dei* non esset personaliter unita. If we regard the two natures as two subsistences or parts, constituting together the one person, there remains then no way of escape from the extremest Nestorianism except that to which Eutyches had recourse, namely, that the one part participated in the properties of the other. Nestorianism is therefore by no means the opposite of Eutychianism, but merely what it presupposes. He who has no part in the former needs not the latter to help him out. In "Philippism" lies the saving of our theology from such errors.

this, then, follows that second clause *by whom also*, etc., simply by way of confirming and at the same also of explaining the preceding. Christ was appointed heir of the universe, nay, this universe has received its being through him. How proper and natural is it, that he through whom the universe was made, after having humbled himself and accomplished the gracious will of the Father, should as his reward be also invested with the dominion over the universe as with a *permanent inheritance*.—The principal idea in κληρονομία is not that of a possession which one receives through the death of another, but a possession which he on his part can transfer as an inheritance to his posterity, consequently, a permanent possession over which he has full authority. (The passage chap. ix. 16, seq., would agree with this interpretation if we were at liberty to translate διαθήκη there by "testament." There too it would be the κληρονόμος himself who had heired the inheritance, not through the death of another, but who by his own death had acquired the right to transfer the inheritance to others. Still when we come to that passage we shall find that there is no reason for departing from the usual *biblical* signification of the word διαθήκη).

Ver. 3.—The twofold idea which lies in the second verse is in ver. 3 farther explained. These two things were said: that Christ has been appointed *in time* (after the completion of the redemption-work) to the theocratical inheritance of the *Kingdom of God*, and that Christ is the *eternal* ground of the entire universe. The second of these things is here repeated in the apposition which belongs to the *subject* of the third verse: ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ; the first in the verb ἐκάθισεν, etc., which contains the predicate and the apposition belonging to the predicate-idea ποιησάμενος, etc., consequently, in the words καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς. (For that ποιησάμενος is in apposition not to the subject ὅς, but to the predicate-idea contained in the verb, appears not only logically, from the idea itself, but also grammatically, from the want of a καί before καθαρισμόν).

With regard to the reading, we may consider it as fully made out after Bleek's searching investigation, that the words "δι' ἑαυτοῦ" before καθαρισμόν and ἡμῶν after ἁμαρτιῶν are to be cancelled.

We proceed now to the *first member of the sentence*—the subject with its appositions. Chiefly the expressions ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης and χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως require here a thorough investigation. Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Limborch, and others have understood ἀπαύγασμα of *the passive light, i. e., reflection* or *reflected image* which a lucid or illuminated body throws on a (smooth reflecting) surface. According to this, Christ would be represented

here as an image or reflection of the Father's glory, consequently, his hypostatical separate existence from the Father is considered as *presupposed*, and emphasis laid on his qualitative sameness with the Father. Others again, as Capellus, Gomarus, Gerhard, Calov, Bleek, have understood *ἀπαύγασμα* rather as denoting the *active light* or the *rays* which continually emanate from a shining body. According to this, the son would be represented rather as a *perpetual life-act of the Father*. But the first signification, as Bleek has shewn, is, although etymologically defensible, still against the grammatical usage; the second, on the contrary, appears to me to be not justifiable on etymological grounds, or at least to rest on unprecise expressions, and even the first, I would hesitate to defend on etymological grounds.—Ἀπολάμπω, with reference to any body, signifies to throw out a light from itself, *ἀπαστράπτω* to dart forth flashes of lightning from itself, *ἀπανγάζω* to throw out a lustre *from itself* (not to produce a reflection on another body). The nouns ending in *μα*, however, denote, not the *act* as continuing, but the *result* of the act as finished. Thus *κήρυγμα* is not the act of announcing, but the announced message; in like manner Philo calls his Logos an *ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως* (ed. Mang. tom. i. p. 35), where *ἀπόσπασμα* must denote the separated part, and *ἀπαύγασμα*, consequently, the secondary light radiated from the original light. In the same sense do we take the expression here. It denotes, not the brightness received from another body and thrown back as a reflection or a mirrored image, nor the light continually proceeding from a shining body as a light streaming out and losing itself in space, but it denotes a light, or a bright ray which is radiated from another light *in so far as it is viewed as now become an independent light*. The expression ray-image (Germ. Strahlbild) best answers to the original; as a ray-image, it is a living image composed of rays not merely one received and reflected, but it is conceived of as independent and permanent, it is more than a mere ray, more than a mere image; a sun produced from the original light. We fully agree therefore with Bleek when, following Chrysostom and Theophylact, he finds the best interpretation of *ἀπαύγασμα* in the expression of the Nicene creed *φῶς ἐκ φωτός*, but we differ from him when he thinks that this interpretation is sufficiently rendered by the German word "Strahl"—"ray."

The original light from which the manifested ray-image has proceeded, is denoted by the word *δόξα* (scil. *αὐτοῦ, θεοῦ*). Many commentators, as Tholuck, wrongly interpret this of the Shekinah, that cloud of light under the Old Testament dispensation in which God revealed his presence and glory in a manner perceptible to the outward sense to Moses, then to the High Priest in the holy of holies, and last of all to the shepherds, Luke ii. 9. This would be

impossible if for no other reason than this, that, as the original light was then a light perceptible to the sense, much more must the ἀπαύγασμα proceeding from it be a brightness apparent to the bodily eye. But, moreover, according to this explanation, the Son, the absolute, adequate, personal revelation of the Father would be degraded beneath the Old Testament imperfect, typical, form of the Divine manifestation, seeing that he would be represented as an ἀπαύγασμα of the latter, which was not even itself an ἀπαύγασμα, but was a mere reflection. Without doubt, therefore, those are right who understand the expression δόξα in the supersensible meaning in which it was used by John, and explain it of the eternal essential glory of the Father, that *light inaccessible* of which Paul speaks in 1 Tim. vi. 16, and which God himself is (1 John i. 5). God's own eternal unsearchable essence is light throughout, not a βῦθος, not a dark original basis which must needs first develope itself into brightness, but light clear to itself, and self conscious, and comprehending in itself the fulness of all possible things, an original monad—which bears in itself, and calls forth from itself the possibility and reality of all monads—full of wisdom and love. This is the original glory of the Father's essence, and this original glory was manifested to itself in eternity, and to the creature in time, inasmuch as it allows to proceed from itself the Son, a living independent ray-image, in whom all that glory finds itself again, and reproduces itself in an absolute form, and in whose existence and manifestation the love, as in his nature and qualities, the wisdom of the Father represents itself.

This interpretation of the ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης is confirmed by the expression which follows in the second member—χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως. Substantially the same thing is denoted by ὑπόστασις as by δόξα, only regarded from another point of view. Δόξα signifies the essence of the Father with reference to his glory in which he represents himself before the eyes of the suppliant creature; ὑπόστασις denotes this essence *as* essence and without regard to its outward manifestation. Originally ὑπόστασις signifies *solidity*, then *reality*, *being*, *existence*. It is well known, that the term in its philosophical use acquired an ambiguity of meaning which led to mistakes in the Arian controversy. The Alexandrians taking the word in the sense of "subsistence" ascribed to the Son a proper ὑπόστασις (an independent existence) along with the Father, which gave great offence to the Western Christians, inasmuch as they took the word in the older sense to mean "essence," and therefore of course could ascribe no other essence to the Son than to the Father. In the passage before us ὑπόστασις is evidently used in the *older* sense. True, Calvin, Beza, Salmeron, Gerhard, Calov, Suicer, and others found a difficulty in the Son's being represented as a mere

reflection of the Father's essence, seeing that he himself participates in this essence, and were therefore induced to understand *ὑπόστασις* rather in the later sense, so that the person of the Son was designated as an exact image of the person of the Father. This however, on the one hand, would involve the anachronism of transferring a later speculative theological terminology to the apostolical times, to which the designation of the Father, Son, and Spirit as three *ὑποστάσεις* was as yet so unknown that the author could not possibly have used the word in the sense of "person" without being unintelligible to his readers; on the other hand the whole difficulty which has given rise to this false meaning, rests on an unsound interpretation of the word *χαρακτήρ*.

Χαρακτήρ does not any more than *ἀπαύγασμα* denote a mere reflection, a copy. Derived from *χαράσσω* it denotes not, as Wahl and Bretschneider assert, "an instrument for engraving," a style or chisel, but the mark made by a stamp, the *features carved* on the stone, or the gem, or the seal-ring. It thus comes to signify metaphorically, the features of a countenance, the features of character —and, thirdly and finally, in a weakened signification, it is also used for a "characteristic mark," a token by which anything is known (like *τύπος*) (thus we speak of the *character* of a species of plants). But *χαρακτήρ* never denotes the *copy* of one body left by a seal or signet on another; it never signifies the *image* or the *copy* of the features of a countenance; Lucian speaks rather of *εἰκόνες τῶν ἀντιμόρφων χαρακτήρων* (de Amor. p. 1061). The third of the above significations is evidently not suitable here; the Son can in no intelligible sense be called a distinguishing mark or sign of the nature of God; not less unsuitable is the second, viz., *stamp* in the sense of expression, characteristic quality, which, besides being a figurative and abstract signification, is inadmissible partly, because the Son cannot possibly be merely a quality of the Father, and partly because the parallelism with *ἀπαύγασμα* requires a concrete term. We must therefore take *χαρακτήρ* as meaning *stamp* in the sense of a form cut out or engraven. As it belongs to the *δόξα* to concentrate and reproduce itself in a form composed of rays, a sun, so it is proper to the *οὐσία* or *ὑπόστασις* to stamp itself out (or according to the ancient mode of viewing it: to engrave itself) in a manifest form or figure. This form or figure is not, however, to be viewed as a *copy* (as if the *ὑπόστασις* itself had already a form which was now copied in a second form) but as an immediate and substantial rendering visible and corporeal, of the *ὑπόστασις*. The idea is therefore substantially the same as that which is expressed in the words *ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*.

If it be asked, who is the *ὅς* to whom these appositions belong, whether the Logos as eternally pre-existent, or the Logos as incar-

nate in time, it follows from what has been already remarked on the relation of the third verse to the second, that in general they belong more properly to the former. By the ὤν is represented the *permanent nature*, not the *temporal acting* of the *Son*. This, however, must not be so regarded, as if that *eternal relation of the Son to the Father* had been *altered* by his coming into the sphere of time. Even when he walked in lowliness on the earth, as Zuingle has already remarked, he could speak of himself "as the Son who is in heaven" (John iii. 13).* Even when he had exchanged the form of the world-governing, world-embracing eternity, for the form of life *in* the world, and *under* earthly historical relations, he was in the kernel of his being still ever one with the Father, still the brightness of his glory and the stamp of his nature, only that he now revealed this nature more in historically human relations, so to speak, as *practical* love and holiness and wisdom. Thus also the second apposition explains itself: φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ. First of all, it is evident, that by ῥῆμα cannot be meant, as the Socinians explain it, the preaching of the gospel, but only the creative Omnipotent word which lies at the foundation of the world's existence; then, that φέρων, in like manner as ἀπαύγασμα and χαρακτήρ, is to be rendered not abstractly, but concretely (sustinere, comp. Num. xi. 14; Is. ix. 6); finally that αὐτοῦ applies in a reflexive sense to the Son, and not to the Father.† The meaning then is, that the Son sustains the universe by the omnipotent word of his power. Here too, it is the eternal relation of the Son as *eternal* to the universe that is spoken of, that relation, the ground of which was given in the words of ver. 2, δι' οὗ καὶ ἐποίησε τοὺς αἰῶνας. Only it must not be forgotten here also, that this eternal relation of the Son to the universe was not in the least altered by this—that

* This, of course, again is not so to be viewed, as if the Son of God had remained in heaven as a *part* or *portion* of Christ, and taken part in the *world-governing* omniscience and omnipotence, while the human nature as another *part* upon earth was without omnipotence and omniscience. This would land us in a more than Nestorian separation of the person of Christ into two persons. But the eternal Son of God, entering into the category of time and the creature, emptied himself, during the period of his humiliation, of the μορφὴ θεοῦ, *i. e.*, the participation in the *government of the world* and the world-governing omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, and manifested his Divine attributes and powers in *temporal human form*, in the form of *particular miracles*. But his oneness of *being* with the Father, although assuming another *form*, remained unaltered.

† As the older manuscripts have no spiritus, αὐτοῦ also might be written, without thereby changing the reading as Calov thought "with impious temerity." But Bleek has shewn, that in the hellenistic literature αὐτοῦ only stands where in the first person ἐμαυτοῦ would stand, *i. e.*, where an emphasis lies on the "self;" on the other hand, that αὐτοῦ stands where in the first person ἐμοῦ would stand. Τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ would have to be translated "with the word of his *own* power." There is no occasion for this emphasis here. And just as little occasion is there for departing from the reflexive signification of αὐτοῦ, here the only natural one.

the Son becoming man was the sustainer of the world in another sense, namely, the centre of the world's *history*, and the redeemer of humanity and reconciler of heaven and earth.

The subject of the sentence denoted by ὅς (*υἱός*) is therefore neither the Logos as eternal, *exclusive* of his incarnation, much less is it the incarnate as such ; but the subject is Jesus Christ the *incarnate, in so far as he is the eternal* Son of God, who, as the Logos, has an eternal being with the Father, and whose doings in time could *therefore* form the centre-point and the angle of all that is done in time.

This action in time of him who is the eternal ray-image and exact stamp of the Divine nature, is now described in the *predicate* of the sentence, in the words *καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς*. The genitive *τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* which we cannot well translate otherwise than "purification *from* sins" is explained by this, that in the Greek it can also be said *αἱ ἁμαρτίαι καθαρίζονται*. *Καθαρίζειν* corresponds to the Hebrew כִּפֶּר, and finds an intelligible explanation in the significance which belonged to the Levitical purification in the Old Testament cultus. Those, therefore, would greatly err, who should understand *καθαρίζειν* of moral improvement, and so interpret *καθαρισμὸν ποιεῖν* as if the author meant to represent Christ here as a teacher of virtue, who sought by word and example the improvement of men. And even those might be said to be in error who explain *καθαρισμός* of the taking away of guilt by atonement, but do this only on account of passages which occur further on in the epistle—as if the idea of the biblical *καθαρισμός* were not already sufficient to confirm this the only true explanation. The entire law of purification, as it was given by God to Moses, rested on the presupposition that man, as sinful and laden with guilt, was not capable of entering into immediate contact with the holy God. The mediation between man and God, who was *present* in the holiest of all, and in the holiest of all *separated* from the people, appeared in three things ; first, in the sacrifices ; second, in the priesthood ; and third, in the Levitical laws of purification. The sacrifices were (typical) acts, or means of atoning for guilt ; the priests were the instruments for accomplishing these acts, but were by no means reckoned as more pure than the rest. Hence they had to bring an offering for their own sin before they offered for the sins of the people. The being Levitically clean, finally, was the *state* which was reached positively, by sacrifices and ordinances, negatively, by avoiding Levitical uncleanness, the state in which the people were rendered qualified for entering into converse with God (through the priests) "without death" (comp. Deut. v. 26); the result, therefore, of observances performed, and the presupposed condition of faith and worship. The *sacrifices*

were what purified; the purification was the taking away of *guilt*. This is most clearly set forth in the law respecting the great festival of atonement (Lev. xvi.). There we find these three principal elements in the closest reciprocal relation. First, the sacrifice must be prepared (vers. 1–10), then the high priest must offer for his own sins (vers. 11–14); finally, he must "slay the sin-offering of the people" (ver. 15), and sprinkle the mercy-seat and the whole sanctuary with its blood, and "purify it from the uncleanness of the children of Israel" (ver. 19), and then, lay the sins of the people symbolically on the head of a second beast of sacrifice and drive it laden with the curse into the wilderness (vers. 20–28). For—ver. 30—"on that day your *atonement* is made that ye may be *cleansed;* from all your sins before the Lord are ye cleansed." Purification in the biblical sense, consists in the atonement, the gracious covering (כִּפֻּר, ver. 30) of guilt. (In like manner, were those who had become Levitically unclean, for example the lepers Lev. xiv., cleansed by atoning sacrifices). An Israelitish or Jewish-Christian reader, therefore, would never associate with the expression *καθαρισμὸν ποιεῖν* what is wont to be called "moral improvement," which, so long as it grows not on the living soil of a heart reconciled to God, is empty self-delusion and a mere outward avoiding of glaring faults; but the *καθαρισμός* which Christ has provided, could in the mind of the author and his readers be understood only of that gracious atonement for the whole guilt of the whole human race, which Christ, our Lord and Saviour, has accomplished through his sinless sufferings and death, and from which flows all power of reciprocal love, all love to him our heavenly pattern, and all hatred to sin on account of which he had to die. It is easy to repeat these words of the scriptural author with the mouth; but he alone can say yea and amen to them with the heart, who with the eye of true self-knowledge has looked down into the darkest depths of his natural, and by numberless actual sins aggravated, corruption, and who despairing of all help in himself, stretches forth his hand to receive the offer of salvation from heaven.

For his faithful obedience unto death on the cross the incarnate was crowned, inasmuch as, without his having to give up the form of existence which he then had,—the human nature, therefore as man and continuing to be man—he was exalted to a participation in the divine government of the world. This participation is expressed by the words *sitting at the right hand of God.* Never, and nowhere, does the Holy Scripture apply this expression to denote that form of world-government which the Logos exercised as eternally pre-existent; the sitting at the right hand of God rather denotes everywhere, only that participation in the divine majesty, dominion, and glory, to which the Messiah was exalted after his work was finished, therefore *in time,* and which is consequently ex-

ercised by him as the glorified Son of Man *under the category of time.* Already in Psalm cx. 1, where the expression for the first time occurs, it applies to the future, the *second David,* at a future time to be exalted.

The expression finds its explanation in the old oriental practice, according to which the king's son, *who was himself clothed with royal authority,* had the liberty of sitting on the king's throne, at his right hand. This signification lies at the foundation of the figure already in Psalm cx.; that Jehovah is there represented as contending in behalf of the Son, while the Son rests himself, has nothing to do with the figure as such, and is not inherent in the expression "to sit at the right hand of God" as such (although of course that feature of Psalm cx. also finds its counterpart in the exalted Christ).

That explanation which arose amid the tumult of confessional controversy rests on an entire misapprehension of the figurative expression, namely, that as God is everywhere, the right hand of God is also everywhere; to sit at the right hand of God means therefore to be everywhere present. This interpretation is quite as mistaken as if one were to understand by *δεξιὰ θεοῦ,* a particular place where God sits on a throne (a mistake which Luther falsely attributed to Œcolompadius). In the expression *ἐκάθισε ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης* there lies solely the *idea of participation* in the divine dominion, and majesty (*μεγαλωσύνη,* majestas, denotes here God himself), without any local reference whatever.

On the contrary, the expression *ἐν ὑψηλοῖς* that is added, contains a distinct determination of locality; whether we connect it with the verb *ἐκάθισεν,* or (which is better, as, otherwise, *ἐν ὑψ.* would have to stand before *ἐν δεξιᾷ*) with the noun *μεγαλωσύνη.* Ἐν *ὑψηλοῖς* is the Hebrew בַּמְּרוֹם, equivalent to בַּשָּׁמַיִם. But "heaven" never in the holy Scriptures denotes the absence of space or omnipresence (see on this my scientific crit. of the ev. history, 2 ed. p. 601, seq.),—it always denotes either the firmament, or that sphere of the created world in time and space where the union of God with the personal creature is not disturbed by sin, where no death reigns, where the glorification of the body does not need to be looked forward to as something future. Into that sphere has the first-fruits of risen and glorified humanity entered, as into a place, with a visible glorified body to come again from thence in a visible manner.

Thus is described the *inheritance* (ver. 2) which the incarnate Son has received, and the author, after these introductory words in which he lays the foundation, now passes to the first principal inference which follows from them; namely, that that Son, the organ of the New Testament revelation, is superior to the angels, the organs of the Old Testament revelation. The carrying out of this inference forms the first part of the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. i. 4—ii. 18

PART FIRST.

THE SON AND THE ANGELS.

(i. 4—ii. 18.)

We encounter here the first instance of a phenomenon peculiar to the Epistle to the Hebrews, namely, that the announcement of a new theme is closely interwoven with the end of the last period of a foregoing part. The author passes forthwith from that which he has brought to a conclusion, to a new idea flowing from it, with which an entirely new perspective opens itself out. It follows prima facie and in general from the *inheritance* of the Son described in ver. 3, that the Son must be higher than the angels. This then opens a new theme, which is, to show that it is and must be so, and that this superiority of the Son to the angels will admit of being demonstrated in particulars. But this theme at which the author has arrived is a *principal* one, and one to which he has purposely come. It possesses in his view not merely the importance of a collateral idea, but of one with which, from regard to the practical aim of his epistle, he has especially to concern himself.

It is only from a complete misapprehension of the phenomenon to which we have referred, and which recurs in chap. ii. 5, iii. 2, iv. 3–4 and 14, etc., that we can explain why Bleek should deny, in opposition to De Wette, that a new section begins at ver. 4, and why Tholuck should understand ver. 4 as a "collateral idea," which, however, the author would specially impress upon his readers. Even in relation to ver. 3, ver. 4 is not a "collateral idea," but rather a conclusion to which the author has directed his course in vers. 1–3. But *why* was it of so much importance to him to carry out the comparison of the Son with the angels? Tholuck is certainly right when he says, that his object could not be to combat a party like that at Colosse who occupied themselves with the worship of angels, for the author who usually draws his practical applications very closely, and, in order to do so, breaks without hesitation the connexion of the theoretical reasoning, gives no admonition whatever against the worship of angels. The only practical inference which

he draws is in chap. ii. 2—that the word spoken by the Son is still more holy than the law which was given by angels. Bleek is therefore of opinion, that the belief of the Israelites in the co-operation of the angels in the giving of the Sinaitic law, led the author to speak of angels; but thus outwardly apprehended, this serves as little for explanation as the strange remark that the thought of God's throne reminded the author of the angels who are around his throne.

The true motive of the author lies deeper. *The entire Old Testament is related to the New as the angels are related to the Son;* this is his (first) principal idea, an idea of wondrous depth, which throws a surprising light on the whole doctrine of angels. In the old covenant, mankind, and as part thereof also Israel, is represented as far separated from the holy God by sin, and the angels stand as mediators between them. The mediation in the Old Testament is a double one, a chain consisting of two members, of *Moses*, and the *angel of the Lord*. *There* stands a man who, by his vocation, by his position, by his commission, is raised above other men with whom he stands on the same level as a sinner, and brought nearer to God, yet without being nearer to the divine nature or partaking in it. *Here* stands the form of an angel, in which God reveals himself to his people, brings himself nearer to the people's capacity of apprehension, becomes *like* to men yet without *becoming* man. God and man certainly approach nearer to each other; a *man* is commissioned and qualified to hear the words of God; *God* appears in a form in which men can see him, but there is as yet no real union of God with man. But in *the Son*, God and man have become personally one, they have not merely approached outwardly near to each other. God has here not merely accommodated himself to man's capacity of apprehension in an angelophany, a theophany, but he has personally revealed the fullness of his being in the man Jesus, inasmuch as that ἀπαύγασμα of his glory was man. And in the person of this incarnate one, not merely a member of humanity has come near to God, but as he who was born of a virgin is himself eternal God, in him as first-fruits of the new humanity has mankind been exalted to the *inheritance of all things*.

It was necessary that the author should show how the two mediators of the Old Testament, the angel of the covenant and Moses, find their higher unity in Christ. To shew this of the angel of the covenant is the problem of the first part, to shew it of Moses, that of the second part (comp. chap. iii.—iv. chiefly chap. iii. ver. 3: *for this man was thought worthy of more glory than Moses*).

The question may still be asked, however, why the author speaks of the *angels* in the plural, why he does not place the individual *angel of the Lord* side by side with the individual Moses? The

answer is very simple; because the *angel of the Lord* was not a particular individual from among the angels. He was not a person distinct from God, not one of the number of created angels whom God used only as an instrument; but the *angel of the Lord* (מלאך י״י) was God himself as he appeared in the *form* of an angel.* (Comp. chiefly Judges xiii. ver. 21 with ver. 22.) The author speaks of angels, therefore, because it was not a certain individual angel who was to be placed by the side of Moses as the second member in the chain of mediation, but because, when God would manifest himself to Moses and to the high priests, he borrowed the form and figure of his appearance from the sphere of the angels, of those angels whom he also usually employed when it was necessary under the old dispensation to make Divine revelations manifest to the eyes of men.

The comparison of the Son with the angels, divides itself again into two sections, which are also outwardly separated from each other by a practical part inserted between them. In the first of these sections the author shews, that the Son is superior to the angels already in virtue of *his eternal existence* as the Son of God (chap. i. 4–14, upon which is engrafted in chap. ii. 1–4 the practical suggestion, that the New Testament revelation is still holier than that of the Old Testament); in the second he shews, that in the Son *man* also has been exalted above the angels (chap. ii. 5–18).

SECTION FIRST.

THE SON IS IN HIMSELF SUPERIOR TO THE ANGELS.

(i. 4–14.)

Ver. 4.—In the words *κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων* lies, as has been already observed, the theme of the whole part, while in the words *ὅσῳ διαφορώτερον*, etc., the special theme of the first section is expressed. The participle *κρείττων γενόμενος* stands in apposition with the *subject* of ver. 3 *ὅς i. e. υἱός*. The subject of whom it is affirmed that he is superior to the angels, is therefore not the Logos as pre-existent, but still *the incarnate Son of God as the organ of*

* The theocratical מלאך י״י the Jehovah who was enthroned above the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant, is not to be confounded with the *angel* Michael (Dan. x. 13), who, after the temple and ark of the covenant had ceased to exist, and the nation of Israel was scattered among other nations, was chosen of God to be the guardian angel of this people. This angel was certainly distinguished from God and his Son (according to Rev. xii. 7); was a creature, one of the created angels.

the New Testament revelation; this appears partly, from the context and the train of thought, inasmuch as it was the business of the author to demonstrate the pre-eminence of the new dispensation over the old, partly from the γενόμενος "become" (by no means = ὤν), partly, from the κεκληρονόμηκεν, *has inherited.*

The argument for the superior dignity of the organ of the New Testament revelation is derived from this—that God already under the old dispensation assigned to the future Messiah whom he there promised, a *name* which plainly enough declared, that this promised future Messiah should be at the same time the eternal Son of the same nature with the Father. In this light, and from this point of view, then, are to be understood also the particular proofs adduced from the Old Testament ver. 5–14, and so understood they present no difficulty. They can only then appear difficult and obscure when it is supposed that the author meant them to prove, that a dignity superior to the angels was ascribed in the Old Testament either to the Logos *as such*, or to the historical individual Jesus *as such.* Nothing of this, however, is said even in the remotest degree. The author lays down the thesis, that the *Son* in his quality as *organ of the New Testament revelation* is exalted above the angels, and in proof of this he appeals to the fact, that the Old Testament ascribes to the Messiah this dignity, namely his being the Son of God in a manner which is not affirmed of the angels. As a middle member between that thesis and this proof, nothing farther needs to be supplied than the *presupposition* that the Son ver. 1–3 *is identical with the Messiah promised in the Old Testament.* But that the readers of the Epistle did presuppose this, that by the υἱός ver. 1–3 in whom God has revealed himself "at the end of this time" (consequently in the "Messianic time;" see above) they understood Jesus Christ, and again that they held Christ to be the Messiah, will surely not require to be proved here.

Κρείττων—the author uses the same expression, in itself quite relative and indefinite, also in the analogous comparisons chap. vii. 19 and 22, viii. 6 and ix. 23, x. 34, etc. The Son is superior to the angels, because (in as far as) "he has obtained as an inheritance a more distinguished name than they." On the idea of the inheritance see the remarks on ver. 2. The act of the inheriting is one performed *in time;* nothing is said of the Logos as eternally pre-existent. But neither is it anything that took place in the time of Jesus that is spoken of; the author does not refer to those events recorded in Matth. iii. 17, xvii. 5, in which the voice of the Father from heaven to Jesus said: This is my beloved Son. The author *could not* in consistency with his plan refer to these events; for his object was to prove his particular theses and doctrines from the records of the Old Testament itself, for the sake of his readers, who

were afraid of doing what might involve a separation from the writings and the ordinances of the old holy covenant of God with the people of Israel. Accordingly, his object here is to shew, that already in the Messianic prophecies the Messiah was represented not as a mere man, but received a name such as was given to no angel, a name which indicates an altogether exclusive and essential relation of oneness with God. The perfect *κεκληρονόμηκεν* points to the time of the Old Testament prophecy.

Ὅσῳ διαφορώτερον παρ' αὐτοὺς κεκληρονόμηκεν ὄνομα. It is evident that *ὄνομα* here, where the author treats (ver. 5, seq.), precisely of the name *υἱός*, is not (with Beza, Calov, and others) to be translated by "dignity."—*Παρά* c. Acc. instead of the genitive, is no Hebraism, but a genuine Greek construction, formed to avoid unsuitable applications of the genitive (such as would occur here). *Διαφορώτερον*, not, more excellent, higher, but *more distinguished, more singular*. Critics in their wisdom have indeed doubted the accuracy of the fact here stated, affirming that the name "sons of God" is given not merely to men—Ps. lxxxix. 27; 2 Sam. vii. 14—but also precisely to angels—Job i. 6, ii. 1, xxxviii. 7; Dan. iii. 25.* Those make shortest work of it, who deny to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews a thorough acquaintance with the Bible; Bleek deals more modestly, when he supposes that the author was not versed at least in the Hebrew original, and explains his overlooking those passages by the circumstance, that the LXX, which he made use of exclusively in his citations, and the knowledge and use of which he presupposes in his readers, who were acquainted with Aramaic, but not with Hebrew—has in those passages *ἄγγελοι θεοῦ* in the place of בני אלהים. This would indeed ward off the moral charge of carelessness and inconsiderateness from the author's person, but not that of falseness and groundlessness from his reasoning. On a more thorough and impartial investigation, however, it will appear here again, how much the foolishness of the Scriptures, and of their writers enlightened by the Holy Spirit, is superior to the pretended wisdom of the children of men. If, in these days, a preacher were to say in a sermon, or in a book designed for edification, that Christ receives in the *New* Testament a name which is applied exclusively to him, for to whom of all that are born of woman has the Father said: This is my *Son?*—would any one have a right to object to such a preacher, that he must be unacquainted with those passages of the New Testament in which Christians are called *sons of God*, and besides that he must be

* The passages Gen. vi. 2, where it is the descendants of Seth that are spoken of and alone *can* be spoken of (comp. my "Weltanschauung der Bibel und Naturwissenschaft" in the "Zukunft der Kirche," 1847, p. 369, seq.), and Ps. xxix. and lxxxix. where בְּנֵי אֱלִים are spoken of, have no connexion at all with this subject.

ignorant of the passage Heb. ii. 10, where the author speaks of "many sons of God?" Is it not then quite a different thing to apply a common name in the *plural* to a *class*, from what it is to apply the same as an individual name in the *singular* to an individual? Even where the New Testament speaks of *υἱοῖς θεοῦ* instead of *τέκνοις θεοῦ*, as in that very passage Heb. ii. 10, even there this difference still obtains, as no one assuredly will deny. And in like manner our author, in reference to the Old Testament, would be quite right, even if there were no other difference (which is not the case) than that between the plural as applied to the class, and the singular as applied to the individual. He himself, indeed, in ver. 5, makes the distinction between the *name* of Christ and that of the angels to consist in this—that God has said to no individual among the angels: "Thou art my Son; I have begotten thee." It makes already even an *essential* difference, whether the idea of son comes in an individual to its full manifestation, or only in a class.—As, however, in the New Testament, the difference between the predicates "Son of God" and "children of God," is not merely one of number, but as, in addition to this, there is a *qualitative* difference in the *kind* of designation, so is it also in the Old Testament. When JEHOVAH in Ps. ii. 2 and 7, declares his anointed to be his son whom he has *begotten*, this is something different from what is said, when the angels as a class are called sons of the ELOHIM, who has *created* them. Nay, this difference is, in respect of the expression, even greater and more marked than that in the New Testament between *υἱός* and *τέκνον*. The angels are called sons of God in so far as God is the Elohim, the all-governing Creator of all things, and they have come forth from his creating hand, and have lost by no fall this their primitive relation to God as his children;* the Messiah, on the other hand, is called the Son of God, in so far as God is JEHOVAH, the free, self-sufficient one, proceeding from himself, and independent of all creatures.† In reality then, the Son has received a *διαφορώτερον ὄνομα παρὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους*, and the form of ver. 5, *for to whom*, etc., shews plainly enough, that the author was clearly conscious of that difference. Bleek's view is correct, however, so far, that the author would feel less concern in omitting all *express* reference to the passages in Job and Daniel, as the readers in the Septuagint could not be misled by those passages.

At ver. 5 then, begins the proof that the Old Testament already assigns to the future Messiah a name, such as is never given to

* In Job ii. 2, Satan is not reckoned among the "children of God:" but *distinguished* from them. That he should come בְּתֹכָם (locally, is something extraordinary).

† See this correct interpretation of the אהיה אשר אהיה in Drechsler: Einheit und Aechtheit der Genesis, p. 10, with which is to be compared my treatise ueber das Alter des Jehovahnamens in Niedner's Zeitschr. für hist. Theol. 1849, p. 506.

an angel. We shall without prejudice explain these particular passages in their original connexion, from which it will appear, whether our author has invested them with a meaning which they do not bear.

Τίνι γὰρ εἶπέ ποτε τῶν ἀγγέλων—at εἶπε is to be supplied from ver. 1, θεός as the subject. Ποτέ does not serve to strengthen the τίνι (Kuinoel, Bretschneider, Wahl), but is independent, signifying "at any time," and thus forms a marked antithesis with πάλιν. This καὶ πάλιν is to be extended in the following way (Bleek and others): καὶ τίνι τῶν ἀγγέλων πάλιν εἶπε; "to which of the angels has he *at any time* said: Thou art my Son? and to which has he *again* said: I will be to him a Father."* This contains clearly the two ideas: God has used such expressions to an angel *not even a single time;* but to the Son *not merely once* but *again and again.*

The words cited are to be found in Ps. ii. 7. Very little essentially is gained by the usual question, whether this Psalm contains a direct prophecy of the Messiah, or an indirect one, or none at all. Let us enquire chiefly, who was its author, when it was written, and what occasioned it. Assuredly, this sublime lyrical effusion had a *historical occasion*, which affords the explanation of it in its subjective human aspect. For, let it be ever so prophetic, it is still essentially not a משׂא, not a נאם יהוה, it does not begin with בא אמר יהוה, but is a *psalm*, an *hymn*, an effusion of religious poetry, which has beneath it a נאם יהוה as the basis on which it moves, and to which pointed reference is made in the 6th verse חוק—יהוה. We are therefore justified in seeking a humano-historical occasion for the psalm. It cannot then have been written before the time of David, since the hill of Zion is spoken of as the royal seat; least of all in the time of Solomon (as Bleek would have it), since according to 1 Kings v.; 1 Chron. xxii., Solomon reigned in peace, and in his time there is not the slightest trace of such a violent insurrection of rebellious nations as is described Ps. ii. 1, seq. After the division of the kingdom, there was under Uzziah a subjugation of the neighbouring heathen nations, but only in a very partial degree, and the revolt of these heathen had become something so common, that it would scarcely have so powerfully moved the soul of a poet—besides, in this case, we should have expected to find among the hoped-for blessings of the future some mention of the re-union with the northern kingdom. There remains, therefore, no other time in which the Psalm can well have been written, but that of David. Against this ver. 6 has been adduced, as not properly applicable to

* It would be much harsher to extend the phrase thus: καὶ παλιν ερωτῶ· τίνι τῶν ἀγγέλων εἶπε. [It is, I think, simpler and more correct to explain πάλιν, and again, = and to take another instance, so De Wette.—[K.]

the annointing of David, seeing that David was anointed as a boy at Bethlehem. But supposing that ver. 6 applies to the person of David (which would first require to be investigated), the object of the words עַל־צִיּוֹן הַר־קָדְשִׁי would certainly not be to give a dry, outward, prosaic determination of locality—of the place of the anointing. The poet would rather denote the whole wondrous series of Divine acts by which the shepherd was exalted from his anointing by Samuel onwards, guarded amid the many dangers to which his life was exposed, until at length he came to be acknowledged by all the twelve tribes, and was brought to the summit of his dominion in the residence which he took by conquest, and which he founded —I say the poet would comprehend this whole series of Divine acts in a poetical unity, and as we would denote the same thing by the one symbolical expression: God has exalted him to the throne of Zion, so the poet denotes it by the symbolical expression entirely similar: "God has anointed him to be King in Zion." It is not said that Samuel anointed him, but that God anointed him. This interpretation would be all the more unobjectionable, that there is nothing to hinder our translating עַל by "over," and taking the words עַל־צִיּוֹן to denote the term. ad quem: God has anointed him (to be King) over Zion. Still, as already observed, we can by no means regard it as decided that ver. 6 speaks of the person of David. And thus every motive for placing the psalm in another time than that of David falls to the ground.

Precisely in David's life-time we find a state of things which remarkably corresponds with that described in the psalm. We read in 2 Sam. viii. that Hadadezer the King of Zobah rebelled against David, who subdued him, and that the Syrians of Damascus hastened to his assistance with a mighty host, of which David alone took 21,700 prisoners. Shortly before this, David had also put down rebellions on the part of the Philistines, Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, and Amalekites, and so there was then a time when almost the whole heathen world known to the Israelites had risen up in hostility against Israel and Israel's King (and consequently, according to the views of the ancient heathen, against Israel's God—for it was believed that with the people their gods were vanquished). After David's victory, Thoi, King of Hamath, sent to him presents in token of homage, so that there is not wanting an occasion also for what is said in vers. 10–12.—But in vers. 7 and 12 we find a statement which more than anything else confirms us in the view that the second psalm was written at that time (certainly after the victory was completed), and, moreover, that no one but David himself sung this hymn of thanksgiving and hope. The poet rests his firm hope upon this—that God has said to him: "thou art my son." A word to this effect had been spoken to David in the charge which

he received from God by Nathan the prophet, shortly before the Syrian war. When he wished to build God a temple, Nathan disclosed to him that *he* should not build God a temple, but *his posterity* (זרע as a collective); yea, God will build it an house, and *establish its throne forever; God will be its Father, and it will be his Son.* Now we know certainly (from 1 Kings viii. 17, seq.), that Solomon applied that prophecy to himself in such a way that he undertook the building of the temple, and we must even say that in this he did perfectly right; for if the "posterity of David" was to build a temple for God, there was no reason why the first member of that posterity should not immediately put his hand to the work. Only, it must not be forgotten, that Solomon himself by no means thought that the prophecy of Nathan as yet found its complete fulfilment in his erection of the temple. He says this most distinctly in 1 Kings viii. 26, 27. He considers it as a benefit still to be prayed for, that those words of Nathan to David should be verified, for *his* temple is as yet not a house in which God may truly dwell. Not less clearly was David conscious of this, that Nathan's word would first obtain its full accomplishment "in the distant future" (לְמֵרָחֹק), "in a man who is the Lord, Jehovah himself" (2 Sam. vii. 19),* or, as it is explained in 1 Chron. xvii. 17, "in a man who is exalted up to Jehovah." On this promise so well understood, David builds the hope which he expresses in Ps. ii. We know now the time, the occasion, and the author of the second psalm. And it is only now that we have the necessary preparation for enquiring into its contents. One might feel tempted to refer the contents of the psalm (as Bleek does) to the earthly historical king (to David according to our view, to Solomon according to Bleek's). Thus David would compose the psalm sometime during the insurrection of the Syrians—in vers. 1–3 he describes the raging of the heathen against Jehovah, and against himself, the anointed of Jehovah—then, in ver. 4, he expresses the certain hope that God will laugh at his enemies and utterly destroy them, and in ver. 6 he confirms this hope, by calling to mind the covenant-faithfulness of God, who has helped him hitherto, and has raised him to be King over Zion. But in ver. 7 there comes an obstacle by which this interpretation is entirely overturned. David appeals in ver. 7 to this —that God has said *to him:* "Thou art my son"—has said *to him:* he will give him the ends of the earth for a possession. When had ever such a promise been given *to David?* It is expressly said in 2 Sam. vii. 12, that David shall not build an house to the Lord, but shall sleep with his fathers; *not to him, but to his seed after him,* will God establish the kingdom forever and be their Father. It is

* If אדני יי were not in apposition to תורת־אדם, but vocative, the latter expression could have no possible meaning.

quite clear then, that David in the second psalm speaks in the name of his seed after him, that he adoringly looks forward to the fulfilment of that glorious hope in *the distant future*, 2 Sam. vii. 19 ; it is clear that the insurrection of the Syrians forms *merely the occasion, but not the object and import* of the second psalm.

The second psalm presents to us not an historical but an ideal picture. After the general insurrection of the southern and northern nations bordering on Israel had been quelled, and David had begun to reflect on this event, and to compare it with Nathan's prophecy, there opened before him a grand prospect stretching into the future; what had befallen him appears as a type, as a typical instance of a great ideal law which would again and again repeat itself, until it found its perfect manifestation in the time of the "seed after him," his view of which seed had already in the prayer 2 Sam. vii. 19 concentrated itself into the concrete form of "a man who is to be exalted up to Jehovah." For, apart from the fundamental law of all poetical intuition, according to which what is general (as in the case before us "the posterity") individualizes itself in the eye of the poet, it could not remain hid even from that *reflection* which is divested of all poetry, that the fulness of the prophecies given in 2 Sam. vii. must find their *final* accomplishment in a *concrete descendant*. If, in opposition to David, "who was to sleep with his fathers," the royal dominion was to be established for ever in the house of David or the seed of David (2 Sam. vii. 16), this certainly could not be accomplished thus—that his descendants, one after the other, for ever should also "sleep with their fathers;" but the one part of the fulfilment must consist in this, that God should show a fatherly forbearance towards the sins of the particular descendants (2 Sam. vii. 14), the other part certainly in this, that at length an individual would come, in whom the endlessness of the dominion, and the absoluteness of the relation of son, should find adequate manifestation. Now, *we know*, as has been already observed, from 2 Sam. vii. 19, and 1 Chron. xvii. 17 (the passage comes of course from the royal annals which form the basis of both books) that David really understood that prophecy in this and in no other sense, and Ps. ii. 7 compels us to refer the psalm to an *individual* who was the seed κατ' ἐξοχήν promised to David.

As the heathen had assembled against him to throw off his yoke, so, transferring himself in spirit to future times, he sees how the nations of the earth (the representation is here purposely general, and nothing is said of the Syrians) would also rise up against the future perfect King, and that out of hatred to the living holy God who has anointed him. But, in like manner, he sees also already, how the living God will deride the folly of the children of men. God himself speaks in majestic calmness the simple word : "I have

anointed my King upon Zion." (It is quite evident that this is not spoken of David, but of that *seed after him.*) Now David hears that future King himself speak words of holy confidence; he hears him say, that he will often confess and freely proclaim that the Lord has declared him to be his son, that the Lord has anointed him. (His real being he derives not by his carnal descent from David, but by the word of the promise of Nathan to David—he is begotten by the *word of God.* In the phrase "this day," it is evident that the royal singer sees in ideal vision *his own time* when he received the promise, blended with the *future time*, that of the perfect *seed*, and thus the "this day" forms a direct antithesis with the times in which David was begetting or had begotten corporeal descendants.) —Further, David hears, in ver. 8 the *seed* reminding God of his promises (2 Sam. vii.), in ver. 9 he hears God answering in accordance with these promises; and finally, in vers. 10–12, David concludes in his own name with an admonition to the kings of the nations to be in subjection to that promised "son;" soon the time shall come when he shall execute judgment on the heathen.

In the prophecy of Nathan, the prayer of David connected with it, and the second psalm, there lies before us *the germ of the whole Messianic prophecy.* In the second psalm, it appears still in the form of lyrical elevation, and it is more than probable, that the meaning of that first grand presentment remained a mystery undisclosed to the majority of David's contemporaries, and the generations immediately following, just as, at a later period, the prophecies of the divinity of the Messiah (Mic. v. 1, and Is. ix. 6) were locked up from the great mass of the Jewish people. Still, the consciousness of the importance of Nathan's prophecy never vanished (1 Kings xv. 4; 2 Kings viii. 19, etc.). But when, after the separation of the kingdoms, outward and inward decay increased more and more, and God by his prophets (first of all by Amos and Hosea) gave intimation of the coming exile, he then also again put into the mouth of the prophets the promise, that after the exile there should come a צמח דוד born in a low estate, brought like the first David from the sheep-folds of Bethlehem, not from kings' palaces (Mic. iv., v.) a branch springing from the roots of the hewn stock of the house of David (Is. xi.), an Immanuel born of the lowly maid of the house of David (Is. vii.);—and of the substantial identity of this *branch* with the "son," Ps. ii. and the "seed," 2 Sam. vii. on the one hand, and the Messiah on the other, there can no reasonable doubt be entertained.

Our author—who, in connecting the passage, 2 Sam. vii. 14, with the second psalm, makes it sufficiently evident that he had interpreted and understood the psalm in connexion with the prophecy of Nathan—simply calls to mind the fact, that in the very first com-

mencement of the Messianic prophecy* there is ascribed to the Messiah a relation of Sonship to God, such as is never applied, even approximately, to any one of the angels. A relation of such a kind, that the Messiah *derives his real being not from David but from God.*

For this was, as we saw, the import of the words *to-day I have begotten thee.* We shall therefore not have to inquire long in what sense the author of our epistle understood the σήμερον. In no other than the only natural sense. It denotes neither the eternal present, nor the time of the incarnation of Jesus, nor that of his resurrection, ascension, etc., but the time of that promise which was given by Nathan, in opposition to the (later) time when David begat Solomon (2 Sam. xii. 24). It all hinges upon this—that the υἱός does not derive his real being from David.

The second citation 2 Sam. vii. 14 has received its explanation in what has been said above.

Ver. 6.—The proofs of the assertion that the Son has received a higher *name* than the angels are, in truth, closed with the two citations in ver. 5. In ver. 6 seq. there follow certain other arguments, in which also the *superiority* of the Son over the angels appears, although not precisely that which consists in the *name.* The sixth verse is unquestionably one of the most difficult in the whole epistle. With regard to the construction, πάλιν seems, according to the position of the words, to belong to εἰσαγάγῃ; still, there is no difficulty in deciding, and by the consent of the best interpreters (Peschito, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Capellus, Grot., Limb., Hammond, Bengel, Wolf, Carpz., Kuin., Bleek, and others), it has been substantially determined, that according to the sense it can belong only to λέγει, parallel to the πάλιν (εἶπε) ver. 5; consequently that we have here an easily explicable hyperbaton. It cannot be "a second bringing in of the first-born into the world" that is here spoken of, as Olshausen rightly observes, seeing that nothing has been said of a first. And thus, from the outset, we are spared the fruitless trouble of deciding whether the "two bringings in" are to be understood of the eternal generation and the incarnation, or of the incarnation and the resurrection, or finally of the resurrection and the second coming.

What, however, is meant generally by the εἰσάγειν εἰς τ. οἰκ. can only be determined by looking more particularly at the citation itself and the meaning of it.

The words καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ are to be found verbatim in the LXX. cod. Vat. Deut. xxxii. 43. The cod.

* The idea of the Messianic prophecy we understand here, of course, in the narrower sense, as the prediction of a definite, royal, descendant of David. In the wider sense, Gen. iii. 15; and Deut. xviii. 15 are also Messianic prophecies.

Alex. has *πάντες υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and for this in a subsequent place *ἄγγελοι* where the cod. Vat. has *υἱοί*; but the Vatican reading is here, as it almost always is, the older and the more genuine, and is confirmed by the citation before us.

It has indeed been maintained (Pattr., Kuinoel, etc.) that this citation cannot be taken from Deut. xxxii., but is derived from Ps. xcvii. 7, where we find the words *προσκυνήσατε αὐτῷ πάντες οἱ ἄγγελοι θεοῦ*. But those who have adopted this view have been driven to it by the circumstance, that in Deut. xxxii. the words in question are not to be found in the Masor. text of the Hebrew original. How could the author, it was thought, appeal to a passage which was a mere spurious addition by the Alexandrine translators? But as it is evident, notwithstanding, that he follows, in respect of form, the passage in the LXX. Deut. xxxii., and deviates from Ps. xcvii., it was found necessary to have recourse to the subsidiary hypotheses, *a*, that the author has had both passages in his memory, *b*, that he was conscious of the spuriousness of the passage in Deut. xxxii., *c*, that he therefore intended to cite the other passage, *d*, but, notwithstanding, intentionally or unintentionally borrowed the *form* of the words from Deut. xxxii.

The artificial nature of the operation here presupposed, almost bordering upon the ludicrous, would of itself suffice for the refutation of this view. In addition to this, however, it enables us to escape from Scylla only to fall into Charybdis. For, if the words in Deut. owe their existence to a spurious addition, the words in Ps. xcvii. owe theirs to a manifestly false translation.

The Hebrew original runs thus—אלהים השתחוו־לו כל, and in the context, it is not the angels that are spoken of, but the false gods of the heathen, who will yet be constrained to bow before Jehovah. Nor is anything said there of a "bringing in of the first-born into the world;" the subject is simply and solely the sovereignty of Jehovah, before which the idols shall be destroyed. And even in the (spurious) superscription which the psalm bears in the LXX.: *Τῷ Δαυὶδ, ὅτε ἡ γῆ αὐτοῦ καθίσταται*, not a word is to be found either about the *οἰκουμένη* or the bringing in of a son into it.

While it is thus impossible to find in the verse before us a citation from Ps. xcvii. 7, all becomes right when we consider the citation as taken from Deut. xxxii. 43. For, with respect, first of all, to the absence of the words in the Masoretic text, we must with all our deference to this text as resting on ancient and strong tradition, never forget that we have in the LXX., particularly in the Pentateuch, an *equally ancient* recension of the Hebrew text. That the Seventy did not fabricate these words but found them in their original, is also Bleek's view. We have here, therefore, not a genuine text opposed to a spurious addition, but a reading opposed to

a reading. And, moreover, in the 6th verse, according to the proper sense of the words cited, all mainly depended upon this, that in accordance with the general religious consciousness and understood phraseology, the angels should be represented as having merely the position of worshipping spectators, when the setting up of the Messiah's kingdom is spoken of. We will further explain and justify this assertion. The determination of the time here referred to, *ὅταν δέ*, etc., one might be tempted to explain from the circumstance, that when Moses sang that song, Israel who, in Hos. xi. 1, is called the first-born of God, was just about to enter as a people among the nations of the earth. This explanation would at least be incomparably better than that according to which it is the entrance of the Logos from eternity into time that is mentioned. There is no mention here of the *κόσμος*, but of the *οἰκουμένη*, the sphere of the earth as inhabited by the nations.

But as *αὐτῷ* must plainly be referred to the same person that is called *πρωτότοκος*, while *αὐτῷ* again refers in the passage cited, not to the then Mosaic nor to the post Mosaico-Messianic Israel, nor to the ideal Israel, but to *Jehovah who will help his people*, it follows, that the author also, in the word *πρωτότοκος*, cannot have had in his mind either the real or ideal Israel, or the Messiah as such, and we shall therefore have to look out for another explanation of the *εἰσάγειν*.

We must first, however, ascertain more particularly the meaning of the passage Deut. xxxii. 43. Moses in vers. 15–18 rebukes the sins of Israel at that period, those numerous manifestations of the obduracy of their hearts which the people gave in spite of the mighty acts of God which they had witnessed. In vers. 19–35 he threatens them with terrible punitive judgments in the future, should they persist in these sins, in this obduracy. The punishment threatened is concentrated in this, that if the people should continue to be ungrateful for their redemption from the Egyptian bondage, God would at length take back from them the freedom which he had given them, and leave them to fall anew into a still more terrible bondage among a heathen people. We know that this was fulfilled, and how. We know how, from the time of Joshua to that of David, God conducted the people to the pinnacle of prosperity; how, from David to Zedekiah, he let them fall into all the depths of hapless degeneracy; how, in spite of prosperity and adversity, the people of Israel sank deeper and deeper into corruption, until, at length, God caused to be fulfilled the threatening first uttered by Moses, and afterwards repeated by Amos, Hosea, Micah, etc., and let the people fall into bondage to the heathen nations, the Babylonians, Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, Egyptians, and Romans. But Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, etc., were not the first who predicted a re-

deliverance from this affliction, for Moses had already foretold, Deut. xxxii. 36–42, that God would have compassion on those who were humbled and converted by those chastisements; then should it be known that it is he alone who can help and save. *Moses prophesies, then, in* vers. 36–42 *of the same re-deliverance which has been more specially described by the later prophets, as the deliverance through the Messiah, consequently, as the Messianic salvation.* Now here, in ver. 42, it is said (according to the reading maintained in the LXX.): the angels shall worship the Lord, *i. e., Jehovah the Saviour*. This Jehovah, the Saviour, appears indeed in the mouth of Moses to be quite identical with Jehovah generally, with God, but the Christian readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews knew already and acknowledged, that the Jehovah who should arise and come forth in the Messianic time for the salvation of his people is *God the Son, the Incarnate.* Two things must not be forgotten if we would rightly apprehend the meaning and the argument of the verse before us—first, that the author simply testifies to the Godhead of Christ, ver. 2, 3, as a thing already known to his readers through the apostolic preaching, and acknowledged by them, without deeming it necessary to adduce proofs for this doctrine; secondly, that for this very reason (as well as on account of the whole train of thought, ver. 4, seq.), the aim of ver. 6 is not to prove that the Messiah is the Son of God, but that the Messiah, who is known to be identical with the Son of God, is, even in the Old Testament dispensation, placed higher than the angels. For, it was on this point that the readers needed to be instructed. They had no doubts about the Messiahship of Jesus and the divinity of the Messiah, but this whole Messianic revelation was still in their eyes but an *appendix* to the Mosaic revelation, given only on account of Moses and Israel, only a blossoming branch of the religion of Israel. They had yet to be brought to know, that the divinity of him who was the organ of the New Testament revelation necessarily involves his infinite elevation above the organs of the Old Testament, that the old dispensation was ended on account of the new, and that this new dispensation was on account of all mankind, not on account of the old. This they had yet to be taught, and this is precisely what is designed to be proved on these verses, the proof being drawn from the divinity of Christ, already acknowledged by the readers.

In ver. 5 the author has shewn that the Messiah *even where he is prophesied of as David's Son*, is said to be the Son of God in a sense in which it is said of no angel. In ver. 6 he shews, that a place above the angels is assigned to the Messiah *moreover, when he is represented as Jehovah the Saviour himself.* When the Messianic salvation is described, the angels receive only the place of *worshipping spectators; instruments* of this salvation they are not.

The *εἰσάγειν τὸν πρωτότοκον*, etc., will now explain itself. The writer evidently means to express the idea, that these words are connected with a passage which speaks of *the entrance of Jehovah the Saviour into the world*, hence, of the entrance of the *Son* into the world. He says, designedly, not *υἱός*, which would denote the incarnate, but *πρωτότοκος*, which, like the *μονογενής* of John, denotes the eternal Son of the Father, the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* (Col. i. 15). The *ὅταν* serves now, of course, to determine not the time *in* which, but the time *of* which Moses spake in Deut. xxxii. 43. The idea with all its modifications would have to be expressed thus: "But again he says *of the time* when he shall introduce the first born into the sphere of the earth," etc. He calls it the *sphere of the earth*, not the *world*, because the Redeemer appears in Deut. xxxii. 42 specially as the finisher of the exile, as he who should offer to his people a *national restitution* among the nations of the *οἰκουμένη*. He has in reality also offered this to his people; his disciples after him too did the same (Acts iii. 21, *καιροὶ ἀναψύξεως* breathing times from the yoke); but as Israel remained obdurate, they lost the offered deliverance, and remain deprived of it until they shall turn to the Lord after the fulness of the Gentiles is come into the church (Rom. xi. 23, seq.).

In vers. 7–9 a third argument follows. A statement concerning the angels is here opposed to one concerning the Son. The following is what is implied generally in the opposition. The angels, the mediators of the old covenant, stood in a very outward relation to the salvation that was to be wrought out; they had not to work out that salvation, but only to bear witness of it; they stood in the closest relation to nature, and the appearances of nature, chiefly those of a terrible kind. These appearances of nature had only a preparatory and pedagogical aim; the Son, on the contrary, stands in the closest relation to the inner moral life. God employed angels to impress with fear a rude unsusceptible people by means of miracles; the Son has founded a kingdom of righteousness consisting of those who become partakers of his nature in free and joyous love.—The author, accordingly, devotes himself more and more to a comparison of the *inner nature* of the old and the new covenant.

The seventh verse presents again a peculiar difficulty. So much indeed is evident, that the *πρός* is to be rendered not "to" but "respecting," in "reference to;" for the words here cited, Ps. civ. 4, do not in themselves form an *address* directed to the angels. It is doubtful whether the Sept., which is here cited word for word, has correctly rendered the sense of the original Hebrew. In the 104th Psalm the greatness of God in nature is described. In ver. 2 it is said: God makes use of the light as a garment, of the heaven as a tent, ver. 3, of the clouds as a chariot, etc. In the words which

immediately follow עֹשֶׂה מַלְאָכָיו רוּחוֹת the *sulject* must be רוּחוֹת and the predicate מלאכיו, *he makes the winds his messengers, flames of fire his servants*, he employs the winds and the flames as his servants just as he makes use of the clouds as his chariot.—But does the Greek translation give the same sense? This is impossible even grammatically, for then the words would have to run thus: *ὁ ποιῶν ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ τὰ πνεύματα*, etc. But the article is at *ἀγγέλους* and not at *πνεύματα*. In spite of the rules of the language, Calvin, Beza, Bucer, Grotius, Limborch, Michaelis, Knapp, and others have so rendered the Greek words as to make them correspond with the Hebrew.* But then these words themselves would not be suitable to our context. For, in the statement that God employs the winds as his messengers, nothing is expressed respecting the nature and rank of the *angels*, but only respecting the use of the *winds*. But, as we have already observed, the rules of the language render every doubt here superfluous. The Greek words can be rendered in no other way than this: "*who maketh his angels winds and his ministers a flame of fire.*

Here, then, is another instance in which the writer appeals to a statement in the Sept. which owes its existence to an incorrect and inaccurate rendering. (So also Olshausen). The attempt of Calvin, Beza, and others, to make the Greek words correspond with the Hebrew original in spite of the rules of grammar, is, as we have seen, vain and inadmissible; but equally so is, on the other hand, the attempt of Luther, Calovius, Storr, Tholuck, and others, who would interpret the Hebrew original, in spite of the context of the psalm, according to the rendering of the Sept. Wherefore have recourse to such arts? Would any one in the present day take it amiss if a preacher were to give an excellent sermon on the verse, "The heart of man is a perverse and fearful thing?"† And yet this verse will in vain be sought in the original text; the Hebrew words have quite another meaning. But though the idea is not to be found in that particular *place* of the original text of the Bible, it is still not the less *biblical;* and the same holds good of the idea in the citation before us. Throughout the New Testament (for example Rom. viii. 38; 1 Pet. iii. 22), the angels, at least a class of them, are regarded as *δυνάμεις* of God, *i. e.*, as personal creatures furnished with peculiar powers, through whom God works wonders in the kingdom of nature, and whom he accordingly "makes to be storm-winds and flames of fire," in as far as he lets them, so to speak, incorporate themselves with these elements and operations of

* The strange interpretation given by Bengel and Meyer—God makes his angels out of wind, out of a fine but still material substance, while the Son is immaterial and uncreated—needs no refutation.

† [The above is a translation of Luther's version of Jer. xvii. 9.]

nature. It is a truth declared in the Holy Scriptures of great speculative importance, that the miracles of nature, for example the lightnings and trumpet sounds on Sinai, are not *wrought* immediately and directly by God the Governor of the world, but are *called forth* at his will by exalted creatures specially qualified for this work. This position the angels hold ; they are there to work terrible wonders in the sphere of nature before the eyes of a yet uncultivated people. The writer found this idea expressed shortly and tersely in that passage of the Sept., and he was quite as entitled to appeal to it in addressing his readers who made use of the Sept. as we are, in presence of a congregation using Luther's translation of the Bible, to appeal to that expression about the perverseness and fearfulness of the heart of man.

In the eighth verse πρός is, of course, to be taken in the same sense as in ver. 7, not as marking an address but as signifying "in reference to." It can therefore not be inferred at least from the preposition πρός, that the author regarded the passage in Ps. xlv. 7, 8 as a direct address to the Son of God. The words are spoken *in reference to the Son of God.* In how far they are so will be ascertained from a consideration of the passage in its original connexion.

The 45th Psalm is a carmen epithalamium on the marriage of a king with the daughter of a foreign king, as appears from verses 10–12, and, according to ver. 2, the song is presented to the king by one of his subjects. There is not the slightest occasion for considering the psalm as a direct prophecy of Christ. And as the superscription plainly designates the psalm a song of songs, שִׁיר־יְדִידוֹת, it is in all probability one of an ancient origin, and not belonging to the period after the exile, when already men had begun to discover more in the psalms than such human relations. The superscription ascribes the psalm to Korah, the contemporary of David and of Solomon. But, apart even from this superscription, the psalm suits no other king so well as Solomon. That hope which we found expressed by David (2 Sam. vii. and Ps. ii.) of an everlasting confirmation of his throne, recurs here, ver. 7 ; the king who is the subject of this song, is described as very rich ; he has according to ver. 9, ivory palaces, as Solomon had, 2 Kings vii.; he has gold of Ophir (ver. 10) as Solomon (1 Kings ix. 28); the daughter of Tyre, *i. e.*—according to the analogy of *daughter of Zion*—the city of Tyre* congratulates him (ver. 13), and Solomon stood in close alliance with Tyre (1 Kings vii.); the choice, too, of a foreign king's daughter not only occurred in the case of Solomon (comp. the song of songs)—this might be the case also with later kings—but in Solo-

* Hitzig indeed understands the princess Jezebel as meant by the daughter of Tyre; she, however, was from Sidon.

mon such a choice might as yet be excused, while, at a later period, a song celebrating a marriage so contrary to the law would scarcely have received a place among the collection of sacred songs. Already was the voice of prophecy lifted in all its majesty against Jezebel; and a powerful tribunate was formed in the cause of the theocracy against Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 19, seq.) and later kings.—Some indeed find in ver. 17 a feature which does not answer to Solomon. The words "instead of thy fathers shall be thy sons" (*i. e.*, these shall richly compensate for thy departed ancestors) are said not to be applicable to Solomon, as he had only a single ancestor who bore the crown. We might therefore be tempted to explain ver. 17, "thy sons shall compensate the *want* of ancestors;" but it is not probable that the poet should have referred to this want. Indeed there is no need of having recourse to any such shifts. Solomon had in reality no want of ancestors; and although only the last of these had borne a crown, this involved, according to the ideas then entertained, no defect of honour; nay, we find already from the book of Ruth, which was written with a view to exalt the house of David, how readily the real ancestors of David and Solomon were acknowledged as such, although they lived in a humble station. The poet could therefore with all propriety express the idea, that the glory of the ancestors of Solomon would be equalled and even surpassed by that of his posterity.

How now are the Hebrew words Ps. xlv. 7, seq., to be translated? From ver. 3 to ver. 10 Solomon is addressed throughout, from ver. 11 onwards his bride is addressed. There is then in the outset no occasion for viewing the words, *thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever*, as an interposed ejaculatory prayer to God. How unsuitable would it have been, if the poet had placed the everlasting throne of God in opposition to the throne of David as not everlasting! Further, it is also evident, that we are not at liberty with Gesenius and Olshausen to translate the words by "thy divine throne." Even if the words were בִּסְּאֲ אֱלֹהֶיךָ (according to the analogy of הַר־קָדְשִׁי), that rendering would still be unnatural, and the other, "the throne of thy God," would be more proper. The words כִּסְאֲךָ אֱלֹהִים, however, cannot signify, even grammatically considered, "thy divine throne" (this would require כִּסְאֲךָ כְּסֵא אֱלֹהִים), but only "thy throne, O God." An instance, indeed, seems to occur in Lev. xxvi. 42 (according to Gesenius' explanation), where the *genitive* is immediately joined to the *noun with the suffix* (אֶת־בְּרִיתִי יַעֲקוֹב my covenant of Jacob); but there יַעֲקוֹב is evidently not the *genitive of quality*, but the *adverbial accusative of relation*, and the relation of a covenant made by God with Jacob is evidently a different one from that of a throne *of divine majesty belonging* to a king; so that that passage does not afford the least analogy for the one before us. But granting that there

were such an analogy in a grammatical point of view, it is still contrary to the sense and spirit of the Hebrew language to use אלהים as a genitive of quality, and to flatten and degrade the idea of God or of divinity in a heathenish style to the idea of creature-majesty. Modern pantheism, indeed, speaks, of a divine locality, or of a "divine" opera; heathenish insipidities of this kind were foreign to the purity of the Israelitish monotheism.

On the other hand, it was not foreign to the Israelitish mode of conception and expression, to denote persons who stood as the agents and representatives of God by the word אלהים (sing.) or האלהים (plur.) —not, however, by האלהים as sing.—comp. Ps. lxxxix. 27, lxxiii. 15, etc. They were thus denoted, not because they were regarded as creatures equal with God, but because, in their relation to those who were subject to them, they were clothed with divine authority. This might, with perfect propriety, be said of the "seed of David" —Solomon—especially at the time when reference is made to that prophecy of Nathan, that the throne of David should be established for ever and ever.

The Psalmist after those words thus goes on: "A sceptre of righteousness (*εὐθύτης* = מישור in the Sept. frequently) is the sceptre of thy dominion; thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity. *Therefore* has thy God, O God, anointed thee with oil of joy more than thine associates." By the "associates" cannot be meant those holding office about the king's court; for, that the king is exalted in prosperity and glory above the officers of his court is true, and has ever been true, not merely of righteous, but of all kings, the unrighteous as well, and could not therefore with any reason be represented as a special blessing consequent on the righteousness of Solomon. Least of all can the *μετόχοις* be explained, with Olshausen and others, of the angels; to these neither the Psalmist nor our author can have referred in this word; we shall soon see that the point of comparison between the Messiah and the angels lies in quite another part of the citation. The associates are evidently his associates in royal dignity—other kings; and the Psalmist says, that on account of his righteousness Solomon has received more joy, prosperity and glory, than any other king of the earth. The anointing with oil of joy is not to be understood of the anointing to the office of king or prophet, or even of the anointing with the Holy Ghost in general, but the figurative expression is derived from the well-known custom of anointing the head at festivals (Deut. xxviii. 40; Psalm xxiii. 5, xcii. 10; Matth. vi. 17), and "to be anointed with oil of joy" is equivalent to being blessed with joy and prosperity.—That אלהים in the eighth verse is again vocative follows, not merely from the analogy of the seventh verse, but is evident of itself, and serves rather for the further confirmation of the correct rendering of ver. 7. It is impossible that

אלהיך can be in apposition with אלהים; even in a vocative address such a construction would be foreign to the spirit of the Hebrew diction; besides, here in the nominative or subject such a redundance would be all the more intolerable, as the emphasis which it involves is altogether without occasion or aim. The LXX. have therefore rightly understood אלהים as the vocative and אלהיך as the subject. That אלהים has no article is explained by this, that it is not an address to God, the one, definite, well-known, but an address to a man.

The repeated address אלהים applied to Solomon close beside the designation of Jehovah as אלהים is certainly highly significant. The poet addresses him thus not out of flattery, but under the influence of the theocratic feeling that the dominion of God over Israel finds its manifestation in the dominion of the anointed of God over Israel. This involves the idea that the theocratic king is the *fulfiller of the will of God in Israel.*

How then does our author apply this passage? He does not say that these words of the psalm are in the sense of their author an *address* to Christ (comp. the remark on *πρός*), but that they are spoken *of Christ*, are applicable to him. That exalted dignity and rank was ascribed to Solomon *because, and in so far as* his sceptre was a sceptre of righteousness, *because, and in so far as* he loved righteousness and made the will of God his will. The Psalmist contemplates Solomon then as the *ideal* of a theocratic king such as was conceived in 2 Sam. vii. and farther delineated in hope, Psalm ii. In as far as Solomon in reality made the will of God his will, in so far might he be accounted the *seed* promised to David, in so far might the predicate אלהים be assigned to him. It is quite possible and comprehensible, that in the first years of his reign it was believed that the prophecy of Nathan, 2 Sam. vii., and the hope of David, Psalm ii., 2 Sam. vii., found their fulfilment in Solomon, while the words of David were forgotten that the Lord spake "of the distant future." (It was thought, too, in the time of Constantine, that the reign of the thousand years had commenced!) But it soon appeared how mistaken this belief was, how far Solomon departed from a faithful fulfilment of the will of God. Although, however, that psalm—as a hymn on Solomon—was shewn to have proceeded from human error, it did not, therefore, and in the same degree *cease* to be prophetical, but it then first *became* a prophecy. It became apparent that the ideals delineated in that psalm under the guidance of the Holy Spirit would first be realized in the *future*. The ideal of the righteous king who absolutely fulfils the will of God, and to whom, therefore, the predicate אלהים truly belongs, and whose dominion is to have an everlasting continuance, is only very imperfectly fulfilled in Solomon, is first perfectly fulfilled in Christ. Thus

those words cited from the psalm are spoken *respecting the Son.* In the sense of their human author they are neither a direct nor an in-indirect prophecy of Christ, but the object of which they treat, Solomon, was a real, a living prophecy of Christ, a type and prefiguration, and, in as far as those words represent Solomon in his typico-ideal, not in his human-imperfect character, they are certainly in the sense of the Holy Spirit a prophecy pointing to our Saviour.

Inquire we now finally, how far we have in that declaration of the Psalmist *a proof of the superiority of the Messiah over the angels.* Three things are declared of the ideal of a theocratic king—consequently of the Messiah ; *a*, he is אלהים ; his authority is the authority of God himself ; *b*, his dominion is endless : *c*, both are true because he perfectly fulfils the will of God. The perfect theocratical king—therefore Christ (which required no proofs for the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews)—stands in this threefold relation above the angels. *He is the absolute revelation of God and therefore himself God; the angels are only servants. He is King of an imperishable kingdom ; the angels execute only periodical commands; he rules in a moral way as founder of a kingdom of righteousness, and his whole dignity as Messiah is founded directly on his moral and spiritual relation to man; the angels are only mediators of outward appearances of nature, by which a rude, unsusceptible people are to be trained for higher things.*

Ver. 10–12.—As ver. 8, seq., is connected with ver. 7 by the words *πρὸς τὸν υἱόν*, so is ver. 10 still more closely connected with ver. 8 seq., by a mere *καί*, and indeed we shall soon see, that the two members ver. 8, 9 and ver. 10–12 taken together, form the antithetical member to ver. 7.

Here also we will first consider the passage quoted (Ps. cii. 26–28) in its original meaning and connexion. The words in themselves have no difficulty ; the Sept. has rightly rendered them, and the author follows the Sept. ; the meaning of the words too is clear. But the question again recurs how far these words, evidently spoken of *God* can afford any proof of the superiority of the *Son* over the angels. The supposition that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews by mistake, *i. e.* from complete ignorance of the context from which he took the passage, considered those words as an address directed to *Christ*, is too awkward to find any acceptance with us. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews can scarcely be conceived of as so senseless, that, without any occasion, he should use words which apply to God as if they applied to the incarnate Son of God. So coarse a mistake would certainly not have escaped detection ; for it is not to be forgotten that his *readers* were also in a certain sense his *opponents*, and would scarcely have allowed themselves to be drawn away from their deep-rooted prejudice in

favour of the old covenant and the Old Testament Israel, by *bad* and *untenable* arguments. That supposition is all the more improbable when it is considered, that the author has evidently quoted all these passages not from memory, but has carefully copied them from the LXX., so that he could not possibly be ignorant of their original context. In general, however, it is a very superficial and shallow view that would lead us all at once to consider the use of Old Testament passages in the New Testament as parallel with the exegetico-dogmatic method of argumentation pursued by the Rabbins. The apostles and apostolical men have, indeed, exhibited in their epistles such a freedom from the spirit of Jewish tradition, such an originality and youthful vigour of new life, such a subtlety and depth of psychological and historical intuition, and the whole system of Christianity in its freshness and originality stands in such contrast to the old insipid anti-Messianic Judaism, and appears so thoroughly a new structure from the foundation resting on the depths of Old Testament revelation, and so far from being a mere enlargement of the Pharisaico-Rabbinical pseudo-Judaism, that it were indeed wonderful, if the same apostolical men had in their interpretation of Old Testament passages held themselves dependent on the Jewish exegesis and hermeneutical method. In reality, however, the apostolical exegesis of the Old Testament stands in directest opposition to the Jewish-Rabbinical, so that one can scarcely imagine a more complete and diametrical difference. In the Rabbinical interpretation it is always *single words*—studiously *separated* from the context—from which inferences, arbitrary, of course, are drawn. The Rabbins affirm, for example, that when a man lies three days in the grave, his entrails are torn from his body and cast in the face of the dead; *for* it is written in Mal. ii. 3, "I will also cast the filth of your festivals in your face." (Sepher joreh chattaim, num. 66.) Nay, the later Rabbinism, as a direct result of this arbitrary procedure, went the length of drawing inferences even from single letters. They taught, for example, the transmigration of the soul, and that the souls of men ever continue to live in men; thus the life of Cain passed into Jethro, his spirit into Korah, his soul into the Egyptians (Ex. ii. 12, seq.), for it is written Gen. iv. 24 יקם קין, and י, ק, and מ are the first letters of Jethro, Korah, and מצרי. (Jalkut rubeni, num. 9.) The genuine pharisaical principle which forms the basis of all this, is, *that the letter as such* is what is most significant. The New Testament writers, on the contrary—as we have seen in reference to Heb. i. 6–9, and as we shall see more and more as we proceed with the epistle—drew all their arguments from *the spirit* of the passages *considered in their connexion.* Nothing at all is inferred from the mere letters of the passages quoted. In Ps. xlv. there is not a syllable about *angels.* When the author, notwithstanding,

has adduced that passage as a proof that the Messiah is superior to the angels, he has, as we have seen, necessarily reckoned on a *rational consideration of the passage on the part of his readers*, and a *reflective logical comparison* of the passage with that in Ps. civ. 4, and the force of the argument proceeds only from such a judicious interpretation and attentive examination of the ideas and references objectively contained in both passages.

The procedure which he uniformly follows is not that of collecting passages in which the *words* "Son" and "angel" occur, and arbitrarily interpreting them—thus the Rabbins would have done—but of adducing the weightiest passages in which the Messianic salvation is prophesied of (substantially, although not at all under the name "Messianic"), and from these developing the *idea of this salvation*. Thus in vers. 7–12 the simple and fundamental idea which he wants to shew is, that while the angels are employed by God as *ministering in temporary phenomena of nature*, the Messianic salvation, on the contrary, is ever represented, *a*, as the lifting up of the man, the theocratical king, immediately to *God; b*, as the immediate saving act of God himself, *i. e.*, in one word ; *c*, as an immediate relation of God to men without the intervention of mediation by angels. He finds this *idea* of the Messianic salvation in those expressions of the Psalms, but not dry outward statements respecting the *person* of Christ.

In vers. 8, 9 the important truth was stated, that the true theocratical king, when his dignity is described, receives not the predicate "angel," but the predicate אלהים. He enters without the mediation of an angel, a מלאך י״י, into *immediate* unity with God himself. Have we then in vers. 8–10 a description of the saving work of a man who is one with God, we are therefore entitled to expect that in vers. 10–12 a passage will be adduced as a counterpart, in which the Messianic salvation is described as an *immediate* act *of God* to man, without the interposition of angels. For this is the difference between the Mosaic economy of the law and the Messianic economy of the gospel : *a*, in the economy of the law the man, Moses, is God's *servant*, and enters as yet into no immediate contact with God himself, but only with a form of the Divine manifestation in the מלאך י״י ; in the Messianic economy, on the contrary, the theocratic king is himself אלהים in an immediate relation of oneness with God, while nothing is said of the mediation of angels ; *b*, in the Mosaic economy, God works upon men through angels ; in the Messianic, God works immediately and directly on men without the need of angels. This latter idea, as has been already said, we must expect to find proved by a quotation in vers. 10–12.

Let us look now at the psalm. It is a song of complaint תְּפִלָּה, לְעָנִי and according to ver. 4 written during the exile ; and it is evi-

dent from ver. 14 (thou shalt arise and have mercy upon Zion), that the author bewails not the sorrows of an *individual* but the misfortune of *his people*, although he represents this in an individualized lyrical form as his own affliction. After having pourtrayed in vers. 2–12 his own wretched condition, *i. e.*, the condition of the Israelite and the Israelites, he appeals in ver. 13 to the immutability and eternity of God. It is self-evident that it is not the eternity as a metaphysical attribute of God, nor his unchangeableness as the immaterial Spirit that is spoken of, but the unchangeableness of Jehovah in his acts, in his relation to Israel, in a word the Divine *covenant-faithfulness*. Upon this he grounds the inference ver. 14, that God shall again have mercy upon Zion, then will the heathen and their kings fear him (ver. 15), and men will speak of the saving work of God to coming generations (ver. 19), that God, namely, has looked down from heaven and heard the cry of the prisoners (vers. 2–21). It is, then, *the deliverance from the captivity* that is here spoken of, consequently *the Messianic time*. The prophets before the exile had represented the Messiah as the *deliverer from the exile*. Not till towards the end of the exile was it revealed to Daniel, that the Messiah should come not immediately after the seventy years of the exile foretold by Jeremiah *in the strict sense*, but after seventy years of weeks; *i. e.*, just that state of being under the yoke of the heathen, which is substantially a state of exile, would, even after the local return to Canaan, stretch over a period of seventy years of weeks. The 102d Psalm does not yet discover the difference between a state of exile in the stricter, and in the wider sense; the Psalmist simply prays for the speedy arrival of the promised time of the redemption and the salvation, that salvation which, when it actually appeared, Luke i. 68, was denoted literally in the same way in which it had been denoted in Ps. cii. 19 as "as God's looking down upon his people."

At the conclusion of the psalm the prayer is again concisely expressed in the words, "Take me not away in the midst of my days (ere I have witnessed the deliverance of the people), *thy years* are to all generations." Here too the prayer for deliverance is enforced by the thought of God's unchangeableness, which implies here, besides the idea of the covenant-faithfulness of God, also that of his greatness. Upon this follow the words: "Thou hast in the beginning (לִפְנִים, κατ' ἀρχάς) laid the foundations of the earth, the heaven also is the work of thy hands. They shall perish, thou shalt remain," etc. The fundamental idea there then is, that *the hope of the promised Messianic deliverance rests upon God alone and not on any kind of creature help*. Emphasis is expressly laid on the fact that the heavens also and celestial beings are subject to time and to

change, and that upon them the hope of the Messianic salvation cannot rest.

Thus do we find here, in reality, the precise idea expressed which we were led to expect. Ver. 8, seq.: the Messianic salvation, in so far as it appears the act of *a man*, an anointed one, "the seed of David," is already according to the prophecies of the Old Testament far superior to angel-revelations, is immediately Divine, eternal, everlasting. Vers. 10–12: the Messianic salvation, in so far as it appears as the act of *God*, is already according to the expectation of the Old Testament an immediate act of *God alone*, of which no creature, no celestial creature even, is capable.

Thus the Son, as in vers. 8–9, so in like manner in vers. 10–12, appears in a threefold opposition to the angels, ver. 7. *a, The Messianic redemption is an act of the everlasting faithfulness of God himself, not of a creature. b, It is everlasting, not mutable. c, It is founded on a moral relation of God to men, on the faithfulness of God, not on a relation to nature.*

In conclusion then we see, that vers. 8–9 and vers. 10–12 are the two members parallel to each other, which taken together form the complete antithesis to ver. 7.

Ver. 13 forms the key-stone of the whole argument. Let us look back for a moment on the course of the reasoning. The New Testament revelation of God in the Son was opposed to that of the Old Testament as the absolute to the relative, ver. 4, and the absoluteness of the former derived, 1, from the name *Son* which is assigned in the Old Testament to the promised Messiah, but to none among the angels, ver. 5; 2, from this, that where the (Messianic) saving work of God, *i. e.*, of the πρωτότοκος is prophesied of, merely the place of worshipping spectators belongs to the angels, ver. 6; 3, vers. 7–12, from the *immediateness* of the union of God with men in the Messianic salvation, from its *everlasting duration* and its *spiritual nature*, inasmuch as it rests on the reciprocal relation of human righteousness, vers. 8–9, and Divine faithfulness, vers. 10–12.—It had been shewn in vers. 8–9, as well as in vers. 10–12, that an immediate elevation of man to God, and an immediate act of grace on the part of God towards man, without the interposition of angels, were already laid down in the Old Testament as the fundamental characteristics of the Messianic salvation. This *immediateness* is now in ver. 13 still farther confirmed by a crowning passage from the Old Testament in which it is most clearly expressed. The Messiah, it is said, shall sit upon God's throne, and take part in the Divine dominion. Nowhere is this represented as belonging to an angel.

The quotation is from Ps. cx. 1. Bleek cannot allow this psalm

to be taken as prophetical of the Messiah, because the hope of a personal Messiah was foreign to the time of David. This objection needs no refution after what has been said at ver. 5. Tholuck also (Hebraerbr. Beilage, i. p. 10) has rightly directed attention to 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, seq.—that saying of David in which he expresses so definite a hope of a definite posterity who should fulfil Nathan's prophecy, 2 Sam. vii. That we have, in Ps. cx., also an expression of that hope grounded on 2 Sam. vii. should no longer be doubted. We by no means need to appeal to the declaration of Christ, Matth. xxii. 42, seq.; even if we were able, without doing violence to a sound understanding, to agree with those who regard that declaration not as Christ's real opinion, but as intended by him half in jest merely to lead the Pharisees into an inextricable difficulty—even if we were at liberty to adopt such a view, the composition of the 110th Psalm by David, and its Messianic signification, would still stand fast of itself. The remarkable representation of a sacerdotal king like to Melchisedek, which we find in this psalm, will not at all suit a time subsequent to that of David. The later kings stood partly in hostile relation to the priesthood, cultus, theocracy, and worship of Jehovah, partly, even when they stood in a peaceful and friendly relation to these as in the case of Hezekiah and Josiah, they shewed this precisely by *not* invading the rights and offices of the priests; the attempt of the otherwise pious Uzziah to combine the priestly functions with the kingly was punished by God himself with the infliction of the disease of leprosy. In such a period, such a psalm, with the representation which it gives of a priest-king, could not have been composed. To unite the priestly with the kingly dignity was at that time as little to the *praise* of a king, as it is now to the praise of the emperor Henry IV. as an emperor, that he invested bishops and popes. As this, on the contrary, was a commendation under Charles the Great, and even under Henry III., so also was *that* a ground of praise in the time of David, of David the protector of the high priesthood against Saul, the man after God's heart, in opposition to whom the priests had no occasion for watching over and defending their rights, because they had no reason to dread any malicious invasion of these from the despotism of the king. We must therefore seek for the *date* of the psalm in the time of David. With respect to its *contents*, modern critics have held the psalm to be a hymn upon David sung by one of his subjects. The first words correspond with this explanation: the Lord (God) said unto my lord (the king). But the words immediately following, in which God is represented as having spoken, will not apply to David. It is easy to comprehend how Solomon should receive the predicate "God" as the theocratic ruler, especially when he is contemplated as the ideal *seed of David*, and the fulfiller of the will of God. But it

cannot be comprehended how an Israelite should have spoken of David's sitting upon *God's throne;* for the throne of God was, as we learn from Ps. xi. 4, xxxiii. 14, etc., in the heaven ;* a sitting upon God's throne was not applicable to David even by the boldest hyperbole, still less would ver. 4 be suitable to David, in which Jehovah is represented as having sworn to the king—the same who is spoken of ver. 1—that he shall be a priest and king at the same time, and that *forever* לְעוֹלָם. When had ever such a thing been promised to David ? Bleek thinks there is no trace of the psalm's referring to the *future;* but do not ver. 1 (*the Lord said*) and ver. 4 (*the Lord hath sworn and will not repent*), refer plainly enough to a *prophecy* that had been given and was still *unfulfilled* (ולא ינחם fut.)? It is possible, indeed, that a prophecy referring to David's own future destinies *might* be meant, but it will be difficult to find any prophecy of such an import in reference to David. Nowhere else must we look for the נְאֻם יי mentioned in Ps. cx. than in that very prophecy of Nathan, 2 Sam. vii. with which we are now so familiar, and there it is said, twice in succession, not of David, but in express contradistinction to him, of his seed: וַהֲכִינֹתִי אֶת־מַמְלַכְתּוֹ ver. 12, and וְכֹנַנְתִּי אֶת־כִּסֵּא מַמְלַכְתּוֹ עַד־עוֹלָם, David shall indeed die, but his seed shall reign forever. There, too, we find the words עַד־עוֹלָם of Ps. cx. 4. And we have already seen at ver. 5 of our chapter, that although Nathan had spoken of the *seed* collectively, David might yet expect, and did expect, the fulfilment of this promise in no other way than in a definite individual of his posterity. (With this the objection of Bleek falls of itself to the ground—that the idea of a personal Messiah was unknown in the time of David). What remains of Ps. cx. 4 finds its explanation also also in 2 Sam. vii. Nathan had revealed to David that he was not appointed to build the Lord an house ; he was appointed merely to reign ; but his seed after him was to build an house to the Lord, and the Lord would build an house for it. If now the seed of David was to do in a higher and more excellent degree that which in a less degree the builders of the tabernacle had done, this might properly be considered as a uniting of priestly-eccesiastical with civil functions, and might be represented in the language of lyrical poetry as a government "after the order of Melchisedec." But if the seed of David is to have an house built for him by the Lord himself, and is to reign forever and ever, he is thereby exalted to God's own throne ; God has built for him his house and his throne, he has built God's house ; the dominion of both is thus endless and unlimited, and becomes accordingly one and the same.

* The mercy-*lid* over the ark of the covenant which shut out the accusing testimony (the ten commandments) from the view of God, is indeed in Luther's translation, but nowhere in the original, designated as a seat or throne of God.

But while it is impossible that David can be the object of the psalm, he can be, and is, its author. For, from what other individual of the time of David are we at liberty to expect such an unfolding of the Messianic hope, than from that king who gave utterance to the prayer with which we are already familiar in 2 Sam. vii. 18–29 and chap. xxiii. 1, seq.?

This passage from the Psalms, then, is cited by our author. No angel, but a man, is chosen to an immediate unity of *dominion* with God, to absolute rule over all enemies, over the whole world. The angels, on the contrary, as the author says in ver. 14, by way of recapitulation, looking back to ver. 7, are *ministering* spirits λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα; they exist only on account of those who are appointed to be "heirs of salvation." *It is not the angels that are called into a relation of oneness with God, but man.* In this antithesis, the whole train of thought finds its conclusion.

A Practical Intermediate Part.

(ii. 1–4).

In ch. ii. 1–4 the author immediately adds a practical application of the foregoing. All the more carefully must we hold fast the *New Testament* doctrine. Περίσσως is a familiar expression, especially with the apostle Paul. Why the comparative is used here appears from the train of thought, which is as follows (as is plain also from vers. 2 and 3). Apparently, the authority of the Mosaic law is higher than that of the gospel; for there God revealed himself by angels, here by a man. But it follows from what has been said, that the New Testament revelation, far from having less authority on that account, possesses rather *an authority by so much the greater*, that it was not given through the mediation of angels, but is immediate, consequently, that greater heed must be given, not to esteem it lightly.

Μήποτε παραῤῥυῶμεν, A.D. and other manuscripts read παραρυῶμεν, which, however, is not a different reading, nor an error in the writing (Tholuck), nor a poetical form, but, as Sturz (de dial. Maced. et Alex.) already perceived, and Thiersch (de Pent. vers. Alex. p. 85) has since further proved, nothing more than an Alexandrian orthography. The form παραῤῥυῶμεν cannot be the conj. pres. act. of παραῤῥυέω, as this verb nowhere occurs, but is supplied by the grammarians for the explanation of certain forms. We have here simply the conj. aor. sec. pass. of παραῤῥέω to flow by—lest we *unconsciously slide past* (comp. Sept. Prov. iii. 21). Some supply τὰ ἀκουσθέντα, in which case it would signify—"that we forget not the things we have heard," but this gives an almost tautological idea.

When others supply *τὴν σωτηρίαν* in the sense of "everlasting happiness," something heterogeneous is thereby introduced into the words. The best way certainly is to supply *τῶν ἀκουσθέντων*: "that we may not even yet entirely fall away from the doctrine we have heard." For this was the specific danger that threatened them. Whoever of those Jewish Christians should once treat what specifically belonged to the New Testament as a *secondary thing*, to which he needed not to give such anxious heed as to his connexion with the Mosaic ordinances and law, might come *unconsciously and imperceptibly* to lose entirely his Christian knowledge and love for the gospel. (Similarly De Wette, Bleek, Tholuck).

Vers. 2, 3.—The idea already implied in the first verse—that the gospel *because* given to men by Jesus possesses all the higher and holier claims, is now further unfolded as the ground of what is said in ver. 1. Εἰ introduces an argument e concessis; that the law is *βέβαιος* (*i. e.*, has a fully attested Divine authority) was undisputed on the part of the readers. This authority, however, rested substantially on the fact, that the law *was promulgated by angels*. The question presents itself, whence arose this view of the co-operation of angels in the giving of the law from Mount Sinai. Among the more recent theologians the opinion is pretty prevalent, that this was a belief entertained by the Jews in the time of Christ, a rabbinical notion, of which Stephen (Acts vii. 53), Paul (Gal. iii. 19), and the author of this epistle availed themselves for their respective objects. If it should be granted that it was nothing more than a notion belonging to that time, it would not therefore follow that it was superstitious; on the contrary, there lay beneath it a profound truth. Moses did not make the law but received it; the voice which spake the ten words, Ex. xx., the finger which wrote them, could not, however, be immediately ascribed to God; it was rightly conjectured that those appearances were brought about by the agency of exalted creatures, and that forms of revelation so external do not correspond with the eternal and invisible nature of God. And that is precisely what our author means to urge, namely, that the revelation of God in the *person* of Jesus Christ is one which is absolutely adequate; that, however, which consists in the mere *utterance of a law* is not adequate. The whole reasoning, therefore, would rest on a profound truth, even if that view respecting the co-operation of angels on Mount Sinai were a mere rabbinical theologumenon.

But it is not a mere theologumenon; it has a *real* foundation in the statements of God's word, of the Old Testament. We will not, indeed, and are not warranted to refer here to the מלאך יי; for although it is always of importance to bear in mind that God, in the time of Moses, chose for the form in which he appeared that of the angelic species, still, the *angel of the Lord* was no individual

created angel; least of all would this explain the use of the plural in the passage before us—*δι' ἀγγέλων*. We would rather refer—in as far as regards, in general, the origin of the doctrine of angels before the exile—to the passage in Joel iii. 11 (at the final judgment the Gentiles shall assemble together; "there God lets his mighty ones come down") compared with 2 Kings xix. 35 ("the angel of Lord came down and smote the camp of the Assyrians"). With reference, however, to the special co-agency of angels on Sinai, we would appeal, with Olshausen, to the two passages Deut. xxxiii. 2, seq.; Psalm lxviii. 17. In the first passage, in the song of Moses, it is said: God shined forth from Mount Paran, he came with ten thousand of holy ones. The form רִבְבוֹת is stat. constr. plur. of רִבָּבָה myrias; רִבְבוֹת־קֹדֶשׁ, therefore, means multitudes or hosts of holy ones. It is then said in ver. 3: Yea, he loveth the tribes; *all his holy ones are at thy hand; they sit at thy feet; he receives thy words.* (The *ἁπ. λεγ.* תכו is derived perhaps from the Arabic تكا.) Those who sit are evidently the Israelites who sit at the foot of the mount, as it were at God's feet; the subject to *receives* can be no other than Moses. There is thus an antithesis between the "they" and the "he." But this antithesis cannot be that which results from placing emphasis on the וְהֵם, for then וְהוּא must have stood before ישׂא. But as this is not the case, וְהֵם can only be used in opposition to the foregoing קְדֹשִׁים, *so that these holy ones are plainly distinguished from the Israelites as different persons.* It may also be supposed on other and independent grounds, that the Israelites are not meant by these "holy ones." In the first place, the former are never by Moses either described as holy ones or designated by that epithet; in the chapter immediately preceding (chap. xxxii.), he speaks much of their unholiness and obduracy. But in the second place, if by these holy ones the Israelites are to be understood as meant, then must we give to בידך the signification "in thy *protecting* hand," "in thy protection," a signification which this expression had not yet obtained in the time of Moses. Finally, the idea as a whole—that God protects the Israelites, and bears them, as it were, in his hands—would be altogether out of place in this description of the giving of the law from Sinai. Four distinct and independent reasons, then, compel us to render the words: "all his holy ones stand at thy hand" (at thy side, near thee), and to explain this of the hosts of angels standing near to God. In the same way must we explain the "multitudes of saints" spoken of in ver. 2. The Alexandrian translator must also have perceived that angels were spoken of here; he has, in true Alexandrian fashion, put into the text the correct interpretation of רִבְבוֹת קֹדֶשׁ, by substituting the words *ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελοι μετ' αὐτοῦ* in place of a translation of the to him obscure words אֵשׁ דָּת לָמוֹ ver. 2.

The other passage to which we would refer, and which serves to confirm our explanation of the foregoing, is Ps. lxviii. 17. The 68th Psalm belongs to the time of Solomon; not to an earlier period, since in ver. 30 mention is made of the temple in Jerusalem; nor to a later, as in ver. 28 the princes of Naphtali and Zebulon appear with presents before the King, which could not possibly have taken place after the separation of the two kingdoms; chiefly is ver. 32 applicable to Solomon, where mention is made of the Egyptian and Ethiopian ambassadors bringing gifts, and also ver. 17, where it is said that God from this time forth for ever has made his dwelling place "on the hill." In this psalm we read ver 18: "the chariots of God are twenty thousand, many thousands; the Lord is with them on Sinai in the holy place."—The author of our epistle, therefore, was fully justified by what he read in the Old Testament in calling the law *a word spoken by angels.*

This word was *βέβαιος* (see above), and every *παράβασις* (positive transgression), nay, even every *παρακοή* (negative omission) received its just recompense. To designate the recompense, the author, who evidently aims at elegance of style, uses the more select, more rare, and sonorous word *μισθαποδοσία.*—If this held good already of the law,—how shall we escape (namely, the just recompense) "if we neglect so great *σωτηρία*, which is confirmed to us by those who heard it as one which, at the first, was spoken by the Lord?" A twofold antithesis to the law is here specified. First, the law was a mere word (*λόγος*) which, indeed, laid commands upon men, but imparted no strength or inclination for their fulfilment, the gospel, on the contrary, is a *salvation*, a *redemption*, an act. (Some would, most unhappily, and without any occasion given in the text, but rather destroying the beauty of the idea, explain *σωτηρία* by *λόγος τῆς σωτηρίας* with an arbitrary reference to Acts xiii. 26.) Secondly, the *salvation* has been revealed and preached to men, directly and *from first hand*, by the *Lord himself*, not from second hand by the angels. This is implied in the words *ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσα*, etc. (Ἀρχὴν *λαμβάνειν* used by later Greek writers instead of the classical *ἄρχεσθαι.*) The *beginning* cannot, of course, be understood here as forming an antithesis to the *continuance;* as if the two acts *ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσα λαλεῖσθαι* and *ἐβεβαιώθη* were co-ordinated, and the sentence to be resolved thus *ἀρχὴν ἔλαβε λαλεῖσθαι καὶ ἐβεβαιώθη*, in which case the idea would be—that the salvation was at first spoken by the Lord himself, but afterwards had been delivered to us as sure by those who heard it. Where then would be the difference between the *salvation* and the law? The law, too, was *at first* given by God, and then brought by angels to men. The author of our epistle, however, lays no emphasis on the fact, that the salvation was given from God *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*, but that it was brought to men *from the very*

first by (διά) *the Lord*, consequently, not first by intermediate persons. Ἐβεβαιώθη, is therefore, of course, not co-ordinate with ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσα λαλεῖσθαι, but λαβοῦσα depends on ἐβεβαιώθη. *That* the *salvation* was revealed directly by the *Lord* is what has been delivered to us by the ἀκούσαντες the ear (and eye) witnesses as a certainty, and consequently as a divine authentication of the σωτηρία.

Some have found in vers. 1–3 a proof that the Epistle to the Hebrews could in no case have been written by the apostle Paul. (Euthal., Luth., Calv., etc.) For Paul, far from excluding himself from the number of eye-witnesses, rather lays all weight on the fact, that he had seen the (risen) Lord himself, 1 Cor. xv.; Gal. i. This argument is, however, without force; other grounds there may be against the Pauline origin of the epistle, but in these verses there is none. It is one thing to have once seen the risen Lord, it is another thing to be an ear-witness of the *salvation* spoken by Christ, *i. e.* of the entire revelation of God in Christ. (Comp. Acts i. 21.) The same Paul, who, in writing to the Corinthians who doubted of the resurrection, or to the Galatians who disputed his apostolic mission, appeals to the former fact, must yet have acknowledged that he was not an eye-witness of the *salvation* in the latter sense. Moreover, the 1 plur. in ver. 1 is not *communicative*, but merely *insinuatory*.

Ver. 4.—It is quite consistent with the practical aim which our author never loses sight of, that he attaches only a subordinate value to the confirmation of the Gospel by miracles. He says—συνεπιμαρτυροῦντος. Μαρτυρεῖν means to bear witness of a thing which is still under question, doubtful,—ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν to testify of a thing already established,—συνεπιμαρτυρεῖν to give an additional testimony to a thing in itself certain, and confirmed by proofs from other sources. This implies that the *salvation* in Christ does not properly stand in need of confirmation by miracles, but bears already in itself the testimony of its truth. And, indeed, it will never happen, that a heart which is *inwardly* far from the truth of the Gospel, which is wanting in repentance and self-knowledge, the spiritual hunger and thirst, will be, so to speak, forced into an acknowledgment of the truth of this Gospel by an appeal to the miracles which accompany it. On the contrary, to such hearts miracles are rather προσκόμματα, "that with seeing eyes they see not, and with hearing ears they hear not." Only the heart which has first experienced in itself the miracle of regeneration, of creative renewal, is capable of the *humility* which *believes*, even where it does not *comprehend*. For this very reason, however, the miracles are not something *non-essential;* but, as in the time of Christ, so still, they serve the end of being boundary stones between faith and unbelief, *signs* of God for the believing spirit, intimating that he is a living God, who stands

above, not beneath his works, chiefly as the distributor of life and the Saviour, above that nature which is fallen by sin, and is subject to death (in which view the resurrection of Christ, the first-fruits, forms the centre point of all miracles),—and *signs* of faith which, in miracles, learns and exercises humility. It is, moreover, worthy of observation, that this very passage which ascribes to miracles the humble function implied in the word *συνεπιμαρτυρεῖν*, furnishes a *principal proof of the historical reality of the miracles*, and, with this, of the supernatural character of Christianity in general. A man who wrote before the year 70, speaks of miracles, even where he does not give them a high place, as of well-known and undisputed facts!

Miracles may be regarded in a fourfold aspect, first, with respect to their *design* as *σημεῖα* (אוֹת), signs, miraculous testimonies in behalf of any truth; secondly, with respect to their *nature* as *τέρατα* (מוֹפֵת), *i. e.* supernatural acts; thirdly, with respect to their *origin* as acts of power (*δυνάμεις*), because wrought by higher powers; and finally, in their *specifically Christian* aspect as impartings of the Holy Ghost (*πνεύματος ἁγίου μερισμοί*), as exercised by those who, according to the will and wise distribution of God, are endowed with the particular gifts of miracles (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 11).

SECTION SECOND.

IN THE SON MAN IS RAISED ABOVE THE ANGELS.

(ii. 5–18.)

In the first section it was shewn, that already the Old Testament points to a future absolute revelation of God to man, a revelation through a Mediator, by whom man should enter into immediate contact with God, and God with man, and that this predicted revelation of God is, even in the Old Testament, placed higher than that which was given through the mediation of angels. It was therefore the dignity of the Son as such, his person and office, that was first spoken of.

In the second section, on which we now enter, the one idea already implicitly contained in the first section (i. 8, 9), namely, that in the Son, *man* is immediately exalted to a union with God such as belongs not to the angels, is taken up and independently carried out. Here again, the 5th verse, which contains the new theme, is connected by means of the conjunction *γάρ* with the con-

cluding words of the foregoing section. The new idea—that the divine dominion over the future kingdom is ascribed not to the angels but to the Son of Man, follows quite naturally upon the exhortation in ver. 1–4 as a new proof, but at the same time comes into co-ordination with the whole of the first section, chap. i. 5–14; the first section was the one foundation upon which the exhortation, chap. ii. 1–4, is made to rest; chap. ii. 5, together with its further development in ver. 6–18, forms the other foundation.—Thus the author, with great beauty of style, bridges over the space between the concluding words of the first section and the announcement of the new theme, just as we observed before in chap. i. 4.

Before, however, proceeding to follow out exegetically this new theme, it may not be without advantage to view somewhat more closely the ground-idea of the new section in itself, and to make ourselves familiar with it. That not merely the Son as the eternal only-begotten of the Father or the first-born (πρωτότοκος) of every creature is higher than the angels, but that *man* also *as such* is called (of course in Christ) to a much more immediate union with God than belongs to angels, and that therefore man, as regards his proper destination, is higher than the angels,—this is a statement which at first sight will appear surprising, as we are generally wont to regard the angels as *superior* beings. And, indeed, it is not without reason that we do so. For, according to the statements of the Holy Scripture, the angels are endowed with higher and less limited gifts and powers, and although as creatures they cannot be conceived of as unlimited by space, and consequently, as incorporeal, still they have an unspeakably freer and less circumscribed relation to space and to matter than men have in their present state. They clothe themselves with visible matter and put off this garment again; they transfer themselves to wheresoever they please, they are not bound to a body of clay, and as they are without sexual distinction (Matth. xxii. 30) there exists among them neither any development of the individual from childhood through the various steps of age, nor of race, through successive generations. The entire species has come from the creative hand of God *complete* in all its individuals, complete as the diamond which sparkles with perpetual and unchanging lustre.—How now, shall we reconcile with this, that our author should place above the angels poor weak *man*, hemmed in by space and a gross body, developing himself upon the basis of animal sexuality? Just in the same way as we can reconcile it with the weakness and meanness of the rose-bush, that there is in it, notwithstanding, a more excellent life than in the diamond. The enamel of the rose when it has reached its bloom is something far superior to the glitter of the diamond. So also will man, when he reaches the bloom of his *glorified* life, unspeakably excel the angels

in glory. Man's superiority lies just in his *capability of development.* When the diamond is once disturbed by the ray of a burning reflector it is irrecoverably gone; so are the angels, once fallen, for ever lost, according to the doctrine of Scripture. The rose can with difficulty be hurt, and even from its root it will still send forth new life; so was man rendered capable even by sin (the possibility of which, though not its actual entrance, was necessary in consequence of his freedom) of entering into full spiritual life-fellowship with God, through the help of the Saviour entering into him, nay, capable of receiving the person of the redeeming Son of God as a member into his race. Hence also, it is the planet-system that has been assigned to man as the habitation and the theatre of that absolute revelation of God in Christ,—the planet-system, in which the antithesis between the fixed-star-like, or angel-like independent *sun* and the animal-like dependent *moon* finds its genuine human reconcilement in the *planets*, and most completely in the *earth*—while the angels, as the "hosts of heaven," have their dwelling-place in the fixed stars, where there is no opposition between illuminating and illuminated bodies, where planets do not revolve round suns, but fixed stars around fixed stars.*

In ver. 5 the ground-idea is first of all expressed in a negative form. The *οἰκουμένη ἡ μέλλουσα*, the future terrestrial globe, *i. e.*, the future kingdom (comp. Isa. lxvi. 22) העולם הבא is nowhere represented in the Old Testament as ruled over by angels. The positive antithesis to this follows in vers. 6, 7 in the form of a citation which plainly enough implies the statement, that *man* rather is appointed to the dominion over "all things."

Vers. 6, 7.—The citation is taken from Ps. viii. 5–7; the passage is quoted according to the Sept., with this exception, that the words *καὶ κατέστησας αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τῶν χειρῶν σου*, which are not found in the original Hebrew but are added in the LXX., are omitted by our author. The manner in which he introduces the quotation *διεμαρτύρατο δέ πού τις λέγων* appears at first sight strange, but in nowise implies that the writer (as Koppe, Dindor., Schulz thought) did not know where the citation was to be found.† For we find a similar indefiniteness also in chap. iv. 4, where the words cited ("God rested on the seventh day") are of such a kind that it was impossible the author could be ignorant of where they originally stand. That he knew this, too, in the case before us, is evident from the exactness with which he cites according to the Sept., while

* See this view further developed and vindicated in my essay, "Die Weltanschauung der Bibel und die Naturwissenchaft," in the journal "Die Zukunft der Kirche," principally in p. 31, seq. and p. 55, seq.

† Still less, of course, does it imply, that he meant to throw doubt on David's being the author of the psalm, and to represent its author as an unknown person—as Grotius thought.

at the same time he omits those words of the Sept. which do not belong to the original. Πού τις is therefore a mere arbitrary mode of expression (which was peculiar also to Philo, comp. Bleek on this passage); the author forbears to specify the place of the citation, just because he takes it for granted that it was quite well known. In the same way might a writer or speaker in our own time say—"one has said: Here I stand, I can do nothing else." With respect to the quotation itself it presents two difficulties; *a*, the words παρ' ἀγγέλους evidently appear to belong to those of the citation from which the author draws his inferences, comp. ver. 5. His object is to prove from the passage in the psalms, that man was indeed made lower than the angels, but only for a time, not forever; rather, that precisely to man, and not to the angels, is the dominion over the οἰκουμένη ἡ μέλλουσα ascribed. But those very words παρ' ἀγγέλους have no foundation in the original Hebrew, the words there are וַתְּחַסְּרֵהוּ מְעַט מֵאֱלֹהִים. *b*, The words βραχύ τι are evidently understood by the writer, ver. 9, in the sense of *time* as meaning "a short time." "We see Jesus who was for a short time made lower than the angels crowned." To take βραχύ τι there in the sense of *degree* would yield no sense whatever. Consequently the author has also in ver. 7, in this citation, understood βραχύ τι in the sense of *time*. But מְעַט in the Hebrew, and βραχύ τι in the Sept., according to the opinion of its authors, are to be understood in the sense of *degree;* this at least is the most prevalent opinion among more recent critics (also that of Olshausen). The only thing then that remains for us is here again to give the psalm itself our direct and unprejudiced consideration. Whether or not the psalm was written by David is here a matter of perfect indifference; reasons, however, will appear occasionally and unsought for, to warrant our ascribing its authorship to him. Let us consider, first of all, the psalm itself.

"Jehovah, our Lord, how mighty is thy name upon the whole earth, thou whose honour is praised* above the heaven." Here, already, there is an evident antithesis between earth and heaven. The God, whose majesty is praised above in all heavens, disdains not to acquire for himself also on the poor small earth a glorious mighty name by the acts of his covenant-faithfulness (as the Lord, our Lord). Ver. 2, "Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast

* תנה cannot be imperf. which in a relative clause would be altogether without sense. If we derive it from נתן then it must be the 3 sing. præt. with ה fin. (comp. ver. 7 שַׂתָּה instead of שַׂתָּ) and apocopated ך. In this case אשר must point back to שִׁמְךָ. "Thy name, which has made thy glory above the heaven." This, however, is a very forced idea. The simplest way is to point the word thus תְּנָה (as Pual of תָּנָה Jud. v. 11, xi. 40, which corresponds well enough with the ἐπήρθη of the LXX.), or, if it be thought preferable, to point תָּנָה in the sense habitare, from which תַּנּוֹת "dwellings" is derived. But the latter root did not belong to the Hebrew till after the captivity, while תָּנָה, celebrare, is a primitive poetical expression.

thou established a power for thee, because of thine adversaries, to subdue the enemy, the avenger." It is not easy to say what the poet had in his mind here. At first sight we might be tempted to imagine a reference to some special case, in which a hostile warrior had, by the weeping and lisping of a child, been moved to pity towards its parents. But a definite case of this kind which the readers of the psalm might have been able to call to mind without farther description, does not occur in all the Old Testament; nor is it the enemies of a man but the enemies of God that are spoken of; and, besides, the subsequent part of the psalm treats solely of the high position which God hath assigned to man as such. We must, therefore find in ver. 2 a reference of a more universal kind. God has on account of his enemies, for their subjugation, provided a power, and that out of the mouth of weak sucklings! By the enemies of God we must understand the whole power opposed to God on the earth, the kingdom of darkness, the kingdom of the serpent; by the power which God hath provided we are to understand the whole of those preparations which God hath made or promised to make for overcoming the darkness. What are the preparations of this kind with which we are made acquainted in the Old Testament? Has God, perhaps, promised that he will at one time send hosts of angels who shall trample on the serpent's head? No; when his object is to chastise sinful men, he places a cherub with a flaming sword before the closed gate of paradise; but when the future redemption from the bondage of the serpent, from death is spoken of, then no mention is made of an angel, but the seed of the woman is to bring the salvation, hence, though erroneously and hastily, she fixes her hope on the boy that first comes from her womb; she has now a man child, and thinks that with the seed of the woman she has at the same time recovered the possession of the God whom she had lost (left behind in paradise). And from this time forth, all hope of salvation was turned towards the birth of the heirs of the theocratic blessing, and on the preservation and protection of these first-born. The original promise of the seed of the woman separates itself into many branches; when a son is born to Lamech he calls him Noah, for he hopes that he will bring comfort to men in their trouble and labour upon the earth which God has cursed (Gen. v. 29); all the hope of Abraham is turned towards the birth of Isaac and the preservation of his life, Isaac's hope rests upon Jacob; the whole prospect of the future salvation always rests on such weak beings; upon the child which slumbers in a basket among the sedges of the Nile, rested the salvation of Israel; and, moreover, David's entire faith rested on the seed, which was to be the Son of God, and was to reign forever with God. (Comp. Hofmann, Weissag. u. Erfullung. part I. p. 195). This psalm then certainly suits

no author better than David. The same royal singer, who in Psalm ii. and cx. admired the Divine majesty of the seed promised to him, is, in Psalm viii., lost in adoring wonder that God has selected a lowly son of man as the instrument of his Divine conquests.

Sucklings, weak children, are the threads on which the hope of Israel hangs. (How natural was it for the reflective reader already here to carry out the antithesis ; God has not told his people to direct the eye of their hope to the appearances of angels, and to hosts of angels).

The 4th verse of the 8th Psalm contains nothing that might serve to confirm what is said in ver. 3 ; that the poet considers the heaven as the work of God, can be no reason or proof that God has chosen children to be the instruments of his power. We are therefore not entitled to give to כִּי the argumentative signification "for," but must render it as a syntactic particle by "when," so that ver. 4 forms an antecedent clause to ver. 5. "When I look upon thy heavens the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast prepared ; what (I must then exclaim) is man that thou are mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him." To translate the words מַה־אֱנוֹשׁ "how excellent is man," as Böhme and Kuinoel do, is forbidden by the sense of אֱנוֹשׁ, which, as is well known, always designates man on the side of his weakness and frailty. The whole passage is evidently rather an exclamation of adoring wonder, that God, this mighty ruler of all heavens, should let himself down to poor weak man, the suckling, and should give him so high a rank. The words מַה־אֱנוֹשׁ then, express the contrast between the weakness of man and his high destination—not, however, the result of the latter. The antithesis vaguely and generally implied in ver. 2—that he who is enthroned in the heavens disdains not the earth as the scene of his majesty—is thus rendered more definite in vers. 3–5.

But the promised glory is at first only *promised;* it lies still in the future ; that it may *soon* be realized is the hope which the Psalmist expresses in the 6th verse of the Psalm : וַתְּחַסְּרֵהוּ מְּעַט מֵאֱלֹהִים "thou hast made him to want a little of God." חסר signifies "to want," in Piel, "to cause to want," so in Eccles. iv. 8, "I cause my soul to want good." The rendering : "Thou hast made him a little less than God" is therefore, to say the least, arbitrary ; nor does it suit the context, in which all emphasis is rather laid upon this, that man, who is not "a little" but infinitely inferior to God, is, notwithstanding, appointed to share with God in the dominion over the world. We are therefore to understand מְּעַט not in the comparative, but (as in Eccles. iv. 8) in the privative sense, and מְּעַט not as significant of *degree*, but of *time*. *For a little while* must man be deprived of God—not God qua Jehovah, for it is purposely

not ממיך, but God qua Elohim, *i. e.*, the contemplation and enjoyment of the visible nearness of God in his glory as the Creator ; but the time comes when he shall be crowned with glory and honour, and shall reign over all the creatures of God (vers. 6–9). Thus does God make his name glorious on the earth (ver. 10).

The second difficulty in regard to *βραχύ τι* now disappears of itself. We see that מְעַט is to be taken in the sense *of time*. But the first difficulty, too—namely, that *παρ' ἀγγέλους* is not found in the original Hebrew, is now easily removed. *If we suppose this παρ' ἀγγέλους to be also not in the Greek text, the force of the argument drawn from the citation remains still quite the same.* The psalm contains the idea that God who rules over all heavens has made the salvation to rest *precisely on the weak sons of men*, and has destined *the sons of men to be the future lords of his kingdom.* If also the antithesis be not expressly stated, that it is not angels who are the promised saviours and rulers, it is still clearly enough implied in the train of thought which is pursued. The LXX. have actually put this antithesis into the text, although not in the clearest manner ; the writer of our epistle, who always cites from the LXX., could do the same with all the more safety that the whole argumentative force of the passage depends *not at all upon those words which owe their existence to an inaccurate rendering of the original.* Nay, he might do this with all the more reason, seeing that the translation *παρ' ἀγγέλους*, although inaccurate, is yet by no means without occasion. The LXX. were induced to adopt it because the Hebrew does not say : "Thou (Jehovah) hast caused him to want *Thee* for a short time," but "Thou (Jehovah) hast caused him to want *Elohim.*" They thought that אלהים must denote a subject different from Jehovah (or a plurality of such). And there is something true in this, if we are not just justified in at once understanding אלהים of the *angels.* Without doubt, however, אלהים denotes God in a different point of view from יהוה. He is called Jehovah as the personal, living, free-willing, and hence, chiefly, as the faithful covenant-God ; Elohim, on the other hand, as the adored, all-governing, Creator and Lord of the worlds, in his creative majesty. The Psalmist, therefore, would not, and could not, say : Jehovah, thou hast caused man to want *Thee;* since God as Jehovah has never withdrawn himself from men. But he might truly say : Jehovah, thou hast made man to want the godhead—the contemplation of and intercourse with the world-governing godhead in its glory. The idea which the LXX. have substituted for this : "Thou hast made him lower than the angels," evidently agrees with it substantially ; for this is substantially wherein the superiority of the inhabitants of heaven consists, that as they serenely fulfil the will of God, so they enjoy the undisturbed vision of God, and intercourse with him.

The gist of the argument, however, rests, as we have said, not on παρ' ἀγγέλους ; on the contrary, there follows in ver. 8 still another inference such as does not presuppose any express mention of angels at all in vers. 6, 7.

Ver. 8.—The words and meaning are clear. When the author draws the inference from the fact of *all things* having been (in the way of promise) made subject to man, that *nothing* can be excepted—he, thereby, suggests to every thinking and attentive reader the special application, that the angels also will then be subject to man.

Here this train of thought concludes. With the words νῦν δέ, which must be regarded as belonging to ver. 9, an entirely new train of thought begins, the design of which is to shew, in how far man has been already invested with the glory and elevation above the angels ascribed to him in Ps. viii., and in how far he has still to expect this. At present, indeed, man as such, *i. e., humanity*, has not yet attained to that elevation. Still, in *the person of Jesus*, who (although the Son of God, and already in himself higher than the angels, according to chap. i., yet) by his incarnation has been made lower than the angels like to us, a first-fruits of humanity is raised above the angels, But he is raised only to draw *all the rest* after him ; for it was necessary that he should suffer, just in order that as a captain he might make many sons partakers of his glory.

How then was it possible, that such a commentator as Bleek should so entirely mistake and misunderstand a train of thought so clear throughout ! He acknowledges (in p. 259) that "it seems as if the person whom we are to understand as meant by that man, ver. 6, seq., were first designated in ver. 9," and yet denies that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has used the ἄνθρωπος in ver. 6 in the general collective sense ! But, in truth, the opportunity was too tempting of fastening upon our author, here again, a grossly Rabbinical misunderstanding of a psalm. True, the writer says not a single word of the Messiah in vers. 6, 7, but places in opposition to the species angels to whom the οἰκ. ἡ μέλλ. is not to be made subject, the species *sons of man* to whom (according to Ps. viii. and Heb. ii. 10) it is to be made subject, and "it seems" as if the relation of Jesus to this general prophecy were first spoken of in ver. 9—and yet, the author must have taken the eighth Psalm, which is not Messianic, for a Messianic Psalm ! True, the expression מה־אנוש cannot, as Bleek himself acknowledges, be understood with Kuinoel as pointing to the glory, but only as pointing to the weakness and frailty of man, and בן־אדם as parallel with אנוש can only denote the "son of man" in his impotency—and yet, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot possibly have had understand-

ing enough to find out this simple sense; but although "it seems" that he first speaks of Christ in ver. 9, he must yet necessarily have meant the Messiah by the pregnant term *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου* —however different this expression is from *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. True, what is said in vers. 8–10, as we shall afterwards see, is altogether inconsistent with this supposition which has nothing to rest upon, and Bleek is there driven to an extremely forced interpretation of the sense; but yet, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews must bear the charge of a Rabbinico-Messianic explanation of the Psalms, which owes its existence solely to modern mistrust of the writers of the Bible.

What ground, then, can there be for departing from the simple interpretation of the words *as they stand?* Indeed, had the author said, "*Not to the angels* has he made the future kingdom subject *but to the Son;* for one testifies," etc.—then, Bleek might be right. But the author has in chap. ii. entirely relinquished the comparison of the angels with the *Son as such*, and purposely shews, from ver. 5 to ver. 18, that not merely the *Son*, as first-born and Messiah, but that in him *humanity as such* is exalted above the angels, and that therefore it was necessary that the Son of God should become a member of *humanity* (vers. 16–18).—We remain therefore firm and unshaken in the view, that, in vers. 6–8, not merely in the sense of the Psalmist, but also in the sense of our author, it is *man* or *humanity* that is spoken of and by no means the Messiah.

In vers. 9, 10 there follows a new chain of thought consisiting of three links. *a, Man as a whole* is at present not yet exalted above the angels. *b, The man Jesus* is, however, already exalted, and he is exalted, *c*, as *leader of the rest of humanity*, for which he has secured by his suffering the possibility of a like exaltation.

The first of these points needs no farther explanation either grammatically or otherwise. The second, on the contrary, even with respect to the construction, requires a more particular consideration. Three constructions are possible. The first and most natural is to take *Ἰησοῦν* as object, *ἠλαττωμένον* as adjectival attribute of *Ἰησοῦν* and *ἐστεφανωμένον* as predicate to the object. *Man* is not yet exalted; but we see *Jesus* who, indeed (although as *first-born* already higher than the angels, yet through his incarnation) was for a time made lower than the angels, already, on account of his sufferings unto death, crowned with glory and honour. By the being *crowned* is meant, of course, nothing else than the having *all things subject to him;* he who is crowned is thereby set up as ruler. And the glory and honour with which Jesus has been crowned is just that in virtue of which, since his ascension, he now, not merely as the Son of God, but rather also as the exalted son of man, excels

the angels, and is the object of their adoration. In Phil. ii. 5–10 we have the best commentary on the passage before us. Before him who once humbled himself to the death of the cross every knee now bows, those who are *in heaven* and on earth, and he bears a name which is above *all* names.

The adjectival attribute, however, *ἠλαττωμένον βραχύ τι*, was evidently necessary, because the author would make it plain that he speaks here not of that *glory and honour* which Christ enjoyed *before* his incarnation, as the *first-born* (chap. i.), but of the honour which the *incarnate*, after having been humbled to the condition of men, made subject to misery and death, has *received* as the reward of his *suffering unto death*. Hence he designates Jesus expressly, as him who *like* us was for a time made lower than the angels.

The words *διὰ τὸ πάθημα* (as Olshausen also rightly observes) cannot with Beza and Jac. Capellus be made grammatically dependent on *ἠλαττωμένον*, but only on *ἐστεφανωμένον*. The question, however, why *ἐστεφανωμένον* does not stand as antithetical to *ἠλατ*τ. before *διὰ τὸ πάθημα* finds its answer in the simple remark, that the *emphasis* here does not rest on the antithesis between the humiliation and the exaltation, but on that between the not yet exalted man and the already exalted Jesus. *Ἐστεφανωμ.* is therefore antithetical with *οὔπω . . . . ὑποτεταγμένα*, and must like *ὑποτεταγμένα* be placed at the end.

Bleek, who construes the sentence in the same way, finds himself now in vers. 9, 10 involved in an evident perplexity, owing to his erroneous interpretation of vers. 6, 7. He must admit that mention is first made of the *person of Jesus Christ* in ver. 9, and yet, according to his opinion, mention was already made in vers. 6–8 of *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. There remains for him, then, no other way of escaping from this difficulty, but that of explaining vers. 6–8 of the *Messiah as promised*, vers. 9, 10 of *Jesus* as the fulfiller of that prophecy. The following is the meaning which he assigns to the verses before us: According to the promise *all things* are to be made subject to the Messiah; all things are, however, not yet made subject to the Messiah actually come, to Jesus (he has still enemies and unbelievers on the earth). This seeming objection to the Messiahship of Jesus the author now seeks to remove by saying, that Jesus, although not yet *exalted* over all, is still in the meanwhile *crowned*.—Here, in the first place, the respected theologian contradicts himself when he finds the historical person of Jesus mentioned in the sentence *νῦν δέ*, and not first in the sentence *τὸν δὲ ἠλατ*τ. (see his own interpretation p. 260), and when he finds an antithesis between the *αὐτῷ* in the sentence *νῦν δέ* and the foregoing *αὐτῷ*, which can only be found between the *νῦν δὲ . . . . αὐτῷ* and the *τὸν*

δὲ Ἰησοῦν. In the second place, he completely loses sight of the author's train of thought, which has nothing to do with the question whether or not upon earth, among men, all have already subjected themselves to Christ, but is solely occupied with the question whether the ἄνθρωπος (whoever this may be) is still lower than the *angels* or has *already* been exalted above the *angels*. In the third place, he takes for granted that there is an antithesis between the ὑποτάσσειν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα and the στεφανοῦν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, of which there is not the slightest indication in the words.* In the fourth place, we must expect to find as the conclusion, the assurance that to Jesus who is already *crowned*, all things shall at some future time be also actually *made subject*. Instead of this we find the conclusion, that in Jesus and through him, many also of the *rest of men* shall attain to a participation in that glory and honour; proving most clearly that the author in vers. 6–8 had in view *not the Messiah*, but *man as such*.

Other commentators differ from our explanation even in the construction. Some take τὸν δὲ ἠλαττ. as object and Ἰησοῦν in apposition to it. "But we see him who was for a little made lower than the angels, namely Jesus, crowned," etc. Every one must see how forced this is as a construction. But besides this, the meaning which it yields would only be suitable, if by the ἄνθρωπος in vers. 6–8 might be understood the Messiah. But, even in this case, a contradiction would arise, namely, with ver. 8, in which the αὐτῷ must also be understood of the Messiah. Thus something would be affirmed of the Messiah in ver. 9 which is denied of him in ver. 8. A third construction (Tholuck and others) makes ἠλαττ. the object, Ἰησοῦν the predicate, and ἐστεφ. apposition to the predicate. "We see man made for a little while lower than the angels *in Jesus* who has been crowned."† The whole passage would, according to this, be an answer to the question where and in whose person are we to find that humanity which is spoken of in vers. 6–8. But this interpretation is impossible even in a grammatical point of view; the words in order to have this meaning must run thus: Ἰησοῦν τὸν διὰ, etc. In general, however, the Greek would not express by a mere placing together of two accusatives such a formally declared judgment, in which by the predicate is expressed not the contents, but the compass of the idea contained in the subject, in which an answer is given not to the question what? but to the question who? We should rather have expected the following: τὸν δὲ . . . ἠλαττωμένον

* The idea which Bleek finds in this passage must have been expressed in Greek thus:—Καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἰησοῦ οὔπω ὁρῶμεν τὰ πάντα ὑποτεταγμένα. Βλέπομεν δὲ αὐτὸν ἐστεφανωμένον γοῦν δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ, καὶ οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἃ ἤρξατο ὁ θεὸς ταῦτα καὶ τελειώσει.

† Similarly Olshausen: "We acknowledge Jesus who is crowned with honour and glory to be that one who was made a little lower than the angels." This must have been expressed thus: Ἰησοῦν τὸν διὰ κλ. ἐστεφανωμένον.

βλέπομεν ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστι ὁ διὰ, etc., or τὸν δὲ . . . . ἠλαττ. βλέπομεν Ἰησοῦν εἶναι. But also, with respect to the sense thus obtained, the justest doubts may be entertained. The proposition in ver. 8, that man has not yet entered on the glory promised to him, would thus in ver. 9 be not *limited* but *reversed*. For, if by that *man who was made for a little lower than the angels* spoken of from ver. 6 to ver. 8, we are, according to Tholuck's explanation of ver. 9 to understand none other than Jesus, and according to ver. 9 Jesus is already exalted, then it cannot be said in ver. 8 that *man* has *not yet* been exalted.

Thus the simple explanation given above is confirmed on all sides.—

The author passes to the third *link in the chain of thought* in the words : ὅπως χωρὶς θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντὸς γεύσηται θανάτου. There are two points to be determined here, the one pertaining to *the reading*, the other to the *connexion* of ὅπως with what goes before. The *reading* wavers between χάριτι θεοῦ and χωρὶς θεοῦ. Theodoret, Theodorus of Mopsuestia, and the Nestorians read χωρίς. And Marius Mercator, Theophylact, and Œcumenius put forth the charge that this reading owed its existence entirely at first to the invention of the Nestorians. Occasion was doubtless given for this charge, by the manner in which the Nestorians availed themselves of this reading in their doctrinal controversies with the Catholics. They ununderstood χωρὶς θεοῦ as more exactly determining the subject contained in γεύσηται, and thus obtained the rather strange sense : Jesus has tasted of death without his Godhead, *i. e.*, the Divine part in him remained unaffected by his death. But, however, *convenient* this reading might be to those excellent critics, it by no means owes its *origin* to the Nestorians. First, because the words χωρὶς θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντός explained without prejudice and without artifice, can yield no sense favourable to the Nestorians ; secondly, because two hundred years before Nestorius, the reading χωρὶς θεοῦ was known to the ancient Church Father Origen. And not merely known ! For he mentions the reading which stands opposed to it as one to be found "in several manuscripts" (ἐν τισιν ἀντιγράφοις). *In his time* then, the *majority* of the manuscripts had the reading χωρίς. When, therefore, at a later period, Jerome says, vice versa, of the reading absque Deo, that it occurs only in quibusdam exemplaribus, very little weight is to be attached to this, partly, because the most eminent *Latin* Fathers, Ambrose, Fulgentius, Vigilius and others, adopted the reading absque, partly, because it is not difficult to understand how the more flat and easy reading χάριτι should have come gradually to be preferred to the more difficult, and, on doctrinal grounds, suspected χωρίς. This satisfactorily explains how it should happen, that on to the 6th century to which our oldest MSS.

extend, the ancient reading *χωρίς* was almost entirely suppressed; hence it has been preserved only in the single cod. num. 53, in a scholium to cod. 67, in a cod. of the Peshito, and in the Patristic citations before referred to.

The same course was pursued in regard to the reading *χωρίς* as has recently been pursued by Bleek; it was rejected on internal grounds, and because it yielded no proper sense. But this very circumstance is a guarantee for its genuineness. The reading *χάριτι* is certainly clear as water, most easily understood, and—most futile, nay unsuitable. Christ has, by the grace of God, tasted death for all. That not merely the giving up to death together with its results, but that even the tasting of death should be traced to the grace of God, has something startling in it. Still, it might be said, that *χάριτι θεοῦ* refers only strictly to the words *ὑπὲρ παντός*. And this is certainly worthy of being listened to. But still, the meaning thus remains *futile*, inasmuch as there was no necessity or occasion whatever to mention in this context, in which the subject treated of is the exaltation of man above the angels, that Christ was given up through the grace of God; at least *χάριτι θεοῦ* might be thrown out of the text without producing any perceptible defect in the train of thought. The reading, certainly, is *easy*, especially in comparison with the other, from which even Bleek could extract no suitable sense;* nay, it lay quite at the hand of every copier who thought for a moment how the offensive *χωρίς* might be suitably recast.

The reading *χωρὶς θεοῦ* is the more difficult, more significant, more suitable. Certainly, if with Paulus in Heidelberg we explain *χωρὶς θεοῦ* "forsaken of God," an idea arises which is out of place here. But is it not evident, that *χωρὶς θεοῦ* is rather to be taken along with *ὑπὲρ παντός*? True, Bleek thinks that *πᾶς* denotes here merely the human race, and that the author consequently cannot have intended to say that Christ has tasted death for *every* being in heaven and on earth with the single exception of God; but he intends merely to say, that Christ has tasted death for men. But if the author intended to make this latter statement, why then did he not write *ὑπὲρ πάντων* or *ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων*? Why did he rather choose the *enumerative* singular "for every one?" (It is self-evident that *παντός* is not neuter, and cannot be translated by *universe*).—We find the best commentary on this passage in ver. 8 and in 1 Cor. xv. 27. In the latter passage we meet quite a similar thought, quite a similar limitation to that which lies here in *χωρὶς θεοῦ*. At the resurrection, writes the apostle Paul in that passage, *all things* shall be put under the feet of Jesus, *πάντα γὰρ ὑπέταξεν*

* Olshausen also thinks that if the reading *χωρίς* be adopted, nothing remains but to render the words "in his state of being forsaken by God."

ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ (a reference to Ps. viii., just as in the 8th verse of our epistle). Ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ, he continues, ὅτι πάντα ὑποτέτακται, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὑποτάξαντος αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα. There was occasion for the same restriction in our passage. In ver. 8 the writer had laid emphasis on that very πάντα in Ps. viii., and thence proved, that *absolutely all things, the angels as well*, should be made subject to man. In a way quite analogous to this, he will now in ver. 9 shew, that Christ by his death has reconciled *absolutely all things, heaven and earth*. The same is said in Eph. i. 10,—*i. e.*, that side by side with this capital and central fact in the human sphere, no other analogous acts of God in the sphere of the angels can be placed; that, rather, *all creatures, the angels likewise*, participated in the blessed fruits of the death of Jesus. And this he expresses *first*, by again saying ὑπὲρ παντός, and *then*, inasmuch as he limits this παντός *merely* in reference to *God*, shews that the παντός refers to *everything except God*, consequently also to the angels. Christ has tasted death for *every one*, God himself alone excepted.

It is quite evident, then, that the preposition ὑπέρ in *this* context does not denote the vicarious satisfaction; for Christ has made this only for sinners, for men and not for angels. Ὑπέρ is here therefore to be rendered not "in the place of, instead of," but "for, in behalf of." The angels also, although they need no atonement, have yet likewise enjoyed in *their* way the blessed fruits of the death of Jesus. If, in general, their happiness consists in the adoring contemplation of the majesty and love of God, then the contemplation of this most wonderful act of self-sacrificing love must form the consummation of their bliss (comp. 1 Pet. i. 12). And if there is joy among the angels over every sinner that repents, then the death of Jesus, by which the way to repentance and conversion has been opened for all sinners, must have been the fountain of a sea of joy to the angels.

The second question to which we now pass is *how the particle ὅπως is to be explained and construed*. First of all, it is most natural to take ὅπως as dependent on ἐστεφανωμένον; but this seems to give an idea which has no proper meaning. The crowning exaltation of Christ took place in order that he might suffer death for all. How is this possible, seeing that his death preceded his exaltation? The critics have therefore blindly sought in their own way to escape the difficulty. Some have assigned to ὅπως a new signification; Erasmus, Kuinoel, and others, the signification of ὥστε, Schleusner that of postquam, which in a grammatical point of view, is absurd. Others have had recourse to artificial constructions. Bengel and Böhme, in a truly reckless manner make ὅπως dependent on ἠλαττ.! Grotius, Carpzov, Storr, and Bleek, on a short clause to be supplied from the noun πάθημα : ὃ ἔπαθεν. But all these artifices are unne-

cessary. Ὅπως depends actually on ἐστεφανωμένον, can depend on nothing else, and needs to depend on nothing else; for a meaning perfectly good results when only (with Wetstein) the proper emphasis is given to the χωρὶς θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντός. Christ was exalted that he may have suffered death *for all with the single exception of God.* This is certainly not spoken with logical precision; thus spoken it would be: that the death which he has tasted, might be for the benefit of all. This brevity, however, this condensation of two small clauses into one, is *extremely natural.* So, for example, might a teacher say to a youth who was going out for the first time into the world: "See that you remember my words and admonitions also when you are away, that I may not have taken pains with you in vain," *i. e.*, that the pains which I have taken with you may not be in vain. (Olshausen also substantially makes ὅπως dependent on ἐστεφανωμένον: "that he might be one who had tasted death *for all*").

Jesus, then, must be exalted, in order that his death may be for the benefit of all, of men and angels. So long as he was only the crucified man Jesus, so long his death was indeed an objective vicarious death of atonement for guilt not his own, but it yielded no real fruit either to men or angels. Not till the incarnate one was exalted and glorified, and crowned King in heaven, did it become possible for him to send the Holy Spirit, and thus to effect the *appropriation* on the part of man of the salvation which had been objectively wrought out, and therewith to bring *joy* to the angels over the conversion of men.

In ver. 10 we have the third link in the chain of thought to which the clause ὅπως, etc., has formed the transition, nay, which was already implicitly contained in that clause. This part can therefore be connected with the clause beginning with ὅπως by means of an explicative γάρ, "namely." Had this transition-clause been wanting, then we must have expected δέ instead of γάρ. (*Man* has not yet attained to the dominion; *Jesus*, however, is already crowned; but through him, the *rest of mankind also* are to be led to glory). The author, however is not so fond of sharply distinguishing his thoughts from each other, as rather of making rhetorical transitions from the one to the other.

With respect now to the construction of the tenth verse, it is self-evident, *a*, that ἔπρεπε γὰρ αὐτῷ is the governing clause; *b*, that the relative clause δι' ὃν depends on αὐτῷ; *c*, that the subject to ἔπρεπε is formed through the infinitive τελειῶσαι; and *d*, that τὸν ἀρχηγόν depends on τελειῶσαι as its object. The only doubtful point is, whether the accusative ἀγαγόντα, with what belongs to it, is *accusative of the subject* to τελειῶσαι (consequently, together with τελειῶσαι. forms an acc. c. inf.), or is in *apposition* to the *accusative*

of the object ἀρχηγόν. In the latter case, the word in apposition would be placed before its principal word, in order that the latter may receive all the greater emphasis (just as in ver. 9, the attribute ἠλαττωμένον was placed first, and Ἰησοῦν followed for the sake of the emphasis).

That αὐτὸς δι' ὅν, as subject of the verb τελειῶσαι, is different from ἀρχηγός as the object of this τελειῶσαι, as also, that the ἀρχηγός is Christ, is self-evident; the αὐτὸς δι' ὅν is, therefore, God the Father. If now, following the former construction, we render the words thus (with Olshausen): "it became him for whom and through whom are all things, in bringing many to glory to make the leader of their salvation perfect through suffering," then God the Father is here the one to whom the action expressed by the ἄγειν belongs and this whole clause πολλοὺς υἱοὺς εἰς δόξαν ἀγαγόντα receives the place of a mere *accessary* limitation, to some extent a conditional limitation. If God (thus we might explain the idea), if God would bring many sons to glory, then must he make him whom he has chosen as their captain, perfect *through suffering*. The emphasis rests here on the words διὰ παθημάτων. That the *suffering* was necessary is the kernel of the thought, all the rest serves only for preparation.—If again, following the other construction, we render the passage thus: "For it became him for whom and through whom are all things to make the *captain* of their salvation perfect through suffering, as one who should bring *many* sons to glory," then the emphasis here rests evidently on πολλοὺς υἱοὺς ἀγαγόντα and ἀρχηγόν. It is, however, precisely one of the peculiarities of our author's style to place such principal clauses as it were in the *periphery* of his sentences, and this of itself would suffice to give the preference to this second construction. In addition to this, there is the beautiful parallelism resulting from this construction between the Ἰησοῦν placed after, and the ἀρχηγόν, in like manner placed after. Moreover, the two ideas are thus placed antithetically to each other: at present, *Jesus* alone is exalted; but he is exalted as a *leader of others*. The train of thought, then, absolutely requires that the emphasis in ver. 10 should rest upon this—that through Jesus *the rest of mankind also* attain to glory, consequently on the *end* and *result* of the suffering of Jesus—but not on the means, the suffering itself. And how strong the emphasis which the author lays upon that *result* he shews by giving a twofold expression to the idea that through Jesus many attain to glory, first, in the words πολλοὺς υἱοὺς ἀγαγόντα, and then, in the word ἀρχηγός. We are not, therefore, at liberty to sink the clause πολλοὺς υἱοὺς ἀγαγόντα into a mere accessary limitation, which, according to the former construction, would be unavoidable, but must necessarily give the preference to the second construction. Ver. 10 is connected with ver. 9 as an

explanation of it; there, as we saw, all the stress lay on ὑπὲρ παντός; in ver. 10, too, it must therefore be shewn how *others also* attain to glory through Jesus. And the same idea is followed out also in ver. 11. It is shown in ver. 11 how the glory of *Christ* is participated in by *man*, but not why it was necessary that Christ should *suffer* in order to procure this glory.

We render the passage accordingly: "It became him for whom and through whom all things subsist, to make perfect, through suffering the *captain* of their salvation, as one who should bring *many sons* unto glory." The idea that Christ could not be a first fruits of others without suffering, finds its explanation in the passages John xvi. 7; xiv. 2, 3. Πρέπειν, as also ὀφείλειν, ver. 17, seems to denote not a fatalistic necessity, but a necessity lying in the nature of the thing, and therefore in God's own wise, world-governing will. That the Father is here designated by δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα, which is usually a term of designation for the Son (Rom. xi. 36; 1 Cor. viii. 6; ἐξ οὗ is generally said of the Father) is explained partly, by the paronomasia with δι' ὅν, partly by this,—that the Father is here regarded not as the creator, but as the governor of the world, through, and under, whose guidance the work of salvation is accomplished.

In vers. 11–13, there follows a further train of thought which, however, does not stand along with the rest of the members in vers. 5–8, vers. 9, 10, vers. 14, 18, as co-ordinate with them, but as subordinate to the member in vers. 9, 10 containing, namely, a *mere explanation of the idea* in ver. 10 (that through the one *Son*, others also should become *sons*). It is shewn in vers. 11–13, that *already in the Old Testament it is said, the Messiah shall receive his subjects into his own relation of sonship with God.* First of all, in ver. 11, the proposition is thetically laid down that the ἁγιάζων and the ἁγιαζόμενοι stand in the relation of brethren coming from one head of a family. With respect now, first, to the meaning of the expression ἁγιάζειν, it denotes here not sanctification in the special sense, as an effect of faith in the atonement, and as such different from justification; but, just as little does it denote justification as such, as was thought by many of the old Protestant commentators. The expression ἁγιάζειν denotes here, rather, the total change in their relation to God which takes place in the members of the new covenant, in opposition to the relation of the natural man to God. This wide signification is explained by the sense and usage of the word ἅγιος. Ἅγιος is, in the first place, used in a dogmatico-metaphysical sense of God. God is holy, because he is in himself the perfect one, and the fountain of all good,—also of all that is morally good as corresponding to his own nature. God is further holy, in relation to personal creatures, *i. e.* he is righteous; here ἅγιος denotes the con-

sistency of the divine dealings towards us with his nature. In the second place, however, ἅγιος is used in a historical sense of the creature, and forms in this sense the antithesis to all that which by sin has become estranged from God, separated from God, and morally *bad* or essentially *profane*. Those things are holy, which are withdrawn from the profane natural life, and devoted to the service of God. Those persons are holy, who are withdrawn from the sinfully-natural life, *and are placed in a relation of grace and redemption to God*. Hence in the Old Testament the Israelites, and in all the apostolical epistles the Christians, are called οἱ ἅγιοι, although they are by no means already sinless. Only, in the third place, does ἅγιος come to denote (and in this case ὅσιος is rather used) the state of a personal creature who is absolutely free from sin, or who has become free (1 Pet. i. 16).—The ἁγιάζειν in the passage under consideration is an instance of the second of these usages, and denotes the total act by which Christ withdraws his own people from the natural life of death, and places them in the sphere of a new life which rests upon his atoning death, has its source in his resurrection, consists in the appropriation of salvation through repentance, faith, and renewal of life, and will at one time be perfected in sinlessness and glorification.—The other and stricter signification of ἁγιάζειν, in which it denotes the special renewal of life proceeding from faith (John xvii. 17 ; comp. Heb. xii. 14) belongs to the third usage of ἅγιος.

Who, now, is the εἷς, the common parent, in relation to whom the ἁγιάζων, Christ, and the ἁγιαζόμενοι, the subjects of the Messiah's kingdom are called brethren, *i. e.*, who is he whose *sons* Christians become through the *sanctifier?* Hunnius and Carpzov thought it was Adam ; Bengel, Schmid, and Michaelis, that it was Abraham. All these (as also Olshausen) found, accordingly, in ver. 11 the idea expressed that the Son of God, as *incarnate*, has entered into a relation of brother to men. Then is ver. 11 an answer to the question,—*by what means* has Christ made *many* to be *sons?* Ver. 10: Christ, as *leader*, draws many sons after him, ver. 11 : for he has become man, and therefore comes from the same common ancestor with *those who are sanctified*.—This interpretation is, meanwhile, decidedly wrong. Not until ver. 14 does the author pass on to shew that Christ, in order to raise us to a participation in his sonship with *God*, must needs take part in our sonship with *Adam*. The citations also in ver. 12 prove, as we shall see, not that it was necessary for the Messiah to become man, but simply that the Messiah should stand in the *spiritual* relation of a *brother* to the subjects of his kingdom, that he should lift them up to his relation of oneness with God. Finally, the designation of Christ here as the *sanctifier*, and the *sons* as the *sanctified*, also shows that it is not the *physical*

relationship which we, the sons of Adam, have from our birth onwards with Christ as the son of Mary, of David, of Abraham, of Adam, that is here spoken of, but the *spiritual* relationship into which we enter with him through our being *sanctified.* In ver. 11, then, we are not told *by what means* Christ raises us to sonship with God (namely: that for this end it was necessary that he should become a son of man), but, rather, in this verse it is repeated by way of explanation that Christ makes us his brethren, and as the *sanctified* raises us to sonship with God. Thus, with the ancient Greek commentators and Tholuck, we must explain the "one"* *of God* the *spiritual* father, as of Christ, so also of those who are descended from Christ. But it is, certainly, *to this descent from Christ*, not to the "common origin from God" (Bleek) that the idea expressed in the ἐξ ἑνός is to be referred, as appears of itself from what has been just said.

It still remains to be observed on these words, viewed grammatically, that πάντες along with τε—καί—forms a pleonasm.

For which cause, etc. Because the Messiah is destined to enter into the relation of a brother with the members of his kingdom, not merely into that of a ruler over them—*i. e.* to exalt them to a participation in the sonship—therefore, he is not ashamed already in the Old Testament to call his subjects brethren, *i. e.* therefore does an analogous relation appear also in the anointed one of the Old Testament.—It is in this elegant rhetorical manner that our author connects his proofs from the Old Testament vers. 12, 13 with the thesis ver. 11. From what is said in ver. 11 it *becomes intelligible* how, already in the Old Testament, such passages as Ps. xxii. 22 could occur. There lies therefore, of course, in these Old Testament passages at the same time, *vice versa*, a *testimony* to the truth of what is said in ver. 11. This is plainly the aim of the author, to prove by these citations that even in statements of the Old Testament this relation of brother to the members of his kingdom, this calling to exalt them to the place of *children*, is attributed to the expected Messiah.

The great majority of commentators have not rightly apprehended the bearing of the 11th verse, and hence have not known what rightly to make of the citations, vers. 12, 13. We say nothing of the insipid view of those who, as soon as they come upon an Old Testament citation, ignorantly presuppose that the author's design was to prove that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, and who then imagine they have done something wonderful when they show that the passage cited contains "no direct prophecy pointing to Christ." It is nowhere the aim of the author throughout the entire epistle to

* Calvin is for taking ἑνός as the neuter and supplying γένους. This is, grammatically, not possible.

prove that Jesus is the Messiah; this he presupposes, chap. i. 1–3, as an acknowledged fact on the part of his readers.—Those again may be said relatively to have best apprehended these citations, who think their design is to prove that, even according to the statements of the Old Testament, *it was necessary that the Messiah should become man.* We know, indeed, that according to the plain words of the author in ver. 11 this also cannot be right. Not that the Messiah, the Son of God *must of necessity become man*, not that the *incarnation* was the *means* of exalting the rest of men to the place of *children*, is what would here be proved from the Old Testament, —this *means* is first spoken of at ver. 14,—but that even in the Old Testament, it was reckoned as *a part* of the calling of the Messiah, *i. e.* the Anointed, the theocratical king, that he should not merely *rule over* his subjects from above, but in *brotherly ministerial love* lift them up to the same close *filial fellowship with God* in which he himself stood as the anointed of God.

On the *erroneous* supposition that ver. 2 is intended to prove the necessity of the incarnation, of the Messiah's becoming a child of Adam, the three citations have been interpreted in the following manner. In Ps. xxii. 22, David the king is not ashamed to remember that his subjects are at the same time his brethren, by virtue of their physical descent from Adam or Abraham. Now, as the first David was a type of the second David, there must also exist in the case of the latter a basis of physical brotherhood with men. (So also Olshausen). But, in the first place, David wrote that psalm not as the king, but as a fugitive from Saul (see infra); and secondly, from the fact that David *mentions* a physical relation as subsisting between him and his subjects, it cannot be inferred that this relation belonged *essentially* to his character as anointed of the Lord, and must therefore repeat itself in the second David. With equal justice might it be said, that because David in the 51st Psalm laments that he was conceived in sin, the second David must needs also have been conceived in sin. The second passage is supposed to be taken from Is. viii. 18. Isaiah in his character as a prophet says, that he puts his trust in God, and therefore retains the consciousness that although he is a messenger of God to the people of Israel, he is still at the same time a member of this people, and has to exercise faith in his own prophecy. Consequently, Christ also, the absolute prophet, must be a member of humanity to which he was sent. But it is the manner of all prophets to speak at the same time as men, and one might perceive in this a trace of their relative and imperfect character, and be led to an inference precisely the reverse, namely, that the absolute prophet must needs have been a prophet in the pure sense of the word, and not at the same time one of those to whom he was sent. If, therefore, these citations are to

be understood in this sense, the force of argument which they contain appears feeble indeed. (On the third citation which, indeed, has been the best understood, see below).

We now come to look at these citations from quite a different point of view. If our explanation of ver. 11 is right, then the author intends to prove by the citations in ver. 12, seq., not that the Messiah must needs have taken part in our relation of sonship to Adam, but *that it belongs to the calling of the Messiah to raise the subjects of his kingdom to his own Messianic relation of sonship to God*, to that close union and fellowship of grace with God in which he stands as the anointed of God. Let us now see whether the citations in reality prove this.

The first is the passage in Psalm xxii. 22. It is well known that this psalm was ascribed by tradition to David, and was regarded as typical by the early Christian Church. From the place which it occupies in the first book of the Psalms of David it appears, according to Delitzsch's excellent investigations (Symbolæ ad Psalmos illustrandos), that this psalm was included in the collection appointed by David himself (comp. 2 Chron. xxiii. 18 with Psalm lxxii. 28). The situation, too, which is described in Ps. xxii., under the figure of a circle composed of destructive wild beasts and wicked men, applies to no one more fitly than to David when Saul persecuted him, hunted him from cave to cave, and from one hiding place to another, and surrounded on every side the mountain which he frequented. It is, however, not a mere individual trust in God which David expresses in the psalm ; he was through Samuel anointed of God to be king, he had the promise of the throne, and on his faith in this promise did that confidence rest. When, now, the apostles find in those sufferings of David and his deliverance out of them, a type of the sufferings and the resurrection of the second David, this is not mere caprice on their part, but a thing for which they have ample warrant. The conflict of Jesus with his enemies was, throughout, and in the closest manner, parallel to David's conflict with Saul. There, as here, we see, on the one hand, the man after God's heart, the anointed of God, who knows that he, although chosen to attain to glory and to establish his kingdom, will, despised, and alone, receive the exaltation from the hand of God ; there, as here, stands, on the other hand, the possessor of worldly power, who fears with groundless suspicion lest the anointed of God should seek to cast him down from his power with the weapons of rebellion. But to this was to be added, that this relation was first developed in Jesus in that absolute purity and perfection which it as yet wanted in David. David, although he shrunk from laying his hand on Saul, had yet gathered around him a band of fighting men, Jesus had only humble fishermen and publicans. Thus the conflict which is

pourtrayed in Psalm xxii. had reached only a typical, inadequate development in David; what David sings in that psalm first found its full truth in the second David. And when, moreover, our Lord himself in his anguish on the cross actually acknowledged the opening words of the 22d Psalm as containing the most perfect expression of his situation, how can critics, shutting their eyes against the light of day, still deny that the psalm expresses a relation which in itself was a prophecy in act pointing to Christ?

The suffering Messiah of the Old Testament, then, in that psalm expresses the resolution in the midst of his affliction that if God should save and exalt him—in other words place him on the promised throne and make him *king*—he will declare to *his brethren* the faithfulness of the Lord, and will also raise them up to such a knowledge of God, and such an assurance of their gracious relation to him, as that they too should praise the Lord with him. He calls his future subjects brethren, not from regard to their being descended from Abraham in common with him, which would be too jejune a meaning, but it is *the feeling of royal love* that teaches him to regard his future subjects as brethren, and plants so deep in his heart the *care* for their salvation, for their growth in the knowledge of God. Herein, evidently, lies the significance of the declaration, that David regards his future royal vocation as a *ministerial* one, that he counts it as belonging to his future duties as king, not merely to rule over his subjects outwardly as a caliph, but as one truly anointed of God *to lead them into that relation of nearness to God in which he himself stands, and on account of which* he, the man after God's heart, has been anointed to be the Messiah of Israel. If, now, the first, the imperfect David, held it as an essential part of his Messianic calling to love his subjects as brethren in God, to care for the salvation of their souls, and to lift them up to his own relation of sonship to God—how could the second, the perfect, David be inferior to him in this? No! the inference was certainly altogether logical and warranted:—if, already, the anointed of the Old Testament was not ashamed to regard his subjects in such a sense as brethren, so much the more will it be the part of the New Testament Messiah, to raise the subjects of the Messianic kingdom of the New Testament Israel to that relation of sonship with God in which he stands, and to make them *sons*.

The second citation is generally supposed to be taken from Isaiah viii. 17; the third is the passage in Isaiah viii. 18, consequently, the immediate continuation of ver. 17. If, however, the second citation was really from Isaiah viii. 17, it must with reason appear strange, that our author should by a *καὶ πάλιν* separate from each other these two verses which, although containing two different elements of thought, would still have formed but *one citation* (just

as in chap. i. 8, 9). The *καὶ πάλιν* compels us to look for the second citation in another place than immediately before the third. Indeed the words לֹא־אֶבְטַח בּוֹ (LXX. *καὶ πεποιθὼς ἔσομαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ*) are to be found not merely in Isaiah viii. 17 but also in 2 Sam. xxii. 3, and, already the older commentators, and among more recent theologians, Tischendorf, have recently traced our citation to its original source.

And, indeed, it is only in the connexion to be found in 2 Sam. xxii. 3, that the words cited involve the proof which, according to the context, we must expect to find in them.—Isaiah, after having, in chap. vii. 1–8, chap. viii., communicated Divine revelations concerning the nearer (chap. viii.) and more remote (chap. vii.) destinies of Judah, begins a hortatory address with the 9th verse of the 8th chapter, a sermon as it were on the text given in chap. vii. 1–8, viii. "Rage ye people, and be broken in pieces!" he exclaims; he sees in the spirit one kingdom falling down upon another and one after another destroyed; he fears not this, however; Jehovah alone is to be feared, Jehovah alone is to be trusted in. His people dreads other powers and trusts in other helpers; but Isaiah "trusts in the Lord." The first person sing. (on which our author by means of an *ἐγώ* lays emphasis) stands there merely in opposition to the contemporaries of Isaiah, who had set their trust on something earthly. How, now, from the fact that Isaiah was more believing than his fellow-countrymen, can the inference be drawn that the Messiah shall exalt his subjects to the relation of brotherhood with himself, and of sonship with God?

In 2 Sam. xxii., on the contrary, we have *a song which David sang when God had preserved him from Saul.* Ver. 1. There David declares that Jehovah had been his shield and had covered him. (How naturally, according to the ordinary association of ideas, must our author have been led from the prayer of petition in Ps. xxii. to the corresponding prayer of thanksgiving in 2 Sam. xxii.)! When, now, David says in this connexion: "I trust (also farther) in *him*," the *ἐγώ* here has its antithesis, not in the unbelievers, but in Jehovah; the anointed of God in these words enters into a close union with God; he expresses the feeling of the purest sonship to God; it is God who has anointed him, and in whom he has trusted in the extremity of need, who as a faithful father has extricated him, in whom he will henceforth also rest all his hope. The subject of Ps. xxii. was David's relation to his subjects, that of 2 Sam. xxii. is David's relation to God. We thus see how these two citations are connected together, supplement each other, and only when taken together form the entire proof, just as in the first chapter, vers. 8, 9 and vers. 10–13 formed the two connected members of one argument. Let it be remembered, that in chap. i. 8, 9 it was shewn

that the Messianic salvation must needs come through a human ruler and not through an angel, and in vers. 10–13 that the Messianic salvation was to be brought about and accomplished immediately by God and not through angels. Here also, in like manner, we find two propositions similarly related to each other: *a*, the anointed of God must raise his subjects to his own position of faith and grace, must educate them so that they shall stand in the same relation to God as he does, and *b*, the anointed of God stands in the relation of closest unity with God. Or, more shortly, and precisely: the Messiah makes his subjects to be *his brethren* (his fellows in as far as respects the relation to God); he himself, however, is the *child of God*. The Ergo is easily supplied: he makes his subjects to be children of God, *υἱοί*.—Here, again, it is not words but ideas on which the force of the reasoning rests.—

As in chap. i. 6, in addition to the passages cited to prove that the Son has received a more excellent name than the angels, other passages are at the same time brought forward which say nothing more of this *name*, but in which the description of the Messianic salvation is continued, so, here also, in the course of the 13th verse, to the two citations in which it is shewn that the Messiah raises his subjects to the place of brethren and partners with him in his sonship,* a *third* is added in which nothing further is said specially on this point, but in which a new independent proof is adduced of the principal proposition in ver. 10, that the Messiah makes his people to be *children*.—The third citation is taken from Is. viii. 18. Just as it was natural for the author to pass from the 22d Psalm to the corresponding prayer of thanksgiving in 2 Sam. xxii., so naturally must the passage 2 Sam. xxii. 3 have brought to his mind the parallel passage in Is. viii. 17, and thus led him to Is. viii. 18. We must again carefully consider this passage in its connexion, in order rightly to understand it. Ahaz, immediately after his accession to the throne, being threatened by Ephraim and Syria, despises the offered help of the Lord (vii. 11, seq.), and relies on the help of the Assyrians. The rebuke is addressed to him ver. 13, seq.: O house of David, why dost thou offend God? Behold, O maid (O woman), thou shalt have yet to conceive (the well-known symbol of an affliction which is necessary in order to a salvation), and shalt come through suffering to bear a son whom thou shalt call "God with us" (the promised second David). God, then, will bring the self-trusting house of David by means of afflictions to this—that it will feel as a woman, as a maid; then first is it capable of bearing the promised one, when in humility it places itself in a *receptive* relation

* Nothing of course is said here of the eternal Sonship of Jesus Christ. To a participation in that eternal Sonship none of the *sanctified* are exalted; they are, however, exalted to a participation in *that* Sonship spoken of in ver. 10, *i. e.*, the Sonship commonly so called.

to God.* For, before the time arrives when the promised one can as a grown up man bring the Messianic salvation, Judea *shall be laid waste* (ver. 15, comp. ver. 22). An unprecedented calamity shall first befall *both kingdoms*, Ephraim and Judah (ver. 17), before the promised period of glory, and that from the same Assyrian power on which the foolish Ahaz relied for help (vers. 18 and 20). —After this revelation had been made to Ahaz, Isaiah receives the command from God to write upon a roll the symbolical name "haste to the spoil, speed to the prey." He does this taking two men as witnesses. After this, he begets a child, when the child is born it is a boy, and he receives the command to give to this boy the name "haste to the spoil, speed to the prey;" the boy was to be a living witness and pledge, that the prophecy given to Isaiah nine months before would in its first part (that Samaria and Damascus should be laid waste by the Assyrians) be soon fulfilled (ver. 4); with like certainty, also, would the other part be fulfilled, that Judah should be oppressed by the Euphratean power (which must here still be regarded as the "Assyrian," as it was first under Hezekiah revealed to the prophet that Babylon should take the place of Assyria). That the prophet, immediately after having written on the roll, goes in to the prophetess, leaves us to conclude that he did this according to Divine direction. Thus we have here a series of signs, of which one always points to the other. His writing on the roll is a sign that a *boy* should be born to him, to whom he is to assign that name written on the roll. That the boy is in reality born, and receives that name, is a sign that Samaria and Damascus are to be laid waste by the Assyrians; the overthrow of Samaria is a sign that the after part of the threatening also, chap. vii. 17, that concerning Judah, shall be fulfilled, and with this the coming of the promised Son of David rendered possible.

The "haste to the spoil, speed to the prey" was, however, not the first son of Isaiah who bore a symbolical prophetical name. In chap. vii. 3 it is purposely mentioned that already an older boy existed with such a name, the "Shearjashub." The younger son was a living prophecy of the judgments which were to come upon Juda; the elder, a living prophecy of the future salvation, of the conversion in which these judgments were to issue (comp. Is. x. 21).

But it is not merely on the existence of these *sons* who were prophetic in their names that Isaiah, in his address viii. 18, rests that trust which bears him up amid all the agitations of the people, for he goes on to say, "Behold I and the children whom thou hast given me." In like manner as his trust rests upon his sons does it rest also upon himself. His sons give him faith and hope by the

* We see then the house of David, purified by affliction, matured in the person of the Virgin Mary to a purely womanly receptivity for the promised salvation.

names which they bear ; in himself, also, it must be the *name* which he has received from his parents, and which appears to him in connexion with the names of his sons—to be significant and consolatory. He is called "Jehovah's salvation," and, as David in his character as the anointed king was a type of the New Testament king, so is Isaiah, as the anointed prophet and servant of God, a type of the New Testament Messiah, the *Saviour;* Isaiah is the Saviour of the Old Testament as David was the Messiah of the Old Testament. *That not he alone, however, but that he, together with his sons, forms the type of Christ*—this is important to our author. The sons of Isaiah were certainly not merely living *pledges* that the "salvation of Jehovah" would at one time come after "calamity" and "conversion ;" but the future salvation was also *typified* in this father together with his sons. Certainly, however, there must be added to this the other element—that the children of Isaiah in their character as *pledges* (personal living prophecies) *were with him received into the prophetical calling of their father, into the dignity of the prophetical office;* in other words, that they were not merely children of a prophet (of a man who was besides a prophet), but prophetical children, or that *their relation to their father as children was itself a prophetical relation.* And the Isaiah of the New Testament, the Saviour, the Joshua (יְשַׁעְיָה and יְהוֹשׁוּעַ are synonymous), must not be inferior to him in this : was the one not merely a prophet in word, neither must the other be so ; did the one beget children which like their father were prophets, then must the other also beget children who, like him, stand in a Messianic union of grace with God.

Thus the three citations do in reality prove exactly what they ought to prove. It belongs to the calling of the Messiah to raise *others* to a participation in his *sonship.*

Vers. 14–18.—Our author now passes to a new application of the idea, closely connected, however, with the third of the citations which we have just been considering. He had, *a*, laid down in ver. 5 the thesis, that the place of ruler in the future kingdom of God is assigned not to the angels (but to man); he had, *b*, shewn in vers. 6–8, that even in the Old Testament this place is promised to the family of man ; he had, *c*, observed in vers. 9, 10, that as yet indeed Jesus alone had been exalted to the glory, but it is only as the first-fruits and as leader to bring *many sons* after him ; and here, by way of appendix, he had in vers. 11–13 called to mind how, already, the Old Testament considers it as a part of the Messiah's office to lift up the members of his kingdom to the same relation of grace and unity in which he stands to God. Now, however, in ver. 14 he begins to shew, that as *means* to this end—the exaltation of man to the rank of sons of God and this glory—it was necessary that the

Son of God should come down to be a son of man, a son of Adam. As in vers. 9, 10 he affirmed, that the (already present, as it were already perfected) Messiah must needs *suffer* in order to make others to be *sons*, so in vers. 14–18 he shews that it was necessary the Son of God should *become* man in order to *become* the Messiah.

The proof of this which he adduces connects itself so naturally with the third of the preceding citations, that ver. 14 just presents the same idea as is contained in that citation, only in another point of view. In ver. 13 the principal thing was to shew, that to the office of the Old Testament יְשַׁעְיָה belonged *not merely the uttering of words but also the begetting of children;* in ver. 14 he *lays* stress on this—that those children *must also be actually born*, in order to be living prophecies ; in ver. 13 he shews, that the children of Isaiah *had part* in the prophetical spiritual calling of their father, in ver. 14, that that participation was rendered *possible* by the *actual birth* of those children. And that this new application of the passage is warranted, appears already from the interpretation we have given of it above. The mere uttering or writing down of the words "Shearjashub, Mahershalal-hashbaz" was as yet no sign, no testimony, no prophetical ratification of the deliverance ; the gracious sign imparted to the prophet, and through him to the people, was only then given when God *actually sent* these children to him, when they *actually came into the world*, when they *partook of flesh and blood* (for these words contain the antithesis to the mere giving of the names). It must not, however, be thought that our author avails himself of this view of the case as containing properly a proof, that it was necessary the Son of God should be born as man. He could not mean this, for that case contains no such proof. For, it is not with the children of Isaiah, but with the father Isaiah himself, that Jesus is represented as parallel. He had, however, no such argument in his mind. Even the ἐπεί does not express properly a causal relation, but serves only to introduce *that parallel* which the author himself by adding the word παραπλησίως "in a similar way"—has denoted as one which does not hold *fully and in every point of view.* Indeed, he makes use of the citation in ver. 13 not as a proof of the idea contained in vers. 14–18 (he never applies one and the same citation to prove two different trains of thought), but merely by way of *transition.* According to that passage, it was necessary that the children should be actually born, and we perceive a relation in some measure analogous to this in Jesus ; *he also has assumed flesh and blood*, he, in order to make us partakers in his sonship to God, has first taken part in our sonship to Adam. This *new thesis* is laid down, and it is not *proved* from Is. viii. 18, but that citation only served as a *transition* to it introduced in the elegant manner peculiar to the author. The proof follows in the sen-

tence beginning with *ἵνα*, and then in ver. 16. *Σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*— designates the *human nature* in opposition to the incorporeal uncreated *God* (comp. Matth. xvi. 17; Gal. i. 16) not the body in opposition to the soul, nor the mortal body in opposition to the glorified (Grotius, Tholuck)—an antithesis which could not be urged in this context.

That through death, etc. The author now proceeds to specify the *internal ground* upon which the thesis rests. That which stands in the way of our becoming sons of God, and which must first be removed, is *death*, or—as the author here more specially describes it—the being subject to the kingdom of darkness and the prince of this kingdom, who has the power of death. This bondage of death could be removed only by our guilt being atoned for through the sacrificial death of Christ. In order to this, however, it was necessary that he should become a member of that humanity which took its rise from the first Adam.

So much in reference to the train of thought in general. To come to particulars, *καταργεῖν* is an expression frequently used by Paul, but occurring elsewhere in the New Testament only in Luke xiii. 7, and in our passage (but also in the profane writers). It is equivalent to *ἀργὸν ποιεῖν* to render ineffective, to deprive of efficacy. The author certainly might have expressed his meaning thus: *ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τὸν θάνατον καταργήσῃ*. But he has, with good reason, avoided doing so. For Jesus by his death has not freed us from death, absolutely, and in every respect; the death of the body still remains, but its sting has been taken away; it is no longer a judgment before which conscience trembles and which keeps men in incessant fear; to the Christian the death of the body is rather only a deliverance from the "body of this death" (Rom. vii. 24), a final putting off of the last remnant of the old Adam with which we have still to contend, in other words, the completion of sanctification, for, as the Heidelberg catechism so admirably expresses it in the 42d question: "Our death is not a payment for our sin, but only a dying to sin, and an entrance on life eternal." Therefore the author speaks not of a taking away of death absolutely, but only of a cessation of the *power of death*. In the words *κράτος τοῦ θανάτου* the genitive is not the gen. objecti ("power to kill"), for *κράτος* never denotes a mere facultas; it is the gen. subjecti. It is the power which death exercises over us, the violence which it offers to us. The best explanation of this is to be found in ver. 15, the consideration of which we shall here anticipate. Christ has delivered those who *through fear of death* were, *i. e.*, shewed themselves, to be all their life time subject to bondage. The man who, however well he might ward off repentance and the knowledge of sin, and by this pretended self-righteousness keep his conscience at

rest, yet, when the thought of death comes home to him, cannot divest his mind of anxiety, testifies by this very anxiety—these irrepressible stirrings of conscience in the prospect of death—that he is *guilty*, and that as yet he can lay no claim to freedom from the power of death.

But the author is not satisfied with saying merely that Christ has rendered ineffectual the *power of death;* he goes a step farther back and says : Christ has rendered ineffective him who had this power of death over us—the devil—who held this power as an instrument in his own hands, and made use of it as a means to vanquish us. The time is now happily gone by when it was customary to explain away the Satan of whom we read in the Bible, by changing him into an "evil principle." An "evil principle" implies in itself nothing less than an absurdity. The very essence of evil consists in the absence of principle, in a contradiction to principle. If the idea of an "evil principle" were conceivable, then might it also be conceived that God was evil ! But evil is only conceivable as a perverted selfish quality of the will of the personal creature, to be accounted for by the formal freedom of this creature ; evil as such has no existence (nullam habet *substantiam*), but we give the name of evil to the quality of that creature-will which, in opposition to God's will, and to man's own inner nature, refuses to stand in a *receptive* relation towards God, and will be its own independent lord, its own God. (Hence, also, evil is not a mere negation of good, but its direct, positive opposite). Now, we learn from the Scriptures that this evil quality of the will is to be found not merely in the human race, but also in the sphere of that other class of personal creatures, the angels, only with this difference, that because, in the angels, sin cannot be divided into sins of pride, and sins of the flesh, which strive against each other, and because it cannot be driven out of the centre of the soul into a circumference, the σάρξ, —the fallen angels are sunk *irrecoverably* into corruption. The sinful man is in his corruption half beast and half devil, the fallen angel is all devil. Farther, it is evident, that as the sinful man devotes his spiritual and corporeal powers and capacities to the service of sin, so the fallen angels, subject to the permission of God, spend the energies with which as creatures they are endowed, and employ their greater freedom from the restraints of body and space, in the service of sin.

Experience fully corresponds to what we learn on this subject from revelation. It is manifest in the history of the kingdom of God, that that kingdom has to contend not merely with individual weakness, or with the wickedness of individual men, but with great anti-Christian powers (Eph. vi. 12), to which the men who are engaged in their service are for the most part related merely as *blind*

instruments. The workman, who lets himself be persuaded to join in a rebellion through the false representations of insurrectionary communists, commits *knowingly* only the sin of covetousness and of disobedience to the law; the citizen who allows himself to be drawn by the prevailing spirit of the time into unlawful actions, commits only the unconscious sin of folly; neither the one nor the other has discovered the great plot against the kingdom of God which they are helping to advance; nay, they are often surprised when they see the fruits which ripen on the field that has been wrought by them. The blinded man often aims at the *very opposite* of that which the prince of darkness, whose instrument he is, strives and manages to accomplish by him; in the hands of that prince of this world, parties professedly opposed to him often unwillingly help forward the same cause, and bring about the same victory. In short, there is actually a *providence of evil*, only relative, it is true, and in the end always subject to the absolute providence of God, which, however, stretches far beyond the conscious aims of its human instruments.

Now, the man who has not attained to freedom in Christ, or has fallen back from this freedom into the *bondage* of sin and death, is not merely a slave of his individual sins and sinful infirmities, but becomes, at the same time, a slave and tool of the prince of darkness; he has a price at which he is saleable, and for which the wicked one gets possession of him. He becomes a slave of that power which is at once a seducing, a conscience-accusing, and a corrupting power (corrupting the body as well as the soul, destroying all happiness, recompensing with poison and death). It is the prince of darkness who holds in his hands the power which death exercises over us; who employs the power of spiritual death, of sin, to make man his tool; who employs the power of bodily death to spread death and murder and destruction; who employs the power of guilt to accuse us before God, and, *above all*, *before ourselves*, to rob us of rest, to quench in us the hope of the possibility of grace; who insultingly rejoices to see us condemned before the judgment seat of God. He has, indeed (as Anselm of Canterbury has already shewn in opposition to a false theory of his time), no *legitimate claim* as the seducer to the possession of the seduced; but he exercises a *real objective power* over those who, through their own sin, have surrendered themselves to his power. From him must the Messiah redeem men—and he shewed that he *acknowledged the guilt in the manner in which he removed it.* Men seek to redeem themselves, either by *not at all acknowledging* the guilt and the necessity of a real atonement for the sin, but by trifling away and disowning this last remnant of truth in the sinner—the deposition of an evil conscience—and thus putting a self-invented idol in the place of the

holy God; or, they seek to do this by acknowledging the necessity of an atonement, but setting themselves at the same time to effect this atonement by external works which they regard as meritorious, but which have no foundation to rest on. Christ, by giving himself up to death, has *acknowledged* the guilt and *truly atoned for it;* he has, in one act, atoned for the sinner and judged the sin.

The 15th verse has already been explained above. Something only remains to be said on the words τούτους, ὅσοι. Τούτους does not point backward (as if it were intended to express an antithesis to διάβολος: Christ has taken the power from the *devil*, but *these*—scil. men—he has set free); it evidently points forward to ὅσοι, and is almost equivalent to "those who." Ὅσοι, however, is of course not to be taken in a *restrictive* sense, as if it were denied that all needed this deliverance, but in a *comprehensive* sense: "but those who were always subjects," = "as many as" quotquot. Ὅσοι is similarly used in Acts xiii. 48. The meaning of that passage is: of the Jews (who also were ordained of God to the salvation in Christ) only a small number believed; but of the Gentiles, *as many as* were ordained to salvation believed, *i. e.*, a great number.

Ver. 16.—To the internal proof derived from the nature of things, the author now—in accordance with his former procedure—adds a proof taken from the Old Testament. But it was not necessary here that he should cite a particular passage, it was enough to allude to a generally known fact of the Old Testament. *God has assisted not the angels but the seed of Abraham.** By means of an explicative γάρ, this idea is added as a *further explanation* of the clause beginning with ἵνα, etc. The force of the proof lies precisely in the generality of the idea. On the part of the human race there is the need of redemption, but also the capability of being redeemed; the good angels need no Saviour, the fallen are incapable of being saved (because they are not merely slaves of sin, but wicked rulers in the kingdom of death). But the author, in giving expression to the antithesis evidently implied in οὐκ ἀγγέλων, shews that his object in the 16th verse is not merely to prove positively that the Messiah must of necessity become man, but, *returning to the point from which he set out in ver.* 5, that not the *angels* but *man* has been chosen to be exalted through the Messiah to that glory and honour described in vers. 8 and 10, and *from this* the inference is then indirectly drawn (in ver. 17) that the Son of God must become *man*—not angel.

* The Church Fathers and the theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries supplied a φύσιν to the genitive, and rendered thus: "he has not assumed the nature of angels, but that of the seed of Abraham." Castellio was the first to oppose this monstrous interpretation; after him the Socinians and Arminians. Since 1650 the right interpretation has been the general one.

Seed of Abraham denotes in itself not man, but the theocratic Israel. He, however, who entered into the *species*, entered at the same time into the *genus* to which this species belonged. The expression here is to be understood in a different sense from that in which Paul uses it in Gal. iii. Paul in that passage means by the *seed of Abraham* not the bodily posterity of Abraham into which Christ *entered* by his incarnation, but the spiritual Israel which is *born* of Christ and of which he is the *leader*.

Vers. 17, 18.—In the 17th verse the author first states the amount of what is contained in the argument given in ver. 16. His object was to prove that the New Testament Messiah must needs take part in the human nature; he has appealed in proof of this to the well known Old Testament fact, that God entered into a gracious and covenant relation not with the angels but with the seed of Abraham, consequently that the seed of Abraham stands in need of salvation and is capable of receiving it; he now repeats the quod erat demonstrandum: therefore he (the subject is to be brought down from vers. 14, 15) must be made in all things like to those who (ver. 11–13) are ordained to be exalted through him to be his brethren. The force of the conclusion depends on the idea which has already been expressed, ver. 14, in the sentence beginning with *ἵνα*. The author, however, does not merely close the series of arguments begun in vers. 14–16, but at the same time makes a transition to a *new idea*. He *repeats* the idea already expressed in the words *ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου*, etc., ver. 15, but repeats it so as to open an entirely new perspective. The idea in ver. 14, seq., was this: Christ must become man in order by his death to free us from the power of death and the bondage of Satan—in other words to make atonement for us. Now, however, this idea appears in the new form: Christ must become man, because only thus could he execute the office of a High Priest. In shewing that man is exalted through the Son to the place of sons, and thus made superior to the angels, the author is led to shew the necessity of the incarnation and the atoning sufferings of Christ, *i. e.*, his office as the Redeemer, the high priestly atoner. In this office, the type of Christ is not the מלאך יהוה but the *ἀρχιερεύς*, and thus the author shews in ver. 17 that the New Testament Messiah is exalted above the מלאך יהוה and the angels in general, conclusively and principally on this account, that he *unites to the office of a messenger of God to men that of a priestly representative of men before God*, to the office of a מלאך (*ἀπόστολος* chap. iii. 1) that of an *ἀρχιερεύς*.

This idea is more clearly expressed in the additional clause *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. Hitherto, the Messiah of the New Testament was regarded from that point of view in which like the Old Testament מלאך י״י he was a messenger of God to men; but this does not com-

prehend his whole Messianic office. He is not merely a more perfect messenger of God to men than the Old Testament messenger of the covenant; but he is this, precisely because he is *not merely* the perfect *apostle*, but at *the same time* also the perfect high-priestly representative of men *in their relation to God*, *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. This simple explanation is confirmed by the analogous conjunction of the *apostle* and *high priest*, in the first verse of the next chapter.

Ἐλεήμων is not to be understood as an independent predicate along with *ἀρχιερεύς* as a second predicate, but like *πιστός* belongs as an adjective to *ἀρχιερεύς*. (Otherwise *πιστός* must have been placed after *ἀρχιερεύς*). Further, these two epithets do not express a specific difference, by which Christ, as the compassionate and faithful high priest, is to be distinguished from the Old Testament high priests as unmerciful and unfaithful—the author does not, and indeed cannot enter here on this comparison which he afterwards draws, and in which he shews that Christ was superior to Aaron—but those adjectives are rather to be understood as simple epitheta necessaria. The idea is this: every high priest must, on his part, feel compassion towards those who are represented by him, and on their part again, must enjoy their confidence; now, as the New Testament Messiah must unite with the office of a *messenger* that of a *high priest*, he must also be merciful and faithful, and as this would not be possible if the high priest were not in all things like to his brethren, so must he become like to them in all things. Or more concisely expressed: "He must become like to his brethren in all things—wherefore he was a merciful and faithful high priest for them, in their relation to God."

And he must be a high priest "in order to make atonement for the sins of the people." *Ἱλάσκεσθαι* comes from *ἵλαος*. The idea expressed in *ἵλαος* we will explain by the following observations. God is love; out of love he created the world and its crown, the personal creature. In this act, his love is one with his holiness. In creating man such as he is, in forming him so as that in his inmost nature he is led to love God, and, through the love of God and holiness, to become happy, *and only thus to be capable of happiness* and harmony within himself—in this, God shewed as much his love as his holiness. This might be called the *legislative grace of God* (חן and צדק). But after man had fallen, God did not cease to love him; he loves him still with *saving grace*, Rom. iii. 24. The first act and manifestation of this saving grace consists, however, in this—that God *maintains unimpaired* also in the fallen man that fundamental law of man's nature, according to which he cannot be happy without holiness—does not take conscience from him, in other words, takes *happiness* from him, displays himself as not *propitious* towards him, and turns against him his *wrath*, Rom. i. 18. This is the *con-*

servative, or, which is the same thing, the *chastising* grace of God. The second act of that saving grace consists in the sending of his Son and then his Spirit—in the *saving* grace properly so called (ἔλεος, רַחֲמִים חֲנוּנִים Luke i. 72), and more especially, the justifying and sanctifying (juridical and medicinal) grace. When man does not resist this grace, then it becomes again possible for God to let man taste his friendship, enjoy his blessed presence, and to conduct himself again as propitious towards him. Ἵλαος then denotes not the internal disposition of God towards man, but the actual positive *expression* and *radiation* of that feeling which first becomes again possible towards the redeemed; and ἱλάσκεσθαι means to *make* it again possible for God to be ἵλαος, *i. e.*, actually to expiate actual guilt.

In ver. 18 an explanation is given why the being *compassionate* and *faithful* and, with this, the being *made like to his brethren*, necessarily belongs to the office of the high priest.

First of all, however, it must be settled how this verse is to be construed. Erasmus, Bengel, Storr, Kuinoel, Böhme, and Tholuck take ἐν ᾧ as a simple argumentative particle "because." It is true that it is not a relative limited *temptation* that is here spoken of—it is not "*in as far as* he was tempted, *in so far* is he able to save"—as if Christ was tempted only up to a certain point, and was able to succour only up to a certain point. It is true also, that it is not the aorist ἔπαθεν that is here used. But precisely because it is not the aorist, we think that every obstacle in the way of taking ἐν ᾧ in its proper signification is removed. It is no historical or special statement that is here made, but one of a general kind. It is not: "Christ *was* tempted in certain points but in others not, and in so far as he *was* tempted he has been able to succour;" but it is, "in so far as he *has been* tempted *he can* help," or, to separate the two ideas which are here conjoined: A high priest can help in so far as he has been tempted, and so also can Christ—he therefore must be tempted in all things, in order to be able to help in all things.

But of those critics who rightly and literally translate ἐν ᾧ, some have still had recourse to artificial constructions. Casaubon and others have referred ἐν ᾧ not to πειρασθείς but to πέπονθε; "in that which he has suffered, and suffered as one who was tempted, he is able to help those who are tempted." Here the πειρασθείς becomes an accessary idea, while it evidently stands parallel with πειραζομένοις as a principal idea. Bleek takes the words ἐν ᾧ πέπονθεν as a relative clause dependent on πειρασθείς: "as one who was tempted, namely, in the things in which he had to suffer, he is able to help those who are tempted;" but it is difficult to see either what necessity there was for this accessary idea in the relative clause, or

why the relative clause should have been placed first, or what is to be made of the *αὐτός*. The idea which Bleek thus obtains would in Greek be expressed thus: *πειρασθεὶς γὰρ ἐν ᾧ πέπονθεν, δύναται*, etc.

The only natural construction is that which refers *ἐν ᾧ* directly to *πειρασθείς*, which is placed after precisely for the sake of emphasis. Quibus in rebus tentatus ipse (est et) passus est, iis tentatos potest adjurare. The *πειραζομένοις* stands opposite to the *πειρασθείς*, and the *βοηθῆναι* to the *πέπονθεν*. With *grammatical* exactness the sentence would be expressed thus: "In all things Jesus could help those, who were tempted (in those things), in which being tempted, he has suffered;" so that *ἐν ᾧ* belongs to *πειρασθείς*, and *ἐν τούτῳ* to be supplied belongs to *δύναται*. *Logically ἐν ᾧ* refers also of course to *πέπονθεν*, and *ἐν τούτῳ* also to *πειραζομένοις*, so that the parallelism becomes perfect. For as Christ was tempted precisely through suffering, and suffered in the being tempted, so it is evident that he "has suffered" in the same respects in which he was "tempted." And again, he who succours one who is tempted, just helps him to overcome the temptation; the helping, therefore, refers just to those things in which the state of *being tempted* manifests itself.

In this 18th verse we have the deepest internal ground on which the doctrine of the *vicarious satisfaction of Christ* is based. How true and scriptural soever the dogma is, it cannot be denied that in the ecclesiastico-scholastic development of it, the depths of the Scripture doctrine were far from being thoroughly penetrated. The view taken by the scholastics of the middle ages and those of the evangelical school, was, for the most part, merely the juridical. They thought of the multitude of single human *individuals* together with the *individual* Jesus, standing as it were upon one level before the Judge. Those individuals have each a debt which they cannot pay; that individual Jesus pays the debt for all the others. The inadequacy of this representation lies not in the idea of the objective substitution as such, but in this,—that no inquiry is made into the ground of the *possibility* of this substitution, that the substitute is viewed merely as an individual beside individuals, consequently as absolutely *another* and *different* person from them, as this particular individual. Our author teaches us to look deeper than this, when in vers. 10–18 he closely connects the necessity of the incarnation with that of the substitutionary high-priestly sufferings; he teaches us to regard man not as a *mass of individuals*, but as one *organism*, as a tree, so to speak, which has grown out of one root, out of Adam. In the man Jesus, the pure and ripe fruit of humanity, so to speak, has stood before God—a fruit, however, which has not *developed* itself out of the race of Adam, but was *given* to this race, *engrafted* upon the diseased tree—and thus in Jesus the *organism of man* has

done all that was required to be done. But though this fruit did not *develope* itself out of the diseased life of the diseased tree, it was yet necessary that it should grow upon this tree ; by the incarnation of Christ a *sound branch* was engrafted on the tree, which, as a branch of the tree bore blossom and fruit, so that blossom and fruit, although not products of the life-power of this tree, still in reality belong to it. But, to speak without metaphor, the proto-adamitic humanity could not *beget* a sinless man, but it could *receive* the Son of God becoming man and sinless man, so that he *as a real member of this race*, partaking in its nature and in the consequences of death, could bear the fruit, nay could be himself the fruit, which the race ought to have borne. Accordingly it is manifest that what is here spoken of is not merely a vicarious passive satisfaction, but chiefly a vicarious active satisfaction, which again forms the basis of the passive satisfaction.

PART SECOND.

THE SON AND MOSES.

(iii.—iv.)

From what is said in chap. ii. 17, 18, the author might have proceeded forthwith to the comparison of the New Testament Messiah as the perfect High Priest, with the imperfect High Priest of the old covenant. But after a brief recapitulation in chap. iii. 1, of what is proved in the preceding, namely, that Christ unites the office of a *high priest* with that of a perfect *messenger* of God to men, he suddenly breaks off in ver. 2 into a *comparison of Christ with Moses.* This is not the result of caprice, but of an intrinsic necessity.

First, the place held by the organs of the Old Testament covenant themselves, rendered it necessary that he should pass first of all to Moses. The instruments employed in the *institution* of the law were not the מלאך and Aaron, but the מלאך and Moses. Not till the third line of succession did the permanent office of the high priest appear. Then secondly, the intrinsic suitableness of the above arrangement of the principal parts, depends on the *carrying out of the second part itself.* The manner in which this second part is carried out is exactly parallel with the arrangement of the first part, so that the author also at the end of the second part (iv. 10), recurs again to the idea of the *high priest.* And thus, after having been conducted from the two terminal points to this idea as the *central idea* of the Messianic office, he can then proceed—in a third part—to develope this acknowledged central idea (chap. v.).

The angel of the covenant appeared in the name of God before the people of Israel, Moses in the name of Israel before God, the high priest stood in the name of God (with the name *Jehovah* on the front of his mitre) before Israel, and in the name of Israel (with the names of the twelve tribes on the breast-plate) before God (Ex. xxviii. 9–29, and 36–38).

Now the New Testament Messiah is, according to chap i. 2, superior to the angels, *a*, because in himself as the Son he is higher than the angels, and *b*, because in him also, the whole human race is

exalted above the angels to dominion in the coming world (*οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα*,) and this because the Messiah is not merely מלאך, but at the same time *ἀρχιερεύς*, not merely the messenger of God to man, but, at the same time the atoning priestly representative of man before God.

With this, now, the second part runs quite parallel. The fundamental thesis iii. 3 : *for this man was counted worthy of more glory than Moses*, is, even in respect of form, evidently analogous to the fundamental thesis of the first part, i. 4 : *being made so much better than the angels*. The New Testament Messiah is superior to Moses, because, *a*, as a Son in the house (iii. 6) he is superior to *the mere servant* of the house (comp. with iii. 5, *θεράπων*, chap. i. 14, *λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα*), and, *b*, because the work of conducting Israel to its rest, which Moses had not completed, was first completed by him (chap. iv. 1, seq.). This work Christ has accomplished, in virtue of his not having been merely a Moses, a leader and lawgiver, but at the same time an atoning representative, a high priest (chap. iv. 14, seq.)

But so exact is the parallelism between these two parts even in minute details, that as the two sections of the first part, so also those of the second, are separated from each other by an intermediate passage of a hortatory kind :

I. THE SON AND THE ANGELS.	II. THE SON AND MOSES.
a, The Son of God is, in himself, superior to the *ministering spirits* of God, i. 5–14.	*a*, The *Son* of the house of Israel is, in himself, superior to the *servant* of this house, iii. 1–6.
(*Hortatory passage*, ii. 1–5.)	(*Hortatory passage*, iii. 7–19.)
b, In him *man* is raised above the angels, ii. 6–16. *For:* he was *at the same time high priest.*	*b*, In him *Israel* is conducted to its rest, iv. 1–13. *Therefore:* he was *at the same time high priest*, iv. 14–16.

SECTION FIRST.

THE NEW TESTAMENT MESSIAH IS IN HIMSELF, AS SON, SUPERIOR TO MOSES.

(iii. 1–6.)

Vers. 1, 2, form the transition. This transition takes the form of an exhortation. This exhortation, however, is not, as some have thought, connected by means of the *πιστός*, iii. 2, with the idea ex-

pressed in the πιστός, ii. 17; for in chap. ii. 17, πιστός denotes one who is the object of another's confidence, the "trustworthy," while in iii. 2, it denotes active "faithfulness;" the link of connexion is rather in the words ἀπόστολος and ἀρχιερεύς, in which the substance of the train of thought in chap. i.–ii. is recapitulated, in order from this point to proceed further. Κατανοεῖν does not mean to lay anything to heart, but to submit anything to the νόησις, to consider, to weigh. The more proximate object of this verb is Ἰησοῦν, which, however, is already provided with the attribute τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερέα τῆς ὁμολογίας ἡμῶν. Its more remote object are the words πιστὸν ὄντα, etc. "Consider the (this) messenger of God and high priest of our profession Jesus, (*as him*) who is faithful in his house to him who appointed him, as Moses was faithful." The attribute *messenger and high priest*, etc., thus serves to *recapitulate* the attributes which the readers *already knew* to belong to Jesus; the appositional clause *who was faithful*, etc., serves to introduce a new attribute which is now predicated of Jesus, and which is henceforth to be the object of their attentive consideration. The imperative κατανοήσατε does not, however, in this context involve an *independent practical exhortation* which flows from the theoretical passage chap. ii., but a mere charge to the readers now immediately to accompany the author to a new idea.

But this charge, at the same time, certainly implies the *moral* duty of laying permanently to heart what is further to be said. This is evident from the manner in which it is introduced, *holy brethren, partakers of the heavenly calling*. On the idea expressed by ἅγιος see chap. ii. 11. The mention of the *heavenly calling* entirely corresponds, in the place it occupies here, with the mention of the *so great salvation* in chap. ii. 3. The motive to the earnest consideration and heed which is enjoined, lies in the excellent and heavenly character of the object which is to be considered. By the κλῆσις is meant the calling explained in chap. ii. 6–8 to the dominion in the οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα. It is idle to enquire, whether this *calling* is designated *heavenly* because it proceeds from heaven, or because it calls and conducts to heaven. The two things are inseparable. A calling that comes forth from heaven to man, has, eo ipso, for its *object and import* the relation of man to heaven. Moreover, what is spoken of here specially is that call which has come to men through the eternal Son himself, the incarnate one, who has come from heaven, and which invites men to become *children*, fellow heirs with him of the heavenly inheritance. He who is a *partaker* of this calling, that is, in whose ears soever this call has been sounded, is thereby laid under obligation attentively to consider and give heed to all the elements of this *calling*.

Let us now consider more particularly the attribute "the apos-

tle and high priest of our confession" (*τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερέα τῆς ὁμολογίας ἡμῶν*). Jesus is called *ἀπόστολος*, from the analogous relation in which he stands to the מלאך יי as *messenger of God to men*, *ἀρχιερεύς*, from the analogy between him and the כֹּהֵן הַגָּדוֹל *as representative of men before God*. This signification of *ἀπόστολος*, following so simply from chap. i.–ii. would certainly not have been missed, although the author had written *ἄγγελος* instead. It is, however, easy to see why he was not at liberty to use *ἄγγελος*. In the Old Testament מלאך there lies a double signification,—first, the etymological appellative, according to which it means messenger, and according to which whosoever held the place and office of a messenger of God to men might be called מלאך ; and, secondly, the usual gentile signification according to which it means *angel*, and denotes only a certain *kind or class* of beings (viz. the angels). Now it is true that these two significations belong also to the Greek word *ἄγγελος* (comp. 1 Tim. iii. 16, where *ἄγγελος*, *messenger*, is used of the disciples). But after the author had in chap. i.–ii. used throughout the word *ἄγγελος* in its gentile sense, to denote the *species* angel in opposition to the human species, he could not well, without causing confusion, apply the same word to denote the mere *vocation* of a messenger of God. After having in chap. i.–ii. so strongly urged that Jesus has perfectly and absolutely fulfilled the calling of a messenger of God, just in virtue of his not belonging to the species *ἄγγελοι*, it was necessary that here, when he again ascribes to Jesus that calling, the office of a messenger of God, he should choose a word which expresses only the appellative, and not at the same time also the gentile sense of מלאך, a word which might without ambiguity be rendered only by "messenger," and not at the same time by "angel." For this, no better, and generally speaking no other word offered itself than *ἀπόστολος*, formed from the verb *ἀποστέλλειν*, which is so often employed by John (iii. 34, v. 36, vi. 29, x. 36, xx. 21), and elsewhere also in the New Testament (for example, Gal. iv. 4), as the *technical term* for the sending of the Son into the world.

All the difficulties which critics have hitherto found in the expression *ἀπόστολος*, from their not observing the relation of chap. i.–ii to chap iii.–iv., thus fall of themselves to the ground, and we are also saved the trouble of considering one by one, and refuting the many unsuitable explanations of *ἀπόστολος* that have been given. Some have expressed their surprise that Jesus should be placed on the same level with his Apostles—but it is the sending of Christ by the Father that is here spoken of, not the sending of the twelve by Christ, and consequently, not the special signification of the word *ἀπόστολος* as the official name of the twelve. Others thought that the author should rather have said *προφήτης* or *διάκονος*, but the

analogy of the office of Jesus to that of the "angel of Jehovah" could be expressed neither by προφήτης nor by διάκονος. A third class sought to explain the idea expressed in ἀπόστολος by that of the ὁμολογία, or (as Olshausen) by that of the κλῆσις; a fourth, to which Bleek belongs, thought that Jesus is called ἀπόστολος on account of his analogous relation to Moses, etc., etc. Even the signification "high priest" was contended for by some, because, in a passage of the Talmud, the high priest is on a single occasion called שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין!

The genitive τῆς ὁμολογίας ἡμῶν has for its object, simply to distinguish Jesus as the New Testament messenger of God and high priest, from the Old Testament מלאך יי and הכהן. He is the ἀπ. and ἀρχ. of *our* confession. This does not require that with Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calovius, Storr, etc., we should grammatically resolve the genitive into the clause ὃν ὁμολογοῦμεν. The same sense is obtained without this procedure, if we take the genitive simply as expressing the idea of "belonging to." The messenger of God *belonging to* our confession is thereby also the *object* of our confession. The rendering of ὁμολογία by "covenant," which some have proposed is contrary to the grammatical usage.

Let us proceed now to the appositional sentence ver. 2, in which is specified the *new* quality and office to which the attentive consideration of the reader is to be directed, πιστὸν ὄντα, etc. Ποιεῖν here, as in Acts ii. 36; Mark iii. 14, is used to express not the calling into *existence*, but the appointing to an *office*, here the office of Messiah, which is represented under the figure of the establishment and government of a household. In this his office Jesus was faithful to him who had called him to this office.

The words ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ are referred by Chrysostom, Theophylact, Böhme, Kuinoel, and De Wette to the words ὡς καὶ Μωϋσῆς, so that no comma is placed after Μωϋσῆς, and the sense is as follows: "Jesus was faithful to him who appointed him, as also Moses was faithful in all his house. The genitive αὐτοῦ can, in this case, be referred either to Moses, or to Jesus, or (as the majority are of opinion) to God. But this construction appears unnatural, especially when we compare it with vers. 5, 6, where the idea is more fully brought out, that as Moses in his (Moses') house was faithful as a *servant*, so, in like manner, was Jesus faithful in his (Jesus') house as a *son*. We, therefore, with Calvin, Seb. Schmidt, Paulus, Bleek, and others, place a comma after Μωϋσῆς, and refer the words ἐν ὅλῳ, etc., to πιστὸν ὄντα. "Who is faithful in his house to him who appointed him, in like manner as Moses was." *Logically*, the sentence would, of course, have to be extended thus: Ἰησοῦς πιστός ἐστιν τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτὸν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ, ὡς καὶ Μωϋσῆς πιστὸς ἦν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ.—The genitive αὐτοῦ is already, on account of the parallel accusative αὐτόν, not to be referred to God, but to be

taken in the *reflexive* sense. Christ was faithful in his (Christ's) house, as Moses in his (Moses' house). Only, the difference between the two houses is not yet *urged* here. All that is meant to be said is, that each was faithful in the sphere of office assigned to him. Hence also the genitive is not a gen. possess., according to which, the house of Christ would be represented as Christ's *property*, and the house of Moses as the *property* of Moses—this would, indeed, be in contradiction to ver. 5, where it is plainly said that Moses was not lord but only servant in his house—but the genitive *αὐτοῦ* is (just as in the words *ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ*, ver. 5) merely a genitive of *appertainment or locality*. "His house" signifies "the house to which he belonged, in which he was placed."

What house, or what two houses, are here meant will more particularly appear in ver. 5, seq. In the meantime, the simple answer will suffice with reference both to Moses and Christ, that the author had in his mind the בֵּית־יִשְׂרָאֵל, house of Israel.

Ver. 3.—As the author in chap. i. 4 introduced the principal theme of the first part in the form of an appendix, an apposition, so here, he introduces the principal theme of the second part in like manner, in the form of an appendix, namely, an *explanation*. Γάρ is not argumentative; for the statement that Christ excelled Moses in *glory*, contains no argument for the statement that he was like him in faithfulness. Γάρ is explicative; it is not, however, the idea in ver. 2 that is explained, but a new motive is adduced for the exhortation in ver. 1. So much the more must the relation of Jesus to Moses be considered and laid to heart, as Jesus excelled Moses in *honour* (whom he resembled in faithfulness, ver. 2).

Ἠξίωται.—The *subject* here is, no more than in chap. i., the Son of God as pre-existent logos, but here, as there, the Son of God manifest, incarnate. The author does not set out from the eternity of Christ, and come down to his incarnation, but sets out from his historical appearance upon earth, and ascends from this to his eternal being with the Father (ver. 4). Here, first of all, it is predicated of the human historical person of the New Testament Messiah, Jesus, that he has been counted worthy by the Father of higher honour than Moses. *Wherein this higher honour consisted*, it was not necessary for the author to bring to the remembrance of his readers. This had already been done implicitly in chap. ii. 9, 10. Moses has not risen again, Moses has not ascended to heaven, Moses has not been crowned as *leader*, the first-fruits in the kingdom of exalted and glorified humanity; Moses, in the transfiguration of Christ, rather took a subordinate place next to Christ. All this was so familiar and so clear, that the author could feel satisfied in laying down the proposition, that Christ has been counted worthy of

higher honour than Moses, as one which would be unquestioned by all his readers. (And what an argument have we in this silence for the historic truth of the evangelical history)!—But *upon what this elevation to higher honour was founded*, the author proceeds to mention in the words καθ' ὅσον πλείονα τιμὴν ἔχει τοῦ οἴκου ὁ κατασκευάσας αὐτόν. It is founded on this, that Christ was the incarnate eternal Son, he by whom are all things, by whom also the house of Israel, the theocracy, was established. The train of thought thus runs exactly parallel with that of chap. i. The train of thought in the 4th verse of that chapter we found to be this: Jesus the incarnate, was (after his sufferings) made higher than the angels, because he is the incarnate eternal *Son*.

The καθ' ὅσον is to be explained precisely in the same way as the similar, ἐν ᾧ ii. 18. The author does not mean to say that Christ is superior to Moses only in a certain respect, or only in a certain degree; he does not mean to deny that Christ *is absolutely* superior to Moses; in short, he does not intend to limit the thesis, *Christ has more honour;* but he draws out the three logical propositions of which the proof of this thesis consists—the *universal* or major proposition: "the founder of a household has more honour than the household founded by him"—the *particular* or minor: "Christ was founder of the household to which Moses belonged as a part or member"—and lastly, the conclusion: "therefore Christ has more honour than Moses." Or to express this in one sentence: "Christ has so much the more honour than Moses, by how much the founder of a household has more honour than the household founded by him." The καθ' ὅσον thus serves merely to compare a particular case with a general principle.

We have, in this explanation—following the Peshito, Chrys., Theodoret, Calvin, Beza, Erasmus, Capellus, Bengel, Bleek, Olshausen, etc.—understood the genitive τοῦ οἴκου as the genitivus comparativus, and referred it to πλείονα. The conclusion thus arrived at may, however, appear unwarranted, as the intermediate idea, namely, that Moses was a part of the *house* itself, seems to be not so easily supplied. Many, indeed (with the Vulg., comp. Luther, Michaelis, Heumann, Semler, Ernesti, Paulus) have appealed to ver. 5, where Moses is spoken of not as part of the house, but as θεράπων in the *house*, and have therefore construed τοῦ οἴκου as dependent on the verb ἔχει, and rendered thus: "by how much more honour from the house the founder of it has," where we must supply: "than the servant in it." But this supplement is exceedingly harsh, and all the more so, as the idea that Moses took the place of a *servant* has not yet come before us. Besides, it is not even true to say, that Jesus bore so much honour in, or from the house of Israel; for, from the house of Israel in which he was placed, he bore nothing

but shame and contempt; he had his *honour* not from the house but from the Father. But, finally, the text gives not the slightest occasion for this forced construction. Let it be observed that the author does not speak of the building (*οἰκοδομεῖν*), but of the *κατασκευάζειν* of a house. The *κατασκευάζειν*, the founding and equipment of a house, comprehends not merely the setting up of the stones and beams, but also the entire regulation of the *household;* the *οἰκοδομεῖν* is an act of the builder, and the *οἶκος οἰκοδομούμενος* is the aedificium; on the other hand, the *κατασκευάζειν* is an act of the young husband or householder, who not only builds or causes to be built an aedificium, but sets up a familia in it, and the *οἶκος κατασκευαζόμενος* is the *household;* hence *οἶκος* here may be translated "household." But that Moses belonged to the *household* of God was no far-fetched idea, an idea to which the subsequent designation of Moses as a *θεράπων* is nowise contradictory, but which rather confirms and explains it.

Ver. 4.—The further explanation which is added in ver. 4 by a *γάρ* is somewhat strange. It is impossible that the design of this can be, to bring before the readers the two trivial ideas, that every house is built by some one, and that God is the creator of all things. Wherefore such undisputed truisms in this connexion? The contents of ver. 4 must evidently rather be fitted in to the reasoning, and must form a necessary organic member of the argument. One would expect a priori to find in ver. 4 the minor proposition, that Christ was in reality the *founder.* And, indeed, all the more ancient theologians explained the ver. in this sense. In support of it, the absence of the article *θεός* has been urged, and *θεός* taken as a predicate. The proposition contained in the words *ὁ δὲ τὰ πάντα κατασκευάσας θεός* (scil. *ἐστιν*) would accordingly not be declaratory, but descriptive, not an answer to the question: *who* he is who has founded all things, but an answer to the question, *what* he is who has founded all things. It would be said that Christ who has founded all things is God, that divinity belongs to him.

But there are weighty objections against this interpretation. What is desiderated as the explanation of ver. 3, is not the statement that Christ as the founder of all things is God, or an answer to the question whether he is God or a mere man, but that Christ is related to the *house of Israel* as its founder. Moreover, the substitution of *all things* in this verse for the house of Israel, ver. 3, would be a doubly perplexing interruption to the train of thought. But above all, the words *ὁ δὲ πάντα κατασκευάσας* viewed as the *subject*, would, in this context, be an exceedingly *indefinite* designation of the person of Jesus, as thus, between ver. 3 and ver. 4, those necessary middle terms would be entirely wanting. And, moreover, it would be impossible to perceive in this case what could be intended

by the preceding statement, *every house is founded by some man;* this would only have meaning on the supposition that the author's intention was to represent both Moses and Christ as *founders* of houses, and, accordingly, to represent only the houses themselves as differing in honour. This he certainly *might* have done (for Moses might quite properly be considered as the founder of the Old Testament economy); this, however, he has not done, but rather has farther carried out in vers. 5, 6, the opposition introduced at ver. 4 between Christ as the *son* of the house, and Moses as the *servant.* If, then, we would not bring total confusion into the author's train of thought, we must depart from that interpretation, and determine with Olshausen, etc., to understand θεός as the subject (the article, it is well known, is often wanting at θεός), and ὁ πάντα κατασκευάσας as the predicate. "He, who has founded all things, is God."

The old difficulty, however, here recurs—what these apparently trivial statements have to do in this context. Meanwhile, their purport and significance becomes clear, *when we understand ver.* 4 *not as an explanation of ver.* 3 *alone, but of vers.* 2, 3 *taken together.* In ver. 2, the faithfulness of Christ towards him who had appointed him was spoken of, and then in ver. 3, Christ was called the κατασκευάσας τὸν οἶκον. This might appear to involve a contradiction. It might be asked: how can Christ have been a faithful *curator* if he filled the place of a *master and founder?* Now the author shews in ver. 4, that the one does not exclude the other, that it is true every house has a founder, but that above all such founders God ever stands, consequently that Christ, *although* κατασκευάσας, *was yet in a situation in which he might exercise faithfulness towards one still superior to him.**

In vers. 5, 6 there follows a second proof of the thesis laid down in ver. 3, namely, that Jesus is superior to Moses. It was said quite generally in ver. 2, that Christ was faithful in his house (*i. e.*, the house entrusted to him), as also Moses was faithful in his house (*i. e.*, the house entrusted to him). *Nothing was determined in ver.* 2 as to whether the house entrusted to Christ is identical with the house entrusted to Moses. There is not a single word to indicate that two different houses were meant, so that it was still in ver. 2 left open to the reader to understand *one* house as meant, which had been entrusted for administration first to Moses, and subsequently, to Christ. The sole difference which as yet, namely at ver. 3, has been spoken of is, that Christ in the house entrusted to him filled

* Similarly, but less exactly, Bleek: God is indeed the *proper* κατασκευάσας, the primus autor, but still the place of a κατασκευάσας belongs also to Christ. This is inaccurate. What is meant to be said in ver. 4, is not that a kind of κατασκευάζειν might be predicated of Christ although *his Father* was the κατασκευάσας but that the *being faithful* might be predicated of Christ although he was the κατασκευάσας.

the place of the κατασκευάσας, but Moses that of a part of the familia. And herein lay the first proof of the greater *honour* of Jesus.—A second proof of this is now adduced, namely, a second point of comparison or difference, so stated, however, that the first is again repeated along with it. Now also in vers. 5, 6, the two *houses* themselves are distinctly represented as two different houses; in the one house, Moses serves *for a testimony of the future revelations of God* (so that this house itself exists εἰς μαρτύριον), the other house, the house of Christ *are we;* the other οἶκος is a *living* house, built of *living* stones. Thus there is a twofold difference which appears in vers. 5, 6; to the difference in the place occupied by the two *curators* is added the difference in the dignity of the *houses themselves.* Moses is θεράπων in the house committed to his care, and this house is of a *typical* nature; Christ is υἱός in the house committed to his care, and this house is a *living* house, composed of *living* stones. (Olshausen gives the train of thought in like manner thus: "Moses is a servant in the tabernacle, but Christ is lord over the new temple").

This second proof, taken from the essential nature of the Old and the New Testament economy, bears the same relation to the first proof which was drawn from the abstract dignity of the persons, as (in chap. i. vers. 7–12) the proof drawn from the essential nature of angelic revelations bears to that drawn from the name *angel* and *Son* (vers. 5, 6). Here, however, in this passage, as has been already observed, the first proof is at the same time recapitulated. The designation of Moses as a *servant*, explains in what respect Moses belonged to the *house* (according to ver. 3) and formed a part of it (of the familia); in the designation of Christ as a son, a son of the house, are comprehended the two statements in ver. 3 and ver. 4, namely, that Christ in relation to the *house* filled the superior place of the *founder*, but that nevertheless in relation to *God*, he occupied the subordinate place of a *faithful* fulfiller of the Divine commands. Both these are involved in the idea of the *son of the house*—the superiority over the familia, and the inferiority to the Father as the supreme lord of the house.

Many commentators, however, have been of opinion, that a third antithesis between Christ and Moses is indicated in these two verses, namely, between αὐτοῦ, ver. 5, and αὐτοῦ, ver. 6. Either the second of these words was read αὑτοῦ, in which case αὑτοῦ, ver. 5, as the direct antithesis of αὐτοῦ, ver. 6, would have to be rendered by *ejus* and referred to God, and *could* not be taken in a reflexive sense—or else (so Bleek), while the reading αὐτοῦ was retained in both places, in the former it was rendered by *ejus*, in the latter by *suus.* The meaning was held to be, that Moses was a servant in the house of God as a house *not his own*, but Christ a son in *his own* house.—

First of all, it is evident that in reality no new idea results from this; for if Moses was a servant and Christ the son, it is implied in this that the house in which Moses exercised his office was not in the same sense *his* house, as the house of Christ was *Christ's* house. The only question is, whether the author when he wrote αυτου, αυτου meant, by means of these two genitives, to *express* and *give emphasis* to this idea which was *already apparent* without them. We think this question must be answered decidedly in the negative. Had the author meant this, he must at least have used the emphatic ἑαυτοῦ at ver. 6, and not have left the choice of the spiritus asper or lenis to chance, or the caprice of the reader. But even a mere ἑαυτοῦ at ver. 6 would not be sufficient for this. At ver. 5 the idea of *not his own* would necessarily have to be expressed positively and explicitly, not merely implicitly by an αὐτοῦ (in itself, moreover, ambiguous, and capable of being understood reflexively); it must have been said distinctly that Moses was servant in a house *not his own*. Of all this, the author has said nothing and indicated nothing. But finally, in addition to this, that interpretation would involve us in a positive difficulty. If the author means to say, that Moses acted in God's house as a house not his own, but Christ in God's house as his own paternal house, this would imply that the house in which Moses acted is *presupposed as identical* with that in which Christ acted. This, however, would do away with that second point of difference on which the author purposely lays special emphasis in vers. 5, 6. His design, evidently, is to distinguish the house of Christ "which we are," as one different from that in which Moses served, εἰς μαρτύριον τῶν λαληθησομένων.

All these considerations lead us to the conclusion, that no such opposition is intended between αὐτοῦ, ver. 5, and αὐτοῦ, ver. 6, as would represent the house of Moses as one not belonging to him, ver. 5, and the house of Christ, ver. 6, as his own property. We understand αὐτοῦ in both places reflexively and precisely in the same sense as at ver. 3, the genitive being neither with respect to Moses or Christ a gen. possessoris, but only a genitive of relation in both cases. Moses was faithful as a *servant* in his house, *i. e*, in the house the care of which was enjoined upon him, Christ as a *son* in his house, *i. e.*, in the house the care of which was enjoined upon him. The difference in the place occupied by both is first expressed in the words θεράπων and υἱός.

This entirely new idea in vers. 5, 6 is introduced by καί—μέν, and is thus connected with what is said in ver. 2, so as to appear to be a limitation of what is there said. In ver. 2 it was said that both Christ and Moses, each in the house committed to his management, were faithful. In vers. 5, 6 it is shewn what differences obtained in respect to this.

The words θεράπων and υἱός in which the first difference (already specified in ver. 3) is repeated, need no further explanation than they have already received. On the other hand, we must consider more particularly those words in which the new, the second difference, that which obtains between the *houses*, is represented—namely, the words εἰς μαρτύριον τῶν λαληθησομένων and οὗ οἶκός ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς. Λαληθησόμενα does not, as some expositors have unaccountably explained it, denote those revelations which Moses was still further to receive. This explanation could only have any meaning, if in the context, mention was made of a certain period in the life of Moses from which the "still further" was to be reckoned. The word rather denotes those revelations (on this wide sense of λαλεῖν comp. what what is said on chap. i. 1) which God proposed to give *after the time of Moses;* in particular, the revelation in Christ is meant. The whole office and service of Moses was comprised in laying down *a testimony*, which pointed to the necessity of a future, more perfect, revelation of God.—To what extent was this testimony given? The author himself replies to this in the subsequent chapters of the epistle. At present, we may be allowed to make only the following observations. Through Moses God gave his law, first the ten commandments, and then the law respecting the tabernacle and sacrifices. The ten commandments, even in the Pentateuch itself, bore the name of the *testimony* (עֵדוּת), and they were to be deposited in the ark of the covenant, in the presence of God, as a testimony bearing witness before God against the sins of the people. But that the holy and righteous anger of God might not be provoked by the sight of the testimony to visit the people with just punishment, that testimony must be *covered* (כָּפַר) before the eye of God; and for this the golden mercy-lid (כַּפֹּרֶת) alone was not sufficient, but God's eye must ever rest on the blood of the propitiatory sacrifices, sprinkled with which the mercy-lid could then only truly "cover" the sins of Israel. But the necessity of always from time to time offering these propitiatory sacrifices anew, *testified* most clearly that those animal sacrifices could not take away guilt, and that a future more perfect priest and sacrifice was necessary. Thus was the service of Moses, and at the same time also, the *house* itself in which Moses ministered—the tabernacle—*a testimony of the things that were afterwards to be spoken.* Grammatically, indeed, the words εἰς μαρτύριον belong, of course, not to οἴκῳ but to θεράπων. But logically, they are placed so as to form the antithesis to the words οὗ οἶκός ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς. If Moses as lawgiver and builder of the tabernacle served *for a testimony*, this implies that the entire tabernacle itself existed *for a testimony.* It was not yet the true perfect house in which God could truly dwell with men, but was a dead, a symbolical, house in which was represented the relative approximation be-

tween God and the people of Israel which was preliminarily possible, and in which was *testified* the necessity of a more perfect revelation and atonement.

Christ's house on the contrary *are we*. (Comp. Eph. ii. 19–22; 1 Pet. ii. 5).—The reading ὃς οἶκος is not warranted critically, but would yield the same sense. The absence of the article at οἶκος is analogous to the passages Luke x. 29; Heb. xi. 10; LXX. Ps. cxliv. 15, and is explained by the unconscious style of expression peculiar to the native Hebrew, who would think the noun sufficiently determined by the accompanying genitive. It is quite as unnecessary, therefore, as incorrect and contrary to the sense, to render the words: "a house of him are we," as if the author meant to ascribe more than one house to Christ, one identical with that of Moses (!) and another besides. No, the one and the only house of Christ is the true, New Testament Israel, and this is meant to be expressly *distinguished* from that house in which Moses served *for a testimony*, etc.

The threefold difference between Christ and Moses, vers. 5, 6, entirely corresponds, in the arrangement of the epistle, to the threefold difference between Christ and the angels, chap. i. 7–12.

The limitation expressed in the words ἐάν περ τὴν παῤῥησίαν, etc., forms the transition of the exhortation in vers. 7–19 (which, again, in the place it occupies, corresponds to that exhortation, in chap. ii. 1–4, which stands between the two sections of the first part, inasmuch as it comes in between the two sections of the second part). This limitation is not necessary to the completion of what is said in ver. 5. The house of Christ is *in itself, objectively*, and in its very nature—not conditionally upon our continuing faithful—different from the house of Moses, as a living house; it has this superiority unconditioned. But whether the author can *express* this in itself unconditional superiority under the *subjective* form: "whose house are we"—whether he must not rather say: "whose house are *Christians* (to which class, however), *you* do not belong"—this depends on whether the readers of the epistle continue in the *confidence* and in the *rejoicing of the hope*.—Παῤῥησία is nothing else than the πίστις itself in its most direct and most practical expression, manifesting itself as the inward power of the peace which dwells in the heart, in circumstances of outward difficulty. While, therefore, ἡδονή denotes rather that felt gladness and joy the experience of which is awakened within a man by means of favourable circumstances *from without*, παῤῥησία is precisely the reverse, and denotes that joyful boldness which flows *from within* and is victorious over *unfavourable* circumstances; it is joyfulness felt in situations in which *others would despair;* hence it is the immediate fruit of the objective peace obtained with God through the atonement. But why does the

author so emphatically require the maintenance of this παῤῥησία? If we compare the admonitions in chap. ii. 1–4, iii. 7–19, vi. 1, seq., etc., we find in them all, earnest warnings not so much against direct apostacy, as against the *neglect of the doctrine that the institutions of the old covenant have found their fulfilment in the new covenant and by it are made superfluous.* The readers do not appear to have been already suffering persecution, but as likely soon to encounter dangers and persecutions. Now, in the introduction (to chap. i. 1) we have found it to be probable, that the Epistle to the Hebrews is not an epistle properly so called, and was not addressed to a church, but is a treatise intended for a circle of Jews who were about to pass over to Christianity, perhaps, according to chap. vi., in part already baptized, but who were still *catechumens*, and were now, through fear of being excommunicated from the temple, and the temple worship, in danger of being estranged and turned aside from their resolution to become Christians, because, namely, they had not yet accustomed themselves to regard the Old Testament institutions as things that might be *dispensed* with, and had not yet been able to convince themselves that they were *superfluous.* Hence the author everywhere shews, how all that is peculiar to the Old Testament is inferior in excellence and in internal significance to the New Testament revelation in Christ, and is related to it merely as the imperfect, the typical, is related to the perfect fulfilment. The same circumstance also accounts for the regular alternation of purely doctrinal and purely hortatory passages, such as we find in none of the *epistles* properly so called. Perhaps also, it would not be too bold in us to explain the words μέχρι τέλους—which some have most unsuitably referred to the end of the world, and others, better, to the death of the individual—as referring rather to the end of the *crisis of decision* in which the readers were placed at that time. For, if he only were truly a stone in the house of God who had held fast his *confidence* until death, then none of the living would be at liberty to regard themselves as such. It occurs to me therefore, that the author intends rather to say, that the readers would only then have a right to consider themselves as belonging to the house of Christ when they had kept the παῤῥησία *to the conclusion, i. e.,* until the final resolution were taken to go over to Christianity.

The second thing in which they are to continue steadfast is the καύχημα τῆς ἐλπίδος. The Jews also had a καύχημα; they boasted of their descent from Abraham (John viii.), of their temple and priesthood, of their being the chosen people of God, all palpable and manifest advantages. The poor Christians had nothing of the kind in which they could glory. Regarded by the Gentiles as a Jewish sect, by the Jews as apostates from the people of Israel, forming no state, no people, without rulers, without a head except

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

one who was crucified, the refuse and off-scouring of the people, they had nothing of which to boast but the glory which they hoped to receive. Since that period the same has been substantially true of Christians. Hence, it is their duty now, as it was then, to hold fast the hope in which they glory.

INTERMEDIATE PASSAGE OF A HORTATORY KIND.

(iii. 7–19).

In vers. 7–19 follows the *exhortation* itself, for which we are prepared by what is said at the end of ver. 6. The particle *διό* closely connects it with ver. 6. Because salvation and sonship are to be obtained only under the condition mentioned in ver. 6, *therefore* must they not be obstinate and disobedient, as the Scripture says, or the Holy Ghost, through whose impulse it was that the holy men of God spake. The passage in Ps. xcv. 7–11 is here cited according to the Sept. The Sept. has given substantially the right rendering. In it the two names of places מְרִיבָה and מַסָּה are rendered by the appellatives *παραπικρασμός* and *πειρασμός* not improperly, but rather with happy tact, as, indeed, these names were not properly nomina propria which belonged to those places before the time of Moses, but appellative designations of otherwise unknown localities, and designations which owed their origin and occasion to the actual occurrence of a *temptation* and *provocation* (comp. Ex. xv. 23, xvii. 7). The words אַרְבָּעִים שָׁנָה are referred by the Massorites (doubtless with reason) to the 10th verse, קָצַט by the LXX. (not so well, although of course without any substantial alteration of the sense) to רָאוּ, verse 9.—The meaning of the passage here cited is evident, and needs no further explanation than is furnished in Ex. xv. and xvii.

The citation, as has been already observed, is connected grammatically with the end of the 6th verse by means of *διό*, but is nevertheless so selected as in its entire contents to form an inference from the whole train of thought vers. 3–6. Not merely from the statement that without holding fast the *confidence* and *hope* no sonship and participation in the Messianic salvation is possible, but also from this, that Christ is superior to Moses, it follows, that if obduracy towards the *servant* was already so severely punished, all the more earnestly should men beware of obduracy towards the *Son*.

The *σήμερον ἐάν*, in like manner as the הַיּוֹם אִם of the original text has the general meaning which our author ascribes to it (chiefly in ver. 13 in the words *καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν, ἄχρις οὗ τὸ σήμερον καλεῖται*). Even the Psalmist evidently does not indicate any particular day in the calendar on which the people should not be obdurate; still he

might presuppose that on the same day on which he composed the psalm they would hear it; with him also—more manifestly even than in the Greek translation—the חַיּוֹם אִם has the more general sense: "the day, when" = "what day;" חַיּוֹם אִם is = בְּיוֹם, Gen. ii. 17, iii. 5. The sense is, that if any one receives an admonition from God he should comply with it *without delay*, and not put off the required obedience till the morrow.

Ver. 12.—It is somewhat inconsistent with the spirit of the Greek diction, that *βλέπετε* here is not connected with ver. 11 by an *οὖν* or *δέ*, and the more surprising in our author, as he generally studies elegance of style. The difficulty is not helped by supposing, with Tholuck, that the words of the citation from *σήμερον*, ver. 7, on to *κατάπαυσίν μου*, ver. 11, are dependent on the words *καθὼς λέγει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*, and thus making *καθώς* the *protasis* to which an *apodosis* is to be supplied: *μὴ σκληρύνητε*. ("Therefore, as the Holy Ghost saith, be not obdurate," etc.—so be not obdurate.) For a new period begins again with *βλέπετε* without any connecting particle, and, moreover, the supplement which is proposed is very forced and tautological. Much preferable is the explanation proposed by Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, Wetstein, Carpzov, Ernesti, and others, to which Bleek also inclines. These join the whole citation also with *καθώς*, so as to form one member which they regard as the *protasis*, and do not supply an *apodosis*, but consider this as given in ver. 12, "Therefore, as the Holy Ghost saith, be not obdurate, etc. —so take heed." Meanwhile, it may reasonably be asked, whether so long a citation attached to the protasis, which cannot be read in one breath, not to speak of a raised breath (as the nature of the protasis requires)—whether such be not a greater offence against good style than the want of an *οὖν* or *δέ* in a newly begun sentence. The latter may rather be explained satisfactorily enough by supposing that the author here purposely leaves the smoothly flowing train of thought and with intentional liveliness and directness interrupting himself, as it were, breaks in on the flow of the address by exclaiming: "Take heed, brethren," etc.* I hold it, therefore, more natural, with Schlichting, Capellus, Heinrichs, Kuinoel, Klee, etc., to understand the citation as dependent, not on *λέγει* but on *διό*, and to explain the words *καθὼς . . . . ἅγιον*, not as a protasis, but as a parenthesis—"therefore (as the Holy Ghost saith), harden not your hearts," etc.—and then to begin a new period with ver. 12.

Βλέπειν, in the sense of prospicere, occurs also in Mark viii. 15, xiii. 9. Of what are they to take heed? Of this, that none amongst them have an evil heart of unbelief. The genitive *ἀπιστίας* serves to determine the manner in which, and in how far, the heart

* In ver. 15, where the absence of a *δέ* cannot be explained in this way, Bleek nevertheless admits that a new period begins.

is evil; the words *ἐν τῷ ἀποστῆναι* express the manner in which this *unbelief* manifests itself. In departing, namely from the way of conversion to Christ once entered upon.

In ver. 13 a positive admonition is added by way of *warning*, the admonition, namely, that they should daily exercise the *παράκλησις*, *admonition*. This word denotes both the practical application of the law in admonitory discipline, and that of the gospel in quickening, refreshing comfort. The author, especially at this part of his exhortation, avails himself of the word *σήμερον* in the passage from the Psalms (the sense of which is given above on ver. 7). He directs attention to the importance of the *daily*, *ceaseless*, practical application of the Christian doctrine to the heart and mind. And what avails all speaking and studying, where this powerful, living purification of the *heart* through the law and gospel of God is neglected?

Ἵνα μὴ σκληρυνθῇ, etc. The idea expressed by *σκληρύνειν*, *harden*, is to be explained from the figure involved in the word. The figure is derived from a circumstance in physical nature, namely, from the gradual stiffening of bodies originally soft. Still more beautiful and striking is the figure involved in the corresponding German expression *verstocken;* it is taken from a circumstance connected with organic life, namely, from the growth of trees, in which the pliant branch becomes by degrees an unbending bough or stem, a stock. The stiffened body no longer takes on any impression, the bough now grown into wood can no longer be drawn and bent at pleasure. Just as the living plant grows until it reaches some fixed limit of development, so does the soul of man, by its ceaseless development of life, form itself into that fixed state to which it is destined. In itself, and in general, there is nothing bad in this progressive development of the soul; in the season of youth and education a certain germ will and must shoot forth in the soul, the personal *character* and destined life-vocation of the individual will and must form themselves; in his twentieth year the man should already *be* something, should be not merely a single individual, but one who has *become* of such or such a nature or disposition. Nay, the last and highest step which the Christian takes from the stage of formal freedom to that freedom of the children of God, in which holiness has become altogether another nature to him, can be explained from that general fundamental law of the progressive growth of the soul. But this growth and development can take place also *in reference to what is evil*, and it is this to which the word *harden*—as a vox mala, non ambigua—is specially applied in the Holy Scripture. Such a process, by which the soul becomes firm and unbending, can take place, first, in the sphere of the *will*, as a wilful obdurateness against particular commandments of God, as in Pharaoh (Ex. iii. seq.), then,

in the sphere of the entire disposition and moral character, as an abandonment to sins and vices, in which case the man has no longer *in himself* any strength to effect a change in himself, but there remains for him only that salvation which is offered through the quickening and electrically kindling influence of grace and redemption; or, finally, a hardening of the heart may exist also in reference to this offered salvation itself, the obduracy of *positive unbelief;* this is its absolute form, in which the last power of the soul to substantiate itself is exhausted, the last possible step in the kingdom of freedom is taken, and this is the proper, most immediate idea expressed by σκληρύνειν as it appears in the *New* Testament.

It is, moreover, a fine proof of divine wisdom that this figure of *hardening* is applied only in malam partem, and that nothing is ever said in Scripture of a hardening in what is good. For although that development of the soul, as we have seen takes place also in the sphere of the good, it could yet be but very inadequately expressed by the figure of a *hardening*, as the good even when, as perfect holiness, it implies the *impossibility* of sinning, consequently the highest degree of internal fixedness, still preserves throughout the character of the *free, loving* will, and therefore of the highest *internal* moveableness and movement.

This state of obdurateness is not always reached by one leap, and through intentional wickedness, but quite as often, nay oftener, through ἀπάτη, *i. e.* through being deceived and self-deception. Thus the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews, by their foolish, one-sided attachment to the Old Testament forms of the theocracy —by overvaluing what was relative, and regarding it as absolute— were in great danger of making complete shipwreck of faith, and sinking into this miserable state of obduracy. The remark may here be made, that in our own day an analogous overvaluing of things in themselves important, but still only relatively so, as, for example, of differences in confession, or, it may be, of the extraordinary gifts of the apostolic time, is possible, and may possibly lead to the same issue.

This deceit (ἀπάτη), however, is never such as that, under it, the man is *guiltless* and purely passive, purely one who is deceived. On the contrary, our author speaks with good reason of an ἀπάτη τῆς ἁμαρτίας, consequently of a being deceived, which implies guilt on the part of him who is deceived, a *self deception.* The convictions of men are, in general, only apparently determined by arguments which address the reason alone; in reality, they are always substantially determined through the will. Man's power of perception does not resemble a mirror which *must* take up all the rays that fall on it; it rather resembles the living eye, which can open and shut itself, turn itself hither and thither; and which also on account of its

being a relative light, can let itself be *blinded* and *dazzled*, and rendered incapable of receiving the light of the sun, the absolute truth. In ver. 14 the author recurs to the idea contained in the 6th verse, in order from it to pass in ver. 15 to a new element in the practical application of the passage from the Psalms, cited in vers. 7–11, namely, to the application of the word παραπικρασμός (in vers. 12, 13 he had chiefly availed himself of the word σήμερον).

In ver. 14 there is a repetition of the idea, that because the salvation in Christ is so great, it is of so much the more importance to keep hold of it; or more exactly, mention is made here, as in ver. 6, of the greatness of the salvation; and as in ver. 6, the condition is here stated under which alone we can be partakers of it. We are μέτοχοι Χριστοῦ—the meaning of this expression is explained by what was said on chap. ii. 10–13—but we are so only *if we hold fast the beginning of the confidence firm unto the end.* The word ὑπόστασις signifies (comp. i. 3) base, bottom, foundation, then substance; lastly, also (principally in the usus linguæ of the LXX.), fiducia (the act of resting one's self on or confiding one's self to anything). This signification, also, best suits the passage xi. 1; faith is there described as a confident trusting in unseen future things which we cannot yet grasp, but for which we must hope. So also here, it denotes the confidence of faith. The readers have already a *beginning* of this. If, as is commonly supposed, the Epistle to the Hebrews were an epistle addressed to a circle of churches in Palestine, it would be impossible to explain how the author should have been able to say of his readers collectively, that they had a *beginning* of faith. For in the churches in Palestine, where indeed were the congregations of longest standing, there must have been a number of persons who had reached the maturity of the Christian life—individuals who had belonged to the personal circle of Jesus' disciples, and in reference to whom it would, to say the least, have been harsh to put it down as *questionable* whether they would continue in the faith steadfast to the end. For the ἐάν περ does not, as εἰ, express a simple objective condition, but places before us a decision according as either of the two events shall happen, and thus puts both events seriously in question. On the other hand, this style of address finds a perfect explanation, if, as we have supposed, the Epistle to the Hebrews was directed to a certain circle of catechumens and neophytes, in regard to whom it was really a matter of serious question whether they would eventually join themselves to the Christian Church, or would let themselves be estranged, through fear of being excommunicated from the temple worship.

Ver. 15.—The chief difficulty is in the construction. On what verb does ἐν depend, in the words ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι? Chrysostom,

Grotius, Rosenmüller, and others, have taken vers. 16–19 as a parenthesis, and connected *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι* with the words *φοβηθῶμεν οὖν*, chap. iv. 1. But in this case we should expect to find a particle, a *δέ*, or some such, at *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι*, although no great weight can be laid upon this, as at ver. 12, also, the transition particle is wanting. A stronger objection is, that according to that interpretation, a particle (namely, the *οὖν*) at chap. iv. 1 would be too much. (For it cannot be explained as a *resumptive οὖν*, as it could only be so in the case of the words *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι* being again taken up at chap. iv. 1, thus: *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι οὖν τοῦτο φοβηθῶμεν*). But the strongest objection of all to this mode of construction is, that it would entirely destroy the train of thought, seeing that in chap. iv. 1 the author, as we shall soon find, passes from the immediate hortatory part to an entirely new didactic section, so that chap. iv. 1 cannot be joined into one period with chap. iii. 16. Others, as Flacius, Capellus, Carpzov, Kuinoel, have been of opinion that only the half the words cited in ver. 15 are dependent on *λέγεσθαι*, and that the other half, from *μὴ σκληρύνητε* onwards—which clearly forms a part of the citation—is the principal clause on which the *ἐν* must be made to depend! (When it is said: "To-day if ye will hear his voice:" then harden not your hearts).—Semler, Morus, Storr, De Wette, Bleek, Olshausen, etc., supply *λέγω* before ver. 16. (Seeing that it is said: "To-day," etc., I ask, who then has hardened himself)? This rendering, also, and the connexion of thought which results from it, no one will affirm to be natural, besides that in this case, if the author in ver. 15, seq., passes to a new turn of thought, the *δέ* at ver. 15 could not be dispensed with. Bengel, Michaelis, Zacharia, and others, explained ver. 14 as a parenthesis, and construed *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι* with *παρακαλεῖτε*, as if the author meant to prescribe the forms of words with which they were to admonish one another daily: "to-day, harden not," etc. Not much better is the connexion with *κατάσχωμεν* proposed by Luther, Calvin, Beza, and Tholuck; they will hold fast the faith most effectually by repeating to themselves at times the words in Ps. xcv. 7.—It is certainly preferable to all these artificial constructions, to suppose a simple anacoluthon; as if the author had begun a new period at ver. 15, but had not finished it, having allowed himself to be interrupted by the question *τίνες γὰρ*, etc., and thus led to another idea. But here, likewise, we stumble at the want of the *δέ*, which cannot, in the case before us, as at ver. 12, be explained by the emphasis of the address.

It appears to me the most natural way to take *ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι* as dependent on *the whole of the* 14*th verse*, *i. e.*, as grammatically dependent on *μέτοχοι γεγόναμεν*, and to render "as it is said." We are partakers of Christ if we keep the faith, *inasmuch as it is said*,

etc. Ver. 15, therefore does not (as according to the interpretation of Luther, Calvin, etc.) lay down the manner in which we *must act* in order to keep the faith, but simply a *reason* or *proof* that we must keep the *faith*, in order to be partakers of Christ.

This proof is now developed in vers. 16–18, and then in ver. 19 the same thesis as we have in ver. 14, only in a negative form (that the Israelites on account of their *unbelief* came not into the rest), is repeated as a quod erat demonstrandum. The carrying out of the proof connects itself with the word παραπικρασμός, on to which the author had quoted the passage from the Psalms at ver. 15. Still, only the *first* link in the chain of proof is connected with this word. It forms only the point from which the writer sets out. Afterwards he deals in like manner with the other ideas and words of the passage in the Psalms, chiefly specifying the forty years' murmuring (προσοχθίζω from προσοχθέω from ὀχθέω, indignari, this again from ὄχθη, a cliff, a place of breakers, hence ὀχθεῖν, to surge against, to be vehement against any one), and the words εἰ εἰσελεύσονται εἰς τὴν κατάπαυσίν μου.

The following are the successive steps in the proof. At Marah (Ex. xv. 23), and at Massah and Meribah (Ex. xvii. 7), *certain* sins were committed; the people had murmured on account of the want of water; it was not, however, these sins, but sins committed at a later period at Kadesh (Num. xiv.) that brought upon the people the punishment of the forty years' wandering in the wilderness, which the Psalmist poetically connects with those sins at Marah and Meribah; nor was it at these places, but at Kadesh, where it is *expressly* recorded that the *entire* people, with the sole exceptions of Joshua and Caleb, murmured and sinned. Therefore our author finds himself necessitated to form a bridge, so to speak, from those particular sins mentioned in the passage in the Psalms, to the general sin of *unbelief*. He asks therefore first: "Who* were they who did provoke God? (Was it only those who had sinned at Meribah?) Did not all do this who came out of Egypt by Moses?" Thus he remembers that that special act of sin taken by itself, does not find its fit and proper designation in the word *provocation*, but the *disposition* as a whole, which all Israel everywhere manifested. Hence, secondly, it is evident, that the Psalmist was justified in connecting the punishment of the forty years' wandering with the sin of the

* It is evident, even from the train of thought, that the true reading is τίνες, τίσι, and not (with Œcum., Theoph., Vulg., Luther, Calvin, Grotius, etc.), τινές τισί ("only some"). (Comp. Bleek on this passage, p. 471, seq.). The author could infer only from the universality of sin in the time of Moses that the Israelites entered not into their rest, and therefore that the promise still awaited its fulfilment; he could not have inferred this from the fact, that "only some" had sinned at that time and had been punished.

"provocation." "But with whom was he angry forty years ?* Was it not with them that had *sinned?*" From this it was to be inferred that all must have *sinned.* Finally, in the third place, he must notice the chief and fundamental sin, that *disobedience* which refuses to be led in the gracious ways pointed out by God, that disobedience which is therefore substantially one and the same thing with *unbelief;* for in Kadesh nothing was said of a disobedience against the law, but of the disobedience which—as was well known to all the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews—had its source in the *unbelief* described in Num. xiv., which led the people to think that, in spite of God's help, it would not be possible for them to conquer the land. Thus the author, in ver. 18, adds the third member of the proof, and returns again in ver. 19 to the thesis which was to be proved.

In speaking, however, of the *entrance into God's rest,* the author has introduced to his readers a new element of which he further avails himself as the theme of the following *didactic section.* It was to be ascribed—he shews in chap. iv.—not merely to the subjective unbelief of the Israelites, but also to the objective imperfection of the Old Testament revelation, that Israel could not enter into the true rest. He then shews how the highest fulfilment of the promise of rest still lies in the future, and is offered through Christ, and that we have therefore now to be doubly on our guard against *unbelief,* as this is now doubly inexcusable.

SECTION SECOND.

IN THE SON ISRAEL HAS ENTERED INTO ITS TRUE REST.

(Chap. iv.)

This section belongs to those of which, as Tholuck justly remarks, "few commentators have succeeded in clearly tracing out the connexion of the ideas." The fault of this, however, belongs not to the passage, but to the commentators, who have brought too much their own ideas with them, and have not had the self-denial simply to surrender themselves to the words of the writer.

For example, it has been taken for granted at the very outset vers. 1–3, that the author here proceeds to warn against the subjective sin of unbelief. It is all one whether the words can bear this

* Here he shews, by the way, that he was well acquainted with the original text of the passage. He here connects ארבעים שנה with אקוט just as is done in the original.

sense or not,—this *must* be their meaning! nor does it alter the case, although what follows in ver. 4, seq., should in no way be suitable to such a sense.

Ver. 1.—In the sentence *μήποτε*, etc., it is self-evident that *τις* is the subject, *δοκῇ* the predicate, *ὑστερηκέναι* the object to *δοκῇ*, as also that the words *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν κατάπαυσιν αὐτοῦ* are dependent on *ἐπαγγελίας*. Further, it appears pretty clear on a comparison of chap. ii. 11 with 18, that *αὐτοῦ* here is not to be understood in the reflexive sense, but as pointing back to God, who was the subject at chap. ii. 17–18. The only thing about which there can be any question is, upon what the genitive *καταλειπομένης ἐπαγγελίας* depends.

The great majority of commentators understand this genitive, without more ado, either (so Cramer and Ernesti), as a genitive of relation dependent on the verb *ὑστερηκέναι* ("that no one among you appear to remain behind the promise which is still left," *i. e.*, appear as one who neglects the promise which is still left, *i. e.*, the fulfilment of it)—a construction which is impossible owing to the position of the words, and the absence of the article at *ἐπαγγελίας*—or, they take the words *καταλειπομένης ἐπαγγελίας* as a *gen. abs.*, but still regard this genitive abs. as dependent on *ὑστερηκέναι*, while *ὑστερηκέναι* is considered as the principal idea, and *δοκῇ*, which is taken in the sense of *videri*, as a pleonastic accessory idea (so Bleek, Olshausen, and the greater number). The sense then is: "Let us take heed, that no one amongst you shew himself as *one who comes too late*, seeing that a promise is still with us," *i. e.*, that no one amongst you appear, in reference to the promise still existing (still to be fulfilled), as one who comes too late.* In support of the purely pleonastic use of *δοκεῖν* which is here supposed, the only authority that can be adduced is a passage of the bombastic Josephus (art. ii. 6–10). The signification putare, opinari, which *δοκεῖν* usually has (for example chap. x. 29; Acts xxvii. 13), we are assured will not suit the context here; as the author evidently intends to warn his readers not against the *thought* of being too late, but against the actual coming short itself.

Meanwhile, this is not so clear and manifest as for example Bleek himself thinks. First of all, apart from the purely pleonastic use of *δοκῇ* in that interpretation, the use of the verb *ὑστερεῖν* already strikes us as strange. If it is the aim of the author to warn against trifling away the fulfilment of the promise still left, *i. e.*, the *sub-*

* Still more unsuitably, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Gerhard, De Wette explain *καταλ. ἐπαγγ.* by contemta promissione = promissionem contemnens. *Καταλείπειν* might indeed have this meaning (Acts vi. 2), but in this case, the article could not be omitted before *ἐπαγγελίας*. The only natural way of expressing this idea in Greek would be this: *μήποτέ τις ἐξ ὑμῶν καταλείπων τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν κλ. δοκῇ ὑστερηκέναι.*

jective participation in this fulfilment, why does he select a word for this purpose which in nowise contains the idea of a subjective trifling away, but of a purely objective being too late? Whether the readers lived before or after the fulfilment of the still remaining promise was not a matter depending upon their choice; how then could the author admonish them to take heed, lest they came some time after this promise, which was still left, was also fulfilled? Did this fulfilment then take place in one definite moment of time?—We must therefore take the verb *ὑστερεῖν* in a very weakened signification, somewhat in the signification of "neglect," and in addition to this suppose a double figure in *ἐπαγγελίας*; in the first place, "promise" must stand for "fulfilment of the promise," and, secondly, the words "subjective interest in the fulfilment of the promise" must be supplied at *ὑστερεῖν*. Take heed—this would be the idea—seeing that the fulfilment of a promise still remains, lest any of you should lose by delay his interest in this fulfilment (or should neglect the right time at which to obtain an interest in it).

But a second inconvenience now presents itself, namely, the perfect *ὑστερηκέναι*. Ὑστερεῖν already means "to come too late;" and why should the perfect be used in a passage where warning is given against a *future* coming too late?

For all these reasons, we agree with the interpretation given by Schöttgen, Baumgarten, Schulz, Wahl, and Bretschneider, according to which *δοκῇ* receives its proper and natural signification, which beside the inf. perf. is the only suitable one (as in Acts xxvii. 13), while the *principal idea* is in *δοκῇ*, and the gen. abs. is regarded as dependent on *δοκῇ*. "Let us take heed, therefore, lest while there is still a promise to be fulfilled, any one of you should nevertheless imagine that he has come too late" (namely: that he lives in a time when all promises are long since fulfilled, and that no further salvation is to be expected, or has any claim on our earnest endeavours to attain it). The author says purposely not *μὴ δοκῶμεν οὖν*, but *φοβηθῶμεν οὖν μήποτέ τις δοκῇ*; he will represent this error not merely as a theoretical one, but (chap. ii. 12) as one that was practically dangerous. This idea harmonizes exactly with the context. The author here, as indeed everywhere throughout the epistle, designs to impress upon his readers the consciousness that the new covenant is not worse than the old, that Christianity is not something superfluous, something with which, at any rate, they might dispense if only they have their beloved Judaism, but that the latter rather has been made dispensable by Christianity. He, therefore, in ver. 1, and in the beginning of ver. 2, places Christianity *on a level* with Judaism,—we too wait for a promise to be fulfilled—then in the second half of ver. 2, he begins to shew how Christianity is even far superior to Judaism.

Ver. 2.—The first words are clear. We too, as well as those who lived in the time of Moses, have received a blessed message, a promise that we shall be introduced into a promised land of rest. Nay, we have received this in a higher and better sense than they. The word which has been given to us is infinitely better than the word which the Israelites received by Moses. In the first place: the word spoken by Moses could not bring the hearers to the faith; it remained something external to them, it proffered a promise indeed, and annexed a condition to it, but it imparted no strength to fulfil this condition (ver. 2–5 comp. ver. 12, 13); and secondly, the promise contained in that word even in respect of its import, was not the true and right promise, for it was an earthly rest that was there proffered, whereas it is a spiritual and eternal rest that is now promised to us (ver. 6–10).

Let us look, now, at the first of these two arguments which begins with the words, ver. 2., *ἀλλ' οὐκ ὠφέλησεν*, and is afterwards repeated more fully in ver. 12, 13. It is not to be wondered at, that a false interpretation of ver. 1 should have led the majority of commentators into an entire misunderstanding also of ver. 2. They conceive that here (as in chap. ii. 16–19) it is still the *subjective unbelief of the Jews* that is adduced as the reason of their not having attained to the rest, whereas, in the passage before us, it is rather the *objective imperfection of the Old Testament revelation* that is given as the ground of the imperfect fulfilment of the promises. Only thus, too, can the connecting particle *ἀλλά* be accounted for. In the words *καὶ γάρ ἐσμεν*, etc., the new covenant is only placed on a level with the old, and in the purely objective point of view, that in the one, as in the other, a gracious message is given. The statement now made that the word of God in the old covenant *did not profit* or was inefficacious, stands in an antithetical relation to that which precedes it. (Had the writer meant to say, that the Israelites under the old covenant were unbelieving, as also many under the new covenant are inclined to unbelief, he would have used only the connecting particle *δέ*, or better still *καὶ—μέν*.)

But the view which we have given of the train of thought finds its justification chiefly in the words themselves. The reading of these words, however, wavers, and that in three points. Firstly, in one portion of the codd. the attic form *συγκεκραμεν . . .* is found, in the other the later form *συγκεκερασμεν . . .*; that the latter is the true reading, while the form owes its origin to a correction, is self-evident. Secondly, a single *cursive* manuscript (Griesbach Nro. 71) has *ἀκουσθεῖσι*, instead of *ἀκούσασι*; and more recent critics, on the authority of the Vulgate, have conjectured a reading *ἀκούσμασι* (dat. plur. of *ἄκουσμα*); here again it is self-evident that the reading *ἀκούσασι*, confirmed by all sources, considered merely as the more dif-

ficult, is the genuine reading; and we shall soon see that *ἀκουσθεῖσι*, as also the rendering of the Vulgate, ex illis quæ audierant, owes its origin to the embarrassment arising from not being able to extract any suitable sense from the other. The difficulty is greater in the third point. The Peshito (ܒܗܘܢ ܕܫܡܥܘ ܠܐ ܐܬܚܕ ܥܡ ܗܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܫܡܥܘ) and the Vulgate (sermo auditus non admixtus fidei ex eis quæ audierant) point to the reading *συγκεκρασμένος*, which is found also in Chrysostom, and has been retained in several cursive MSS. On the other hand, the codd. A.B.C.D.E., the versio Copt., Aeth., Armen., Philoxen., Slav., have the accusative plural *συγκεκερασμένους* (resp. *συγκεκραμένους*). Almost all the more recent commentators (with the exception of Olshausen and Tholuck) consider the latter as decidedly the true reading, on account of these weighty external proofs. But the point is not, therefore, to be regarded as summarily settled. The fact of the nom. sing. occurring only in the cursive MSS., while the uncial MSS. have the acc. plur., by no means proves that the nom. sing. is not the ancient reading. Let us take into view the authority of the primitive Peshito, certainly the most ancient source of the New Testament text which we possess, the circumstance that Jerome, who, with the utmost care, compared good manuscripts which already in his time were old, gave the preference to the nom. sing.; finally, that Chrysostom read the nom., and we shall have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, that the nom. sing. is a reading of primitive antiquity, beside which, however, there stood already in the first centuries another reading, and which was soon almost entirely supplanted by this other reading.

We have now only to ask which of the two readings is, upon internal grounds, the more suitable; and if we find, moreover, that this internally more suitable reading might, as the more difficult one, be easily misunderstood, we shall then have an explanation of the early origin and the subsequent general acceptation of the false reading. The acc. plur. yields the more flat and less suitable sense; the nom. sing. yields a finer sense, which, however, might easily escape recognition on a superficial reading.

If we adopt the reading *συγκεκερασμένους*, the passage must then be rendered thus: "The word heard (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 13) did not profit those persons, because they did not unite themselves in the faith with those who obeyed,"—viz., with Joshua and Caleb. According to this, it would still be the *subjective unbelief* of the contemporaries of Moses that is here blamed—a view inconsistent with the context. (So Œcumenius, Photius, Hammond, Cramer, Matthäi.) But as before, at chap. ii. 16–19, no distinction whatever was made between those who believed not, and Joshua and Caleb who believed, and, in general, no reference at all was made to these

two men,—such an explanation of the passage as that just mentioned would be unintelligible and arbitrary. Besides, it is inadmissible to take *ἀκούειν* in the particip. *ἀκούσασιν*, in the pregnant signification of "obey," which it never has in the Epistle to the Hebrews; and this is doubly inadmissible here, where it stands so close beside *ἀκοή*. Others have proposed, moreover, to connect the dat. *ἀκούσασιν* as *the dative of possession* in the sense of a *genitive* with *πίστει* (through the faith belonging to the hearers, or becoming them), which is a grammatical monstrosity. Even Bleek can find no other way of escape than to conjecture *ἀκούσμασι*, and in this he at least shews from what view the reading *ἀκουσθεῖσιν* has originated.

The reading *συγκεκερασμένος* offers an exceedingly fine and suitable sense, but one indeed which might easily be overlooked. The author, in chap. iv., no longer speaks of the subjective unbelief of Moses' contemporaries, but of the objective imperfection of the Old Testament institutions. The word which was given by Moses to the Israelites—consisting, *a*, of the *promise* that they should come into the earthly *rest*, and, *b*, of the *law* as the annexed *condition*—could not be *united to the hearers* by faith. (So also Olshausen). This idea finds its clearest explanation in its opposite ver. 12, where, according to the context, the New Testament *word of God* is spoken of, and where it is described as *penetrating into the innermost marrow and joints of the man.* The law remained as a cold command external to the man, the will of God and the will of man were not united; therefore the Mosaic word of God could not profit. The law, with its "thou shalt," could never bring about that surrender of the heart, that disposition and attitude of loving *receptivity*, which can be awakened only by the love of Him "who hath first loved us," and which is called "faith," and leads to a fellowship of being and of life with God.

How easily now might this idea have been overlooked, as it lies not on the surface of the words! How easily may it have happened to interpreters and transcribers, in the very earliest period, as it has to the majority of commentators till the present day, to fall into the error of supposing that the writer still continues, in chap. iv. 1, 2, to speak of the subjective unbelief of Moses' contemporaries! It will not be disputed that the early origin, and subsequent wide extension of the false reading *συγκεκερασμένους*, may in this way be fully accounted for.—The antithesis, therefore, to *faith*, ver. 2, is not *unbelief*, but *works*, and this antithesis is, in fact, expressed in ver. 3.

Ver. 3.—"For we enter into the rest as *believers.*" It is quite evident that those are wrong who paraphrase the words thus: "If we do not merely *hear*, but also *believe*." The *πιστεύειν* has its antithesis in the *ἔργοις*. It is not a condition *equally* belonging to the old and the new covenant that is here described, but the *difference*

of the condition of the New Testament covenant from that of the Old Testament. In the words, *as he said*, the author proceeds to shew in how far even the Old Testament itself points to the insufficiency of the law and its *works*. For this end he again cites a verse from the 95th Psalm, which he had already cited in chap. iii. (although with a different object), namely, the words: "As I have sworn in my wrath: they shall not enter into my rest." These words, however, in themselves contain no proof of the statement, that through *faith alone* we can enter into the rest of God, but they derive their argumentative force from the clause which is added: "Although the works were performed from the creation of the world." It is self-evident that the *works* here are antithetically opposed to *faith*. It is surprising how all critics should have supposed that the works *of God* are here meant, and especially his works of *creation*. Γενηθέντων is understood in the pregnant sense of a part. pass., and γίγνεσθαι, moreover, in the sense of τελεῖσθαι; and the words are thus rendered: "Although the works (of God) were already completed from the moment of the (finished) creation of world"—*i. e.*, in other words: "Although the creation of the world was already finished from the moment at which it was finished!!" A strange idea! And when was it that the concluding moment of an action came to be denoted by ἀπό? Had this been the meaning of the author, he must have expressed himself thus: καίτοι τῶν ἔργων ἐκ τῆς καταβολῆς κόσμου ἤδη τετελεσμένων. Works which are done ἀπό καταβολῆς κόσμου, can be no other than such as are done *since* the creation of the world, *from* the creation of the world onwards.

And, if the above interpretation is ungrammatical, it is no less irreconcileable with the context and the train of thought. The meaning which it yields would be this: Although God already rested, men did not yet rest. But the "although" is about as suitable in this place as it would be in the sentence: Although Quintus is already very old, Cestius is still young. From the fact that God has already completed the creation of the world, to infer directly, and without any intermediate proposition, a warrant for expecting that the Israelites shall be introduced into the *rest of God*, is about as valid a sequence as, from the fact that Quintus is old, to infer the expectation that Cestius also shall be old. The commentators, too, have not been insensible to this impropriety, and have sought to lessen it in various ways. Many of the older interpreters gave to καίτοι for a change the signification et quidem—of this nothing further need be said. Others of more recent date, following Calvin, have sought to remove the difficulty by ingenious supplements. Tholuck, for example, supplements the idea in the following terms: The Israelites were not permitted to enter into the *rest;* and yet God

rested *in heaven* after the work of creation was finished, so that an objective *resting-place* already existed. But what reader could find all this in the words καίτοι, etc.? Bleek has shewn most ingenuity in filling up the idea, and if we have rightly understood him, it is in the following way: God rested from the *creation;* but God's rest is reciprocal in its nature; then only does God *really* rest, when he has completed the work of his *manifestation* to the *creatures.* And, accordingly, it is remarkable that for God *the Sabbath* has already begun; and there are, nevertheless, *creatures who do not keep the Sabbath with him,* nay, who *cannot* keep it with him. But however true this train of thought may be in itself, we read nothing of it in the text; and no one who reads this chapter, without beginning at the middle, and coming backward, could possibly have in his mind, in reading ver. 3, these intermediate ideas about the Sabbath (which are to be found in ver. 9, seq., and in a similar form to that in which Bleek has given them). But, in addition to this, no indication is given, even in what follows, of the antithesis implied in the words, that God rests *indeed* from the creation, *but* that he has not yet finished the *work* of the manifestation of himself to his creatures. We must therefore reject this explanation also, on account of the *context,* even although the *interpretation* on which it rests had been grammatically less untenable. The true and most simple explanation is to be drawn from ver. 2. The author had there affirmed of the word spoken by Moses, that it was not *mixed* or amalgamated with the hearers *by faith,* that it remained external and strange to them, and therefore that it could profit them nothing. He had in opposition to this, laid it down in ver. 3, that we, the members of the New Testament Israel, enter into that *rest* into which the Old Testament Israel entered not, and that we enter *by faith.* What more natural, now, than that the reader should think of the well-known opposition of faith and works, which indeed had already been implicitly indicated in ver. 2? It was almost an example of the rule of three: the New Testament word of Christ is related to faith as the word of Moses, the law, is to—the works.

Only we must guard against limiting the idea expressed in ἔργα to *good* works. Of such works, indeed, *none* were performed from the creation of the world. Nay, this is rather what the apostle intends to bring out—that as "the works" were done from the beginning, and yet notwithstanding Israel did not enter into the rest, these works were none of them good, but evil, and at least imperfect, works tainted with sin.

In like manner, we must guard against another improper restriction of ἔργα to the works of the law, fulfilments of the Mosaic commands. These were, of course, not performed from the creation of the world, but only after the giving of the law from Sinai.

No; the author speaks quite generally of the works of men, of the *work* of the human race, of all activity, all endeavours better or worse. The idea is, in general terms, as follows: *All that can be comprehended under the term works, has been performed from the time of the creation of the world onwards, but has never been sufficient to bring man to the* κατάπαυσις, *to a state of satisfied rest.* The inference from this is, that an entirely new way of salvation, not that of human doings and human endeavours, but that of faith in the salvation which God hath provided, is necessary in order to attain to the *rest.*

Vers. 4, 5.—This idea is in these verses more fully explained. The author shews here, that by ἔργα he meant not the works of God, but the works of men in opposition to those of God. "*God*, indeed, rested already on the seventh of the days occupied in the creation of the world: and still he says of *men*, they are not yet capable of entering into his rest." God's works, then, were finished—internally perfect, and therefore externally complete—but the works of men were internally imperfect, and hence, externally there was no mention of a resting of men; the work and labour still continued, and could not cease until the result was arrived at; the result, however, remained ever unattained.

The first part of this idea is introduced by the words: εἴρηκε γάρ που περὶ τῆς ἑβδόμης. On που compare our remark on chap. ii. 6. The author here refers beforehand to the ἑβδόμη, because he intends afterwards to graft a further idea on this preliminary mention of it, which he does in ver. 9, seq.

In vers. 6–8 the author passes to a *new* sentiment, a new point of comparison between the work of Christ and the work of Moses. The opposition between the work of both is twofold, just as was that in chap. iii. 2–6 between the persons. The first imperfection in the work of Moses consisted in this (iv. 2–5)—that his work imparted no power for the fulfilment of it, did not unite itself to the hearers through faith, and therefore could not conduct to the promised rest; the second consists in this—that the rest itself into which the Israelites could be introduced by Moses and were actually introduced by Joshua, was only an earthly, a typical rest, while Christ conducts to a real, a substantial rest, which in its nature corresponds to the Sabbath rest of God. But, as in chap. iii. the first point of difference was repeated in the development of the second (Moses was a *servant* in the *typical* house, Christ a *son* in the *living* house), so here also, when the author shews the opposition between the Old and New Testament rest, he repeats at the same time the first point of difference, that, namely, between the not being able to enter into the rest, and the being able to enter into it, nay, he finds in the second the full confirmation of the first.

Vers. 6, 7, form a somewhat complicated period. The *protasis* consists of two parts, which depend on the verbs ἀπολείπεται and οὐκ εἰσῆλθον ; the *apodosis* consists of the statement, that God, in the old covenant, indicates by the Psalmist a future rest. The connecting link between the two is the particle ἐπεί, since.

The words, *it remains that some enter into it*, are evidently only a repetition of what is said in ver. 1 (a promise being left of entering into his rest), and express, therefore, the fundamental thesis, that the promise of a rest was not fully or really fulfilled in the entrance of Joshua into Canaan. The second member : *those to whom it was first preached entered not in because of unbelief* form, again, only the negative reverse side of the first member, and who are the persons meant by those to whom it was first preached is explained in ver. 2, where it is said of the Christians in opposition to the Old Testament Israel : *for to us hath the gospel been preached as well as to them.* The τινές, therefore, whose entrance into the rest is still impending, are the Christians, while *those to whom it was first preached* are the Jews, and those, especially, to whom in the time of Moses the gracious call to enter into the land of rest was addressed. The words on account of *unbelief* serve to remind us at once of the subjective fault of the Jews mentioned in chap. iii. 16–19, and of the objective impotency of the law mentioned in chap. iv. 2–5.

The principal question here, however, is, in what logical relation do the protasis and apodosis stand to each other. The view generally taken of this relation is, that the apodosis contains the final conclusion at which the author aims, and which he wishes to prove, while the protasis contains the proof. The entire passage is viewed as containing an answer to the question, why God *must* needs have defined and mentioned a second day of rest. The necessitating cause of this was, that the Israelites were disobedient the first time.—To this interpretation the words *since they to whom it was first preached entered not in because of unbelief* are certainly agreeable, but not the words: *seeing it remains that some enter into it.* That *at present* (in the author's time) a farther entering into the rest is about to be accomplished, cannot be the reason why God has, in the time of David, defined a more distant day of rest. (The most that can be said is, that ἀπολείπεται might be related to ὁρίζειν as a kind of *end* or aim).

We think, however, that the protasis contains the answer to the question, why it was *possible* for God to determine a second day of rest. We may give the sense periphrastically for the sake of clearness thus : only for this *reason* could God define a second day of rest long after the time of Moses, because, namely, as was said above in vers. 1, 2, the original promise still waits for its fulfilment, and the Israelites at that time did not in general enter into the rest.

The thing therefore to be proved lies in the protasis, the proof in the apodosis (as if, for example, I wished to prove that one is a spendthrift and said to him: "because you are a spendthrift your father has not entrusted you with any money, = if you were not a spendthrift he would not have withdrawn his credit from you). It is only *formally* and *apparently*, that the protasis contains any reason for the apodosis; the sinew of the proof lies in the conclusion drawn backward from the apodosis to the protasis. Had the author written logically he would have said: "Only if the case so stands as was said in vers. 1, 2, can we comprehend how God could again define a day of rest; but, as he has actually done this, the case must stand so; there *must* still be a rest to be entered into, and Israel at that time must not have entered the rest." (Quite a similar form of logical inversion occurs in chap. v. 1, see infra).

This absolute non-entrance of the Israelites (οὐκ εἰσῆλθον) now prepares the way for the second point of difference between the work of Christ and that of Moses. All that was said in chap. iii. was, that the *single generation* consisting of Moses' contemporaries did not come into the rest, but died in the wilderness. There was still room in that chapter for the supposition, that the following generation did enter into the rest. But, already in chap. iv. 1, the author has tacitly presupposed, that even after the time of Joshua, even now, the fulfilment of that promise of rest is yet at least in part to be accomplished, and in the 6th verse he speaks quite unconditionally of an οὐκ εἰσελθεῖν on the part of those to whom it was first preached, while in ver. 8, which is explanatory, he directly denies disertis verbis that Joshua brought the Israelites to the rest—denies that the rest into which Joshua brought the people was the *true* rest. *Thus, in ver. 6, seq., the Old Testament rest is opposed to that of the New Testament as the merely typical to the substantial* (just as in chap. iii. 5, the *house* in which Moses served for a testimony of future revelations, is opposed to the *house* of Christ, whose living stones we are).

Now this proposition thus modified and thus expanded, that the Old Testament rest was in general not the true rest, is in ver. 7 proved from the Old Testament. Only thus can it be explained, that God could point to a second future day of rest. And this God has done in the 7th verse of the 95th Psalm (cited in chap. iii. for a different purpose).

Three questions present themselves here. First, how the apodosis, ver. 7, is to be construed; secondly, whether the 95th Psalm is one of David's, and thirdly, whether the passage proves what the author intends it should prove. With regard to the first of these questions, the words ἐν Δαυὶδ . . . . προείρηται are a parenthetical insertion, with which the author interrupts himself after he had

begun the citation itself, and which, grammatically, stands in the relation of apposition to the subject involved in *ὁρίζει*. The words *μετὰ τοσοῦτον χρόνον* determine the time of the *λέγων*, and intimate that God spake thus so long after the time of Joshua, namely, by the mouth, and therefore in the time, of David ; and the words *καθὼς προείρηται* likewise connect themselves grammatically with *λέγων*, and indicates to the reader that the words here cited had already been cited above in chap. iii. 7, seq., and 15.* As regards the *third question*, it must be acknowledged that the argumentative force of the passage is very apparent. The Psalmist refers back to the time when Israel was called to enter into its rest, and when Israel neglected this call by its disobedience ; then he exhorts the Israelites, on what day they should hear the voice of God again, to give a different response to it from what they did then, and to obey it without delay (according to the Greek translation : if ye again hear his voice *to-day*, obey it *to-day*). The Psalmist therefore presupposes the possibility of Israel's being again placed in analogous situation to what it was then, and admonishes it not to forfeit again the entrance into the offered glory.

And this, too, involves the answer to the *second* question. Whether David was the author of the psalm or not, is a question on which no important result depends ; the 95th psalm is not like the 2d and 110th, grafted on a special promise made to David, but contains only the general expectation of future gracious calls from God, which, if Israel had already been conducted by Joshua into its absolute rest and satisfaction, would no longer have been possible. All that needs to be insisted on is, that the passage in the psalm was written "so long afterwards" (namely, after Moses and Joshua); its force of proof lay, not in its antiquity, but rather in the lateness, of the time when it was written. In the Old Testament the psalm has no superscription, the Sept. which was in the hands of the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews ascribed it to David, and this comparatively late period was sufficient for the argument which the author would draw from it, and therefore he could without hesitation adopt the statement of the Sept. Critical investigations into the genuineness or spuriousness of the superscription which the psalm bears in the Sept., would certainly have been just as little in place here, as, in the address of Stephen, Acts vii. 14, an investigation into the accuracy of the number 75. It must not, however, be overlooked that our author, inasmuch as he says merely "in David" (= in the book of David, the Psalms) and

* Others take the first *σήμερον* as the object of *λέγων*, "inasmuch as in David he calls it (the day) a to-day." Others, as Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Bleek, take *σήμερον* as *apposition* to *ἡμέραν τινά*, "he defines again a day, a to-day." This entire treatment of *σήμερον* is *modern*.

not *by the mouth of David*, shews plainly enough his intention, that no weight at all should here be made to rest on the person of David. In ver. 8 we have an extension of the proof contained in ver. 7, and, with this, an explanation of ver. 7, in the clear and simple statement, that such a reference to a future call of God and *word of God* would not have been possible, if Ἰησοῦς (*i. e.*, in this context of course *Joshua*) had already truly led the Israelites into the rest. This, however, involves the inference that Joshua did not truly lead the Israelites into the rest; the earthly possession of the land which was not even completely conquered under Joshua, which under the Judges was oppressed by heathen kings, which had in Saul a bad king, in David one who had little rest from war, in Solomon one who fell from wisdom into folly, and which, after the death of Solomon, sunk down from its high eminence of typical glory—that earthly possession of the land such as was brought about by Joshua, was not yet the true *rest of God*. Thus has the writer returned to the thesis contained in ver. 6: *The Old Testament had no true rest*, and therewith to the thesis in vers. 1, 2: *We have still to expect the entrance into rest, and that the true rest.*

This last inference is now drawn in ver. 9. The author, however, does not here say merely that there is still a κατάπαυσις, a state of rest to be looked for, but he denotes this κατάπαυσις by the higher name σαββατισμός (a word which occurs besides only in Plutarch de superstit. 3), *as the celebration of a Sabbath*. And thus he carries out here an idea which he had indicated in ver. 4; he carries it out here, after having in vers. 6–8 shewn, that the rest into which Joshua led the Israelites was no true rest. Now he shews, on the other hand, that the rest into which the people of God were to be led at a future time, and therefore by Christ, is true, because it bears the character of a *Sabbatical* rest, and thus truly corresponds to the rest of God, after the work of creation was finished. *Here, therefore*, after having suitably prepared the way, the author *first* brings out the idea which the commentators have thrust into ver. 3, where it could have suggested itself to the mind of no reader.

God rested on the seventh day of the creation, because he had finished his work not merely outwardly, but because his work was, internally and qualitatively, a finished and perfect work (ver. 4). But men could not in Moses', nay, even in Joshua's time, attain to any rest from their activity, labour, pains, and exertion (ver. 3), because their work and activity were internally imperfect, stained with sin. The true rest lies in the future; this must be the rest analogous to the rest of God, a *holy*, a *Sabbath rest;* it must consist in this, that man is able to rest from his works, in like manner and in the same way, as God did from his, in other words, that man has

finished his work internally, and can appear before God with the result of his work undefiled by sin.

Ver. 10.—And this work man has accomplished in the person of his Saviour and substitute, Jesus Christ. This verse is generally understood as containing a general statement ("he who, quisquis, enters into his rest, rests from his works"), and it is supposed that the aorist *κατέπαυσεν* is used here, by way of change, instead of the present, or (Bleek), that the aorist is occasioned by the aorist to be supplied at *ὥσπερ*. But with all this artifice, nothing more is gained than a statement in great measure tautological. When we translate the words with grammatical exactness as they stand ("for he who has entered into his rest, himself rested in like manner from his works, as God from his") they yield the finest and most striking parallel to the corresponding member in the first principal part of our epistle at chap. ii. 9. In the second section of the first principal part the three members of the argument were the following.

1. Man is destined to the dominion over the universe.

But 2. Man is not yet so highly exalted.

But 3. Jesus is already exalted.

Quite analogous to this (with a difference only in the formal logical connexion of the three members) is, what we find in this, the second section of the second principal part.

1. Man has received the call to enter into his rest.

2. He has not yet been led into this rest by Joshua; there is still a rest to be expected.

3. And that a *Sabbatical rest*, for: Jesus, who is entered into his rest, rests in a Sabbatical manner as God does.

The statement in ver. 10 is therefore not general, but special; by the words *ὁ γὰρ εἰσελθών* the author meant Jesus, and every unprejudiced reader must also, on account of the aorist *κατέπαυσεν* understand the verse in the same way. The author does not expressly add the name *Ἰησοῦς*, because in ver. 8 this name was used to designate Joshua. In evident opposition to the Joshua who could *not* bring the people to the rest, the author speaks in ver. 10 of "that one who hath entered into his rest." (*Αὐτοῦ* refers to *θεοῦ*, according to the analogy of chap. iii. 11, 18).

Jesus has internally finished his works, nay, the works of all mankind, and therefore has brought them to an external completion. With the Sabbath of the resurrection, on which, after his work and humiliation was ended, he entered into his state of exaltation and glory, on which he left the state in which the soul was separated from the body, the Sheol, and entered into the life of glorified body; with this Sabbath began the *second Sabbath of God*, the Sabbath of God the *Son*, as with the future setting up of a new heavens and a new earth, the Sabbath of God the Holy Ghost will

begin. When, therefore, in accordance with the eternally binding command which requires that after every six days of activity in our earthly calling, one day of rest should be devoted to the sacred Sabbath activities of our heavenly calling, Christians everywhere reckon the seven days not from the creation-Sabbath of God the Father, but from the creation-Sabbath of God the Son—this mode of reckoning finds its justification in the passage before us.

Ver. 11.—Man has not yet entered into the rest, but Jesus has entered into the true Sabbath rest; what, remains, then, but that *we also* should seek *by him* to enter into this *σαββατισμός*. This exhortation follows in ver. 11: *Let us strive, therefore, to enter into that rest*, with the accompanying warning not to let it be with us as with those contemporaries of Moses, who, because they listened not through *unbelief* and *disobedience* to the gracious call which was then addressed to them, were afterwards held up by the Psalmist as an example of warning to us. Let us beware, therefore, says the author, lest we neglect the second more excellent and more powerful call of grace, and lest we also should, in our turn, become a sad example of warning to others. Ὑπόδειγμα, a later Greek word instead of the attic *παράδειγμα*. Ἐν *ὑποδείγματι* "as an example," a proleptic use of the *ἐν*, "that we do not turn out to be an example."

Ver. 12.—The warning, however, is rendered still more pointed and impressive by the statement, that the excuse which (according to ver. 2) the contemporaries of Moses had, no longer remains for us. The ground of *unbelief* in their case lay, not merely in the perverse will of men, but in part, also, in the objective impotency of the *word* brought by Moses, the law, which could awaken no confidence of faith, no joy, no love, and which could not open the heart. This extenuating circumstance, however, does not hold in our case; in our case, there is nothing weak or deficient in the word of God; for the word of God is quick, powerful, penetrating into the soul; if we fall into unbelief, the blame rests *with ourselves alone.*

By the *word of God* is therefore clearly to be understood, as the context shews, the word of the New Testament revelation. Only, it is not to be supposed that in the genitive *τοῦ θεοῦ* is expressed the antithesis to the *λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς* of ver. 2. The genitive *τοῦ θεοῦ* forms rather merely the antithesis to the first person plural *σπουδάσωμεν*. "Let us strive to enter into that rest, for nothing any longer fails on the part of *God*—the word of *God* is powerful." Only from the context is it to be inferred as a thing self-evident, that the author speaks here of the word of God which we have heard, and not of the law of Moses.

And thus ver. 12 certainly forms a supplementary antithesis to

ver. 2 in respect of the *matter* (though not in a formally logical connexion). This deep and subtle connexion has, however, by all commentators hitherto been overlooked. A portion of these commentators (many of the Fathers, Clericus, Bertholdt) have understood ὁ λόγος in the sense in which it is used by John of the Son of God as pre-existent, and find in ver. 12 a reason why we ought to fear—because Christ, who as the pre-existent λόγος punished the Israelites, is so severe; an explanation which is not consistent with the usus linguæ of the Epistle to the Hebrews (comp. i. 6, where Christ as pre-existent is denoted rather by πρωτότοκος). Another section of the critics (almost all from the Reformation downwards), understood by the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ the Word of God in respect to its minatory declarations,* and find in the verse this sentiment: We must therefore beware of becoming an example, because the threatening predictions of God were so surely and powerfully fulfilled. But, according to this, we should rather expect to find in ver. 12 the words: "for the word of God is *killing* and *wounding* as a sword." Instead of this, we read of the *vitality* and *penetrating sharpness* of the word, a sharpness penetrating into the innermost joints and marrow, into the soul and spirit. These predicates form evidently an antithesis to the words of ver. 2, "not uniting itself with those who heard it by faith."

The predicates, now, according to our interpretation, explain themselves without great difficulty. The word of God (with which we have to do in the New Testament), the word of the revelation of the gospel in Christ, is *living*, chiefly in opposition to the stiff, dead law, comp. Gal. iii. 21. The law is a dead fixing of the commands of God upon us—as it stands, so it is. The gospel is nothing but an embodying of a living love itself in living words, words which immediately take captive the heart. The law kills because it is itself a dead letter, because it makes demands which it does not give strength to perform, the gospel is itself a living breath of love, and therefore it makes alive, therefore it works out what it aims at, it is ἐνεργής.

The nature of its efficacy is now more particularly described as an innermost penetration of the innermost man, as a genuine συγκεράννυμι (comp. ver. 2). It is sharper than every two-edged sword (δίστομος that which has two mouths, then that which has two foresides and no back, thus used of a sword: two-edged, comp. Rev. i. 16, ii. 12, LXX., Is. xi. 4, etc.). Not the deadly efficacy but the penetrating sharpness, is that which is meant to be set forth. This appears somewhat more clearly in the following member διϊκνούμενος, etc. "It (the word of God) penetrates even to the dividing asunder

* Only Grotius says: Convenit hoc omni verbo Dei, sed præcipue evangelio, still without explaining more particularly the connexion with ver. 11.

of soul and spirit, of the joints and the marrow." The first question that presents itself here is, whether this language is to be understood as figurative or not; *i. e.*, whether in what is here predicated of the λόγος τ. θ., we are to understand the language as properly a continuation of the figure of the sword (so that logically it would have to be extended thus: it penetrates *as a sword which penetrates* to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, of joints and marrow), or whether we are to understand a real and literal efficacy of the word of God as such to be set forth in the words: the word of God pierces into the soul and spirit, into marrow and bone (in which case only the latter expression would have to be taken as metonymical, or better still as a proverbial expression). Now, prima facie, it seems to be decisive against the latter and in favour of the former interpretation, that according to the latter, the author would be guilty of the inelegance of passing from a statement which is proper and definite, viz., that the word of God penetrates soul and spirit, to one which is vague and proverbial—that it penetrates marrow and bone. But the former interpretation also is attended with a difficulty by no means inconsiderable. Namely: can the figure of a sharp sword be, generally speaking, represented in the words: the sword penetrates even to the dividing asunder of *soul and spirit?* Swords have to do surely with bodies, not with souls and spirits! The most that can be said for this sense is, that the expression "separation of soul and spirit" may be understood as something equivalent to the separation of the body from the soul, and therefore as a mere designation of bodily death. In this case, we must either suppose that the expression is to be extended thus: "to the separation of the soul and the spirit *from the body*" (which, however, would destroy the parallelism with the following member ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν, while it cannot be perceived why the author should have named the spirit together with the soul, and why he did not rather simply say: ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος). Or, we must, with Olshausen have recourse to the conjecture that the author, under the idea of bodily death, had in his mind the consummation of a trichotomy, the separation of the soul from the spirit as well as from the body.

This leads us, however, to a *second question*, the determination of which is indispensable, ere we are at liberty to return to the first. The question is this: must we understand as connected by τε καί *two things closely united with each other by nature, or two things which have grown up together, between which* the sword (or the word of God as a sword) penetrates, and which it is to separate *from each other?* So that the soul should be viewed as having grown upon the spirit, the ἁρμός on the μυελός, somewhat in the same way as the bark on the wood, and the sword cuts through between them some-

what in the same way as a knife separates the bark from the wood. Or, are we to understand τε καί as connecting two things lying deep, of which, however, the second lies still deeper than the first, so that the sword (or the divine word as a sword) first of all, generally speaking, penetrates to them, and then, moreover, penetrates through the first to the second? Thus the spirit would be viewed as being in somewhat the same relation to the soul, as the innermost kernel of a fruit is to the core, and the sword as a knife which cuts into the core, nay, into the innermost kernel itself. The word μερισμός is not at all decisive in favour of the first interpretation; what is spoken of is a separation *as well* of the soul as of the spirit, *as well* of the joints as of the marrow, but not a separation of the soul *from* the spirit, of the joints from the marrow. This very τε καί is rather in favour of the second interpretation.

But a certain solution of the question must be obtained, first of all, from a closer consideration of the two pairs of things themselves. Could the author have had before his mind a separation of the soul *from* the spirit in general? In support of this, reference is made to the biblical trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit which meets us in 1 Thess. v. 23. There is undoubtedly a trichotomy in that passage; but whether by this is to be understood any such *mechanical* construction of man out of three parts or substances; whether it involves the possibility that the soul and the spirit can be cut asunder from each other, so that each may stand by itself, is indeed very much to be questioned. The Holy Scripture certainly distinguishes the soul from the body, and the spirit from the body, and the soul from the spirit. But nowhere does it represent the body as *outwardly separable* from the soul. The present body is a σῶμα ψυχικόν (1 Cor. xv. 44), and the ψυχικὸν εἶναι belongs to its essence. Separated from the soul, it is no longer "body," but "corpse;" every atom in it is qualitatively different as soon as the soul is severed from it; the body is throughout a quickened, animated, living, active material; the corpse is but a material subject to chemical laws. Now, as a "body" separated from the soul is a nonentity, much less can we conceive of a soul separated from the spirit. The same ψυχή which, by its separation from the body, has changed it into a corpse, is called as such also πνεῦμα (Luke xxiv. 37), a sure proof that soul and spirit are still more identical than soul and body. But how are we to explain the circumstance, that in 1 Thess. v. 23, and Heb. iv. 12, soul and spirit are *distinguished* from each other? Soul is the designation of that *life-centre* of individuality *given by nature*, proceeding from natural generation, and bringing with it from nature (as being a thing *not free*, but subject to the influence of nature) certain definite qualities and dispositions. The irrational animal has also this psychical centre of life. But that of man is, in its

essence, immortal; the chief endowment which he has brought along with him is that of self-consciousness in the higher sense, and with this the consciousness of God; thus his nature possesses the internal necessity of developing itself on the basis of *individuality* given by nature, to a self-determining *personality*, to *fill* itself with an endless existence. And thus the same *centre of life*, viewed as self-conscious, bears the name of πνεῦμα. The πνεῦμα is ψυχή in respect of its fundamental quality derived from nature, the ψυχή is πνεῦμα in respect of its personal development. This then affords also a complete explanation of the passage in 1 Thess. v. 23. The whole man,—spirit, soul, and body, is to be preserved blameless. The keeping blameless of the soul can certainly be distinguished from that of the spirit, without its being necessary to infer from this, that the soul is a second substance separable from the spirit. The body is kept blameless, when it is shielded from disease and preserved from vicious defilement, the soul, when it is preserved from insanity (distraction of the soul, frenzy), and pollution through unregulated instincts and passions, the spirit, when it is protected against error and sin.

We cannot, therefore, speak of a separation of the soul *from* the spirit (and with this the possibility falls to the ground of comprehending the μερισμός, etc., under the figure of the sword). On the other hand, an excellent sense is evolved when we regard the soul as something lying deep within man, the spirit as lying still deeper, and the word of God as *penetrating into the soul, and thence still deeper, even into the spirit.* For, the first and more superficial effect of the gospel is, that it in many ways stirs and moves the mind,—the complex assemblage of feelings derived from nature,—it involuntarily seizes the mind, binds and disturbs it. This stirring and arresting effect on the ψυχή it exercises in wider circles, even among the unawakened; it exercises this effect in national churches upon the nation, sinks itself into the heart as a still slumbering seed-corn, keeps hold of the man although he may not yet, by any free act of his own, have decided in favour of the gospel and its reception, and works on in the sphere of the *soul*, produces a strange and unaccountable uneasiness, and again gives comfort like a soft balm; in all this, it is only the ψυχή which has experienced its *power*. Soon, however, it penetrates still deeper, works no longer merely in the sphere of the involuntary activities of the soul, where no conscious resistance is made to it, but penetrates into the watchfully conscious life of the thoughts, passes from the ἐνθυμήσεις to the ἔννοιαι, obtains for itself a place in the sphere of the conscious will and voluntary thought, and carries on its plea with the old Adam in the clear light of day, until the man is driven to a final decision for or against the Gospel.

The second member *ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν* serves most fully to establish the interpretation we have given. With as little reason can it be said that the *ἁρμοί* have *grown* upon the *μυελοί*, as the soul upon the spirit. Μυελός is the marrow, *μυελοί* are the pieces of marrow in the cavities of the bones. Ἁρμός, literally joint, can be taken either in the signification of limb or of joint. The marrow grows neither together with the limbs nor the joints, but forms the inmost kernel of the limbs, and if we adopt the signification limb, we have, here again, two things named which are concentrically related to each other. It is not meant, therefore, that the marrow and the limb are severed from each other, but something is spoken of which cuts not merely into the members, but through the bones into the innermost marrow. Or, if we prefer the signification *joint*, something is spoken of, which not merely pierces as a common sword into the place of the cartilaginous joint, and in this way separates, for example, the under from the upper part of the arm at the elbow, but which penetrates also through and through to the marrow tubes.

But what is this something which has this penetrating power? The *separation of soul and spirit* must, as we have seen, be taken in the proper sense and referred to the *word of God*, not, in a figurative sense, to the sword. Can, then, this *separation of joints and marrow*, which is grammatically included with the foregoing in a single *μερισμός*, be referred to anything else than to the *word of God?* And yet can it with any propriety be said of the word of God that it cuts into the joints, nay even into the marrow? This brings us back to the *first question* which, as it will be remembered, was left undetermined.—I do not think we are warranted in charging the author with an inelegant recurrence from the thing to the figure; but the words in question seem capable of the easiest explanation, by supposing a rhetorical intermixture of two ideas which are logically to be separated, such as we have already observed in chap. ii. 18, iii. 3. With logical precision, the idea would be expressed thus: "The word of God is still sharper than a sword; for a sword cuts generally only into the soft flesh (soft, offering less resistance), but the word of God cuts not only into the (passive) soul, but even into the (free and conscious) spirit; it therefore resembles a sword which penetrates not merely into the members, but (through the bones) into the marrow." This chain of ideas the author puts into a more concise form thus: "The word of God is sharper than every two-edged sword, inasmuch as it penetrates to the dividing asunder as well of spirit as of soul" (thus resembling a sword which pierces even to the separation), "as well of the marrow as of the joints."

Κριτικὸς *ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδίας*—in these words lies the explanation of what was meant by the *cutting asunder of soul and*

spirit. Ἐνθυμήσεις are the natural desires and passions (not the evil only) which involuntarily and undisturbed find play in the natural man. The word of the gospel falls into these like a leavening, a λόγος κριτικός, *i. e.* not as a κριτής, a judge, but as having a *critical or separating* effect upon them. It causes a movement, a fermentation, an unavoidable disquiet among the more unconscious and slumbering impulses and passions; the man feels himself no longer happy, no longer innocent in the indulgence of inclinations to which he yielded before with undisturbed pleasure; he feels himself no longer satisfied with enjoyments and delights, which before were the ideal after which he strove. The word of God, however, exercises this sifting, rebuking, awakening, and comforting power, not merely on the ἐνθυμήσεις, but also on the ἔννοιαι (1 Pet. i. 12), the opinions, the maxims and principles which have been formed on the basis of the natural man, as the result of the conscious and free exercise of the mind. This power it has, because, as the word of that *grace* in the highest manifestation of which the *holiness* of God remained altogether unscathed, it both forgives and judges the same sin in the heart of man, at one and the same time, and by one and the same act. On the cross of Christ the guilt has been atoned for, and the sin which brought Christ to the cross at the same time condemned, and held up as an object of abhorrence to all who love the propitiator. Thus has this word of wonder, the wonder of all words, the power to comfort without seducing into levity, to shake without plunging into despair. It draws while it rebukes, it sifts while it draws: the man cannot set himself free from it who has once heard it; its gentleness will not allow him to cast it from him, and as he holds it fast he escapes not also from its sifting severity. It has in one word—a barb. The law of Moses rebukes the deed done; the word of the gospel works upon the source whence actions proceed, the mind, the heart; it judges *before* the deed is done, not *after;* it is living; its judging consists in making better, in sanctifying the inner man of the heart, and thus extending its efficacy to the outward life.

Ver. 13.—In these words, in which a power of *vision* is ascribed to the word of God ("nothing is hid from its eyes"), we have an instance of that familiar tropical application of this faculty, which is wont to be made to any *illuminating body*, and are by no means under the necessity of recurring to that unsuitable interpretation which explains the *word of God* of a *person.* We can say with perfect propriety: "the sun looks on us, before the sun everything lies open, nothing is hid from it; the stars look into the night"—we can say this without representing the sun and stars as personal beings. So here: all things lie open before the word of the gospel, simply because this word *throws its light* upon and illuminates all things, even the most secret motives of the heart.

Τραχηλίζω, to bend the neck, is said, according to the view of the later critics (since Perizonius), to have received the signification "to put in the pillory" (because those who were put in the pillory had their neck bent downwards), and from this came the signification: to lay open. There is no necessity, however, for such an explanation. The explanation given by old Greek scholiasts is the true one: τραχηλίζω, to bend any one's neck *backwards*, and thereby to lay bare the throat, hence in general: to lay bare.

Αὐτοῦ refers, of course, back to λόγος, not to θεοῦ, by which the thought would be entirely destroyed. With as little reason can it be regarded as pointing forwards to πρὸς ὅν (in the sense of ἐκείνου), so that we should have to translate the words thus: "all things are open to the eyes of that with which we have to do," and as if this were to be distinguished from the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, ver. 12, as something different. It is self-evident that both genitives αὐτοῦ point *backwards* to ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ.

The relative clause πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος is therefore dependent on an αὐτοῦ *already sufficiently definite in itself*, and does not serve the purpose of giving a definiteness to αὐτοῦ, but contains a new and additional idea. That λόγος does not here again denote the word of God, but has a different signification from what it has in ver 12, is likewise evident. Luther, Schulz, Vater, and others take it in the signification "speech, address," and πρός in the signification "in reference to," and the whole clause is analogous to the words in chap. v. 11 περὶ οὗ (πολὺς) ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος. They rendered it, accordingly, thus: "before the eyes of the word *of which we speak*." But this additional clause would be altogether insipid, superfluous, and useless. Others therefore sought to find a weightier meaning in the words. Following the Peshito, Chrys., Theophyl., Theodoret, Schmid, Michaelis assigned to the word λόγος the signification, "reckoning," which it has in the phrase λόγον ἀποδιδόναι (for example xiii. 17), and rendered: "of which we have to give account." This sense is not even suitable to the right explanation of ὁ λόγος τ. θ., nor is it consistent with the right explanation of ver. 12, in which, as we have seen, it is not the judicial threatenings of God's word that are spoken of. Moreover this sense will not admit of being justified on grammatical grounds, as λόγος ἐστί alone cannot stand for λόγος ἀποδοτέος ἐστί. With much more reason, Calvin, Kuinoel, and De Wette take λόγος in the general signification, res, negotium, and render: "with which we have to do." This explanation is doubly recommended if we were justified in finding in ver. 12 a material antithesis to ver. 2, the antithesis, namely, between the λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς which was spoken to the *contemporaries of Moses* and could not profit them, and the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, ver. 12, which is living and powerful, and by which, *according to the context*, is to be understood

the New Testament word of God in Christ. We have just observed in ver. 12, that this antithesis is in no way *expressed* in the words λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ (inasmuch as the genitive θεοῦ must be referred to a totally different antithesis); we see now, however, that the author has by no means left that antithesis without marked and definite expression. With intentional emphasis, he places quite at the end (and this very position gives it a peculiar force) the relative clause πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, "with which *we* have to do," in which the emphasis must be laid on the ἡμῖν. (In the German translation the αὐτοῦ must be rendered not by "desjenigen" but only by the possess. pron. On this, however, no relative can, according to the rules of the German language, be dependent, so that this relative clause, even in order rightly to express the emphasis which rests upon it, must be connected with the subject of the clause in ver. 12).

Vers. 14–16.—In the last verses the striking comparison between the *dead, outward, legal word* of Moses, which could not take away the *disobedience* of the Israelites, nor lead them to the true rest, and the *living penetrating word of the new covenant* was brought to a close. From this now flows as a direct consequence, that we have therefore (οὖν) in Christ not merely a second Moses, that we have in him more than a lawgiver, that we have in him who has gone for us and before us into the eternal Sabbath rest of the heavenly sanctuary, a *High Priest.*

This conclusion of the second section of the second part is, as we have already observed, on chap. ii. 17, completely parallel with the conclusion of the second section of the *first* part. In the first part it was shewn that *the Son is superior to the angels; a*, in his *person*, because in him the eternal πρωτότοκος became man ; *b*, in his *work*, because in him as the first-fruits man is raised to the dominion over the universe, and over all heavens ; and, *c*, this is effected because Christ as the *messenger of God* (ἀπόστολος) in things pertaining to men, united with this the office of *high priestly representative of men* (ἀρχιερεύς) in things pertaining to God. In the second part, it has now been shewn *that the Son is superior to Moses; a*, in his *person*, as the *Son* in the perfect *house* to the *servant* in the typical *house; b, in his work*, because he first opened the way for man to the true Sabbatical rest into which he himself entered before ; and from this it follows, *c*, that he joined to the office of a second Moses—a Divinely commissioned leader *out of captivity*—the office of a *high priest.* The author having thus been led from these two different starting-points to the idea of the ἀρχιερεύς, now proceeds to place upon the two first parts which may be viewed as the pillars of the arch, the third part which forms the key-stone, chap. vi., vii.

It will appear from what has been said that the particle *οὖν*, ver. 14, is to be taken in its usual signification, as marking an *inference* to be drawn from the foregoing, and as closely connecting vers. 14–16 with vers. 10–13. Those err furthest from the right understanding of the passage, who think (as Tholuck and Bleek) that the author left his *proper theme* at chap. iii. 1, lost himself, so to speak, in a digression which had *no proper connexion with the subject*, and that he now takes a sudden leap back to the path he had left, so that *οὖν* here is to be taken in a *resumptive* signification, and as referring to the end of chap. ii. ("Seeing then that we have, as has before been said, an high priest," etc.). With more reason it was already perceived by Calvin, that the author has compared Christ first with the angels, then (according to his plan) with Moses, and that he now intends to pass to a third point; only he failed to perceive that the idea with which the 14th verse begins, really follows as an *inference* from vers. 10–13, and thought therefore that *οὖν* must be taken in the signification atqui; "now further," which the word never has, and of which, as has been already said, there is no need.

Now it is not, of course, to be thought that all the epithets which are assigned to Christ in vers. 14–16, are enumerated with the view of exhibiting the *dissimilarity* between Christ and the Old Testament high priests, and the inferiority of the latter; for a comparison of this kind between Christ and the Old Testament high priest first begins at the third principal part, which immediately follows, and is there (chap. v. 1, seq.) expressly introduced by the general enumeration of the necessary requisites for the high priesthood (*for every high priest*, etc.). Here, on the other hand, we have simply the inference drawn from vers. 10–13, that to Christ belongs in general the high priestly calling (together with that of a second Moses). All the epithets that are here assigned to him have rather the object, therefore, of shewing the *similarity* between Christ and a high priest, or in other words, to vindicate the subsumption of Jesus under the idea of high priest. Vers. 14–16 do not at all belong to the third part, but quite as much to the second as chap. ii. 17, 18 to the first part; and Hugo von St. Cher shewed a much truer and deeper insight into the meaning and aim of the passage than the majority of later critics, when he commenced a new chapter with the words *πᾶς γὰρ ἀρχιερεύς*.

Ἀρχιερέα μέγαν; *ἀρχιερεύς* signifies by itself "high priest;" *μέγας* does not therefore serve to complete the idea of high priest (as is the case when it stands along with a mere *ἱερεύς*, when *ὁ ἱερεὺς ὁ μέγας* = הכוהן הגדול is to be rendered by "the high priest," as for example chap. x. 21), but *μέγας* has here the independent force of an attribute. It follows however, from what has before been said,

that Christ is not here by the adjective *μέγας*. as by a diff. specif., placed in opposition to the Old Testament high priest, as the great high priest to the small, but that *μέγας* here simply takes the place of a natural epithet (just as in chap. xiii. 20, in the words *τὸν ποιμένα τῶν προβάτων τὸν μέγαν*). In like manner, the words *διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς*, which point back immediately to ver. 11 (comp. however, also chap. vii. 26, ix. 11), serve simply to indicate an act of Christ wherein he appears analogous to the high priest; which also justifies the author in calling him an *ἀρχιερεύς*. These words *διεληλυθότα*, etc., contain therefore a supplementary explanation of the vis conclusionis indicated by *οὖν*. Because Christ has gone before as the first-fruits of humanity through the heavens into the eternal substantial rest, there to prepare a habitation for us, therefore, *and in so far*, was his act *analogous* not to what was done by Moses, but rather to the business of those high priests who in like manner entered into the earthly holy of holies. (That the entrance was again also *different* from that of the Old Testament high priests is indeed *implied* in these words, although it is not here *urged*. It is rather the difference betweed Christ and Moses that is here urged; all that is here urged is, that Christ in virtue of his being at the same time also a high priest, is superior to Moses).

On the *οὐρανοί* comp. our remarks on chap. i. 3. The *οὐρανοί* in the *plural*, through which Jesus has passed to the right hand of God, are here the different spheres of the creature, the atmospheric, the planetary heavens, the heavens of the fixed stars and the angels. He is gone into the dwelling-place in space of the absolute, finished, absolutely undisturbed revelation of the Father.

Jesus the Son of God, a brief repetition of the idea unfolded in chap. ii., that in the person of the incarnate *πρωτότοκος*, who as incarnate is called the *Son of God, man* is exalted to the right hand of God.

Because, therefore, we have in the person of this Jesus an high priest, and not a mere Moses redivivus, because he is, in virtue of this, so much superior to Moses, we must "hold fast the New Testament confession, and are not at liberty to give this an inferior and subordinate place to that of the Old Testament. *Κρατεῖν*, not "seize," but "hold fast," the opposite of *παραῤῥεῖν* ii. 1, *παραπίπτειν* vi. 6.

In ver. 15 there follows not an argument or motive for the exhortation *κρατῶμεν*; for this has already its motive in the words *having an high priest;* besides, the circumstance that Christ sympathises with our weakness, and was tempted like us, contains no motive for that exhortation; for this being tempted is not a peculiar characteristic of the New Testament high priest, not a prerogative of the new covenant, but a quality which belongs to him in

common with the Old Testament high priests. In ver. 15 we have rather an explanation of the clause, *We have an high priest.* The author shews that Christ was not wanting in the chief requisite necessary to an high priest in general. (In ver. 15, therefore, there is no such thing as a comparison between Christ and Aaron. The Old Testament high priests were in like manner *able to sympathise.* Comp. chap. v. 1. "*Every* high priest enters into office as one taken from among men, for the benefit of men in their relation to God").

But to what extent Christ was able to sympathise with our infirmities, and what is to be understood by these infirmities, appears most clearly from the words which follow: *Having been tempted in all things like as we are, without sin.* (At ὁμοιότητα the ἡμῶν which of course is to be understood, is omitted, as in Eph. iii. 18.) We must here, first of all, endeavor to obtain a clear idea of what is meant by *being tempted.* Being *tempted* is, on the one hand, something different from being *seduced;* on the other hand, however, it is something different from mere *physical suffering.* He who is seduced stands not in a purely passive relation, but with his own will acquiesces in the will of the seducer; he who is tempted is as such, purely passive. This, however, is no merely physical passivity; headache as such is no πειρασμός. In order rightly and fully to apprehend the idea involved in πειρασμός, we must keep in view the opposition between nature and spirit, between involuntary physical life and freely conscious life, natural dispositions and culture, original temperament and passions and personal character, a given situation and the manner of conduct. Christ as true man had a truly human physical life, experienced the affections of joy and sorrow, of pleasure and aversion, of hope and fear and anxiety, just as we do. He was capable of enjoying the innocent and tranquil pleasures of life, and he felt a truly human shrinking from suffering and death; in short, he was in *the sphere of the involuntary life of the soul passively susceptible* as we are. But there is a moral obligation lying upon every man, not to let himself be mastered by his natural affections *which in themselves are altogether sinless,* but rather to acquire the mastery over them. This will be most evident in reference to temperaments. That one man is naturally of a sanguine temperament is no sin; but if he should allow himself to be hurried into rage by his temperament, instead of laying a check upon it, this is sin. To be of a phlegmatic temperament is no sin; but to fall into habits of sloth, by giving place to this temperament, is sin. Thus *every* temperament involves peculiar temptations. The case is similar with reference to the affections. That I feel joy in an innocent and quiet life is no sin; but were I placed in a position in which such happiness of life could be acquired or maintained

only by the neglect of a duty, then it is my duty to suppress that feeling which is sinless in itself,—that innocent sensation,—and to sacrifice my pleasure to duty. And in as far as I shall still be susceptible of that natural affection of pleasure which I have sacrificed, in so far will it be to me in my peculiar position a *temptation.* That a poor man loves his children, and cannot bear that they should perish of hunger, is in itself a natural sinless affection; but let him be so placed as that without danger of discovery he could steal a piece of money, then that natural affection becomes to him a temptation.

Now, it is quite clear that a man may, in this way find himself in the situation of *being tempted*, without its being necessary to suppose that there is therefore in him any *evil inclination.* The poor man may be a truly honest Christian man; the objective temptation is there; the thought is present to his mind in all the force of the natural affection: "If I were at liberty to take this gold, how I might appease the hunger of my children;" but at the same time he has an immediate and lively consciousness of his duty, and not a breath of desire moves within him to take the gold; he knows that he dare not do this; it is a settled thing with him that he is no thief.—So was it in reference to Christ's temptation; he was tempted "in every respect," in joy and sorrow, in fear and hope, in the most various situations, but *without sin;* the being tempted was to him purely *passive*, purely *objective;* throughout the whole period of his life he renounced the pleasures of life for *which he had a natural susceptibility*, because he could retain these only by compliance with the carnal hopes of the Messiah entertained by the multitude, and he maintained this course of conduct in spite of the prospect which became ever more and more sure, that his faithfulness and persecution would lead him to suffering and death, *of which he felt a natural fear.* That susceptibility of pleasure and this fear, were what tempted him—not sinful inclinations, but pure, innocent, natural affections, belonging essentially to human nature.*

It is evident, that a distinction is to be drawn between this *being tempted without sin* and that temptation in which the sinful, fallen man "is drawn away of his own lust and enticed" (*i. e.* the *subjective* operation of a *sinful desire*, in an objective situation which demands the suppression of a natural affection in itself good). That this species of temptation found any place in the sinless one, is denied in the words: *without sin.* Christ, as Olshausen well observes, possessed in his estate of humiliation not indeed an inability to sin, but certainly like Adam the ability not to sin.

Ver. 16 brings the second section of the second part, and, there-

* Hence the error of the Irvinites in thinking that it is impossible to hold the real temptation of Christ without the supposition of an inward evil inclination.

with, this part itself to a full and formal conclusion. We have here, however, not merely the old admonition of merely general import: not to lose the benefits of the *new* covenant from a false attachment to the forms of the *old* covenant; the admonition is given here in a special form, namely to hold fast the *grace* of God, and to come with joyfulness to the throne of *grace*. In speaking of this throne of grace, the author had certainly not in his mind the כַּפֹּרֶת (which indeed is called "mercy-seat" *only* in Luther's translation, but not in the original, nor in the Sept., and which was in reality a simple "cover" or "lid"); the author in an exhortation to hold fast the specifically Christian element in the atonement of Christ, would assuredly not have expressed himself in a form peculiar to the *Jewish* cultus. The throne of grace is simply the throne of God, but of God as a reconciled father in Christ: They are to draw near to God not as a judge, but as a gracious father for Christ's sake.

Ἵνα λάβωμεν ἔλεον καὶ χάριν εὕρωμεν εἰς εὔκαιρον βοήθειαν, that we may receive mercy and find grace to a seasonable help (as seasonable help). Εὔκαιρος, opportunus, not "in time of need," but simply the opposite of an ἄκαιρος βοήθεια, a help which comes too late. Εἰς cannot, grammatically considered, introduce the *time* of the *receiving* and *finding*, but only the *end* and *result* thereof. ("That we may receive mercy, etc. to a seasonable help" = that the mercy which we receive may take the form of a help coming still at the right time; *i. e.*, to give the sense in other words: that we, so long as it is yet time, and we have something still to help us, may receive mercy and find grace.)

This concluding exhortation to have recourse to *grace*, forms also at the same time the transition to the following part. "Let us come to the throne of grace," the author has just said. Forthwith he himself follows his own admonition, and goes with his readers before the throne of grace, and begins the consideration of the *high-priestly* calling of Christ.

PART THIRD.

CHRIST AND THE HIGH PRIEST.

(v.—vii.)

Hugo von St. Cher has, here again, shewn a happy tact in making a new chapter begin with the words πᾶς γὰρ ἀρχιερεύς. On the first superficial view, one might be tempted to connect chap. v. 1–10 with chap. iv. 14–16, because in both passages we find a comparison between Christ and the Old Testament high priest (a comparison, too, which has respect to the points of similarity). But, to say nothing of the formal conclusion in iv. 16, a closer view of the contents will shew us that a new part begins with v. 1, which (as before at ii. 17, seq.) was merely intimated, and for which the way was prepared in iv. 14, seq. In chap. iv. 14 the writer had already come to speak of the highest and last point in the high-priestly work of Christ; the comparison with Moses and Joshua had led him to the high-priestly entrance of Christ into the Sabbatical rest of the heavenly sanctuary. In chap. v. 1, on the contrary, he begins again, so to speak, at the lowest point and goes upwards, specifying one by one the requisites for the office of High Priest, and proving whether these requisites are found in Christ. (Every high priest must, in the first place, be taken from among men, vers. 1–3, secondly, however, must be called of God to his office, ver. 4. Christ was truly called of God, vers. 5, 6, but at the same time he was true man, vers. 7–9). These points of similarity, however, lead him of themselves to the points of difference between Christ and Aaron, to the Melchisedec-nature of the priesthood of Christ, which new theme he intimates in ver. 10, and, after a somewhat lengthy digression of a hortatory character, treats it in detail in chap. vii. In chap. vii. he then takes up the threads of argument laid down in chap. ii. and chap. iv., and is at length led back to the idea, which was already only briefly intimated in chap. iv. 14 (the entrance of Christ into the *heavenly* the *true* holy of holies) as the highest point at which he aims. The entire part, therefore, chap. v. 1—chap. vii. 28, forms the exposition of the theme that was

merely intimated in chap. ii. 17, and chap. iv. 14. And thus we are convinced that chap. iv. 14–16 forms in reality the *conclusion* of the second principal part, in like manner as chap. ii. 17, 18 that of the first part, and that the true and proper commencement of the third part is to be placed at chap. v. 1.

We infer also from what has just been said, that the third part is, as a whole, parallel in its arrangement with the two first parts. It, too, falls into *two sections* (1, chap. v. 1–10, similarity between Christ and Aaron ; 2, dissimilarity between Christ and Aaron, similarity with Melchisedec), and here also, these two sections are markedly separated from each other by an admonitory piece inserted between them (chap. v. 11—vi. 20). That this hortatory piece in the third part is longer and fuller than in the two first parts can create no surprise. Already was that of the second part (extending from the 7th to the 19th verse of chap. 3) longer than that of the first part (chap. ii. 1–4); in this third part it extends to twenty-four verses, and thus shews itself even outwardly as the last part of an admonition, which from its commencement onwards, gradually becomes more urgent and more full. But in its internal character also, as we shall see, it stands in very close connexion with the chapter which follows. And a longer resting-place was necessary before this seventh chapter, not merely on account of the greater *difficulty* of its contents, but chiefly also because chap. vii. does not connect immediately with chap. v. 10, but at once points back to the train of thought in chaps. i.—ii., iii.—iv., and weaves into an ingenious web all the threads formerly laid down. Chap. vii. is not merely the second section of the third part, but forms at once the key-stone of the first and second parts, and the basis of the fourth part (the argument that the sanctuary into which Christ entered is the true sanctuary, of which the Old Testament temple and worship were only a type). Nay, the seventh chapter may thus be said to form properly the kernel and central point of the whole epistle.

SECTION FIRST.

CHRIST AND AARON.

(v. 1–10.)

Ver 1.—Γάρ is not argumentative, but explicative, and introduces the exposition of the theme intimated in iv. 14–16, to the closer consideration and laying to heart of which a charge was implicitly given in ver. 16.—Other interpreters have understood γάρ as

argumentative, and entirely misapprehending the clear structure of thought in these ten verses, have taken ver. 1 as helping to prove what is said in iv. 15. "Christ must have sympathy with our infirmities, for even human high priests have sympathy with sins." Thus the high priests taken from among men would here be opposed to Christ as one not taken from among men, and an inference drawn a minori ad majus. But if this interpretation is to be received, we miss here, first of all, a *καί* or *καίπερ* before the words *ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος*; then the words *ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων καθίσταται* and *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν* would be quite superfluous; thirdly, we should expect *ληφθείς*, and finally, the words *ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος* would not even form a clear antithesis to Christ, who also was to be included among those born of woman. Nay, even the vis conclusionis in that argum. a minori would be very doubtful; from the fact that sinful men are indulgent towards the *ἀγνοήματα* of others, it cannot be all at once inferred that the sinless one must have been much more indulgent.

We therefore understand the proposition in ver. 1 not as a special, but as a general one. Nothing is intended to be said of the human high priests in opposition to Christ, but the intention rather is to enumerate the requisites which *every* high priest must have. That these requisites were found in Christ, and in how far they belonged to him, is then shewn in vers. 5–10. Thus then vers. 1–4 form a sort of major proposition, vers. 5–10 a minor proposition (which implicitly contains the self-evident conclusion).

Of course, the words *ἐξ ἀνθρώπων λαμβανόμενος* cannot be the *attribute* belonging to the *subject* of the sentence, but must be viewed as in *apposition* to the predicate. The right rendering is not: "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men," but "Every high priest is, as one taken from among men, ordained for men in their relation to God." And it is further to be observed, that the words *taken from among men* express the *principal idea*, while the proof of the *necessity* of this is given in the words *is ordained for men*. The form in which this proof is given is, that the being *taken from among men* expresses the *ground of the possibility* of the being *ordained for men*. Expressed in a logical form, it would stand thus: Every high priest can appear before God for men, *only in virtue of his being taken from among men*. (We found precisely the same logical form at chap. iv. 6, 7).

It is *men* whom the high priest is to represent, and that "in their relation to God," *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν* (comp. chap. ii. 17, where the same idea was briefly hinted which is here ex professo carried out); therefore must every high priest himself be taken *out of men*, out of the number of men; this is the *first requisite of every high*

priest. This requisite is now further explained. He is ordained or appointed for men as their representative before God, not as Moses, to receive the law in their stead, but to offer sacrifices for them. "Gifts" is not the more general, and "sacrifices" the more special term, for ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν refers to προσφέρῃ, and therefore also to both δῶρα and θυσίαι. These two terms are (just like τέρατα and σημεῖα) only two designations of one and the same thing, regarded from different points of view. Sacrifices are called gifts, because the person for whom the atonement is to be made gives them to the priest for God; they are called sacrifices, because they must be slain in order to have an atoning efficacy. The person whose guilt is to be atoned for must take the victim from his own *property*, that it may appear as a representative of himself; and then the victim must suffer the death which its owner had deserved.

In vers. 2, 3, this first requisite of the high priest is still further illustrated. Every high priest is set up as one taken from among men, that he may offer sacrifices *as one who can rightly judge respecting the sinners who bring them.* The mechanical offering of the sacrifices is not enough; a psychologically just estimate of the particular case of him for whom the atonement is to be made, must precede the offering.

Now, this is a point which, so far as I know, no commentator has rightly understood. To look at the passage, first of all, grammatically, the word μετριοπαθεῖν is a term invented by the Peripatetics, which afterwards passed into the general language. The best explanation of the term is given by Diog. Laert. v. 31, when he represents Aristotle as saying that the wise man is not ἀπαθής, but μετριοπαθής. The term involves an antithesis at once to the want and the excess of the passions; it denotes the application of Aristotle's cardinal virtue μεσότης to the sphere of the πάθη. Hence, it may quite agreeably to the context signify: "firm" in relation to suffering, "mild" in relation to the offender, "indulgent" in reference to the erring. (So in Appian, Josephus, especially in Philo and Clem. Alex.). Many commentators would therefore, without more ado, understand the term here also as signifiying "to be indulgent," but, as we shall soon see, improperly. The term ἀγνόημα does not denote sin in general, but a particular class of sins. It is well known, that by no means all trespasses and crimes were, under the old covenant, atoned for by sacrifice, but wilfully wicked transgressions of the law (παραβάσεις) were required to be punished, and could be expiated and atoned for only by the endurance of the penalty. Those sins alone which had been committed בִּשְׁגָגָה, *i. e.*, without the purpose to do evil, in which the man had been hurried into evil by his nature, by the ebullition of passion, could be atoned for without punishment, by sacrifices or sin-offerings (according to the degree of the tres-

pass). Now, *ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πλανώμενοι* in our passage corresponds precisely to the idea of the שְׁגָגָה. (Some wrongly explain *ἀγνόημα* of "sins of error." Such sins are not meant as proceed from *habitual* errors, but such as *in the moment of their being committed* were not accompanied with a clear consciousness of their culpability).

We have now the explanation of the idea as a whole. A priest was not at liberty at once to receive and slay a sacrifice which one brought to him; but he must first make inquiry into the act that had been committed, and must examine whether it belonged to the category of the שְׁגָגָה to which sacrifices were appropriated. This, of course, he could do only by knowing from his own experience the passions of human nature; *i. e.*, *ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς περίκειται ἀσθένειαν*. (*Περικεῖσθαί τι*, to be clothed with anything, to be burdened with).*

The third verse contains a further explanation. In order to demonstrate how necessary it is that a high priest should partake in the infirmity of the men whom he represents, the circumstance is added, that according to the ordinance of the Mosaic law, the high priest was required to offer sacrifice for his own sins. It is this idea chiefly that has given occasion to the false interpretation of ver. 1. Such a thing, it has been thought, could be said only of "human high priests." But this is altogether unnecessary, for the author in vers. 1–4 speaks just as little of human high priests in opposition to Christ, as of Christ specially. He simply lays down the two requisites which belong to the idea of *high priest*, as historically represented in the law, and ver. 3 contains a proof of the first requisite taken from the law. Let us leave it to the author himself to inquire in ver. 5, seq., how far these requisites were predicable of Christ. He will himself know the proper time and place, ver. 8 (and later, chap. vii. 27), for shewing in what respect Christ was *unlike* those Old Testament high priests.

In ver. 4 we have the *second requisite qualification* of every high priest. He must be taken *from among men;* he must not be ordained *by men*, nor usurp the office himself, but must be one *called of God* (at *ἀλλὰ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* is to be supplied simply *λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν*, "as one called of God he receives this honour"), as was the case also with Aaron (and therefore with his posterity who were called with him).†

* The idle question why the author does not use *συμπαθεῖν* instead of *μετριοπαθεῖν*, as well as the false solution of this question connected with the false interpretation of ver. 1, namely, that a pure sympathy can be ascribed only to Christ, but a weak "indulgence" to "human high priests"—both fall of themselves to the ground. *Συμπαθῆσαι could* not be used; we might say *συμπαθῆσαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις*, but not *συμπαθῆσαι τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι*; the latter would mean! to partake in the feelings of sinners—therefore, for example, in those of an evil conscience.

† Tholuck begins a new section with ver. 4. But vers. 7–10 refers to vers. 1–3 pre-

At vers. 5, 6, the inquiry begins whether, and in how far, these two requisites belonged to Christ. The words in themselves are clear. At *ἀλλ' ὁ λαλήσας* is, of course, to be supplied *ἐδόξασεν αὐτόν*. The sentiment, however, is variously interpreted. Some, as Grotius, Limborch, Tholuck, etc., understand the cited passage Ps. ii. 7, as if the author intended to adduce it as a proof that Jesus was called of God to be an high priest. The words *ἀλλ' ὁ λαλήσας* would accordingly have to be logically resolved thus: "But God, inasmuch as he has spoken to him." Others, however, object to this, that in the passage of the psalms neither is the person of Jesus addressed, nor is anything said of the high priestly dignity. Now that in the psalm Jesus is not personally addressed, would of itself have little weight; the verse that is cited contains an address to that Son of David who came soon to be identified with the Messiah; and that Jesus is the Messiah was, as we have before seen, a thing undoubted by the readers. If then it was said in the Old Testament that the Messiah must be an high priest, this was eo ipso true also of Jesus, because he was the Messiah. But another question is, whether in Ps. ii. 7 there is any mention of a high priestly dignity as belonging to the Messiah? In the most artificial way has it been attempted to introduce this into the words. While the expression, *This day I have begotten thee*, refers as we have seen at chap. i. 5, to the prophecy of Nathan, 2 Sam. vii., which is regarded by the Psalmist as, so to speak, a generation of the future *seed*, Grotius, Limborch, Tholuck, etc., would understand this statement, arbitrarily as I think, of the future installation of the second David in his kingdom; and with this again the resurrection of Christ is said to be denoted, and this again is said to involve a calling to the office of high priest! It is therefore not to be wondered at that others, as Carpzov, Bengel, Bleek, etc., have renounced that interpretation of *ἀλλ' ὁ λαλήσας* as a whole, and following Theophylact and Erasmus, have taken these words, together with the citation from Ps. ii. 7, as a *mere circumlocution* for *ὁ πατήρ*. Jesus did not make himself an high priest, but *he* who has called him his Son. The same who, in another place (Ps. ii. 7), called him his Son, has called him also priest (Ps. cx. 4). But convenient as this escape from the difficulty is, it can still hardly be justified. The author must in that case have said at ver. 6: *λέγει γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ*, or at least (with the omission of the *καί*): *καθὼς ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέγει*. But as it stands, the passage cited in ver. 6 from Ps. cx. is clearly added as a *second* proof to the passage from Ps. ii., as a *first* proof of the divine calling of the Messiah (consequently of Jesus) to the honour of the priesthood.

cisely in the same way as vers. 5, 6, to ver. 4. Vers. 5–10 forms the logical minor proposition to vers. 1–4.

And, in reality, the second psalm will be seen to involve such a proof, when we look at it in its historical connexion. The Messiah was called, 2 Sam. vii., to build an house for the Lord more perfect than the tabernacle built under the direction of Moses and Aaron; through him, nay in his person, God was really and perfectly to dwell with men; through him mankind was to be exalted to the honour of being children of God; he himself was to be raised to the honour of being a son of God. To this Ps. ii. refers. Thus was given to him indeed the calling to be *more than a mere ruler;* by a truly priestly mediation he was to transact the affairs of men in their relation to God.

This is expressed undoubtedly more plainly and distinctly in the passage Ps. cx. 4 which is cited in ver. 6. The emphasis in this passage rests on the words *thou art a priest*, not on the words *according to the order* (Heb. דברה) *of Melchisedec.* Some wrongly suppose that the author, here already, designs to pass to the dissimilarity between Christ and Aaron, the Melchisedec-nature of the priesthood of Christ. How can such an assertion be made in the face of the fact, that the author first in ver. 10 formally lays down the comparison between Christ and Melchisedec as a new theme (*of whom we have much to say*), to the detailed treatment of which he does not proceed, until he has prepared the way by an admonition of considerable length, v. 11, vi. 20? In our passage, those concluding words of the 4th verse of the psâlm are cited, simply in passing, along with the rest of the verse, partly, for the better understanding of the verse in general, partly, because the author has it in his mind afterwards (ver. 10) to bring into the fore-ground this new element involved in the name Melchisedec, partly, in fine, because, in general, Melchisedec offered a suitable example for the element of which he treats here in the 6th verse—the union of the priestly with the kingly dignity of the Messiah. Here then, as already observed, all the emphasis lies on ἱερεύς. That to the promised seed of David (to that form which was then, so to speak, obscure and wavering, but which afterwards consolidated itself into the definite form of the Messiah) it was said: "Thou art a priest" —in this lay the most sufficient proof of the statement that he who was the Messiah was therewith, eo ipso, also called of God to the honour of the priesthood. We have already seen (on chap. i. 13) that Ps. cx. refers to that same prediction of Nathan, 2 Sam. vii. And that the Psalmist could not but see in that promise of Nathan the promise of a priest-king, has appeared from our remarks on the 5th verse. A king who was called to build God a temple, was called to something more than the kingly office,—to something more than the government of men in their human and civil relations; he was called to a direct interest in the sacred relation of men to God.

Now in Ps. cx. 1 it was expressly said that that *seed* shall sit with God upon his throne, take part in the dominion of God, be the most immediate fulfiller of the will of God among the Israelites, and thereby serve the Lord in a priestly character, not, however, in that of the Aaronitical priesthood. What better form could present itself to the Psalmist as combining all these features, than the form of that Melchisedec who had been at once king and priest on the same hill of Zion, and in whose name even was expressed all that was expected of the future second David? (comp. Ps. xlv. 6, and our remarks on chap. i. 9, seq.) Thus came the Psalmist to the designation of the Messiah as a *priest.*

Therefore: *Jesus, who is the Messiah, is in the first place similar to Aaron in this, that like him he is called of God to the high priesthood,* called in the prophecy of Nathan itself, and in the two psalms which refer to that prophecy, which represent the future Messiah as *mediator of men with God,* and the second of which even *names* him "priest." In ver. 7–9 the author now proceeds to prove that the first requisite also—*taken from among men*—belonged to Christ. The farther treatment of this requisite carries him naturally to the point in which Jesus is superior to Aaron, to the theme of the second section (hence he has given this requisite which stands first in the major proposition the last place in the minor.)

By means of ὅς this sentiment is loosely connected with ver. 5, 6. Grammatically, ὅς refers back, of course, to ὁ Χριστός or (πρὸς) αὐτόν, ver. 5. The whole period vers. 7–9 can be construed in two ways. We may either, A, take the participles προσενέγκας and εἰσακουσθείς as appositions to the first principal verb ἔμαθεν alone (consequently to the first part of the predicate); or B, those two participles may be taken as appositions to the subject ὅς (in which case the two verbs ἔμαθεν and ἐγένετο are logically to be referred to the two ideas expressed by προσενέγκας and εἰσακουσθείς).

A. ὅς 1, . . . προσενέγκας καὶ . . . εἰσακουσθεὶς . . . ἔμαθεν
2, καὶ τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο αἴτιος

B. ὅς, προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθεὶς
1, ἔμαθεν
2, καὶ ἐγένετο αἴτιος

In order to be able to decide which of these two constructions deserves the preference—for, grammatically, both are equally possible—we must look more closely at the meaning of the several parts of the period, and we begin with the *first part of the predicate, i. e.* the words καίπερ ὢν υἱὸς ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθε τὴν ὑπακοήν, "Who . . . although he was a son, learned obedience in that which he suffered." The concession in καίπερ refers not to ἔμαθε as if what is strange consists in this, that a *son can learn;** but it evidently refers espe-

* This would be admissible only if υἱός were used by our author in the sense of the

cially to *ὑπακοήν*. Although a *son* he must learn to *obey*. Of course, however, *ὑπακοή* cannot be used here in its general sense, as denoting obedience *to the commands of God in general*, but finds its natural limitation in the words *ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθε* beside which is the verb *ἔμαθε*. What is spoken of is obedience to the *special* decree of the Father who laid upon the son the necessity of *suffering;* or otherwise expressed, a special manifestation of general obedience to the Father consisting in this—that Christ swerved not from that general obedience even when it entailed upon him inevitable suffering. And thus the *ἔμαθε* explains itself. By this cannot of course be meant a gradual transition from disobedience to obedience, but only a development of the virtue of obedience itself, the progress of which runs parallel to the difficulty of the situation in which Jesus was placed; consequently, the transition from easy obedience to more difficult, and thereby, more perfect obedience. In proportion as the choice for Jesus either to become unfaithful to the will of his Father, or firmly to encounter unavoidable suffering, became more definite and critical, did he decide with ever increasing firmness and clearness of consciousness on the side of suffering, and against that of disobedience. Thus was every successive step rendered more easy by that which preceded it. When at his entrance on his public labour, there was objectively set before him in the temptation (Matth. iv.) the possibility of his yielding to the carnal expectations of the Jews with reference to the Messiah, the choice which he then made was, outwardly indeed, (as no definite suffering threatened him as yet) easier, but, inwardly, more difficult than that which he made at the temptation in Gethsemane, when indeed his impending suffering appeared to him in its most definite and threatening form, but when he had already made such progress in the way of *obedience* that he must have cast aside and negatived his whole past history had he now chosen the path of disobedience. With every step which he took in the way of *obedience* this became more and more a part of his nature, the law of his being. This is what the author will express by the words, *he learned obedience.*

The next question now is, on what word the determination of time *ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ* depends, whether on *προσενέγκας* or on *ἔμαθε*, whether therefore we are to place a comma after *ὅς* or after *σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*. If *ἐν ἡμέραις*, etc., is referred to *ἔμαθε*, then *ἐν ἡμέραις* as the chronological determination of the first principal verb *ἔμαθε* corresponds to *τελειωθείς* as the chronological determination of the second principal verb *ἐγένετο*. We should then have to adopt the construction above denoted by A, [*ὅς* 1) *ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις*, etc.

Nicene creed to denote the Logos *qua* pre-existent, which, however, as we have seen in chap. iv. 1, is not the case. *Υἱός* in the Epistle to the Hebrews always denotes the son of God *qua* incarnate.

προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθείς, ἔμαθεν, 2) καὶ τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο αἴτιος.] For, if ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις, etc., belongs to ἔμαθε, then προσενέγκας καὶ εἰσακουσθείς cannot of course be in apposition to ὅς, but only to the predicate contained in ἔμαθε. If, on the other hand, ἐν ἡμέραις, etc., be referred to προσενέγκας, in this case both the constructions A and B are possible. But against this reference of ἐν ἡμέραις, etc., to προσενέγκας is, in general, the circumstance, that the words προσενέγκας δεήσεις καὶ ἱκετηρίας, etc., evidently point to the struggle which Christ underwent in Gethsemane, for the chronological determination of which, however, the words ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ would be too vague and indefinite.

Σάρξ, different from σῶμα, denotes the creature in contradistinction to the immaterial, invisible God,—then in its opposition to God,—finally corporealness, as lying under the effects of sin, subject to death. In the future kingdom of glory there will be, according to 1 Cor. xv., σώματα, but no longer σώματα σαρκικά.* The ἡμέραι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ are, therefore, the days of the life of Christ even to his death. They form indeed the most suitable antithesis to τελειωθείς, and quite as suitable a chronological determination of ἔμαθε ὑπακοήν, but on the other hand, not so suitable a chronological determination of the particular event denoted by the words προσενέγκας δεήσεις, etc. For this reason, even if there were no other, the reference to ἔμαθεν recommends itself as the preferable, and with it, that construction of the whole period which we have denoted above by A.

This is confirmed, however, when we turn to consider the two participles προσενέγκας and εἰσακουθείς with that which is dependent on them.

That in the first of these participles there is a reference to the suffering of Jesus in Gethsemane, is unmistakeable. (So Theodoret, Calvin, Bengel, Carpzov, Paulus, Tholuck, Bleek, and the most of commentators.) On κραυγή comp. Luke xxii. 44, although κραυγή is a rhetorico-hyperbolical expression descriptive of the *inward* intensity of that struggle. It is doubtful, however, whether θάνατος here denotes death in the wider sense,—the danger of death—or death as having already actually taken place; whether therefore the sense is, Jesus prayed to him who could save from death, *preserve from death*, or: Jesus prayed to him who could save from death, *i. e. raise him up*. (Estius, Baumgarten, Schulz, suppose the latter: Michaelis and Bleek both; the most of commentators the former alone.) In as far as that prayer of Jesus contains simply the request

* It has been justly doubted, on the other hand, whether the expression "resurrection of the flesh" in the Symb. apost. of Luther, etc., is one that altogether corresponds to Scripture phraseology. And in the oldest recensions of the Symb. apost. it is not an ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός, but πάσης σαρκός that is spoken of (= כל־בשר, all men, righteous and ungodly).

that he may be saved from the threatened cup of suffering, but has no special reference whatever to a future resurrection, in so far does the first interpretation recommend itself prima facie.

This is confirmed again by the following words *καὶ εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας*. Critics are, indeed, here also, not agreed as to the way in which these words are to be explained. Chrys., Phot., Œcum., Theophylact, Vulgata, Luther, Calov, Olshausen, Bleek, and some others, understand *εὐλάβεια* in the sense of *fear of God, piety*, *ἀπό* in the sense of pro, propter = *διά* c. acc., and make the sense to be—that Jesus was heard on account of his piety. (In this case, *σώζειν ἐκ θανάτου* must be referred to the *resurrection* of Christ; for his prayer to be preserved from death, as every one knows, could not be heard). But the meaning here given to *ἀπό* is unnatural, and the sentiment itself much more unnatural. In this place, where the design of the author is to shew, that the first requisite of every high priest—that namely of being *taken from among men*, and *clothed with infirmity*—was not wanting in Christ, there was assuredly no occasion for mentioning the special piety of Christ. More correctly the Peshito, Itala, Ambrosius, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Gerhard, Capellus, Limborch, Carpzov, Bengel, Morus, Storr, Kuinoel, Paulus, De Wette, Tholuck, and a whole host of critics besides, render *εὐλάβεια* by *fear, anxiety*, which signification has been vindicated on philological grounds by Casaubon, Wetstein, and Krebs. *Εἰσακουσθείς* is now, of course to be taken in a pregnant sense, which pregnancy (this Bleek has entirely overlooked) is here fully explained by the foregoing words: *προσενέγκας δεήσεις πρὸς τὸν δυνάμενον σώζειν*. Christ was, *in reference to his prayer to be preserved*, heard, and thus saved *ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας*. But then there is in these very words *ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας* a limitation of *εἰσακουσθείς*. He prayed to be preserved from the death which threatened him, and was *heard* and saved from the fear of death.*

At all events, it would be altogether unnatural to explain *εἰσακούεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας* of the resurrection ("to save from all anxiety and trouble"). For this would certainly be a very indistinct way of denoting a thing for which many distinct expressions were at hand.

If, however, *εἰσακουσθεὶς ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας* is still explained of the resurrection from the dead, then must also the words *σώζειν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου* be, of course, explained of the same. In this case, things that were done *in the days of his flesh* would be spoken of not in *both* participles, but only in the first (*προσενέγκας*, etc.). Then must the chronological determination *in the days* be referred

* Perhaps it would be still more simple not to take *εἰσακουσθείς* in a pregnant sense, but to give *ἀπό* the signification *on the side of*, "in reference to." He was heard in so far as regards the fear of death.

to προσενέγκας *alone*, and thus we should come to the construction B.

Who.

After he, *a*, cried in the days of his flesh to him who could raise him up from death,

and, *b*, was then freed (by the resurrection) from all distress,

1, learned obedience by his suffering, and :

2, after he was perfected, is able to save others.

But against this interpretation there are all possible reasons ; first, the unsuitableness indicated above of the second chronological determination *in the days*, etc., to this single event : secondly, the circumstance that Jesus did not pray in Gethsemane with reference to his restoration from death ; thirdly, that the words εἰσακ. ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας cannot be understood as denoting with any distinctness the resurrection.

If, on the other hand, we abide by the explanation given above, and understand εἰσακουσθείς, etc., of the strengthening of Jesus by the angel, there results a far finer and more suitable sentiment. Jesus prayed to be preserved from death. This was not sin but *infirmity*. His prayer was not unheard ; it was so heard, however, as that Jesus was divested of the *fear of death*.* What a significant example of *learning obedience !*

According to this interpretation, things are spoken of in *both* participles which were done "in the days of Christ's flesh." We can now refer *in the days* to that to which alone it is suitable, and to which it is more suitable than to προσενέγκας, namely to ἔμαθεν. Accordingly, we render the passage thus :

Who,

1, In the days of his flesh,

a, when he prayed for the warding off of death.

b, and was heard in as far as respects the *fear* of death,

learned obedience in that which he suffered, and :

2, after he was perfected,

became the author of eternal salvation, etc.

What a beautiful harmony and symmetry does the sentiment thus receive !

On ver. 9 only a little remains to be observed. Τελειωθείς finds its explanation in its corresponding antithesis : *in the days of his flesh*. In the days of his flesh he was a member and partaker of humanity still lying under the effects of sin and not yet arrived at its destination, and he himself had therefore not yet come to the

* This would do away with the objection of Bleek (ii. p. 78); "that Christ was freed from his solicitude, stands in no intelligible connexion with the principal clause, that he learned obedience by suffering."

destined end of his actions and history. This was first attained when, raised from the dead, he entered in a glorified body into the heavenly sanctuary, as the first-fruits of exalted humanity (chap. ii. 9). Thither he draws after him all who allow themselves to be drawn by him, and who reproduce in themselves his priestly *obedience* in a priestly form, as the *obedience of faith* (Acts vi. 7 ; Rom. i. 5). But as Christ himself was not saved from bodily death, but from the *fear* of death, so also is the *salvation* which he gives to his followers not a preservation from bodily death, but an *eternal salvation*, a deliverance from the *fear of death* and the power of him who has the *power of death* (ii. 14), from eternal death.

Ver. 10.—Some hold with great incorrectness that ver. 10 contains an *explanation* of ver. 9, and is designed to shew how, and in what way, Christ is the *author of salvation*, namely, by his priestly intercession with the Father. Not a word is here said of the priestly *intercession* in opposition to the priestly *satisfaction*. Nor does the comparison with Melchisedec point to this, as Melchisedec never interceded for any one. The truth is, that the first section of our third part has at ver. 9 fully reached its conclusion, and at ver. 10, just as at i. 4, iii. 2, the *intimation of a new theme* is grammatically (but not logically) connected with what precedes. Logically, ver. 10 points back only to ver. 6, inasmuch as a word which formed part of a passage there cited, but the import of which has not yet been developed, is now placed in the foreground as the title of a new section. That the author intends in ver. 10 not to give an explanation of ver. 9, but to intimate a new theme, appears plainly, indeed, from the relative clause ver. 11.

INTERMEDIATE PART OF A HORTATORY KIND.

(v. 11—vi. 20).

Ver. 11 connects grammatically as a relative clause with ver. 10. Περὶ οὗ πολὺς ἡμῖν (scil. ἐστιν) ὁ λόγος, the use of the article in this manner is familiar. But why is this comparison of the priesthood of Melchisedec with that of Christ *hard to be understood ?* The *first reason* lies evidently in the subject itself. The thesis of the similarity of Christ with Melchisedec is, as we have already seen, not merely a third principal clause beside the two foregoing, but is an inference from these two. From the fact that the Messiah must, on the one hand, be more than an angel, on the other hand, more than Moses—from the fact that his priesthood is grafted, in like manner, on his immediate oneness with the Father, as on his humanity, it follows of itself that he is not merely equal to Aaron,

but that he is more than Aaron; that as the perfect high priest he is partaker of the *Divine* nature. Thus the author rises in chap. vii. 1, 2, directly to the doctrine of the *divinity* of Christ.*

A *second reason* however, why that λόγος was δυσερμήνευτος *difficult to be made intelligible*, is given in the clause which follows, and was of a subjective nature. The difficulty lay not certainly in the fitness of the writer to set it forth, but in the capacity of the readers to understand it. Νωθροὶ γεγόνατε ταῖς ἀκοαῖς, they had *become* obtuse and dull of hearing. Those are wrong who take γεγόνατε in a weakened sense = ἐστέ. From the words of ver. 12: πάλιν χρείαν ἔχετε and γεγόνατε χρείαν ἔχοντες, as well as from the admonition in chap. x. 32: ἀναμιμνήσκεσθε τὰς προτέρας ἡμέρας, it is evidently to be inferred, that the readers had exposed themselves to the charge not merely of a want of progress in the development of their knowledge, but were even in the act of making a melancholy retrogression.

What was the nature of the retrogression we are told in ver. 12. "According to the time ye ought already to be teachers, but now ye must be taken again under instruction." The majority of commentators have passed very cursorily over these important words; only Mynster (Stud. u. Krit. 1829, p. 338) has deduced from them the right *negative* inference that the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot possibly have been addressed to the church in Jerusalem. How is it possible that the author could have written in such terms to that mother-church of Christianity, containing several thousand souls, among whom were many who had grown old in Christianity, and certainly individuals still who had known the Lord himself, who since the period referred to in Acts vii. had undergone a multitude of persecutions? How could he then have written to a large church which must necessarily have had in it many teachers, to whom the words *ye have need that one teach you*—and again many Neophytes, to whom the words *ye ought according to the time to be teachers*—would be altogether unsuitable? We agree, therefore, with Mynster when he finds that the Epistle to the Hebrews cannot have been written to the church in Jerusalem, and are of opinion that the suggestion of Bleek that James was then no longer alive weighs nothing against this, while the supposition "that the author had not before his mind at the time the whole circumstances of the church to which he wrote," weighs less than nothing. Mynster should only have gone a step farther and perceived, that our epistle can have been designed in general for no church whatever, conse-

* The Epistle to the Hebrews thus affords at the same time, an important testimony in a critical point of view, for the original and intimate organic connexion of the so-called "Johannëic" doctrine of Christ's person, with the "Pauline" doctrinal system of Christ's work, and of the influence of both on the Jewish Christians.

quently for no church in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. For *every* church, from the very nature of the case, consists of earlier and later converts; our epistle, on the contrary, is addressed to quite a definite circle of readers who had passed over to Christianity together at the same time, and because they had let themselves go astray from the faith *had been taken anew under instruction*—for that the words *ye have need again that some one teach you* are not mere words, but indicate a fact, should not certainly be doubted. The author does not mean to say: ye had almost need that one instruct you again; but upbraids his readers with this as a thing of which they ought to be ashamed, that those who, considering the time, might already be teachers, yet need to receive instruction from others. That, then, which we have already, at an earlier stage, seen to be probable finds here its fullest confirmation: *the Epistle to the Hebrews was written for a definite circle of catechumens, who, upon their conversion, having been perplexed by a threatened excommunication from the communion of the Jewish theocracy, had been subjected anew to a careful instruction.* The author had received information of this, and had doubtless been specially requested by the *teacher* of that people to prepare a writing that might serve as a basis for this difficult instruction.

This defect of knowledge related to the στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν λογίων τοῦ θεοῦ. Λόγιον means a "saying," then an "oracular saying," then in biblical and Christian usage "revelation" (Acts vii. 38), hence at a later period λόγια is used to denote the theopneustic writings generally (Iren. i. 8; Clem. Al. Strom. vii. 18, p. 900, seq.; Orig. Comm. ad Matth. v. 19; Joh. Presb. in Euseb. iii. 39). Here, it has the quite general signification "revelation of God" = the doctrine revealed by God; the same as in chap. iv. 12, vi. 1, is termed ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦ Χριστοῦ. According to the context, it is of course the New Testament revelation that is meant (as at iv. 12), not the Old Testament as Schulz will have it. Τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρχῆς is a cumulative expression similar to the Pindaric σκιᾶς ὄναρ, or as at Eph. i. 19, ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος. Στοιχεῖα means by itself "beginnings," "elements." The idea of beginning is, however, intensified. "Beginnings of the beginning," = the very first beginnings.

Τινὰ is acc. of the subject "that some one teach you" = that one should teach you. (Luther, Bleek, Olshausen, etc.) The Peshito, Vulgate, De Wette, etc., accentuate τίνα, "that one teach you *which* be the first elements." But this is unsuitable. In the first place, an accusative of the subject would thus be wanting to διδάσκειν, and, secondly, the readers were not ignorant of what doctrinal articles *belonged* to the στοιχεῖα, but did not rightly understand the *import* of these στοιχεῖα.

The author repeats the same idea by means of a figure in the words: *and are become such as have need of milk and not of strong meat.*

Vers. 13, 14, contain an explanation from which it already begins to appear what doctrines the writer understood by the milk. Πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μετέχων γάλακτος, whosoever still partakes of milk, still particeps lactis est, still receives and needs milk for his nourishment. Of every such one it is said that he is uninformed, and has no share in the λόγος δικαιοσύνης. Calvin, Grotius, Morus, Schulz, Olshausen, Kuinoel, De Wette, etc., take the genitive δικαιοσύνης as the *genitive of quality*, and δικαιοσύνη = τελειότης, so that λόγος δικαιοσύνης would be equivalent to "the perfect doctrine," the completed, higher knowledge (or according to Zachariä, Dindorf, and others, "the proper, true instruction"). But apart from the intolerable tautological circle which would thus be introduced into the train of thought between ver. 13 and ver. 12, apart, further, from the insipid triviality of the 13th verse, as thus explained, the author would assuredly have used and applied other and less far-fetched expressions for the "perfect doctrine" than the strange expression λόγος δικαιοσύνης.* The majority of commentators have therefore rightly understood δικαιοσύνης as the *genitive of the object*, "the word of righteousness," in which, however, δικαιοσύνη is not (with Theophylact, Chrysostom, Œcumenius, a Lapide, Primasius, Bretschneider, etc.) to be explained of the perfect morality, and consequently λόγος δικαιοσύνης of the moral law, but, as in the whole New Testament, of the righteousness before God in Christ; and λόγος δικαιοσύνης is the doctrine of justification (Beza, J. Capellus, Rambach, Bengel, Storr, Klee, Tholuck, Bleek, etc.), which, as is well known, is also not strange to the Epistle to the Hebrews (comp. chap. xi. 7, xiii. 9).

This explanation, however, is accompanied with a difficulty in respect to the logical connexion with ver. 12. We should rather expect as an explanation of ver. 12 the words in an inverted form: Πᾶς γὰρ ὁ ἄπειρος λόγου δικαιοσύνης γάλακτος μετέχει. This would explain in how far the persons addressed are as yet babes. The train of thought would be this: "You still need milk; strong meat does not agree with you. For whosoever (like you) has not yet apprehended even the fundamental doctrine of righteousness in Christ (whosoever still makes his salvation to rest on the services and sacrifices of the temple), needs as yet milk, being yet a *babe*, and standing still at the first elements of Christian knowledge."

* The Hebrew זִבְחֵי־צֶדֶק (θυσίαι δικαιοσύνης) Deut. xxxiii. 19, etc., would not even form an analogy. For זבחי־צדק are in reality such sacrifices as *correspond to the statutes*, to which therefore the property of צדק, *i. e.* of perfect legality, can be ascribed, while, on the contrary, in our passage δικαιοσύνη must be taken in the altogether heterogeneous sense of "perfect *development*," which it never has.

This is what we should naturally expect the author to say. Instead of this, however, he says: "Every one who still needs milk, has as yet no part in the doctrine of justification." Bleek thinks that ver. 13 contains an explanatory repetition of the words *not of strong meat;* "you could not yet bear strong meat, for whoever still nourishes himself with milk cannot yet understand the doctrine of justification." According to this the author must have meant by the strong meat the doctrine of justification. But this is plainly against the context. By the strong meat, of which the readers were not yet capable, is rather to be understood that obscure doctrine concerning the similarity between the priesthood of Melchisedec and Christ, the deep insight into the Old Testament type, the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. On the other hand, the doctrine of justification, the doctrine of *repentance and dead works*, of *faith*, and of *baptism*, are rather reckoned as belonging to the *elements*, chap. vi. 1, seq.; the doctrine of justification is itself the milk which must first be taken into the heart and the understanding, in order that a foundation may be laid on which the more difficult theologoumena can be built. Bleek's explanation is therefore not fitted to remove the difficulty.

This difficulty is rather to be removed simply by regarding the proposition in ver. 13 not as descriptive or declaratory, not as determining the import, but the extent or comprehension of the idea expressed by *μετέχων γάλακτος*. It is not an answer to the question: "What are the characteristics of him who still nourishes himself with milk?" but an answer to the question: "*Who* nourishes himself with milk?" The words contain a conclusion backwards from the consequence to the presupposed condition. Whosoever still needs milk, *of him it is presupposed* that he must not yet have rightly apprehended the doctrine of justification: = whosoever has not yet apprehended this doctrine is still at the stage at which he needs milk. We found similarly inverted conclusions at chap. ii. 11, iv. 6. This explanation also affords a most satisfactory explanation of the words, *for he is still a babe.* Not without a stroke of irony does the author explain in these words, in how far it must be *presupposed* of a spiritual suckling that he will be *unskilled in the word of righteousness.*

The 14th verse also now runs perfectly parallel with the 13th. He who still needs milk will doubtless not yet have comprehended the doctrine of justification; but that strong and more difficult meat (of the higher typology) is adapted not to such, but only to mature Christians who have come of age, and who are exercised in distinguishing between the true and the false way. *Τέλειος*, as the opposite of *νήπιος*, is a term familiar to the apostle Paul (1 Cor. iii. 1, xiii. 11; Rom. ii. 20; Eph. iv. 14). *Τελείων* finds here its

special explanation in the words which stand in opposition to it, *τῶν διὰ τὴν ἕξιν αἰσθητήρια γεγυμνασμένα ἐχόντων*, etc. Ἕξις is a term proceeding from the Aristotelian school-phraseology, denoting the given natural condition or habitus, in opposition to the *διάθεσις* (*πρᾶξις*), the sphere of self-determination. In general use, it denotes frequently the condition as respects age—hence age = *ἡλικία*; and so in our passage the spiritual age, the degree of inward maturity. Αἰσθητήρια are the organs of feeling, the nerves of feeling. Γυμνάζειν, in the well-known sense of "exercise," occurs also in chap. xii. 11, further in 1 Tim. iv. 7 ; 2 Pet. ii. 14. The distinguishing between the *καλόν* and *κακόν* does not, as some strangely suppose, belong to the *strong meat;* but the habit already acquired of distinguishing the true from the false, is rather the immediate fruit of the right understanding of the *λόγος δικαιοσύνης*, and forms, together with the latter, the indispensable *condition* which must be fulfilled ere *strong meat* can be once thought of. He who has taken the milk of the Gospel, *i. e.* the fundamental doctrine of justification so in succum et sanguinem, that he can spontaneously, and by immediate feeling, consequently without requiring any previous long reflection or reasoning, distinguish the right from the wrong, the way in which the Christian has to walk from the Jewish by-paths, the evangelic truth from the Pharisaic righteousness of the law, so that he could, as it were, find out the right path though asleep—he who has so thoroughly seized and digested these *elements*, that he no longer needs to be instructed in them (the milk), consequently is no longer *νήπιος*, but *τέλειος*—may now have strong meat offered to him—the difficult doctrines of the higher typology of the old covenant, and of the eternal Melchisedec nature of the New Testament high priest.

In chap. vi. 1, therefore, the author admonishes his readers to strive after that *perfection*, and to exert themselves in order finally to pass beyond the *elements*. Ἀφέντες τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον—this, of course, signifies (as appears already from v. 12) not "the doctrine of the beginning of Christ," but "the beginning or elementary doctrine of Christ." Τῆς ἀρχῆς is an adjectival genitive, and to be closely connected with *λόγος*, so that *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is dependent not on *ἀρχῆς*, but on *λόγον*. The great majority of interpreters do not take *φερώμεθα* as the *insinuative* first person plural, and the whole passage as *hortatory*, but understand the first person plural as *communicative*, and the whole as an *intimation* on the part of the author that he now intends to pass to the consideration of the *strong meat*. But that which, first of all, is opposed to the common interpretation, is the particle *διό*. How, from the fact that the readers, according to chap. v. 12–14, could as yet bear no strong meat, but needed the milk of the *elements*, could the author with any appearance of reason draw the inference : "Therefore, let us

lay aside these elements, and proceed to the more difficult doctrines?" Secondly, that interpretation leads itself ad absurdum, for, according to it, τελειότης must be taken in a completely different sense from τέλειος, chap. v. 14. In chap. v. 14 τέλειος denoted the *subjective* state of those who are already exercised in the *word of righteousness*, and in the *discerning between good and evil*, in order to be able to understand what is more difficult; in chap. vi. 1 τελειότης is suddenly made to denote the *objective* difficult doctrinal statements respecting the similarity between the priesthood of Melchisedec and Christ! Hence Chrysostom, Theodoret, Photius, Gennadius, Theophylact, Faber, Stapul., Calvin, Schulz, Böhme, and Bleek, have with reason understood the first person plural as insinuatory, and the whole as an *admonition to the readers;* they are to strive to get at length beyond the elements (in the partic. ἀφέντες there lies then, at all events, a prolepsis: strive after the τελειότης, *so that* you may then be able to lay aside the ἀρχῆς λόγος), and to arrive at that τελειότης described in chap. v. 14.

If, however, this explanation is right, then by consequence must the words μὴ καταβαλλόμενοι, etc., be understood differently from what they have been by all commentators hitherto (Calvin, Bleek, etc. not excepted). All take καταβάλλεσθαι in the sense "to lay a foundation," a sense in which this verb also actually occurs. (Dion. Halic. iii. 69, Ταρκύνιος τούς τε θεμελίους κατεβάλετο; see other passages in Bleek, ii. p. 149.) Now this sense would certainly suit well that false interpretation of the preceding words ("I design, laying aside the fundamental elements, to hasten to what is more difficult, and not again to lay the foundation of repentance," etc.). But, on the other hand, this sense of καταβάλλεσθαι does not suit the true and only possible explanation of φερώμεθα. If the readers were still deficient in the *elements*, in the apprehension of the doctrine of justification, the true means of attaining to the τελειότης did not assuredly consist in their neglecting to gain anew the foundation which they had lost, but, on the contrary, in their using the most strenuous endeavours to secure again that foundation of all knowledge which they had lost. We are therefore reduced to the necessity of taking καταβάλλεσθαι in another sense, in the signification which is the original one and the most common, namely, "to throw down, demolish, destroy," which the word has in all the Greek classical writers, and which it cannot surprise us to find in our author, who writes elegant Greek. "Strive after perfection, while you do not again demolish the foundation of repentance and faith, and the doctrine of baptism, the laying on of hands, the resurrection, and the judgment." The genitives μετανοίας πίστεως are also suitable to this explanation. The author does not speak of a foundation of the *doctrine* of repentance and faith—διδαχή is first introduced in con-

nexion with the third member—but of the foundation of repentance and faith themselves. The apostle would assuredly not have dissuaded from laying again the foundation, in the case of its having been destroyed! According to the right explanation, he rather advises them not to destroy whatever of it may still remain. Πάλιν means, of course, not iterum "a second time," but is used here in the privative or contradictory sense, as at Gal. iv. 9; Acts xviii. 21. That the article is wanting at θεμέλιον cannot cause surprise; it is in like manner wanting in chap. v. 13 at λόγου δικαιοσύνης; chap. vi. 5 at θεοῦ ῥῆμα, etc. The word is sufficiently determined by its genitives. Now, the foundation which the readers are to preserve from destruction, in order to attain to *perfection*, consists of *three parts*. The first is the μετάνοια, the subjective turning of the νοῦς, the mind, the conversion from selfishness to the love of Christ, from self-righteousness to the consciousness of guilt, from contempt of the will of God to the accusation of self. And this μετάνοια is here called a μετάνοια ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων, because that state of the natural man, had, in the persons addressed, taken the special form of a Jewish pharisaism which led them to believe that, as regards their relation to God, they might rest satisfied with certain works which were severed from the root of a heart right towards God, and were therefore "dead." (It is, moreover, not to be forgotten, that not merely the Jew, but every one has the tendency to stamp certain actions outwardly praiseworthy as meritorious works, and with this dead coin to discharge the demands of his conscience, and to still the accuser in his breast.) The positive and supplementary part to this μετάνοια is the πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν. That faith is here denoted, not in the historico-dogmatic form of faith in Christ, the Messiah, but in the philosophico-religious form of faith in God, is not undesigned, but belongs to the fineness and delicacy of the thought. That the author means the *Christian* faith, was already self-evident, and needed not to be expressed by circumstantial description; on the other hand, this he would and must say, that the Christian, as by repentance he renounces dead works, so by faith he enters into a living relation to the *living God*.

The third member is the διδαχή, *i. e.*, not here, of course, the act of instruction, but the object gained by instruction, the knowledge of doctrine thereby acquired. On διδαχῆς are dependent the four genitives βαπτισμῶν, ἐπιθέσεως τε χειρῶν, ἀναστάσεώς τε νεκρῶν καὶ κρίματος. It is evident of itself, that the three last of these genitives cannot be directly dependent on θεμέλιον, for as the *resurrection* and the *judgment* are things to be looked for in the future, the readers cannot be admonished to retain these things themselves but only the doctrine respecting them. (Those interpreters who understand φερώμεθα, ver. 1, as an *intimation* of the author's design, and who

render *καταβάλλεσθαι* by "lay," as they would supply *διδαχῆς* at *μετανοίας, πίστεως, ἐπιθέσεως, ἀναστάσεως* and *κρίματος*, must then as a matter of consequence supply a second *διδαχῆς* at *βαπτισμῶν διδαχῆς*, which would be nonsense. To make *διδαχῆς* dependent on *βαπτισμῶν*—"the doctrine of baptisms" in opposition to mere lustrations—as is done by Bengel, Winer, and Michaelis, yields no meaning whatever, as it is not the doctrine which forms the distinguishing feature between the sacrament of baptism and the mere lustrations, but the forgiveness of sins and regeneration. (With as little reason can we with Œcumenius, Luther, Hyperius, Gerhard, take *διδαχῆς* as an independent co-ordinate genitive beside *βαπτισμῶν* ; for what then would be the meaning of *ἀναστάσεως* and *κρίματος* ?) The right construction has been given by Calvin, Beza, Schlichting, Storr, Böhme, Paulus, and Bleek. They supply *διδαχῆς* at *ἐπιθέσεως, ἀναστάσεως*, and *κρίματος* respectively.

The writer therefore specifies *four principal objects* of the *διδαχή*, baptism and laying on of hands which belong to the beginning of the Christian life, and with which are connected the forgiveness of sins and bestowal of gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the resurrection together with the judgment, in which the life of the Christian Church finds its consummation, and which form the object of the Christian *hope*.

Ver. 3.—Those who understand *φερώμεθα*, ver. 1, as an intimation of the author's intended plan of teaching, must, as a matter of consequence, understand *ποιήσομεν*, ver. 4, also in the same way, and refer the *τοῦτο* to the intimated transition to more difficult subjects, so that the author would here say, he designs, "if God will," now in fact to pass to what is more difficult. But it will be difficult to see how what he says in vers. 4–6, namely, that whosoever has fallen away from the faith cannot be again renewed, is subservient to this design either as argument or illustration. We who have understood *φερώμεθα*, ver. 1, as *insinuative*, *i. e.*, as an exhortation, understand, of course, *ποιήσομεν* also in the same way, and refer *τοῦτο* to the whole of what precedes, as well to the "striving after perfection" as to the not destroying the foundation of the *μετάνοια, πίστις* and *διδαχή*. We thus obtain a sentiment with which ver. 4 connects in the closest and most delicate manner. The author seriously considers it as still a problematical thing whether the conversion to faith and the attainment of perfection be as yet possible for his readers. For, he says, he who has once *fallen from* the state of grace, can no more be renewed. Still, he adds ver. 9, the hope that with his readers it has not yet come to an entire falling away. He therefore sets before them in vers. 4–8 the greatness of the danger, but gives them encouragement again in ver. 9, seq. Both taken together—the danger as well as the still existing possibility (but only the pos-

sibility) of returning—form the exegesis of the *ἐάνπερ*. The thing rests upon the edge, but it is still upon the edge.

Vers. 4–6.—The impossibility of being *renewed* is declared of those who, *a*, were enlightened, who had tasted the heavenly gift, had become partakers of the Holy Ghost, and had tasted the gospel together with the powers of the future world, and then, *b*, have again fallen away. The first four particulars describe the various steps from the beginning of conversion, on to the perfect state of faith and grace. The beginning is described in the words *ἅπαξ φωτισθέντες*, the general designation for the knowledge of the truth. Conversion begins with this, that the man who *was blind as regards himself*, blind in respect to his relation to God, his obligations to God, his undone state, his need of salvation, and *therefore all the more blind in respect to the offered salvation* which he knew not and wished not to know, is now *enlightened* as to his own condition and the truth of the salvation in Christ; that he begins to perceive and to feel that there is something more than deception and superstition in what is declared to him of the Nazarene. Has this knowledge been once gained, then it must be progressive—or the man must be lost; for this light arises upon any one only *once*.—The second step is, that the man taking hold of the salvation, now has the *actual experience* in and for himself, that in Christ a heavenly gift—grace, forgiveness, and strength—is offered to him. If he accepts these *gifts* in humility and faith, he receives, thirdly, the *gift of the Holy Ghost;* his Saviour begins by his spirit to be a living principle within him; and this has as its consequence a *twofold fruit*. He learns and experiences in himself the *καλὸν θεοῦ ῥῆμα* (= דבר טוב Josh. xxi. 45, xxiii. 14; Jer. xxix. 10, etc.).—God's word of promise, *i. e.*, of course the fulfilment of this word, consequently the whole riches of the inheritance of grace promised to the Messianic Israel—peace, joy, inclination to what is good, a new heart, etc.; and then, as a second fruit, he experiences in himself *the powers of the world to come*. To these powers belong not merely those extraordinary miraculous gifts of the apostolic age (which may certainly be viewed also as anticipations of the final victory of the *spirit* over the *flesh*), but all those gifts of sanctification and glorification which, even here below, give to the Christian the victory over the old Adam, and death.—This passage repels the slander of the young Hegelians and their associates who hold, that the Christianity of the Bible is a religion of the future world and not of the present. No! because it is a religion of the future state, it has power to transform the present and to free it from the evils of sin which is the ruin of mankind. But the young Hegelians and their associates, because they have no future world, cannot do otherwise than corrupt and destroy the present.

Now, of him who has already passed over those stages in the Christian course and then falls away, it is here said that "it is impossible again to renew him," *i. e.*, the state of grace out of which he has fallen (the *μετάνοια*, conversion)* cannot be again restored in him; he is and remains lost. We must not shrink from these words or attempt to explain them away. The author assuredly does not mean (as some of the more ancient commentators thought) that such a one is not to be again *baptized*, although he may notwithstanding be saved; just as little does he mean that only men cannot save him, but God notwithstanding may. He lays it down quite absolutely, "it is impossible to renew him again to conversion."

This is one of those passages which speak of the so-called *sin against the Holy Ghost*, or more correctly of a fall that leads into irrecoverable perdition. It is well known, that on this subject there was a difference between the predestinarian Calvinists and the Lutherans, a difference extending even to the exegesis itself. The Calvinists founded their view on the passage in Matth. xii. 31, seq., in which Christ warns the *unbelieving Jews* against committing the sin against the Holy Ghost which can never be forgiven; further, on the passage 1 John ii. 19, where John says of certain individuals who had fallen away from Christianity to Gnosticism: "They are gone out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us they would have continued with us." Both passages were used by the Calvinists as a proof of the theorem that, *a*, one who is really born again cannot fall away, *b*, consequently he who falls away cannot have been really born again—a theorem which, we may observe, is not *necessarily* a consequence of the absolute doctrine of predestination, but is also conceivable independent of it. But how now is this to be reconciled with our passage Heb. vi. 4–6? with this passage in which we are taught that there may be a falling away from a state of faith in the fullest and most proper sense of the term. Calvin laid emphasis on the word *γευσάμενοι*; individuals are here spoken of who had *but tasted a little* of the gifts of grace, and had received only "some sparks of light." But whoever is not blinded by dogmatical prejudices must perceive, that the aim of our author is evidently and assuredly not to say: *the less* one has tasted of the gifts of grace the more easily may he be irrecoverably lost, but precisely the reverse; the *more* one has already penetrated into the sanctuary of the state of grace, by so much the more irrecoverably is he lost in case he should fall away.

Our passage, therefore, unmistakeably declares the possibility that a regenerate person may fall away. But does it not herein contradict what is said in 1 John ii. 19. Not in the least! If in

* Others foolishly think that the state of Adam before the fall is here meant.

our own day a Christian preacher should write or say of people who had been corrupt members of the church, and had become the prey of Ronge and other lying apostles: "They have fallen away from us because they never belonged to us," etc., who would infer from this, that that pastor virtually denies the possibility that those who are really regenerated may also fall away? So it is with John. Of him who could become the prey of such *manifest* babblers and lying prophets as the Gnostics were, it must be inferred, that he had not penetrated far into the substance of Christianity. From this, however, it does not at all follow, that one also who has really attained to a state of grace in the fullest and most proper sense, may not, by becoming indolent in the struggle with the old Adam, and allowing a bosom sin to get the mastery over him, suffer shipwreck of faith.

In opposition to Calvin, then, we must lay down the following as the doctrine of the Holy Scripture on the Sin against the Holy Ghost.

There are three *different ways* specified in Scripture in which a man may be eternally lost. 1. The sin against the Holy Ghost properly so-called, Matth. xii. 31, seq., when a man obstinately resists the *call* of grace, and repels all the *first motions* of the Holy Spirit in his heart and conscience; 2. 1 John ii. 19, when one embraces Christianity outwardly and superficially without being truly born again, and then becomes a prey to the seducing talk of some vagabond babbler; and 3. Heb. vi. 4–6, when one has been truly born again, but gives place to the evil principle in his heart, and being worsted in the struggle, suffers himself to be taken captive by some more refined temptation of Satan, some more refined lie (as here by a seemingly pious attachment to the institutions of the old covenant).*

* Ebrard's view of the above passage is subject to weighty difficulties. It contradicts the express testimony of Scripture in other passages, as *e. g.*, John x. 27, 28; Rom. viii. 35, seq., as well as our most fundamental conception of salvation through Christ. If one who has been once made a partaker of eternal life through Christ can indeed fall away and be lost, then the whole system of the Gospel rests upon a sandy foundation. If therefore the passage before us does in reality affirm that true believers may go finally to perdition, we are involved in inextricable difficulties. But it does not, I believe, affirm any such thing. For, 1, the expressions here used as descriptive of the class in question, by no means of necessity imply actual regeneration. They are of that general character which may be applicable equally to the regenerate and those who by an enlarged religious culture and enlightenment, have approached close to the border land of religious experience without actually attaining it. It is not improbable that the writer designedly used these somewhat vague terms in order that they might be sure to include all those to whom he addressed himself. Concede, however, that they do denote a saving change, and still the passage by no means asserts the possibility that those who have experienced it may fall from their Christian faith. It only asserts an inevitable consequence which, *in such an event*, must grow out of the very nature of the case, viz., the utter impossibility of their being restored, and makes use of this consequence as

Why such a one is irrecoverably lost, we learn from the words in apposition to those we have considered; *ἀναστανροῦντας*, etc. Such a one commits, in a more aggravated degree, the sin which the unbelieving Jews committed against Christ. The Israelites crucified in their madness a pseudo-Messiah, or at the worst a prophet. But he who has *known* and *experienced* Jesus as his Saviour and Re-

one means of preventing their apostacy. God in dealing with his children, addresses them not from the absolute truth which is hidden with himself, but according to their obvious and conscious relations to him. He has ordained the means as well as the end; and while it is certain that the end cannot fail, it is equally certain that it cannot be attained except in connexion with those means with which God has indissolubly connected it. Thus while on the one hand, the Lord had promised unconditionally to Paul that none of the companions of his voyage to Rome should lose their lives, Paul on the other hand, was warranted in saying that their safety was absolutely dependent on their abiding in the ship. So Christians, while assured abstractly of the absolute salvation of all believers, are yet in their own *personal* character and relations properly warned against apostacy; for they can appropriate the comfort of the absolute truth *only in proportion as* they vindicate the genuineness of their profession by actual perseverance. Even Paul who could entertain no doubt of his spiritual calling and ultimate salvation, yet keeps his body under, lest after having preached to others, he himself prove a castaway.

But here, it is replied, the case is otherwise. Not merely are professed believers warned against apostacy, but real believers are informed of the consequences of actually apostatising. Grant that such is the meaning of the passage. It by no means thence follows that such a case ever did or will actually happen. It is not necessarily more than a strong statement of the utterly disastrous nature of such an event, conceiving it possible. The Bible by no means always confines its reasonings to real cases. It often assumes supposable cases for the sake of strongly illustrating a principle. Thus there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth more than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance. The case here supposed has no existence on earth, yet this fact no way detracts from the pertinency of the passage as illustrating a principle. Again Paul says: "If we or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel to you, let him be accursed." None supposes that Paul contemplates such an event as morally possible. Yet it was physically conceivable, and Paul makes the supposition for the sake of a cogent illustration. Again in Romans, Paul, in order to illustrate a principle of the Divine proceedings, contrasts Jews who violate the revealed law with the Gentiles who do by nature the things contained in the law. There *are*, properly speaking, no such Gentiles. All have sinned, and the case is merely a hypothetical one.

Of this nature, I apprehend, is the passage before us. It does not assert that Christians may or do fall away. It only affirms that if persons who have attained a certain spiritual status which it describes (grant them to be Christians), fell away, their ruin is irremediable; their case is hopeless. They have crucified afresh the Son of God, and under aggravating circumstances. They have exhausted and proved vain all the appointed provisions of salvation. The sacrifice on Calvary having been tried and rejected, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins. They cannot, therefore, be restored to repentance. The case here, as in the instances above, is abstractly supposable, and the principle it involves brought to bear as one of the predestined and efficacious means against the catastrophe of which it states the terrible consequences. I cannot myself forbear the conviction that the writer purposely left the language such as to cover two classes of cases—that of the really regenerate who cannot fall away, and that of those who reach such a state of spiritual enlightenment, that though they may fall away, they cannot be reclaimed. In either case the passage is decisive against that superficial Arminianism which in asserting its favorite doctrine of free-will, enables a man to oscillate backwards and forwards between the remote extremes of sin and holiness; yesterday a saint, to-day destitute of holiness, and to-morrow re-established in his spiritual calling.—[K.

deemer, and yet after all falls away from Christianity, actually declares *him whom he has known as the Son of God* to be a pseudo-Messiah, and contemns him.

If now by δυνάμεις are meant the gifts communicated by the laying on of hands, then (as the laying on of hands took place after baptism), the readers must have been *baptized*, and only taken again *under instruction* afterwards. Still δυνάμεις may mean also the powers of sanctification in the wider sense. The former is, however, the more probable.

Vers. 7, 8.—The apostle here remembers Christ's parable of the different kinds of ground. In this parable, however, we find the best refutation of the Calvinistic exegesis of vers. 4–6. The fruitful as well as the unfruitful soil received the same rain and blessing; it is the fault of the soil if the seed is choked by thorns or *evil lusts*. The cause of the falling away lies not in the want of an abstract gift of perseverance withheld by God, but in a shortcoming in the struggle with the old man. In the words κατάρας ἐγγύς the author cannot intend to say that the curse is *still uncertain* (this is forbidden by the words that follow), they simply mean "it is advancing towards the curse," "the curse is impending over it." (Comp. chap. viii. 13).—Εἰς καῦσιν for the nominative καῦσις is a Hebraism = לִבְעֵר with the לְ substantiae, comp. LXX. Is. xl. 16; xliv. 15. The meaning of the author is, of course, not that the thorns and thistles merely, but that the whole land itself shall be burned up with fire and brimstone (comp. Deut. xxix. 22). This is, then, a type of the eternal destruction of the individual who was compared with an unfruitful field.

Vers. 9–12.—The author now turns to the other side of the subject, to the comforting hope that in the case of his readers it has not yet come to a falling away. "If we thus speak to you (in this style of earnest warning) we are yet persuaded of better things concerning you, of things that pertain to salvation." (Ἐχόμενα σωτηρίας a classical amplification of the adjectival idea = haud insalutaria. Ἔχεσθαί τινος, pertinere ad aliquid, to be connected with anything, to have part in anything. The expression is purposely left indefinite, and it is wrong to attempt to find in it one or another precise sense. Ἐχόμενα σωτηρίας forms only the general antithesis to κατάρας ἐγγύς. The change here from severity to gentleness reminds us of the Pauline passages Gal. iv. 12 and 19; 2 Cor. x. 11.

Ver. 10.—The more that the new life has already shewn itself to be efficacious in a Christian, the more that the fruits of holiness have already been visible in him, so much the more safely may it be concluded that his has been a true central, fundamental, and deep conversion. The more that his Christianity consisted only of theory and head orthodoxy, so much the more reason is there to fear that

the whole man has not been converted, so much the greater danger is there of a seeming conversion and a subsequent falling away. What the man has gained by mere dialectics may again be entirely lost by mere dialectics, amid the temptations of the flesh and the trials of suffering. The only sure mark of conversion is the presence of sanctification; the only sure mark of continuance in the state of grace is progress in sanctification.

Upon this truth the sentiment of ver. 10 is founded. Because the readers have already evinced, and do still evince, the visible *fruits* of faith in works of love and service, the author cherishes the persuasion that God will not let them fall, will not withdraw his Spirit and the help of his grace from them. It is striking, however, that he here appeals to the *justice* of God. The Roman Catholic theologians have made use of this passage by way of confirming their theory of the *meritum condigni*. The natural man can indeed perform no good and meritorious works; but the converted man can, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, perform works perfectly good and therefore meritorious, which God rewards by the communication of new gifts of grace. The evangelical theologians have justly opposed to this theory the truth, that the best works of the regenerate are still stained with sin and imperfect, and, in fact, that nothing is said in our passage of *rewarding particular works*. But the evangelical theologians have, in general, been able to find no other way of explaining this passage than by supposing, that the good works of the regenerate, *although imperfect*, yet received a reward *of grace* from God. This, however, is a *contradictio in adjecto;* what God gives out of grace in spite of our imperfection wants precisely for that reason the quality of a *reward*.—The truth is, there is another righteousness besides that which *recompenses* or *rewards*. The righteousness of God spoken of in our passage is that which leads, *guides*, and *governs*, every man according to the particular stage of development which he occupies. It is here affirmed of God that he does not give up to perdition a man *who can still in any way be saved*, in whom the new life is not yet entirely extinct, and who has not yet entirely fallen away; but that he seeks to draw every one as long as they will allow themselves to be drawn. This is not a judicial or recompensing righteousness towards man (for man has no right to *demand* the assisting grace of God as a thing deserved), but it is *the righteousness of the Father towards the Son who has bought men with his blood, and to whom we poor sinners still belong until we have fallen away from him*. Not towards us but towards Christ would the Father be ἄδικος, were he to withdraw his gracious assistance from a man ere he has ceased to belong to the *peculium* of Christ.

Ver. 11.—The writer now expresses his earnest wish that his

readers may advance in the Christian life with renewed zeal; that "each one of them may now manifest, even to perfection, the same zeal in striving after the full assurance of hope," as they had hitherto shewn in the *ἀγάπη*. The *full assurance of hope* is opposed to the wavering and uncertainty which they had hitherto shewn, as to whether they might rely entirely and undividedly on the salvation and promise of Christ, or whether they required, together with this, the temple service, and Levitical priesthood.

Ver. 12.—The result of that *zeal* which the readers are to show is, that they may be no longer *νωθροί* (as they have been hitherto chap. v. 12), but may be equal to other Christians, not only in love and service but also in faith and long suffering. *Μακροθυμία*, however, by no means denotes merely passive patience, the passive endurance of suffering, but as at Rom. ii. 7 even *ὑπομονή* serves to denote active constancy, this is still more denoted here by *μακροθυμία*.

Vers. 13–15.—Here commences a somewhat more difficult train of thought which, by means of the particle *γάρ*, is connected with the foregoing as an explanation. The question presents itself: What is *said* in vers. 13–15, and what is intended to be *proved* by it or to be *inferred* from it as an explanation of ver. 12? What is said, and said in words grammatically quite clear, is: God has sworn to Abraham (comp. Gen. xxii. 16, seq., with chap. xvii. 1, seq.) that he will bless him and multiply him. And from this it is inferred in ver. 15, that that ancestor of the covenant-people was thus also made a partaker of the promise through *μακροθυμία*. This idea of the *μακροθυμεῖν* is evidently the connecting link between ver. 12 and vers. 13–15. On the other hand, the words *God hath sworn by himself*, ver. 13, are at first only cited as *as an accessary circumstance* which is afterwards brought into prominence in ver. 16, and made use of as a new and independent idea. (The words *κατὰ τὴν τάξιν* Μελχισεδέκ, chap. v. 6, are found to be cited quite in a similar way, and then, afterwards in chap. vii., made to form properly a new theme. Similarly also the citation chap. iii. 7–12 compared with ver. 15, seq., and chap. iv. 3 and 7).

The principal question then in the explanation of the three verses under consideration is, how far does the fact that God has sworn to Abraham that he will bless him and multiply him involve the inference, that Abraham attained to the (fulfilment of the) promise by *μακροθυμία*? Bleek is certainly wrong, when, in spite of the *καὶ οὕτω*, he will still not allow ver. 5 to be an *inference* from vers. 13, 14, but finds in it merely a statement to the effect that Abraham deserved that promise of the blessing and multiplying, by his constancy (in the faith) evinced at *another time*, namely in the offering up of his son Isaac according to the command of God. The writer, indeed,

does not in a single word point to the *strength* of faith shewn in complying with the command to offer up Isaac; but from the circumstance that God *sware* to Abraham to bless him and to *multiply* him, he infers that Abraham obtained the promise (namely the fulfilment of it) through the *constancy* of his faith. Now, whoever ascribes to our author a rabbinical method of exegesis which cleaves to words and to the letter must here again find himself greatly embarrassed; for here, as always, the force of the argumentation lies not in the letter, but in the thought. There are two particulars on which the force of the proof rests. First, God promised to Abraham *with an oath;* this already implied that the fulfilment of the promise was to be looked for at some future time, for there can be no need of confirming with an oath the promise of a gift which is forthwith and immediately bestowed; an oath is then only necessary, when the fulfilment is so remote as to make it possible that doubts might spring up in the mind of the receiver of the promise from the long delay. Secondly, the subject-matter of the promise, *the promised object itself*, was such as from the nature of the case could only be realized after the death of Abraham. He was to be blessed, and that by an immense multiplication of his seed; that could, from the nature of the case, be fulfilled only many generations after Abraham. Thus Abraham thoughout his whole life saw nothing of the fulfilment of the promise which had been made to him (comp. chap. xi. 39); he was directed to continue until death in the *constancy of the hope of that which he saw not.* So also are the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews admonished not to rely on the earthly, visible, Jewish theocracy and its institutions, but with the constancy of Abraham's faith to build their hope of salvation on the crucified Jesus who has gone into the heavens, whose followers still form a scattered flock, and who have nothing on earth but the *hope* of what is promised for the future.

Vers. 16–19.—The author now brings into prominence the *accessary idea* indicated in ver. 13, that God can swear by none greater than he is himself, and makes use of it for a new turn of thought, namely, for the inference that, just because God is in himself unchangeable, a promise which he has not only given, but has, moreover, sworn by himself in confirmation of it, is absolutely sure and settled. In this certainty of the promises of God there lies a second motive for the readers to continue steadfast in the *hope* of the glory promised to the Messianic Israel (already in Abraham's time). And from this the author, having inwardly prepared his readers and opened their *hearts,* dexterously retraces his steps to his theme respecting the similarity between the New Testament Messianic priesthood and that of Melchisedec.

Ver. 16.—"Men swear by one who is greater (than themselves),

and the oath is for certainty beyond all strife" (for indisputable certainty). This idea is in itself plain. Men swear by a being who is greater than they, who possesses omniscience enabling him to know the perjured person, and power and justice to punish him. The oath consists in this, that the person who swears calls the higher being to witness at once the promise and the fulfilment or non-fulfilment, and to be the eventual avenger of the latter. (Hence with the purified Christian every word is a tacit oath, inasmuch as it is spoken in the consciousness of the testimony of the all-present and all-knowing God. And hence Christ forbids swearing by inanimate things (Matth. v. 34), and puts that state of mind in which every yea is a yea—*i. e.*, in which every word, whether God be expressly called to witness or not, is spoken in the consciousness that God is witness—in the place of that swearing which was alike superstitious and false. Christ therefore does not forbid the oath, but he wills that the Christian should speak *only oaths*, and that in this way the difference between swearing and not swearing should find an end).

Ver. 16.—Now *in God*, the possibility of wavering, or the want of veracity, and thus the necessity of a higher guarantee, falls absolutely to the ground. He is true, not on account of another or from fear of any other, but by his own nature. Therefore he can swear only *by himself*, he can produce only himself and his own nature as the witness and guarantee of his veracity. It is true that for this very reason God's swearing by himself is an anthropopathism, or more correctly a condescension to human infirmity. On his own account he needs not to swear ; on his own account the form of swearing, the form of a promiser and a witness, might be dispensed with. But so long as to *man* the knowledge of the unchangeableness of God was still hidden or imperfect, God condescended to swear. With wonderful wisdom he stooped to the human presupposition of the possibility of change in God, therefore he sware ; but inasmuch as he sware by himself, he in the same act lifted man upwards to the knowledge that *he has that in his own nature* which hinders him from change. This idea, which was already briefly indicated in ver. 13, is further developed in ver. 17.

Ἐν ᾧ, literally "in which circumstance," = in these circumstances, quæ cum ita sint. Hence it may be rendered by "therefore" (Theophylact, Erasmus, Schlichting, Grotius, Kuinoel, Olshausen, De Wette, Tholuck, Bleek, etc.). Ἐν ᾧ does not, however, belong to βουλόμενος ; Rambach and others have explained thus : as now by this (by conforming to the practice among men of swearing) God would shew, etc.; the swearing of God is evidently, however, not placed parallel with swearing of men, but in opposition to it, as

already appears from the words *ἄνθρωποι μὲν γάρ.* Ἐν ᾧ belongs rather to *ἐμεσίτευσεν.*

"Therefore (because *men* swear by one superior to themselves) *God*, when he would shew to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his will in a superabundantly *sure* way, placed *himself* in the middle" (between himself qua the promiser, and men).—Μεσιτεύω, se interponere, to place one's self as mediator between two parties. Then specially in promises in the form of an oath, to place one's self as warranter, as fidejussor or security between the promiser and the receiver of the promise, in order to undertake the security for the fulfilment of the promise. God does this when a man swears by him; he then lets himself be called by both men as a witness and guarantee. When, however, God swears by himself, he then as it were comes in between himself and men. In other words, he is *his own* witness.

Ver. 18.—"Therefore we have firm consolation by two indestructible things, in both of which it is impossible for God to lie—we who flee for refuge to lay hold on the hope at the future goal." As God is in himself unchangeable and true, and needs not to swear, *so his promise is in itself alone* already sure and indestructible. But when, moreover, he appears not merely as promiser, but (inasmuch as he swears) also as *μεσιτεύων*, as his own witness and security, then must the fulfilment be doubly sure, or, more precisely, a double testimony is given to the Divine immutability.

In the words which stand in apposition to the subject *οἱ καταφυγόντες*, etc., the author repeats the condition upon which a subjective interest is obtained in the promise which is in itself and objectively sure. Nothing is wanting on God's part; but we on our part, forsaking all false consolation, must flee to lay hold on the *ἐλπὶς προκειμένη.* (On the partic. aor. comp. chap. iv. 3.—Others less naturally understand *καταφυγόντες* as an absolute idea, and make *κρατῆσαι* dependent on *παράκλησις*, and give this latter the signification "admonition, injunction"). The *hope* involves here both the object of the hope (comp. the adjective *προκειμένη*) and the act of it (comp. *κρατῆσαι*). Καταφυγόντες is well explained by Calvin thus: Hoc verbo significat, non aliter Deo vere nos fidere, quam dum præsidiis omnibus aliis destituti ad solidam ejus promissionem confugimus. The readers were to flee from all false Judaistic props of hope in the concern of their salvation, and to direct their eye alone to the invisible goal of future glory promised in Christ.

Ver. 19.—This firm hope resting solely upon Christ is "a sure and firm anchor of the soul, and such as enters into the inner place behind the vail." Two figures are here, not so much mixed as, in a very elegant manner, combined. The author might compare the world to a sea, the soul to a ship, the future still concealed glory to

the covered bottom of the sea, the remote firm land stretching beneath the water and covered by the water. Or he might compare the present life upon earth to the forecourt, and the future blessedness to the heavenly sanctuary, which is still, as it were, concealed from us by a vail. He has, however, combined the two figures. The soul, like a shipwrecked mariner, clings to an anchor, and *sees* not where the cable of the anchor runs to, where it is made fast; it knows, however, that it is firmly fixed behind the vail which conceals from it the future glory, and that if it only keeps fast hold of the anchor, it will, in due time, be drawn in with the anchor by a rescuing hand into the holiest of all. Thus there is in the *hope* itself that which certainly brings about the *fulfilment*.

Ver. 20.—The holy of holies is now more particularly described as that "into which Christ is entered as our Forerunner." In these words the author touches on the second section of the first part (chap. ii. ver. 16, comp. with ver. 17), and at the same time on the second section of the second part (chap. iv. vers. 10 and 14). In both passages, but with more distinctness in the second, the inference was drawn from this going before of Christ as the first-fruits and preparer of the way to heaven, that his office is a *high-priestly* office. Thus the sentiment of ver. 20 leads the author naturally and without constraint back to the theme begun at chap. v. 1–10, namely, the *comparison of Christ with the high-priest*, and now, after having prepared the hearts of the readers for what he is about to say, he proceeds exactly from the place where he broke off at chap. v. 10; he repeats the new theme already intimated there: *Christ is a priest after the order of Melchisedec*, and this similarity between his priesthood and that of Melchisedec culminates in the *eternity* of it.

SECTION SECOND.

THE MESSIAH, AS A HIGH PRIEST AFTER THE ORDER OF MELCHISEDEC, IS A SUPERIOR HIGH PRIEST TO AARON.

(Chap. vii.)

The train of thought in this chapter is most clearly arranged: First, it is shown in ver. 1–10 that Melchisedec's priesthood was of a higher order than the Levitical; then, in vers. 11–19, the inference is drawn from this, that the Levitical priesthood, and in like manner also, the Mosaical law upon which it was grafted was imperfect, and finally in vers. 20–28, that the Messiah, because

according to Ps. cx. he must be a high priest after the order of Melchisedec, was greatly superior to the Levitical priesthood as well as to the Mosaical law.

The first of these three parts divides itself again into two lines of thought; in ver. 1–3 it is shewn that the priesthood of Melchisedec is an *eternal* priesthood, in ver. 4–10 that Melchisedec *took tithes from Levi.*

Vers. 1–3.—Οὗτος points back to chap. vi. 20. This Melchisedec, namely, he who is spoken of in Ps. cx. The principal nerve of the passage lies, of course, in the principal verb *μένει εἰς τὸ διηνεκές* (not as Storr would have it in the words *ἑρμηνευόμενος βασιλεὺς δικαιοσύνης*). It was already intimated in chap. vi. 20, that Christ is like Melchisedec an *eternal* high priest. And now in vers. 1–3, it is explained in how far Melchisedec's priesthood was eternal, and in like manner it is then shewn in vers. 20–28 in how far Christ's priesthood was eternal. It can therefore not be doubted that the words *abideth for ever* contain the principal idea of the sentence. All the other parts from vers. 1–3 are only accessary members of an explanatory kind.

The question, however, still remains in what relation does this principal idea stand to the thesis chap. iv. 20. Are we to take the *γάρ* in an *argumentative* sense, and is it the intention of the author to prove in vers. 1–3 that Christ was a high priest after the order of Melchisedec? And does the proof consist in this, that Melchisedec was an eternal priest, and that, in like manner, an eternal priesthood belongs also to Christ, so that in virtue of this tertium comparationis—eternity—Christ can be called a high priest after the order of Melchisedec? This cannot possibly have been the author's intention. He must in this case have left out the words *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* in the thesis chap. vi. 20, and, instead of this, must have introduced immediately after ver. 3 what he says from vers. 20–28. (The train of thought must then have been: Christ is a high priest after the manner of Melchisedec; for, Melchisedec's priesthood was eternal, Christ's priesthood was also eternal, ergo.)—In reality, however, the author was under *no necessity* whatever of proving that Christ's priesthood was and must be after the order of Melchisedec. This had already been settled at chap. v. 1–10, and settled on the ground that the prophetical psalm, Ps. cx., contains the calling of the Messiah to the priestly dignity, and that the psalmist had therefore before-hand ascribed to the Messiah the priestly *in conjunction with the kingly honour.* No, it is not the aim of the author to *prove* in chap. vii. 1–3 that the priesthood of Christ is of the same order as that of Melchisedec, but, from the thesis already established, chap. vi. 20, to *draw inferences*, the inference, namely that the *priesthood of the Messiah is superior to the Levitical priesthood.*

We must, therefore take γάρ in an *explicative* signification in the sense of *namely*. The weighty import of the thesis, chap. vi. 20, is now to be evolved, the author will, so to speak, unfold to the reader the fulness of meaning that lies in the simple expression *after the order of Melchisedec*, and shew him with what important results it is fraught.

A series of clauses in apposition follows the subject of the sentence, which, however, do not all belong to the subject, but in part to the predicate. Those which belong to the predicate begin with *first being by interpretation;* that they begin here and nowhere else is evident from this, that the first two attributes are *here repeated by way of being explained.*

Melchisedec, ... first being by interpretation king of righteousness,

king of Salem . . . . then king of Salem, *i. e.* king of peace,

priest of God, etc.

We have therefore to render the sentence thus: "This Melchisedec, king of Salem, priest of the most high God, who met Abraham, etc., and blessed him, *abideth for ever* as one whose name signifies king of righteousness, etc." The first group of appositional clauses serves to denote and to describe the subject; the second serves to shew, what ground there is for ascribing to this subject the predicate *abideth for ever.*

Let us consider the first group. *Melchisedec*, the well-known king of the Amorites, Gen. xiv. The conjecture of Jerome, Luther, etc., that Melchisedec was no other than Shem the son of Noah, is now with reason universally rejected. Equally untenable is the view of Molinäus, Hottinger, etc., that Melchisedec was no man, but a temporary incarnation of the Son of God. Melchisedec was doubtless, according to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, none other than an Amoritic prince of a tribe among whom (just as in the house of Laban) the ancient primitive monotheism was still preserved, and who, according to the old patriarchal fashion, still offered sacrifices as the priest of his tribe to the invisible God in heaven.—The words *who met*, etc. as also the words *to whom he gave a tenth*, etc., serve *here* immediately only to recall to the minds of his readers the few features that have been preserved from the life of this man, and to give them a more distinct presentation of the form of Melchisedec, although these features are afterwards, vers. 4 and 6, again taken up and made use of for farther inferences (just as at chap. vi. 13 the words ἐπεί, etc.).

Pass we now to the *second group* of clauses in apposition. Melchisedec *remains* a priest *for ever*, he whose name being interpreted is *King of righteousness*, whose title signifies *King of peace.* The author was fully entitled to lay stress on these names, as they were

not merely arbitrary, but were really expressive of the nature and character of that man. If our author had drawn similar inferences from the name of the later king Adonizedec of Salem (Josh. x.), this might justly have been characterized as a rabbinical proceeding; but every reader of sound sense will feel how impossible such a proceeding would be to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, how harshly it would contrast with the usually profound character of his reasonings. In Melchisedec the nomen et omen truly met and harmonized. The tribe of people which had built Salem must have been *really* a peaceable tribe, otherwise they would not have given to the city the name "Peace," "city of Peace," and, in fact, the king of this city had not involved himself and his people in that war which, considering the times, was a pretty extensive war. This king himself showed *really* a sense of justice in sympathising with the righteous cause of Abraham, and he showed more than this, in coming to meet Abraham in a friendly spirit with presents of refreshment. Abraham, the champion of faith, offers to him gifts of homage; nay, in giving him the tenth, he thereby places himself under his sovereignty, he takes refuge beneath the sceptre of this king who served the living God, in order that under his protection he may henceforth live unmolested by hostile bands of heathen. The names מלכי צדק and מלך שלם, therefore, really express only in a concise way the *features of character and form* which distinguished that priest-king. And when David (Ps. cx.) in the spirit of prophecy sees and expects of the seed promised to him, that, like Melchisedec, he will unite the priestly with the kingly dignity, he surely does not predict in these words a merely outward and mechanical *conjunction* of the two dignities, but he has before him the figure of a man in whom, as in Melchisedec, the kingly power would be consecrated and penetrated with the sanctifying virtue of the priestly dignity and work, the form, therefore, of a king who would truly govern in *peace* (comp. 2 Sam. vii. 11) and *righteousness* (comp. Ps. xlv. 7).

From this alone, however, it does not follow that Melchisedec's priesthood is eternal. In order to prove this other attributes are still necessary. Melchisedec is *without father, without mother, without descent.* What does the author mean by this? Schulz and Böhme have imputed such absurdity to him as to suppose, that he really meant to say that Melchisedec came into the world without parents, and with some this strange idea even yet finds acceptance. But is it seriously believed that the author meant to ascribe to Melchisedec a *really* eternal priesthood? Christ then was not the only eternal priest! Such an interpretation as this which cleaves to the letter, carries in itself merely that rabbinical narrowness which those who employ it think they find in the Holy Scriptures.

Our author reasons in quite the reverse way. He turns entirely away from all investigation respecting the other unknown events in Melchisedec's life, and views him only in so far as David in the 110th psalm has made use of him, and *could* make use of him as a type of the Messiah. The individual Melchisedec who met Abraham had indeed a father and a mother, possibly a brave father and a gentle mother—for all we know. But just because we do not know this, and because David also could know nothing of it when he used the words, "Thou art a priest after the order of Melchisedec," he cannot have intended to say: the Messiah will have a brave or not brave father, a gentle or ungentle mother, etc.,—in other words, he could not mean to set forth the *individual* with his *other* characteristics as a figure of the future Messiah, but must have referred to the figure of Melchisedec only *in so far as it stands out from obscurity in Gen.* xiv., when he said of the promised seed that he shall be a priest after the manner of Melchisedec.

But this and this alone is justly important to our author. The Levitical priest had to legitimize himself as a priest by his descent from Levi and Aaron; Melchisedec's priesthood had certainly nothing to do with his race and his descent, as nothing at all has been recorded of his descent. Melchisedec stands altogether outside of the great theocratical lineage, which runs from Abraham upwards to Adam and downwards to Levi and Aaron, etc. He comes forth from the darkness, like a streak of light, only to disappear immediately in the darkness again. And yet—although he cannot have been a priest by theocratical descent—the Holy Scripture adduces him, Moses himself adduces him as a "priest of God on high," and acknowledges him as such. If now the Messiah is to be a priest after the order of Melchisedec, then to him also is ascribed not the Levitical hereditary priesthood, but an *independent priesthood having its roots in his own person.*

That the words ἀπάτωρ, ἀμήτωρ mean here really nothing more than parentibus *ignotis* appears partly, from the analogy of profane writers (for example, *Horace*, serm. 1, 6, 10: Multos saepe viros nullis majoribus ortos. *Liv.* iv. 3: Servium Tullium, captiva Corniculana natum, patre nullo, matre serva, *Cic.* de oratore, II. 64: Quid hoc clamoris? quibus nec pater nec mater, tanta confidentia estis?)—partly from the explanatory ἀγενεαλόγητος, which as is well known, signifies not "without generation" but "without pedigree."

Now this also points already indirectly at the eternal nature of the priesthood of Melchisedec; the full proof, however, is first given in the words *having neither beginning of days nor end of life*, but ἀφωμοιωμένος τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ. How this is to be explained appears from what has just been said. The individual Melchisedec had, in truth, a beginning and an end of life; but of this nothing is re-

corded in the Pentateuch, and therefore David could not refer to it in the 110th psalm. It is of importance to the author that nothing is *recorded* of Melchisedec's birth and death. As he has explained *without father and without mother* by the term *without genealogy*, so now he explains *having neither beginning of days nor end of life* by *ἀφωμοιωμένος*, etc. Calvin has already observed with reason that the author does not say *ὁμοῖος*. Melchisedec was not like to Christ, but was *represented* in a manner like to Christ. But that nothing is recorded in the Pentateuch of the beginning and end of Melchisedec's life, and that, notwithstanding, Melchisedec is acknowledged as a priest of God, and that this his priesthood—without predecessors and successors—was set forth by David as a type of the future Messianic priesthood—this, again, has properly for our author a *positive* significance. This is to be explained by *the antithesis to the Levitical priesthood;* for all these characteristic features of the priesthood of Melchisedec are adduced as bearing on the comparison with the Levitical priesthood, and in proof of the inferiority of the latter. The Levitical priest or highpriest became a priest by his birth, and left the priesthood at *his death* to his son; his office was, from the nature of him who held it, not a continuing one, but one that moved onwards from member to member, and *this succession was expressly prescribed and regulated in the law.* When therefore the Psalmist will describe the priestly glory of the promised *seed*, and seeks to concentrate this in a corresponding type, he selects not that of a ritual Levitical high priest—one of those high priests who, from generation to generation, ceased from their office and gave place to each other—but that of Melchisedec who, *a*, was a priest not by formal, legal investment, but because his internal character, his qualities of *righteousness* and *peace* impelled him to bring sacrifices to God, and to consecrate the power of the king by the internal qualities of the priest; who, *b*, was a priest not by descent but in himself; and who therefore, *c*, was not a link in a chain of predecessors and successors, but is represented as alone in his order, and thus far as one who continues a priest (yields up his priesthood to no one).

It is therefore truly no play upon words or artifice of ingenuity, but the Divine wisdom and illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which our author obtains the inferences which he builds on those particulars in the form under which Melchisedec is represented to us. The vindication of his procedure lies in this, that Melchisedec does not appear as in himself (Gen. xiv.) a type of Christ, but is first stamped as a type of Christ by David in Ps. cx., who in this could not certainly refer to all that Melchisedec was, but only to the little that was recorded of him in Gen. xiv.—Seeing then that David when he would describe in its highest form the glory of the seed

promised to him, selects not the form of a Levitical high priest, but that of Melchisedec as represented in Gen. xiv., our author must needs inquire, wherefore and on what grounds this of Melchisedec appeared to the Psalmist the most glorious form, more so than that of a Levitical high priest. These reasons were not difficult to discover. The Levitical high priest was such by investment; altogether apart from his personal character, but the Messiah was to be a high priest (comp. i. 9, ii. 17, iv. 15) from his own internal character, through his personal holiness, compassion, righteousness, and truth, just as Melchisedec was a high priest through his own independent free act and piety. The Levitical high priest held his office in virtue of his descent from Levi and Aaron; the Messiah was to descend not from Aaron but from David; like Melchisedec he was to stand outside of the hereditary Levitical succession of priests. The Levitical high priest must give place to a successor; the Messiah was to be a priest-king without end (2 Sam. vii.; Ps. cx. 4); to this corresponds in Melchisedec the circumstance, that we are nowhere told of his successor in the priestly office. In the manner then in which the account respecting Melchisedec is given Gen. xiv. lies the reason why he must have appeared to the Psalmist as more exalted than the Levitical high priest. None of those *limitations* which were *essential* to the latter are ascribed to the former. It is precisely in the mysterious way in which the Pentateuch represents him as emerging from the darkness, and standing above the theocratical race, that we are to seek the ground of that impression of more exalted majesty which induced the Psalmist to set him forth as a type or example of the priest-kingly glory belonging to the future Messiah. It will, accordingly, be evident that those expositors are entirely mistaken who maintain, that the words *remaineth a priest forever* intimate merely that the priestly office of Melchisedec was everlasting. The office was also in the case of the *Levitical* high priests abiding and lasting. No! the *person* of Melchisedec—not precisely his person in its individual reality but in the outline of it which was presented to the Psalmist—wore the aspect of a priest whose priesthood had its root *in himself*, and who *resigned his office to no successor*. The substance of vers. 1–3 is therefore this: Already the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament ascribe to the Messiah a priesthood which, in virtue of its internal and external independence and freedom from limitations, is far superior to the Levitical priesthood.

Vers. 4–10.—A second proof now follows of the superiority of the priesthood of Melchisedec to the Levitical priesthood. This second proof is drawn from the incidents in the history of Melchisedec already mentioned casually in ver. 1, seq., *who met Abraham*, etc. The whole argument in vers. 4–10 moves in the form of

a sorites. This sorites consists of two principal parts. In vers. 4–7, from the circumstance that Abraham gave to Melchisedec the tenth and received his blessing it is inferred, that Melchisedec was superior to Abraham. In vers. 9, 10 from the fact that Levi was then yet in the loins of Abraham it is inferred, that Levi also was subordinate to Abraham.

The first part of the sorites will in a scholastico-logical form stand thus :—

Major : The receiver of tithe and bestower of the blessing is superior to the giver of tithe and receiver of the blessing.

Minor : But Abraham gave tithe to Melchisedec and received the blessing from him.

Conclusion : Therefore Melchisedec is superior to Abraham. The author does not, however, merely omit the conclusion according to the form of the sorites, and forthwith proceed to the second principal part, but he makes the omission of the conclusions still more easy by the simple process of placing the major after the minor proposition.

Ver. 4 is *the first half of the minor :* Melchisedec received from Abraham the tenth. In ver. 5 a subsidiary remark follows, to the effect that Melchisedec received the tenth from Abraham in a much more striking and distinguished manner than the Levites now receive it from the Jews. In ver. 6 the *first half of the minor*, enlarged by the antithetical reference to ver. 5, is *repeated*, and *the second half of the minor :* that Melchisedec *blessed* Abraham, is added.

In ver. 7 the *major proposition* (already involving the conclusion) now follows the minor ; formally, however, it is adduced only in reference to the blessing. (The same thing was already self-evident in reference to the levying of the tithe chiefly from ver. 5).

After it has been shewn that Melchisedec is superior to Abraham, the receiver of the promise, and the progenitor of all the Levitical and non-Levitical Jews, the author, now glancing back to vers. 1–3, makes the transition in ver. 8 to the second principal part of the sorites, vers. 9, 10, ver. 9 containing the *thesis*, ver. 10 the *proof*.

Ver. 4.—The particle δέ serves simply to denote the transition to another subject. "But now observe further." Πηλίκος how great, how highly exalted, namely, in comparison with the Levitical high priests. The ᾧ does not serve first to determine who is meant by οὗτος ; but οὗτος refers backwards to the Melchisedec named in vers. 1–3, and ᾧ is confirmatory, cui = quum ei. The apposition ὁ πατριάρχης is, on account of the emphasis, placed at the end of the period. He who, as the progenitor of all Israel, also of the Levites,

is superior to Israel and to the Levites, nevertheless paid the tenth to Melchisedec, and thus placed himself in a subordinate position to him. This finishes the first part of the minor proposition (placed before the major in ver. 7).

Before, however, the author adds the other part in ver. 6, he must first meet an objection. The objector might say, Why is so much stress laid on the circumstance that Melchisedec took tithes? Did not the Levitical priests also take tithes? The author must needs, shew, therefore, what an important difference there is between the two cases. He does this in a subsidiary remark at ver. 5. He first of all introduces the objection itself in the form of a *restriction*, "and indeed the Levites also take tithes;" he, however, at the same time, joins to this restriction or concession all the particulars in which the inferiority of the Levites in this respect shews itself, so that he can then forthwith set forth in opposition to this, the higher form of tithe-taking in the case of Melchisedec, and with this can, at the same time, repeat in a more enlarged and more definite form in the 6th verse, the idea of the minor proposition of ver. 4.

We must first of all consider more closely the *subject*: *οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν Λευὶ τὴν ἱερατείαν λαμβάνοντες*. That *οἱ λαμβάνοντες* is really the subject, and that the words *ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν Λευὶ* depend on *λαμβάνοντες*, is evident of itself. If *οἱ ἐκ τῶν υἱῶν Λευὶ* by itself were taken as the subject, and *τὴν ἱερατείαν λαμβάνοντες* as a more special determination of the idea in the predicate, we should then obtain the unsuitable sense that the Levites *then* take tithes *when* they receive or enter upon the priesthood. This, however, would not be agreeable to historical fact. With as little reason can we, with Bleek and others, render thus: *those* among the Levites who receive the priesthood (in opposition to those who were Levites merely without being priests)—for, according to the Mosaic law, all Levites received tithe (Lev. xxvii. 30). The emphasis rather lies on *λαμβάνοντες*, and the Levites are placed in a twofold antithesis to Melchisedec; first, as those who were descended from Levi; secondly, as those who *received* the priesthood (in virtue of this their descent). "Those who, being the sons of Levi, *received* the priesthood," stand in opposition to Melchisedec, who, according to vers. 1–3, was *without genealogy*, and *had neither predecessor nor successor;* but whose priesthood flowed independently, as it were, from his own person. (So substantially also Reland, Pierce, Wolf).

The word *λαμβάνοντες*, then, already indicates one point of inferiority in the Levitical receiving of tithes. A further point of inferiority is given in the words *ἐντολὴν ἔχουσι*. The Levites received by a command the right to lift tithes, and the rest of the Israelites give tithes because they *must* do so. Abraham, on the contrary,

gave tithe to Melchisedec *voluntarily*. *There* there was a third party (namely, God) who is superior to the Levites, as well as to the rest of the tribes, to whom the tithe properly belonged, and who assigned it to the Levites. *Here* it was the personal dignity and majesty of Melchisedec that moved Abraham to give tithes. The same antithesis is repeated in the words *κατὰ τὸν νόμον*.

But the author does not overlook the circumstance, also, that the right of the Levites to exact tithes extends only to the *λαός*, *τούτεστι τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς αὐτῶν*, while Melchisedec's superiority stretches beyond his tribe, even to Abraham, who was quite a stranger to him. In like manner, also, that the descent from Abraham as, on the one hand (in the case of the Levites) it confers the right to take tithes, so, on the other hand (in the case of those who are not Levites), does not protect them from the burden of paying tithes. This latter lies in the words, *though they came out of the loins of Abraham*. Is Melchisedec, then, superior to the progenitor of the race whose members divide themselves into tithe-receivers and tithe-payers, it is therefore evident that the right of these latter (the Levites) to take tithes is of a far inferior nature to the right of Melchisedec. Or, in other words: that Melchisedec stood higher above Abraham, than among his descendants the Levites stand above those who are not Levites. The relation might be mathematically represented thus:

Melchisedec $>>$ [Abraham $>$ (Levites $>$ not Levites)]. Then, in addition to this, comes the other difference indicated in the words *ἐντολήν* and *κατὰ νόμον*, between the right of the Levites to take tithes as a dependent right, and conferred by the lawgiver, and that of Melchisedec as independent and flowing from his personal dignity.

In ver. 6 the other side of the comparison between Melchisedec and the Levitical priests is presented, and special emphasis laid on this feature of it that Melchisedec received tithes from one who, in respect of descent, was not connected with him. In this the *first part of the minor proposition* is repeated, but in a more full and definite form. To this is added here the second part of the minor proposition, viz., that Abraham, although he had received from God the theocratical promise, was yet *blessed* of Melchisedec. The designation *τὸν ἔχοντα τὰς ἐπαγγελίας* corresponds in its logical position to the designation *ὁ πατριάρχης*, ver. 4. At both a *καίπερ* might be supplied instead of the article.

In ver. 7 the *major proposition* now follows the minor, and here we do not indeed find both parts of the minor referred with scholastic accuracy to corresponding general propositions, but only the second part of it, which was adduced immediately before. "Without all contradiction the less is blessed of the higher," = he who

blesses is always superior to him who is blessed. The parallel member: The tithe-receiver is always superior to the tithe-giver was so self-evident (especially after what was said from ver. 5 onwards), that the author might safely omit it.

Equally unnecessary was the formal statement of the *conclusion:* Ergo Melchisedec is superior to Abraham; and so much the more, as he had placed the major proposition, which involved this conclusion, behind the minor.

He therefore, in ver. 8, forthwith makes the *transition to the second principal part of the sorites*, to the argument, namely (for which also he had already prepared the way in ver. 5), that if Abraham is inferior to Melchisedec, so much the more inferior to him is Levi. He, however, makes this transition precisely in such a way as to introduce an *accessory remark* which connects substantially with the accessory remarks of the 5th verse.

The idea, namely, that *here* (under the Levitical law) it is dying men who receive tithes, but *there*, he of whom it is testified that he liveth—this idea forms no link in the syllogistic chain, does not follow from ver. 7, and proves nothing for ver. 8, but is in reality an accessory idea, serving only to lead the attention of the reader away from Abraham to the Levites. In respect of its import, this verse merely points back in a brief way to ver. 3, and only in this view is it, in general, intelligible. If ver. 3 had not preceded, ver. 8 might then really be so understood as if the author there meant to ascribe an endless life to the *individual Melchisedec* (for, with Justinian, Capellus, and others, to consider Christ as the subject of ζῇ, is mere nonsense). But, after what was said in ver. 3 (as in the main Bleek also has rightly perceived) μαρτυρούμενος ὅτι ζῇ can be nothing else than a concise representation of the idea: μήτε ἀρχὴν ἡμερῶν μήτε ζωῆς τέλος ἔχων, and is therefore to be explained thus: "Of whom only his life is recorded, not his death" (Bleek); or, in other words: it is again not the individual Melchisedec who has the testimony *that he liveth*, but it is again the typical figure of Melchisedec, as it appeared to the eye of the Psalmist in the framework of Gen. xiv. Ver. 8, therefore, contains nothing new, but merely reminds the reader of the inferiority of the Levitical priesthood, already shewn at ver. 3, and this with the view, as has been already observed, merely of turning in this way the attention of the reader from Abraham to the tribe of Levi.

Vers. 9, 10.—In these verses we have now the *second principal part of the sorites* itself. In ver. 9 a thesis is laid down, a minor proposition to which the major proposition of the foregoing syllogism implicitly contained in ver. 7 (the tithe-receiver is superior to the tithe-giver) stands directly related; namely, the minor proposition: Levi also in a certain sense paid tithes to Melchisedec; so that here,

neither the major proposition nor the conclusion needed to be specially adduced. In ver. 10 the minor proposition of ver. 9 is proved. The words in both verses are perfectly clear. In the mode of reasoning, however, many commentators have, with a greater or less display of merriment, found here again a thoroughly coarse specimen of the rabbinical manner of interpretation and reasoning, while others again (as Olshausen, Bleek) have sought to vindicate this reasoning by viewing it merely as an "argumentatio ad hominem directed against the Jewish estimation of mere bodily descent" (which might properly be called deductio ad absurdum), and thus to defend it against the charge of unsuitableness. Even Olshausen thinks that this argument is "not to be understoed literally, and that the author means to indicate this by ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; but how then is it to be understood?—The argument would indeed be rabbinical, if the author had inferred from Levi's being still in the loins of Abraham, that Levi participated in Abraham's giving tithes considered *as an individual act of Abraham.* For example, it would be stange and absurd were I to reason thus: "The Margrave George of Brandenburg with great courage protected the Reformation in Baireuth; but Frederic William IV. was then in the loins of George, therefore Frederic William IV. with great courage protected the Reformation in Baireuth." Our author, on the contrary, infers from the fact that Levi was then in the loins of Abraham (*i. e.*, let it be observed, that neither Levi, nor Isaac, nor Jacob were at that time begotten—for so soon as Isaac was begotten Levi was no longer in Abraham's loins) only this, that the *legal relation* in which Abraham placed himself to Melchisedec held good also with reference to Levi. That he does not mean an *absolute* participation by Levi in the paying of tithes, but only such participation *in a certain sense*, not a participation in the act as such, but only in the results and legal consequences of it, seems to me to be indicated by the clause ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν which is added to δεδεκάτωται. He therefore takes care not to say of Levi δεκάτην ἔδωκεν, and purposely makes use of the passive δεδεκάτωται. In this view the argument is fully justified. If, for example, I obtain the freedom of the city of Hamburgh, and have already a son arrived at majority, my investment with this right will not affect the position of this son; on the other hand, those of my children who are still minors, and those whom I may afterwards beget, participate in this right of citizenship which I have acquired. Or, if the Knight of Kronenburgh has placed himself in subjection to the Duke of Nassau as vassal, his already grown up and independent son does not participate in this act, but his children who are begotten after this act of subjection must acknowledge the sovereignty of the Duke of Nassau. So also here. If, at the period referred to in Gen. xiv., Isaac had been

an independent man, he would have had a right to say to his father: You may, if it pleases you, subject yourself to this Melchisedec; that does not affect me; I am free. Isaac, however, was not begotten until after Abraham had entered into this relation of subjection. With perfect justice, therefore, is the inference drawn from the *dependent* character of the descendants to their participation in the act of subjection. Of course, however, it is not an outward political relation of subjection that is here meant (for such could only be spoken of, if the posterity of Abraham had continued all along to be subjects of the Amoritic kings of Salem), but an *ideal* subordination of the theocratical race to the priestly form of Melchisedec.*

In vers. 11–19 we have the second train of thought in this section. In vers. 1–10 the priesthood of Melchisedec was compared with the Levitical, and the inferiority of the latter demonstrated. In vers. 11–19 the author demonstrates, as a further inference from this, the *imperfection* and *incompleteness* not of the *Levitical priesthood* alone, but also of the *Mosaical law.*

Here again, the ideas of the writer move in the form of sorites. Ver. 11 involves the new thesis: in the Levitical priesthood there was no τελείωσις. This, however, is not laid down formally as a thesis, but the transition is made in the following manner. In vers. 1–10 had been already shewn the *inferiority* of the Levitical priesthood. In ver. 11 the author now says: How too could this be otherwise? If a τελείωσις had been given by the Levitical priesthood, then in general there had been no necessity for that promise of *another* priest, a priest after the order of Melchisedec. He thus shapes the new thesis into the form of an *argument.* And as in vers. 1–10 he drew inferences from the import of the prophecy Ps. cx., so here, he draws an inference from the fact of its *existence.* He then in ver. 12 adduces a collateral argument, or rather he again disposes of an objection (just as above at ver. 5). He has conceded in parenthesis, ver. 11, that the Levitical priesthood forms the inner basis of the Mosaical law; from this the inference might have been drawn: by so much the more must the Levitical priesthood be perfect; for the law is perfect. This objection the author in ver. 12 removes by the explanatory remark that *vice versa*, from the imperfection of the priesthood follows that also of the law. In this, however, there is implicitly contained a *second thesis* ver. 12.

This second thesis: *the Mosaical law has no perfection*, is proved in vers. 13–19. (For the first thesis there lay already an argument in ver. 11).

* Strange to say, many commentators have found a difficulty in this, that Jesus as the descendant of David and Abraham must *also* have stood below Melchisedec. Did Jesus then proceed from the loins of a human father?

A, Ver. 13.—The *Messiah* is *High Priest, and yet not of the tribe of Levi* (consequently the Messianic idea as such involves a going beyond the law).

Proof: *a*, Ver. 14.—The *historical fact:* Jesus was of the tribe of Judah.

b, Vers. 15–17.—The *christological necessity.*

Major, Ver. 15 : the Messiah was to be a priest after the order of Melchisedec.

Minor, Ver. 17 : Melchisedec is a priest *forever.*

Conclusion, Ver. 16 : the Messiah must not be born according to the law of the flesh.

B, Vers. 18, 19.—From the fact that the law *could* be abrogated it follows that it was *imperfect.*

Ver. 11.—Εἰ with the Imp. expresses the abstract possibility of a case already known as not actual. "If perfection were." As the logical intermediate member between vers. 10 and 11, the idea supplies itself: "It follows that the Levitical priesthood was also imperfect. And how naturally! For if," etc. Ἱερωσύνη, also in ver. 12, denotes originally the priestly condition, the priestly office, the priestly dignity, while ἱερατεία denotes originally the service to be performed by the priests. But in this chapter (comp. vers. 5 and 12) both words are used promiscuously to denote the priestly condition as a whole—person, office, and service taken together. The expression τελείωσις ἦν διά is purposely of a quite general character; it denotes not the perfected atonement nor the perfected sanctification, but, quite generally, the completion of the saving acts and saving ways of God, *i. e.*, of the theocracy.

The parenthesis ὁ λαὸς γάρ, etc., serves to explain how some might be led to see in the Levitical priesthood the completion of the theocracy. Upon the basis of this priesthood the people received their law. Ἐπ' αὐτῆς is the reading in the A.B.C.D.E. Cyr. and the cursive manuscripts; in like manner, Grotius, Lachmann, Bleek; ἐπ' αὐτῇ is less authorized, and yields the trifling sense that the people received their law with the priesthood, *i. e.*, either contemporaneously with it (Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, etc.), or over and above the priesthood (Gerhard, Bengel, Limborch, etc. Wolf, Storr, and others, interpret the ἐπί "on *condition* of the existence of a priesthood," which is equally unsuitable, grammatically and in point of fact). If we adopt the reading ἐπ' αὐτῆς, then ἐπί is c. gen., and used in the same way as at ix. 17; 1 Cor. ix. 10, "upon it," "upon its basis." The Levitical priesthood, although, considered externally and in respect of time, it was first instituted in the law and through the law, yet formed, internally, the basis and presupposed conditio sine qua non the giving of the law, nay *for* the giving of the law. *In* the giving of the law; for the entire plan

and arrangement of it rests on the law of worship, on the representation of the people before God by the priests, and likewise all its other ordinances are most closely connected with the institution of the Levitical priesthood. *For* the giving of the law; inasmuch as this law was necessary only to awaken within the Israelites a sense of their need of a priestly representation before God; in itself the Mosaical law was not necessary, but only a pedagogical preparatory step correlative with the period of the Levitical priesthood. Some, therefore, might be led to infer, from the important part which the Levitical priesthood plays in the law that the Levitical priesthood was certainly complete in itself, in like manner as the law was *considered* as perfect by the Jews. On this latter supposition, and the inquiry whether a τελείωσις was given by *the law*, the author does not yet enter here, but, in the first place, proves his *first* thesis—that no perfection was given by the *Levitical priesthood*—altogether independently of the other supposition; and he proves this simply by shewing, that otherwise there would assuredly have been no promise of another priest, who should be a priest not after the order of Aaron, but of *Melchisedec*. The construction of the passage is as follows: Τίς ἔτι χρεία ἕτερον ἱερέα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδὲκ ἀνίστασθαι, καὶ (αὐτὸν) οὐ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Ἀαρὼν λέγεσθαι; What necessity would there in that case have been, that another priest should arise after the order of Melchisedec, "and that he," (= "this one,") should not be called after the order of Aaron? (Schleusner and others take λέγεσθαι unnaturally in the sense of "to be chosen." Luther, Baumgarten, etc., construe: τίς ἔτι χρεία λέγεσθαι· ἕτερον ἱερέα ἀνίστασθαι κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδὲκ καὶ οὐ κατὰ, τ. τ. Ἀαρών, a construction which necessarily presupposes a very unnatural arrangement of the words). That καὶ λέγεσθαι stands for ὃς λέγεται will explain why the author—having ὃς λέγεται in his mind—has put οὐ for μή.

In ver. 12 the author now proceeds to obviate the objection contained in the parenthesis of ver. 11. Will some infer from the perfection of the law that the Levitical priesthood, which stood so closely connected with the law, was also perfect? He infers, vice versa, from the imperfection of the priesthood, that the law also was imperfect. As a proof of the imperfection of the former, he has just adduced in ver. 11 the fact, that the Levitical priesthood was to be superseded by one after the order of Melchisedec, and now he proceeds to say: "But where the priesthood changes, there of necessity also the law changes." This, however, involves the assertion that *the law also was imperfect*, as a *second* or auxiliary thesis; and this is now in vers. 13–19 circumstantially proved.

Ver. 13–17 forms, as has just been said, the first principal part of the proof. In ver. 13 we have the argument, that he of whom

this was said (namely the promise mentioned in ver. 11 of a priest after the order of Melchisedec), *was* member of another tribe (than the tribe of Levi), a tribe none of the members of which had ever anything to do with the altar. The words are clear. The author does not say: It is *prophesied* in the *Old* Testament of the Messiah, that he should be of another tribe, but he simply lays down in ver. 13 the *fact*, that he to whom that prediction applied—therefore the Messiah—*was* of another tribe. Not till ver. 14 and ver. 15–17, does he separate the fact of the fulfilment from the prophetical christological necessity. In ver. 13 he still mentions merely the fact of the case viewed as a whole. The Messiah, the *Son of David* (consequently, one who was not a Levite), was to be priest. Thus a priesthood out of the tribe of Levi was ordained. A passing beyond the law, a *μετάθεσις νόμου*, was therefore predicted.

That Jesus is *he of whom these things are spoken*, the author does not prove, and needs not to prove. His readers did not doubt that Jesus was the Messiah; the question only was, whether by this Messiah the Old Testament cultus was abolished, or whether it still continues.*

In ver. 14 the author, by way of confirming what is said in ver. 13, appeals to the *manifest historical fact* that "our Lord" (so he evidently designates *Jesus* as the *historical person*) "sprang from the tribe of Judah." Those therefore are altogether wrong, who find in our passage a proof that the Christians had first inferred from the prophecy of the Messiah's descent from David, that Jesus must certainly have sprung from the tribe of Judah. No! the author introduces this inference first in ver. 15–17, after having previously in ver. 14 laid it down as a *manifest fact* not of the *Χριστός*, of the Messiah, but (as Bleek also rightly perceives) of "Our Lord," of the person of the Lord and Master historically known to the Christians, that he "has sprung" from Judah (*ἀνατέταλκεν* perfect). We have here therefore rather a most significant proof, that the descent of Jesus from the tribe of Judah was a well and universally known fact before the destruction of Jerusalem. In the same years in which the Gospels of Mark and Luke were written, the descent of Jesus from David was already universally known.

Πρόδηλον is stronger than *δῆλον*. *Δῆλον* is what lies open and manifest, *πρόδηλον* is what lies conspicuously manifest among other manifest things.—*Ἀνατέλλειν* is a term. techn. for the rising of the sun; also in Luke i. 78, the expression *ἀνατολή* is used of the birth of Jesus. In the words *εἰς ἣν φυλήν*, etc., it is again emphatically repeated that, according to the law, the tribe of Judah had no right to the office of the priesthood. The author here delicately expresses

* I cannot understand how even Bleek (ii. 351) should still deny this grand practical aim of the whole Epistle to the Hebrews.

in the form of a *litotes*, the *strict prohibition* laid on all who were not Levites from serving as priests: "In reference to which tribe Moses has said nothing of a priesthood."

In ver. 15–17 the author shews that the Messiah, as he was in fact not a Levite, so in accordance with the prediction *could* not be a Levite. He adds the christological necessity to the historical reality. In proof of the former, he might simply have appealed to the predictions of the Messiah's descent from David already mentioned in the preceding chapters; but his manner is not to grasp at what lies nearest and what every reader must himself have been able to say. He goes deeper. He proves in ver. 15–17, not merely that the Messiah must in respect of his humanity spring from David (this was already implied in ver. 13), but that it follows from the nature of the priesthood of Melchisedec, that the Messiah must be born, *in general, not according to the law of a carnal commandment, but according to the power of an indestructible life.*

The sentence beginning with εἰ cannot, of course, form the subject to κατάδηλόν ἐστι, as εἰ cannot stand for ὅτι; equally unnecessary and unjustifiable is it arbitrarily to invent a subject to κατάδηλον (as is done for example by Œcumenius, Limborch, Tholuck, Bleek, etc.: "that, with the priesthood, the law also is abrogated, is so much the more manifest," etc.); all that we have to do is simply to bring down from ver. 14 the clause ὅτι ἐξ Ἰούδα ἀνατέταλκεν, etc. That Jesus sprang from Judah is already in itself an *acknowledged fact* (ver. 14); but this is all the more manifest, as (ver. 15) it follows from Christ's priesthood being after the order of Melchisedec, that he *could* not be born κατὰ νόμον. This reference is drawn syllogistically. From the major proposition ver. 15 the conclusion is directly drawn in ver. 16, and then, in ver. 16, the minor which connects the two is added in the form of an explanation.

The major proposition ver. 15 is clear; it is a mere repetition of the prediction already adduced in ver. 11. In the idea which logically forms the minor premiss ver. 17, the emphasis lies on εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. *Therefore* the inference follows from the nature of the Messianic priesthood (its being after the order of Melchisedec), that the Messiah must be born *according to the power of an indestructible life*, because the εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα belongs to the characteristics of that priesthood of Melchisedec.—Is now the conclusion thus made good? Does the word לעולם, Ps. cx., form really the tertium comparationis in which the future heir of David is to agree with Melchisedec? No; the tert. comp. lies rather in the union of the priestly with the kingly power. But neither (as Bleek thinks, ii. p. 62) has our author by any means adduced the εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα as a tert. comp., but only as an *inference* which appeared to the Psalmist to follow, and (as is proved in vers. 1–3) must follow, from the general idea of a priest like to Melchisedec. The promised posterity which was

described to David, and was conceived of by him as a *priest-king*, and therefore as a Melchisedec-like figure, could not for this very reason be, like a Levitical high priest, a single member of a genealogically connected series of priests, but, as the *only one of his kind* excluding every possibility of succession, must consequently appear as holding his office *for ever*.

Ver. 16 contains the conclusion which follows from the everlasting duration of the Messianic priesthood. He who, differently from the Levitical priests, is to *remain* a priest for ever, must have *been made* a priest differently from the Levitical priests. The latter were made priests according to the law of a fleshly commandment. Σαρκικός (good ancient manuscripts here, and in other passages, have the form σαρκινός, which, however, in like manner as the reading in the received version, forms the antithesis to πνευματικός, so that no difference is thus made out in the sense) is not to be understood as designating the commandment in so far as, in respect of its import it refers to bodily descent (Theodoret, Grotius, Limborch, Tholuck, Bleek): for then those Messianic prophecies which say that the Messiah was to descend from David had also been fleshly! The term is rather to be explained (as already Carpzov and Kuinoel rightly perceived) from the antithetical word ἀκατάλυτος. The passage contains a threefold antithesis; δύναμις is antithetical to νόμος, ζωή to ἐντολή, and ἀκατάλυτος to σαρκικός. The meaning of these antitheses we shall best be able to explain by the following question: *a*, How did the Levitical priest originate? First, and in general, according to a law which ordained that the posterity of Aaron should be priests, whatever might be their inward character and qualifications. How was the Messiah made priest? Independently of the law, nay contrary to the law (vers. 13, 14), purely *in virtue of the power* which dwelt within him personally, which entitled and qualified him to represent men before God.—*b*, What was the nature of that law?—It appeared as a single external statute, an ἐντολή. How did that δύναμις show itself? As a ζωή, as direct power and actuality of life.—*c*. What was the character of that ἐντολή? It belonged to that pedagogical preparatory stage which had as yet nothing to do with the *implanting of spiritual life* in man who was dead through sin, but only with the setting up of outward barriers against sin, and with types of salvation for the *natural, carnal man*. (This is the meaning of σαρκικός comp. Gal. iii. 3.) What on the other hand, is the character of that ζωή? Indissoluble, *i. e.*, possessing in itself the power of perpetuity. In the one case, therefore, that separation of men from their Maker, in which the divine being appears to man only *outwardly* in the form of *fixed commandment* without entering into inward fellowship with him (comp. chap. iv. 2) still continues; in the other case, on the contrary, God has united himself with man, implanted himself within man as the beginning

and beginner of a new life, inasmuch as he has assumed the nature of men, and shewn himself to be the true and perfect high priest, inasmuch as he proved his divine power in his vicarious sufferings, and in the victory of the resurrection.

In vers. 18, 19 the author now draws from the proposition laid down in ver. 12 and proved in ver. 13–17, viz., that the Mosaic law was destined to be annulled by the Messiah—this last inference: that this law was a mere pedagogical preparatory stage, and therefore not the final perfect consummation of the divine revelations. The mode of argumentation is retrogressive. That annulling (*ἀθέτησις*), the actual fact of which was already shewn in ver. 13–17, is explained only on the presupposition of the *ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀνωφελές*. The author might have logically connected in the scholastic form the separate ideas of vers. 18, 19 in the following way: "But (atque *οὖν*) now the *annulling* of a *commandment* only then takes place when the *commandment* in question has shewn itself to be *weak* and *unprofitable*. Consequently (ergo, *ἄρα*) that law must have been weak and unprofitable, must have left its task unfinished, and must only have been an *introduction* to a better hope." But, as always in such cases of reasoning in this inverted order, he despises this scholastico-pedantic form, and chooses the easier form of the explicative *γάρ*.

The principal sentence and the last inference lies in the words *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐτελείωσεν ὁ νόμος, ἐπεισαγωγὴ δὲ κρείττονος ἐλπίδος*. At *ἐπεισαγωγή* we have not to supply *γίνεται* from ver. 18 (as is done by Theodoret, Luther, Gerhard, Bengel, Tholuck, Bleek, Olshausen, and others): for the words in respect of their import, form no antithesis to *ἀθέτησις μὲν γὰρ γίνεται*—(what sort of antithesis would this be: "An annulling of a law is wont to take place only on account of the weakness and unprofitableness of that law; but an introduction of a better hope takes place."—Nothing is said as to how or why this introduction takes place!) Nor are we to supply *ἐτελείωσεν* (with Schlichting, Michaelis, Semler, Ernesti, and others), for then, first of all, the article must have stood before *ἐπεισαγωγή*, and further, it is not possible that a *τελείωσις* can have been effected by the introduction to a hope. The right construction is that which supplies at *ἐπεισαγωγή* either *ἦν* (Erasmus, Vatable, Calvin, etc.), so that *ἐπεισαγωγή* becomes predicate to *νόμος*, or *ἐγένετο δι' αὐτοῦ* (*νόμου*),—"the law has made nothing prefect, but an introduction was given through it to a better hope." That the omission of such a verb is not elegant Greek is of small moment; the supposition that our author, who usually writes correctly, has here again written with somewhat less care, must always be more tolerable than a construction which yields a senseless idea.*

* Ebrard's construction overlooks the force of *ἐπί* in *ἐπεισαγ.*, the natural correlation of *μέν* and *δέ*, etc., and changes a very simple and elegant sentence into a clumsy and

Something negative and something positive, therefore, is affirmed of the law. The negative is: *οὐδὲν ἐτελείωσεν*. *Οὐδέν* is not here in the sense of *οὐδένα*, as Theophylact and others have supposed. What is here said is, not that the particular individual could not be led to perfection by the law, but that the law in every respect opened up and imposed a number of problems without solving any one of them. It set up in the decalogue the ideal of a holy life, and yet gave no power to realise this ideal; it awakened, by means of its law of sacrifice, the consciousness of the necessity of an atonement, and yet could provide no true valid offering for sin; it held forth in the institutions of the priesthood the necessity of a representation of the sinner before God, and yet it gave no priest who was able to save men *εἰς τὸ παντελές* (as it is said ver. 25). In short, "it left everything unfinished."—But one thing the law did accomplish; those who submitted to its rebuke, and did not allow themselves to be seduced into the base and delusive hope of a pharisaical self-righteousness, were led on by it to the better hope through which we (Christians) come nigh to God (in truth). This is the positive thing which is affirmed of the law in the words *ἐπεισαγωγή*, etc.

Ver. 20–28.—In these verses we have the *third* part of this section. It was shewn in ver. 1–10 that the priesthood of Melchisedec, which was represented in Ps. cx. as the type of the Messianic priesthood, is more exalted than the Levitical. In ver. 11–19 it was proved that this Levitical priesthood, together with the Mosaic law so closely connected with it, was destined to find its end and its abolition as an imperfect preparatory stage in the Messiah. In ver. 20–28 it is now shewn that Jesus the Messiah, in opposition to the imperfect Levitical priesthood and Mosaic law, is the *perfect* priest of a *new* and *perfect covenant*. The mention of the imperfection of the Mosaic law, ver. 19, leads by an easy transition, to this new thought.

In vers. 20 and 22, we have the principal sentence: "Inasmuch as Jesus (was made a surety) by an oath, insomuch was he made a surety of a better covenant (or, insomuch is the covenant, whose surety he was made, a better covenant). There are here (just as at chap. ii. ver. 18, also ver. 17, chap. iii. 3) three members of a syllogism brought together in one sentence. The idea expressed in a strictly logical form would run thus: A covenant whose surety has been made a surety by an oath, is better than a covenant in which this is not the case. Now Jesus was made such by an oath, but not so the Levitical priest. Therefore, etc. The minor proposition implicitly contained in vers. 20 and 22, is now further explained and confirmed by the parenthesis in ver. 21. Let us first look at vers. 20 and 22.

obscure one. Construct with nearly all recent interpreters: for there takes place an annulling of the former commandment on account of its weakness and unprofitableness (for the law made nothing perfect), and an introduction in its place (*ἐπί*) of a better hope.—K.

Only the terms *διαθήκη* and *ἔγγυος* need here any explanation. *Διαθήκη*, from *διατίθεσθαι*, has in classic Greek the signification *testament, last will;* then also the further signification *contract;* hence also *covenant*, also *foundation, institution.* If now we consider that the LXX. always renders by *διαθήκη* the fully developed Old Testament religious idea בְּרִית, it will be evident that the Greek *διαθήκη* must also have developed itself into a *fixed dogmatical idea*, and that, consequently, whenever the word occurs in a religious connexion in the writing of Jews and Christians, we must, as a matter of course, take it in this sense as = בְּרִית, *covenant.* It may appear as if the context imperiously forbids this interpretation in the passage before us. This, however, is by no means the case; on the contrary, the mention of a *surety* is strongly in favour of the rendering by "covenant," and against that by "testament." For, it is nowhere the custom for a testator to appoint a surety for the actual fulfilment of his last will; he himself is the surety for this, if, of course, he does not retract his will before his death, and he gives no security that he will not do this. On the other hand, when two parties enter into a covenant-agreement, in which the one party binds himself to an act which is not to be performed till some future time, there is then some reason in his appointing a surety who may give security in his person that the thing promised shall be truly and rightly performed. Luther, Böhme, Bleek, etc., would hardly have allowed themselves to be misled into the rendering "testament," had they not believed that the signification "covenant" would not correspond with a subsequent passage of this epistle (ix. 16), as, indeed, Bleek ii. p. 390, has quite frankly confessed. We must, however, interpret our passage in the sense in which alone every reader could understand it, who reads the epistle onwards from the beginning, and not in the reverse way. We shall then have to deal with the subsequent passage in its proper place.

Ἔγγυος, denom. from *ἐγγυή* sponsio, signifies sponsor, fidejussor. Christ is called a surety here, not because he has stood *before God* as surety (that is, as the vicarious fulfiller of that which men ought to have performed), so Calov, Gerhard, Cramer, etc., but (so Schlichting, Grotius, Olshausen, etc.), because God on his part gave him to the human race as a surety for the actual fulfilment of his covenant promise. For this, and this alone, is what is spoken of in the context. Because *God* has made him a surety by an oath, he is therefore the surety of a better covenant. (Comp. the similar idea in chap. vi. 17, 18, where it is said that *God himself* interposed as fidejussor between himself and men). The author here with good reason calls Jesus not *μεσίτης*, but *ἔγγυος*. From the fact, that God confirmed with an oath the promise that he would send a *mediator* or *founder* of a covenant, it follows only that such a mediator would

come, and that such a covenant would, in general, take place, but not that this covenant has already taken place, and will continue forever. Has God sworn, on the other hand, that he will appoint a *surety?*—*i. e.*, a guarantee for the *maintenance* of the covenant—the permanent validity of the *covenant itself* has been thereby guaranteed.—In how far God has promised to appoint a *surety for the everlasting maintenance* of the covenant to be established, is now shewn in the *parenthesis*, ver. 21. The subject is οἱ μέν, ὁ δέ, the Levitical priest and Jesus. The Messiah, Jesus, has been made priest (comp. vi. 16, seq.) by an oath of God—*i. e.*, God promised and swore that the Messiah should be a priest according to the order of Melchisedec. The descendants of Aaron were constituted priests in quite a different way, namely, in consequence, and by means of the carrying out of a simple, ordinary, legal command. If, then, God has, by that promise on oath, sworn that a priest-king after the order of Melchisedec (consequently eternal, comp. vers. 1–3, and ver. 17), should stand as representative between him and the people, he has thereby clearly promised, not merely one who shall set up a covenant, but one who shall set up and *everlastingly maintain* the covenant—a surety.

Vers. 23–25.—As the superiority of the new covenant is manifest in the appointment of a surety by an oath, so also does it further appear in what is closely connected with this—the unchangeableness of the New Testament priest as compared with the change of the Levitical priests. Vers. 23–25 is, in its position as well as in its form (οἱ μέν—ὁ δέ—), parallel with ver. 21 ; ver. 21 contains a first, vers. 23–25 a second illustration of what is said in ver. 22 : that Jesus is the surety of a better covenant.—Οἱ μέν—ὁ δέ is again the subject. Εἰσὶ γεγονότες is the copula of οἱ μέν, while ἱερεῖς is predicate, and πλείονες a more special determination of the subject. (Not : they were made several priests, but : they, as being more than one, were made priests, *i. e.*, they were made priests in their plurality). The author does not, however, allude here to the circumstance, that *contemporaneously* with the high priest there were also a number of subordinate priests ; he has, up to this point, taken no notice of this difference between the ordinary priests and the high priests, but rather views the entire Levitical priesthood (the ἱερωσύνη, ver. 11), as a whole, in comparison with the priesthood of Melchisedec, although, of course, all that is said of the Levitical priesthood applies also and *pre-eminently* to the Levitical *high priest*. For this very reason, however, the πλείονες here refers not to those several priests who existed *simultaneously* with the high priest, but (as appears from the words διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι, etc.) to the *successive* plurality of priests who followed one another (and *chiefly* high priests). The priesthood of Christ on the contrary, is, according to

vers. 1–3 and ver. 17, ἀπαράβατος, such as cannot pass to a successor, because he ever lives. On the one side we see the weakness of mortality, on the other, the *power of an endless life;* comp. what is said in ver. 16.

From this now proceeds the inference ver. 25, that Christ, because he ever lives, is able *to save to the uttermost* all who will come to the Father through him. Εἰς τὸ παντελές does not signify "evermore," but "completeness," *i. e.*, perfectly; it forms, both in its etymology and its place in the context, the precise antithesis to the words ver. 19, *the law made nothing perfect.* There is still another inference drawn from the *ever liveth;* Christ is therefore able to make intercession for them. (Εἰς c. inf. need not be understood in a final sense, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. vi. 12; Winer's Gr., § 45, 6). Ἐντυγχάνειν is a genuine Pauline term, comp. Rom. viii. 34; to appear in the stead of another, in order to represent his interests, at the same time taking upon one's self his guilt.

In ver. 26–27 the author proceeds, now in conclusion, to state what was properly the material difference between Christ and the Levitical priesthood, inasmuch as he shews, wherein lay the οὐδὲν ἐτελείωσεν of the one, and the εἰς τὸ παντελές of the other. He states in a concise and condensed form the principal points of difference between the *person* and the *office* of both high priests, and thus the difference between the two *covenants.*

Καὶ ἔπρεπεν, he says, and thus vers. 26, 27 connects itself with vers. 24, 25, in the same way as vers. 15–17 with ver. 14. As, in ver. 14, the fact of the non-Levitical descent of Jesus was laid down, and in vers. 15–17 the christological necessity for this, so in vers. 24, 25, the fact of the singularity and perfection of the New Testament high priest is stated, while in vers. 26, 27 the *soteriological necessity* for such a high priest is declared.

It had been shewn in chap. v. 1–10 that Christ, by taking part in human infirmity, was an high priest—that he had this *similarity* to the Levitical high priest. Here, it is shewn, that, for the same end, the representation of men before God, he must also at the same time be *different* from the Levitical high priests, namely *sinless.* This sinlessness is expressed, however, by a series of attributes all of which are to be explained from the antithesis with the Levitical high-priesthood. The Levitical high priest was also all that is here predicated of Christ; he was, however, not perfectly, not truly so, but only in a symbolical way, and therefore imperfectly. The high priest bore upon the plate on his forehead the inscription *Holiness to the Lord* (Ex. xxxix. 30), he was, however, not truly holy, but had holiness in himself only in that symbol. Christ on the other hand, was truly and inwardly holy; this is expressed by ὅσιος; for ὅσιος forms the antithesis to "sinful" (while ἅγιος, as we saw before,

is opposed to "profane"). The Levitical high priest, farther, was, only as a sinless person, qualified for bringing the blood of the sacrifice of atonement into the holiest of all for the people; he *was*, however, not sinless, but required first to atone for his own sins by a sacrifice (Lev. xvi. 2–14), and this atonement too was no real one, but only symbolical, typical. Christ, on the contrary, was truly ἄκακος, therefore (comp. ver. 27) he needed not first to offer for himself. The Levitical high priest must, thirdly, be *undefiled and pure* in order to be able to represent the people before God; he was, however, not inwardly immaculate and pure, but had only the outward symbolical representation of purity, the Levitical purity. Christ, on the contrary, was inwardly and truly *undefiled*. The Levitical high priest required, finally, to be ever on his guard, lest by contact with one who was Levitically unclean he should himself become unclean, and therefore had always to keep at a distance from such, Lev. xxi. 22, especially xxi. 12. Nay, the Talmud ordains (tract. Jomah i. 1), that, for seven days before the sacrifice of atonement, he must refrain from all intercourse with his family. This separation was, however, again only *outward*. Christ, on the contrary, in his intercourse with sinners *remained inwardly free from all participation in their sinfulness*, inwardly untouched by its contagion; notwithstanding that he mingled with men in all their varieties of character and situation, he yet never let drop, for a moment that inner veil of chaste holiness which separated him from sinners. This is what is meant by the expression *separate from sinners*. (Theophylact, Calvin, Gerhard, Michaelis, Storr, Böhme, Kuinoel, Olshausen, etc.), which need not therefore (with Grotius, Bengel, Tholuck, Bleek, etc.) be made to refer to Christ's departure from the world, *i. e.*, to his ascension, which comes first to be spoken of in a subsequent place. (Besides, his being separate from men *after* the ascension, would form no parallel with the separation of the Levitical high priest *before* the day of the sacrifice of atonement). Not till the very last, is his *exaltation above all heavens* adduced as a sealing proof that he was holy, sinless, undefiled, and uncontaminated by the sin of the race,—that exaltation in which, as is then shewn in chap. viii., his high-priestly work completed itself.

Ver. 27.—The inner difference of his *person* shewed itself also in the form and manner of his *functions*. The principal idea of ver. 27 lies in the words: "who needeth not daily as those high priests to offer up sacrifice. For this he did once." It is clear that the *this* here refers to the principal idea, the *offering up sacrifice*, and cannot refer, at the same time, to the words *first for his own sins*. There is, however, a subordinate idea inserted into that principal idea, namely, that Christ did not need to offer first for his own sins, ere

he offered for those of the people. A twofold difference, then, is found to exist between his priestly service and that of the Levitical high priest. First, and chiefly in this, that Christ offered *only once*, whereby he has, once for all, ver. 25, *εἰς τὸ παντελές* saved all who come to God by him, while the Levitical high priests always atoned only for one generation, and this always but for a year, and this only typically. Secondly in this, that he needed not first to offer for his own sins.

A difficulty lies in the statement, that the *high priests* offered *daily*. For, the comparison with the *atoning* sacrifice of Christ offered once seems to require that, here also, in reference to the high priests, we should understand the *yearly*—not daily—*great sacrifice of atonement* as meant, and so it would be really doubly unsuitable to take *οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς* here in the weakened sense = *οἱ ἱερεῖς*; doubly unsuitable, as precisely here, for the first time, the author uses this expression. Two solutions of this difficulty have been attempted. Some have understood either, the daily *incense offering* (Ex. xxx. 6, seq.) which the high priest had to present—but with this the expression *θυσία* will not at all correspond; or (as Gerhard, Calov, Michaelis, Bleek, Tholuck, etc.) the daily *burnt offering* (Ex. xxix. 38–42; Num. xxviii. 3)—this, however, was not brought by the high priest, although (according to Jos. bell. Jud. v. 5, 7) he might *sometimes* voluntarily take part in this offering, namely, on the new moons and Sabbaths; the expression *καθ' ἡμέραν*, however, would still be unsuitable. (One might rather suppose that the author intends to oppose to the one offering of Christ, not merely the *oft-repeated* offerings of the sacrifice of atonement, but also the *various* kinds of offerings—if only *οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς* did not stand here). Others (as Schlichting, Piscator, Olshausen) are for taking *καθ' ἡμέραν* in the signification die statuto (= once every year), or else in a weakened signification (= frequently). The former will certainly not do; had the author intended to express the definite idea that the high priest brought the offering *yearly on a certain day*, he would have said (as at chap. ix. 25, x. 1–3) *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*. On the other hand, I do not see what well-grounded objection can be brought against Bengel's view that our author here—where nothing depended on the bringing into view the *length of time that intervened* between each day of atonement, but where all the emphasis lies merely on the *repetition* of that sacrifice—should have used the somewhat hyperbolical expression *καθ' ἡμέραν* "one day after the other." Looking back on a series of centuries, he fixes his eye merely on a successive series of days, upon which the high priests again and again brought the appointed sacrifice. He takes no notice of the intervening days. Enough, that "day after day" such sacrifices were offered. In one word, the author intends here not to *measure*, but to *count*. He does

not lay before him the calendar of the days in the year, and inquire upon what days an atonement festival fell, and how many days intervened between each, but he sets before him the immense number of days on which these fasts were observed, and lays stress upon this, that on one such day after the other the high priest must offer the sacrifice. (In like manner Olshausen). He treats these days, in other words, as a discrete, not as a concrete quantity. So might a teacher say to an unruly pupil: "day after day" or "day by day I must punish you," without meaning by this, that he is wont, regularly every day at a certain hour, to punish him, but only, that, *again and again*, punishments are necessary, although not merely the Sundays, but, now and then whole weeks should intervene between them. So much, at any rate, is beyond all doubt, that our author did not say *καθ' ἡμέραν* from any ignorance of the law; for, in chap. ix. 7 (where he expressly distinguishes the yearly service in the holiest of all from the daily service in the sanctuary), he himself mentions, that the sacrifice of atonement was brought once in the year.

How far the once offered sacrifice of Christ was to consist in this —that he offered *himself* *ἑαυτὸν προσενέγκας*—is explained in the following principal part of our epistle, so that we do not need here to anticipate what is there said on this question by any subjective reasonings of our own.

Ver. 28 is a concluding explanation, but, at the same time also, a *recapitulation of the whole of our third principal part.*

As an *explanation and further development* of what goes before, this verse connects itself (by means of an explicative *γάρ*) with vers. 26, 27, the connecting link being the idea, that through the oath of promise the *Son of God* was made an high priest *for ever.*

It is, however, a *recapitulation of the whole part*, in virtue of the *antithesis* implicitly contained in it between *ὁ νόμος* and *ὁ λόγος τῆς ὁρκωμοσίας*.

Meanwhile it may be asked, whether ver. 28 is really a recapitulation of chaps. v.–vii., or merely of chap. vii. This verse is generally so understood as that the words *ὁ νόμος γὰρ . . . . ἀσθένειαν* refer to the Levitical priests, and accordingly that something is here declared of the law as *no longer valid, as abrogated by and for Christ*, consequently, that we have only a repetition of what is said chap. vii. 11–19. The idea would be as follows: The (no longer valid) Mosaical law could make no better high priests than *men encompassed with infirmity;* on the contrary, by the promise, Ps. cx., a better high priest has been appointed, namely, the *for ever perfected Son* (scil. of God as at chap. i. 1 seq.). But there are serious objections against this interpretation. If this were the author's idea he would then, *in the first place*, deny here what he himself had formerly maintained and taught chap. iv. 15, vii. 5–10, namely, that Jesus also

was encompassed with infirmity. And, in addition to this, we are by no means warranted in understanding by *ἀσθένεια* here the imperfection of the Levitical priesthood, thus giving it a different signification from what it has in chap. iv. The solution given by Bleek is preferable to this, that in this passage Christ is regarded only in his state of *exaltation* in which he had laid aside the *ἀσθένεια*; as the one *who had ascended into heaven*, as the *perfected* one, there is no necessity for him to repeat his sacrifice. Meanwhile,—not to mention that the author, had he meant to say this, must of necessity have said it more plainly,—it would, even then, not be in accordance with his teaching elsewhere; since, according to chap. ix. 9–14 and 26, the sacrifice of Christ was a perfect one, excluding all repetition, not in virtue of the *exaltation which followed it*, and the laying aside of the *infirmity*, but already in virtue of *its own quality*. To this is to be added, that according to this the common interpretation of our verse, the author would not merely deny that Christ had *infirmity*, but, *secondly*, that he was *man*. For, he would plainly put the *Son* (in the sense of chap. i. 1) in opposition to the *man*. I am of opinion, therefore, that the whole verse must be taken in a different sense. The author does not intend to *deny* that Jesus was an *ἀρχιερεὺς ἄνθρωπος ὢν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ἔχων*; but he takes it for granted as known that Christ was both these things, on the one hand *ἄνθρωπος ἀσθένειαν ἔχων* according to chap. v., and, on the other, *υἱὸς τετελειωμένος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* according to chap. vii., and he recapitulates both here, the fundamental idea of chap. v. 1–10, and the fundamental idea of chap. vii. 1–27. He shews that Christ must have answered the requirements also *of the law*, and *in how far* he must have done so. That the legal requirements of Levitical descent, of daily sacrifice, etc., do not apply to him, that in these respects he abrogated the law—this is proved; but *one* requirement of the law had an internal, an everlasting validity, and, according to chap. v. 1–10, was applicable also to the New Testament high priest, namely, that he, as every high priest, must be a *man having infirmity*. To this of *humanity* and *infirmity* was added, in the case of the Messiah, a second requisite contained, not in the law, but in the promise, Psalm cx., that he must also be a *Son perfected for ever*. Thus, then, the words *ὁ νόμος . . . . ἀσθένειαν* contain a *concession* pointing back to chap. v. The idea is this: The law (in so far as it has not been abrogated) requires of all high priests (consequently also, of Jesus) that they be *men having infirmity;* the word of promise, however, confirmed by an oath given *after* the law and stretching far above it, constitutes the Son, who is perfected for ever, an high priest.

Thus understood the 28th verse therefore contains really a recapitulation of the *whole third part*.

PART FOURTH.

THE MOSAIC TABERNACLE AND THE HEAVENLY SANCTUARY.

(viii.–x.).

From the nature of the two covenants is now shewn the difference between their respective sanctuaries, their λειτουργίαι and the result of their respective services. This, the last of the *theoretical* parts, as it introduces us to the *fifth practical* part in which all the rays from the hortatory parts are concentrated into one focus, is not itself interrupted by an intervening exhortation, as was the case with the three foregoing parts. And, as it does not stand parallel with these three parts, but (as is expressly intimated in chap. viii. 1) is placed as a *key-stone* upon them, so also the introduction to it does not run parallel with that of the foregoing parts, but is independent and peculiar. Our fourth part divides itself into *four sections*. In a *first introductory* section, chap. viii., it is shewn, in general, that the two *tabernacles*, the Mosaic and the heavenly, correspond to the two *covenants*. In a *second section*, chap. ix. 1–11, the construction of the two tabernacles is compared, and it is shewn how, in the Mosaic tabernacle, there lies an imperfection in the separation of the holy place from the holy of holies. In the *third section*, chap. ix. 11–chap. x. 13, the two tabernacles are compared, *a*,—*similarity:* chap. ix. 15, seq., that for the fulfilment of the perfect covenant in general, the *death* of Christ was necessary,—*b*, *dissimilarity:* chap. ix. 25–chap. x. 13, that this death was a *perfect sacrifice once offered*, in opposition to the Old Testament animal sacrifices. Finally, in the *fourth section*, chap. x. 14–39, the *result* of these respective services is compared, and it is shown how by the offering of Christ, the *perfect atonement* and *the access to God in the spirit* has been accomplished in a way which renders all auxiliary means of any other kind superfluous.

SECTION FIRST.

THE TWO TABERNACLES CORRESPOND TO THE TWO COVENANTS.

(Chap. viii.)

In chap. viii. 1, preparation is made for the theme which lies in ver. 2. Κεφάλαιον δέ is not to be taken as an apposition to the

whole sentence that follows; it is better, as some do, to supply a λέγω τοῦτο (not an ἐστί, as Bleek does, for then it must have been τὸ κεφάλαιον).—Κεφάλαιον, used for the classical expression κεφαλή, signifies *sum*, or also *principal point*. Either signification will do here, provided that the rendering "sum" be not understood of a recapitulation of former particular points (this belongs rather to chap. vii. 28), but of an organic combination, a product resulting from all that goes before; and further, that the rendering "principal point" be not understood of a *particular* principal proposition which stands only side by side with the former propositions (much less of a "principal thing" taken from the ideas developed at the conclusion of chap. vii., upon which, as a point of special importance, emphasis is again laid), but of the principal point of the whole book, at which all the former parts aimed. The meaning of the word is best and most comprehensively rendered by the expression "key-stone." Ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις means, besides, not "*in* what has been hitherto said, *under* what has been hitherto said," (this or that is especially important); but "to what has been hitherto said," (the author will now add the key-stone).

In the sentence τοιοῦτον, etc., all the emphasis lies, of course, on the words ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θρόνου, etc. That Christ is *such* an high priest *as has entered not into the earthly but into the heavenly sanctuary;* or, as it is still more plainly repeated in ver. 2, fulfils his service in the *true* tabernacle,—this new sentence, with its further development in ver. 8–10, forms the key-stone of all that has gone before. The two *tabernacles*, together with their *services*, are forthwith compared.

What now are we to understand by the expression *on the right hand of the majesty in the heavens?* Instead of occupying themselves here with dogmatical discussions on ubiquity or non-ubiquity, the critics ought to have explained these words solely from the antithesis. The Old Testament high priest went into the *earthly holy of holies as the place where God revealed his presence.* Still, this revelation of the presence of God in the holiest of all, was not such as if this compartment of the tent had been the true and proper dwelling-place of God: but only in gracious condescension to the wants of men did God, by means of theophanies and manifestations in the light-cloud, consecrate this abode as a place of his presence for men. The holy of holies, therefore, was not the place of *God's presence in itself*, but only the *abode of his presence for the Old Testament Israel*, and therefore, secondly, rather a place where God *symbolically represented* his nearness, than one in which he really was. For, the entire distinction of profane places and holy places, the entire distinction of world, fore-court, holy place, and holy of holies (as also the separation of a particular people—Israel—from the rest of mankind; or, again, the separation of the Levites from Israel, or of the Aaronites

from Levi)—all this rested on the real truth, that God could not yet *in truth* dwell with men, because sin and the power of sin as yet hindered him from revealing himself among, and in, and before men, as he can already reveal himself in the sphere of the angels, and of the just made perfect, in that heaven where his will is perfectly fulfilled (Matt. vi. 10). And therefore, thirdly, this same holy of holies, in which the *nearness* of God was emblematically represented, was, at the same time also, an emblematical representation of the *distance of God from men.* The need of *a special place*, where God revealed his presence, intimated that he was, in *general*, as yet *separated from men.* (Comp. with this John iv. 21–24.) This was the holy of holies into which the high priest might enter once every year, and in which he was not permitted to abide, but must immediately again leave it. In opposition to this, Christ has, *a*, sat down on the throne of the majesty on high; in him (comp. Heb. ii. 9) man has entered on the *everlasting, abiding* enjoyment of the presence of God; the state of separation, of banishment from God in which man was before, is now done away with; God is there in heaven truly present to man, because man is present to him, and thereby has a beginning been made *upon earth* of the *real* presence of God. *b*, Christ has *sat down at the right hand of the throne of the divine majesty;* he has not appeared before God, like the Levitical priests, as a poor sinner who must draw near to the presence of the divine majesty—even its symbolical representation—only with fear and trembling, but so, as that he himself fully participates in the divine majesty and dominion.* *c*, Christ has not entered into that symbolical holy of holies, where God represented quite as much his distance from men as his presence with them, and the latter only as a presence *for men* (more particularly for Israel), but into that sphere where God, without hindrance or limit, *really* reveals before the sinless angels his entire being and the entire presence not merely of his world-governing omnipotence, but of his whole being manifested on all sides.

This universal view which we thus take of the idea in the words before us, shews us, now already, that we must regard the expression to *sit down on the right hand of the throne* as figurative = enter on an abiding participation in the sovereign authority of any one, and that the author did not entertain the crude conception (as has

* The more recent deniers of the divinity of Christ, though they maintain that "nothing is to be found in the Bible about the divinity of Christ," are yet wont at least to acknowledge with the Socinians, that the *exalted* Christ participates in the Godhead according to the doctrine of the holy Scripture! But he who acknowledges so much must, if he will not give up all claim to the name of a rational being, also acknowledge the eternal divinity of the Incarnate. For that a finite, created being should take part in the world-governing dominion of the Omnipotent and Omnipresent– this were indeed the very climax of unreason. An absolute being can limit itself, *because* it is absolute and its own lord; but a finite being can not be *made* absolute.

most recently been laid to his charge by the young Hegelians), that a throne stands in the heaven, with a place on the right hand and on the left! Such a conception would indeed be in direct contradiction to the ground-idea of the author, who makes the Divine element of the New Testament high priesthood to consist in this, that Christ has done away with the limitations of place and time. Carefully, however, as we are here to guard against a coarse materialistic exegesis, we must equally beware of a false spiritualistic exegesis in the explanation of the *οὐρανοί*, as if the heaven were the mere absence of space, and the state of being above or beyond space regarded as an attribute of God. That this is never denoted by שמים we have already seen at chap. i. 3. The heaven is that *sphere of the creation* in which the will of God is perfectly done (Matth. vi. 10), and where no sin hinders him from the full and adequate revelation of himself. *Into that sphere of the world of space* has Christ ascended, as the first-fruits of glorified humanity, in order to bring us thither after him (chap. ii. 10).

Ver. 2.—The principal idea of ver. 1 is now repeated with more distinctness, in the form of an apposition to the subject of *ἐκάθισεν*, and, therewith, the *proper theme* of the fourth part formally laid down. Christ has sat down on the right hand of the Majesty, as one who (in this) completes the service in the true sanctuary and the true tabernacle. *Τῶν ἁγίων* is, of course, not to be taken (with Œcumenius, Schulz, Paulus, etc.), as gen. plur. masculine (Christ a servant of the saints), but as gen. plur. neut., and *τὰ ἅγια* does not signify (as Luther and others render it), "the holy possessions," but (as at chap. ix. 8, 12, and 24, seq.; chap. x. 19; chap. xiii. 11) "the holy place," or specially the "holy of holies," (Theophylact, Erasmus, Calvin, Bleek, Tholuck, and the most). As the author wished to place the adjective *ἀληθινός* after the noun, for the sake of the emphasis, he could only make it to agree in case and number with *σκηνῆς*; in respect to the sense, *τῶν ἀληθινῶν* is to be supplied also at *τῶν ἁγίων* (Bleek, etc.). A similar use of the adjective is made also in German, with the exception that it is placed before the noun. "Ein Diener des wahrhaften Heiligthums und der (scil. wahrhaften) Hütte."

The true sanctuary, the place where God is really and truly united with men, is "not made with men's hands." That tent, covered with curtains and skins, cannot, of course, be the place where heaven and earth are united.

In vers. 3–4 the author now adduces the *first argument* to prove that the *sanctuary* into which Christ entered is the *true* sanctuary, and different from the *tabernacle* of Moses. The steps in the reasoning logically arranged are the following:—A, Only the Aaronitic priests were qualified and permitted to offer sacrifice in the Mosaic

tabernacle. Christ being not an Aaronite *could* not offer there. B, But he must offer (somewhere and something), because every high priest must offer sacrifice. Consequently he needed another tabernacle than that of Moses, (the only one that existed *on earth*). The author now, however (just as at chap. vii. 15–17), passes forthwith from the thesis to the second and more remote member of the proof (B), and then brings in after it the first member of the proof, in the form of an explanation (of how far there lies in B an argument in proof of the thesis). The idea, therefore, takes this form: Thesis: Christ is minister in the *true* (namely heavenly) tabernacle. Argument: For every high priest must offer sacrifice; therefore, Christ also must offer. (Supple.: from this follows, however, the above thesis, that Christ needed another tabernacle); *for*, had he been priest in that earthly tabernacle, he would then have been no priest, as there were already priests there, who brought their offerings in conformity with the law.

The words in detail have no difficulty. Δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι as a general designation of the offerings, we had already at chap. v. 2. The author does not, of course, say of Christ that it was necessary for him to bring δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι, different kinds of offerings, but only that he must have *somewhat* to offer.

Ver. 5.—Although grammatically connected with ver. 4 by a οἵτινες (which, however, may be well enough rendered by "and these"), ver. 5 contains an independent idea, a *new argument* for the thesis ver. 2, so stated as that this thesis itself, only in a more definite form, is first repeated (the tabernacle in which the Levitical priests served is called an image and shadow of the heavenly things), and then the passage Ex. xxv. 40 is adduced as a new argument for the inferiority of the Mosaic tabernacle.

Λατρεύειν with the dative of the person whom one serves is frequent; it more rarely occurs with the dative of the thing in which one serves (besides this passage comp. chap. xiii. 10). To take the dative in an instrumental signification would yield no sense. The Levitical high priests served in a tabernacle which was an emblem and shadow of the heavenly things. Ἅγια is not (with Bleek and others) to be supplied at τὰ ἐπουράνια; the author has evidently rather, on purpose and with good reason, avoided placing a heavenly *tabernacle* in opposition to the earthly. True, in ver. 2, where in stating the thesis he wished to make an evident antithesis, he spoke of a "true tabernacle," a "true sanctuary;" from that place onwards, however, he avoids with intentional care every expression which might have led to the conception of a local sanctuary in heaven. Also in chap. ix., he again sets in opposition to the "holy places made with hands" only "the heavenly things" and "the things in the heavens," ver. 23. And, moreover, the whole reason-

ing in chap. ix. shews, that he considered as the archetype of the tabernacle not *heavenly localities*, but *heavenly relations* and *heavenly facts*. (The holy life of Christ, in his state of humiliation, is the heavenly sanctuary through which Christ must pass; the rending of his body is the rending of the vail that separates him from the holiest of all, etc. Comp. below on chap. ix. 11, and on chap. x. 20). Now, to these *heavenly relations and facts of salvation* the Mosaic tabernacle stands in the relation of a copy and shadow. The verb from which *ὑπόδειγμα* is derived, *ὑποδείκνυμι*, has two significations; first, it signifies to shew something privately to any one, to let something be seen in an underhand way, hence *ὑπόδειγμα*, a private sign, secret token, and, in general, a mark or token; secondly, it signifies also to illustrate something by examples, to draw from a pattern, to copy, hence *ὑπόδειγμα*, a copy, or also (in the profane writers as well as in Heb. iv. 11) = *παράδειγμα* image, model, example. In this passage, however, it has not the less proper signification of image in the sense of *παράδειγμα*, *model*, *pattern*, but the proper signification of *copy*, so that it was not the Mosaic tabernacle that was the *παράδειγμα* (the original from which the copy was taken), but the *heavenly things*. The same idea lies in *σκιά*, but in a still stronger form. The shadow of a body represents not even a proper image of it, but only the colourless contour.

Now, that the Mosaic tabernacle was not *an original, but the copy of a heavenly original*, the author proves from Ex. xxv. 40. In Ex. xxv. 40 Moses is told to build the tabernacle according to the תַּבְנִית, that is, *plan* (not model, comp. Is. xliv. 13, where, ver. 13, the draught is first sketched, and then, ver. 14, the wood is sought for completing it; also 2 Kings xvi. 10; 1 Chron. xxviii. 11, where the signification "plan, sketch," is perfectly suitable, better certainly than the signification "model")—according to the plan which God shewed to him in the mount. These words already lead (as תבנית never denotes *an independent original building*, but always only a *plan on a small scale* by which one is to be guided in the construction—and, even according to the common false explanation of the term, only a *model in miniature*)—these words, I say, already lead, not to the conception that there had been shewn to Moses on Mount Sinai a large real tabernacle; still less, can the author's opinion of Ex. xxv. 40 be, that the original of the tabernacle stands permanently on Mount Sinai (as later Rabbins fabled), and least of all, that Moses looked forth into the heaven from the top of Sinai, and saw there in heaven the original structure. Either the words in Ex. xxv. 40 are to be taken as a figurative expression (so that the *description in words*, Ex. xxv. 4, seq., was called figuratively a plan which had been shewn to Moses), or, there was really shewn to Moses *in a prophetic vision* the draught of a building (comp. Ex. xxvi. 30), but still a draught or

plan which, beyond his vision, had no existence.—The question now presents itself, whether our author understood the passage in this, the right way, or whether he misunderstood it after the manner of the later Rabbins. Now, it is first of all to be observed, that there are throughout no positive intimations that necessitate our adopting this latter supposition. The whole reasoning retains its full force on the supposition, that he *rightly* understood the passage in question. The *heavenly things* themselves (the New Testament *facts* of savation which were delineated in the tabernacle) were, indeed, not shewn to Moses, but only a plan according to which he was to build that hypodeigmatic tabernacle, and he had as yet no consciousness of the prophetical significance of this building. But, indeed, the force of the author's reasoning depends in nowise on whether Moses understood the typical signification of the tabernacle or not. Enough, that *Moses himself did not make or invent the plan of the tabernacle*, enough, that *God gave him the plan*—God, who knew well the symbolical signification of this plan. That the plan for the tabernacle was given by God—in *this circumstance* lies the nerve of the argument; *for this reason* is the Mosaic tabernacle a reflection of *heavenly* thoughts, ideas, relations.*

But *further*, there are even *distinct reasons* at hand for rejecting the supposition, that the author conceived of an original tabernacle standing permanently in heaven, or on Mount Sinai. If he had conceived of this as in heaven, then he must either have said more plainly, Moses was permitted to look forth into heaven from Mount Sinai, or he must have said more plainly (comp. the remarks above): that which Moses saw on Sinai was itself again only a copy of the heavenly original. If, however, he conceived of this as standing on Mount Sinai, then this tabernacle would not have been *ἐπουράνια*, but *ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, which was precisely denied in ver. 4. But that neither of these fantastic ideas had any place in the mind of the author, appears most evidently from the ninth chapter. If the separation of a holy of holies from a holy place is there expressly represented as an *imperfection*, in which the Mosaic tabernacle is *distinguished* from the heavenly original,—how, in all possibility, can the author have regarded that model shewn to Moses—which corresponded with the Mosaic tabernacle even in the minutest detail, and therefore had also a holy place separated from the holy of holies—as that heavenly original itself? So much then is beyond all doubt—

* Faber, Stapulensis, Rivet, Schlichting, Storr, and Bleek, go still farther, and suppose even, that our author did not at all understand the word *τύπος* in the sense of *ground-plan* or model, but in the sense of *copy*, and that his object was expressly to say, that the model which was shewn to Moses was itself only the copy of the true *ἐπουράνια*. Accordingly, he intends to represent the tabernacle as the *copy of a copy*. This, however, could hardly be justified on exegetical grounds. The author would assuredly have expressed this idea more distinctly.

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

that those *heavenly things*, which in the Mosaic tabernacle were delineated in a faint shadow-sketch, did not themselves, according to our author's view, consist of a *locality*, a tabernacle with skins, curtains, fore-courts, holy place, and holy of holies.

Thus, then, the force of the reasoning in ver. 5 lies in reality only in the *negative* circumstance, that the tabernacle was not an *independent original*, but was built according to a *pattern* given by God, the object of which, therefore must have been *symbolically to represent* Divine ideas.

In ver. 6 the thesis, contained in ver. 2 and repeated in a modified form in the beginning of ver. 5, is *once more repeated*, and this time in a form still more complete; so, namely, that not merely the two ideas contained in ver. 2 and ver. 5 are *united*, but a third is added. In ver. 2 it was said positively: Christ is *minister* in the true tabernacle, in ver. 5 negatively: the Levitical high priests served in a tabernacle which was only an image and shadow. Now, in ver. 6 it is said: the *ministry of Christ is more glorious* (*than that of the Levitical high priests*), *and in so much more glorious as the new covenant is more glorious* (*than the old*). Here, therefore, not merely are the two λειτουργίαι compared with *each other*, but they are, moreover, placed parallel with the two διαθήκαις. Thus ver. 6 forms the proper thesis of the entire fourth part, and vers. 1–5 serves only as a preparatory introduction to this thesis. As the author in ver. 6 not merely combines the ideas in vers. 1–5, but, at the same time, also passes to a *new* idea, to the comparison of the services with the *covenants*, he has therefore connected ver. 6 with ver. 5, not by a particle of *inference*, but by a particle of *progression* (νυνὶ δέ).

In respect of form, ver. 6 has the greatest resemblance to chap. i. 4. Here, as there, the comparatives κρείττων and διαφορώτερος are used in the comparison of what belongs to the Old Testament with what belongs to the New. Instead of λειτουργία the author might, by all means, have put σκηνή, but, as has been already observed at ver. 5, he henceforth industriously avoids placing a heavenly tabernacle in opposition to the Mosaic tabernacle.

The ground-idea of ver. 6 then is this, that the ministry of the Levitical priests in the Mosaic tabernacle stands related to the ministry of Christ in the *heavenly things*, precisely as the old *covenant* does to the new. *In what* the old covenant is excelled by the new, we are informed in the relative clause ἥτις, which finds farther explanation in vers. 7–12. This explanation, at the same time, already contains the idea, that the old covenant was destined to *vanish* and to be *replaced* by the new. This idea is then in ver. 13 formally expressed as an *inference*. Does the Levitical priestly service in the temple bear the same relation to the ministry of

Christ (according to ver. 6) as the old covenant bears to the new, and again, is the old covenant (according to ver. 13) to be *abrogated* by the new,—in this lies already implicitly the final inference (which is then in chap. ix.–x. explicitly developed in detail), that the Levitical temple service is *in like manner abrogated, rendered superfluous* by the *ministry* of Christ, as the old covenant by the new.

So much on the train of thought in general. Let us look now first of all, at the relative clause: *ἥτις ἐπὶ κρείττοσιν ἐπαγγελίαις νενομοθέτηται.* Νομοθετεῖν, here evidently in the wider sense = to establish, to enact authoritatively; for that the new covenant also has to do with the *giving of a law* is expressly shewn in vers. 8–12. The new covenant is founded on better promises; for (comp. vers. 9, 10) the old covenant promised salvation and blessing only to him who perfectly fulfilled the law: the new covenant, on the other hand *gives first* before it *asks.*

Ver. 7 serves, first of all, to obviate an objection that might arise in the minds of the readers at ver. 6. They were wont to consider Moses, and the covenant of God with Moses, as the proper and most sacred kernel of the Israelitish true religion. Had not the Messiah himself, according to their view, been promised and given precisely to the members of the *Mosaic covenant people!* Now, to say that this covenant of God with Moses was lowered in value by another covenant, must have appeared to them as almost frivolous. Therefore the author explains to them, that he is at liberty to depreciate, nay, to find fault with the old covenant, and why he is so. "If that first covenant had been faultless then there had been no room for desiring a second." This was certainly the author's idea, but instead of saying *οὐκ ἂν τόπος ἦν τοῦ ζητεῖν δευτέραν,* he has with unconscious conciseness (or by blending the two ideas: *οὐκ ἂν ἦν τόπος* and *οὐκ ἂν ἐζητεῖτο δευτέρα*) joined *τόπος* also with *ἐζητεῖτο* as the object. (The explanation of Bleek and others is not natural: then God would have had no need to seek in the hearts of men a better place for his covenant than was the place on the tables of stone. Equally unnatural is Olshausen's "*τόπον τινὸς ζητεῖν* = to will that something should take place.")—The turn of the thought in general is quite parallel with that in chap. vii. ver. 11 (and ver. 18). As in that place, from the established fact that a new and different high priest is promised, the inference is drawn that the old high priesthood must have been insufficient (and similarly at vii. 18 of the law), so here, from the fact that God—as is shewn explanatorily in vers. 8–12—has promised a new covenant, it is inferred that the old covenant was not faultless.

The meaning of this *οὐκ ἄμεμπτος* is well explained in the expressions used in quite a similar way in chap. vii. 18, *ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀνωφελές.* The author does not mean to find fault with the old Mosaic cove-

nant as being not of divine origin, or, although constituted by God, as being insufficient even for its relative object, and unwisely framed; he only means that it lies open to the charge of being faulty, when human folly, contrary to the divine purpose, gives it out as being *everlastingly sufficient*, while yet God himself, inasmuch as he has promised to give a *new, another* covenant, has thereby declared the old one to be imperfect. It is, therefore, not the author, nor generally speaking a *man* who presumed to find fault with the old covenant, but *God himself* has found fault with it. (Comp. the repeated *λέγει κύριος*, ver. 8 and 9. It was not the word of Jeremiah, but the word of the Lord to Jeremiah.)

Ver. 8–12.—The author in these verses cites the passage in which God has promised a new and a different covenant, and thereby has found fault with the old covenant (not as one that was not divine, or not wise, but as insufficient and destined to cease). The passage is in Jer. xxxi. 31–34. The author quotes literally from the Sept. and the rendering of the Sept. is right.—In the whole of the Old Testament no passage is to be found in which the view is expressed more clearly and distinctly, that the law was only a *παιδαγωγός*, than in this. And, if some commentators have thought that in this passage no fault is found with the old covenant itself, but only with the Israelites, they merely show by this, that they have not understood the simple sense of the passage. It is true, that fault is found with the Israelites who "abode not in the covenant (of Moses);" but when the Lord is induced by this consideration to determine, that he will frame a different covenant, in which he will write the law not upon tables of stone but on the hearts of his people, he surely acknowledges thereby expressly and clearly, that a part of the fault belonged also to the old covenant. (In like manner Olshausen. Comp. also our explanation of the passage chap. iv. 2, in which we encounter a similar misunderstanding on the part of the critics.)

The train of thought in the passage, Jer. xxxi. 31–34 is as follows. A *first principal idea* lies in the words *ἰδοὺ . . . γῆς Αἰγύπτου*. The Lord announces to his people, that he will, at a future time, make a new covenant with them, ver. 8. He calls this covenant new, however, not in the sense of its being only a confirmatory renewal of the old covenant, but in precise and express opposition to the covenant which was made on their removal from Egypt; it is to be a new covenant not merely numerically, but qualitatively (ver. 9, *οὐ κατὰ . . . ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου*). Then follows a *second principal idea* (*ὅτι αὐτοὶ οὐκ . . . ἔσονταί μοι εἰς λαόν*). We are now told what it was that was imperfect in the old covenant, and why there was need of a new covenant, and wherein this should be different from the old. The principal imperfection of the old covenant

lies in its *inefficacy*, which has been demonstrated by actual experience. The cause of this is to be traced not merely to the Israelites not continuing in that covenant, but to the mutual relation that subsisted between the people and their God, which is expressed in the two members: *they continued not*, etc., *and I regarded them not.* The people, on their part, remained not in the covenant, fulfilled not the commands enjoined as the condition of the covenant, and God, on his part, punished the people, inasmuch as after, and in consequence of, the transgressions, he accepted them no more. *The conduct of God regulated itself then according to the conduct of men. God first demanded before he gave;* he first imposed his commands without regard to the capacity and power of men; then he rejected the people because they fulfilled not these commands. (It needs not, of course, to be shewn here for the first time, how wise this stage of legal enactment in the training of Israel was, how necessary it was in order to awaken the knowledge of the infirmities of sin. Nor does our author deny that it was necessary *for its time.* But he proves from this announcement of God himself to Jeremiah, that this stage was only a preparatory one, which could not confer blessedness and brought no *perfection.*) It is different with the new covenant which God promises to make in the coming days. In this covenant God will not write his law outwardly, as a cold requirement, on tables of stone, but he will *write it in the hearts and in the minds* of his people; he will, therefore, *first give to the people and then ask from them;* he will first give them a new heart, a regenerate spirit, pleasure, love, and joy in God's will, and then he will require of them; nor will he then require in vain; for he will then be truly the people's God, worshipped and beloved by them, and in consequence of this, the people can then also be truly his people, protected and blessed by him. In a *third principal idea* (ver. 11, 12), it is now shewn still more plainly, how the fulfillment of the law is under this new covenant to rest on the *inward* disposition, and on what ground this disposition is to rest. In the old covenant God had commissioned Moses and the priests to read the law to the people, and to lay before them the command to acknowledge Jehovah as their God. There is to be no such outward process under the new covenant. Then will every one personally, and from his own inmost experience, know and acknowledge the Lord,—and how? by what means? Because *he forgives their sins, and remembers not their iniquities.* The difference, then, between the old and the new covenant is traced even to this innermost centre-point in that evangelical announcement of God to Jeremiah. There it is the *law* that stands first, and lays down its requirements, which man cannot fulfil, because he wants the power and the spirit, the power of love and the spirit of love. Here it is *free grace,* the forgiveness of sins,

and reconciliation that stands first, and in the heart whose sins have been forgiven love springs up, and from love springs the strength and the inclination for holiness, and the personal experience of the knowledge of God.

Ver. 13.—The author has now shewn that, according to God's own announcement, a new, a higher covenant was to be formed, which rests on better promises (namely, promises not first conditioned by the conduct of men). From this is now drawn the further inference, that for the old covenant a time must also at length come, when it would no longer be merely relatively the old in opposition to the *new*, but also, the absolutely *weak through age* in opposition to the new covenant coming into operation with the *freshness of youth*.

Two ideas are to be distinguished from each other in this verse. First, with the promise of God to make in general a (relatively) new, different, second covenant, the covenant made with Moses ceases to be the only one, and becomes a (relatively) old covenant. Secondly: But of two things, that which is the *relatively older* must, also, at some time, become the *absolutely old*, be outlived and pass away.

We have here, first of all, to obtain a clear idea of the two categories, *old* and *new*, *aged* and *young*. Καινός means *new*, new in the relative sense, that which is added to a thing already existing as a new, *i. e.* a different thing, *novus*. (In the same sense might one, who at an entertainment brings first wine of vintage 1846, and then of 1811, say he will now bring a *new wine*, that is a new, another kind.) The opposite of this in Greek is παλαῖος, that which was already there, πάλαι, the old = the earlier (relatively old), antiquus (from ante), what does not come after something else. The application of παλαῖος to old persons is secondary, and these also are so called, not in the sense of their being infirm through age, but only in the sense of their having been *earlier* in the world than those who are young.

Νεός, on the other hand, means young, fresh, *recens*, that which (at any given time) is still absolutely new *in respect of its existence* (not in comparison with another), that which has not yet existed long, still stands in fresh vigour. (Thus that wine of 1846 is the *young* wine.) In opposition to this, γεραιός, as the Latin vetus denotes what is *absolutely old*, what has no longer in itself the strength to exist much longer. (Thus a man of eighty years of age may be a *new* member (καινός) of a legislative assembly, and still be a γεραιός, and one of thirty years of age may be an old (παλαῖος) member of the assembly, and yet be νεός.)

Most unjustly, therefore, will Bleek, Tholuck, and others render παλαιοῦν by senem reddere, "to render antiquated." Only thus, Bleek thinks can a natural connection of ideas be made out be-

tween the two members ; it gives rise rather, we think, only to a tautology. Παλαιοῦν is rather simply "to make the older" antiquum reddere, (not to antiquate in the modern sense, which would be equivalent to "abrogate)." Inasmuch as God speaks of a καινὴ διαθήκη, *he has* (the use of the perf. is to be noted) thereby made the covenant of Moses the *old covenant*, *i. e.* the relatively older That, however, which has been made the antiquum, the *older*, is, for this reason—*because* it is destined to be displaced by a novum—also far on the way towards an absolute point of *old age*, *i. e.* it is a γηράσκον, *it is old* in respect of its own capacity of existence, and approaches, therefore, step by step, the impending ἀφανισμός. (Ἐγγύς is used in the same way as at chap. vi. 8. As, in that place, ἐγγὺς κατάρας does not mean "nigh to the curse," but "approaching step by step *nearer* to the curse," so here, ἐγγὺς ἀφανισμοῦ, "approaching step by step nearer to dissolution.") Thus, from the fact that God has promised, in general, a new, *i. e. second* covenant, and has declared the covenant of Moses to be the *earlier*, it follows, that this earlier covenant must, at some time, be *old* and *cease*. Now, as, according to ver. 6, the relation between the *ministries* is the same as that between the *covenants*, ver. 13, therefore, already implicitly contains the idea (as has been already observed) that the Levitical λειτουργία is destined to become old, to be outlived and to cease.

SECTION SECOND.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOSAIC TABERNACLE.

(ix. 1—10.)

According to the train of thought in the foregoing section, we are prepared to expect here two ideas which Zuingle has already well denoted in the words : Docet, ceremonias testamenti veteris nonnisi *typum* fuisse novi. Atque ita rursum probat, novum testamentum, sacerdotium videlicit Christi, *excellentius* fuisse levitico. First, the author will have to prove in detail the idea expressed in chap. viii. 1—5, that the Old Testament tabernacle, in general, was a copy of the heavenly things, *i. e.* the *ministry* of Christ,—then, the idea in chap. viii. 6, seq., that, as a mere *copy*, it corresponds to the nature of the *old* covenant as *distinguished* from the new. And indeed we do find both of these things in this section, only (as was to be expected) not treated successively, but blended together.

In ver. 1 the first thing to be asked is, what substantive is to be supplied at πρώτη. The Complut. and Steph. editions read ἡ πρώτη σκηνή, but this σκηνή is not found in the majority of the oldest and best codd. and versions, it rests, therefore, merely on a conjecture,

and this conjecture, moreover, is groundless. In chap. viii. 6–13, it was the *two covenants* that were spoken of throughout, and even at ver. 13, the words *in that he saith, a new*, &c., pointed back to the citation in ver. 8 (I will make a new *covenant*), and thus, at ver. 13 also, the substantive, *covenant*, was to be supplied at the words —*he hath made the first old.* This of itself would show, that the same substantive must be supplied at ἡ πρώτη in the verse before us. And, indeed, σκηνή would in nowise be suitable. For, in ver. 2, where the expression ἡ πρώτη σκηνή actually occurs, it serves to denote not the *Old Testament* sanctuary in opposition to that of the *New Testament*, but the *fore-compartment* of the Old Testament tabernacle (the so-called "holy place") in opposition to the *hind-compartment* (the "holiest of all"), and, therefore, has a signification which would not at all be suitable in ver. 1. We have, therefore, to supply διαθήκη (so Peshito, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Bleek, Olshausen, and, in general, all the more recent commentators.)

Δικαιώματα λατρείας,—δικαίωμα denotes the result of the act expressed by δικαιοῦν, and signifies, therefore, the making just or right. In the New Testament it occurs in a threefold sense: first, it signifies the *fulfilling of righteousness* (as applicable to the perfect man Christ), Rom. v. 18, viii. 4; secondly, the *declaring of the sinner to be righteous* by God for Christ's sake, Rom. v. 16; thirdly, it denotes the act whereby certain things are declared to be right, and therefore obligatory, *i. e.*, *ordinance, law*=מִשְׁפָּט, חֹק, Rom. i. 32; Luke i. 6. Here, of course, only this third signification is suitable. To understand δικαιώματα of the holy vessels is contrary to all usage. Luther, Grotius, and others, take λατρείας as the accusative, and suppose a comma between δικαιώματα and λατρείας, so that the three things would be co-ordinated, "ordinances, services, and sanctuary." But, first of all, τε is mostly used in the case of things *connected by pairs;* besides, the use of the plural in λατρείας would be strange, and λατρείας, moreover, would express nothing else than the performance of the δικαιώματα, which would give rise to a tautology. We therefore agree with the immense majority of both ancient and modern commentators in taking λατρείας as the genitive to δικαιώματα. We thus obtain *two* ideas ("ordinances respecting the service," and "the sanctuary"), which correspond precisely to the two ideas of the foregoing chapter, *service* and *tabernacle.*

By τὸ ἅγιον, as already appears from the epithet κοσμικόν (which forms the antithesis to ἐπουράνιον), is to be understood the *entire* Old Testament *fanum* (not the "holiest of all," which in the Epistle to the Hebrews is denoted by τὰ ἅγια, vers. 3 and 8, or ἅγια ἁγίων, ver. 2; nor the so-called "holy place," which our author always designates by the expression ἡ πρώτη σκηνή.)—The epithet κοσμικόν, as already said, finds its explanation in the antithesis to τὰ ἐπουράνια.

The writer intends evidently to say this: "the old covenant, too, had indeed a *service* and a *sanctuary*, but it had a service determined by *ordinances*, and a sanctuary belonging to *this world*."* These two things he has concisely put together in one clause. He, therefore (as already Olshausen has rightly observed), expresses by κοσμικόν nearly the same thing that he had already expressed in chap. viii. 4 by ἐπὶ γῆς, with this difference, that in κοσμικόν lies not merely the locality but also the quality. Some of the older critics have strangely mistaken the sense of these simple words. Luther and others take τὸ ἅγιον = τὴν ἁγιότητα; Hornberg rightly interprets τὸ ἅγιον, but renders κοσμικός=κόσμιος, "adorned;" Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Kypke, explain κοσμικός = for the *whole* world, destined for all nations (but one of the principal imperfections of the Old Testament sanctuary lay precisely in this, that it was *not* destined for all nations, but only for one people); Theophylact, Grotius, Este, Wetstein, explain: "representing a type of the world-structure" (but the tabernacle represented this in no possible way.) Even among those commentators who rightly explain κοσμικός as antithetical with ἐπουράνιος (It., Vulg., Calvin, Beza, Cramer, Storr, Kuinoel, Tholuck, Bleek), it is still unnecessarily disputed, whether the writer intended by this to denote the imperfection or the materiality of the Old Testament sanctuary. Κοσμικός signifies neither "imperfect" nor "material," but "belonging to the world."† The Old Testament sanctuary was an integral part of *this world*, this κόσμος, which exists as a world separated from God, and in which, therefore, even when what was heavenly appeared, it must needs take the form of the limited, the particular, *i. e.*, under the distinction of fanum and profanum. In this is involved at once the material, local, external, and emblematic character of the Old Testament ἅγιον, and, at the same time, also, its imperfection.

Ver. 2—5. What is now to be proved is not that, in general, a *service* and a *sanctuary* existed under the old covenant, but that *service* was one according to ordinances, and that sanctuary one pertaining to this world. In proof of this (comp. the γάρ), the principal idea is now laid down: "There was built the *first* compart-

* The construction τὸ ἅγιον κοσμικόν which has perplexed many commentators, (and which Ebrard omits to explain) is explicable by a familiar Greek usage. For the English, "he has clean hands," the Greek would be, "he has his hands clean," (ἔχει τὰς χεῖρας καθαράς or ἔχ. κ. τ. χ.) Thus, Heb. vii. 24, "hath an unchangeable priesthood:" Greek, "hath his priesthood unchangeable"=the priesthood which he hath is unchangeable. So, here; "it had its sanctuary κοσμικόν"=the sanctuary which it had was κοσμικόν. The article assumes the existence of the sanctuary as known, and merely leaves the predicative adjective to define its quality.—K.

† Bleek renders the word by "worldly." But this word has acquired in common usage a different meaning. It no longer forms the antithesis to heavenly, but to spiritual, and has become almost synonymous with "profane."

ment of the tent ; behind the *second* vail, however, was the holy of holies." In this construction, which rendered it necessary to pass through two vails into the holiest of all, was plainly expressed that cosmical imperfection, that state of separation between God and the sinful world.

This separation was not, however, in any way merely accidental or outward, but was most closely connected with the entire nature, and with the collective symbols of the Old Testament cultus. The writer shows this by specifying the particular pieces of furniture in each of the two compartments of the tabernacle, and the acts of worship which were performed in each.

Before entering here on the explanation of the text, we must not omit taking a short survey of the local construction and symbolical significance of the tabernacle.

On entering by the door of the rectangular fore-court (which stood on one of its smaller sides) into the *fore-court*, one would then have had the tent immediately before him (again its smaller side), but in entering it, he would yet have to pass the altar of burnt-offering and the basin of water which stood just at the entrance to the tent. On entering into the *tent itself* (therefore passing through the first vail, which formed the entrance from the fore-court outwards), he would then have found himself in the *holy place* (πρώτη σκηνή), a rectangular space which, again, had greater depth than breadth. On the right hand, in this space, stood the *table with the shew-bread*, on the left, the *golden candlestick*, and furthest back, immediately before the entrance to the holiest of all (Ex. xxx. 6), the *altar of incense*. On entering (through the second vail, which separated the holy place from the holiest of all) into the *holiest of all*, he would then have found himself in a square space which had no other entrance but the one from the holy place. Here stood the *ark of the covenant*.

This holy of holies was the place where God sometimes manifested his presence in a bright light or a cloud of smoke. This was the place where God was to be conceived of as always present, even although he should not be visibly manifest. He was present here, however, not as the Creator and Governor of the world (as such he dwelt in heaven), but as the *covenant God* of his people. And therefore was the *act of the covenant* kept here in the *ark of the covenant*. This act of the covenant contained the mutual contract which God had made with his people. He *required* of the people the fulfilment of his eternal, absolutely holy will, which he had expressed in the "ten words ;" the decalogue was the *condition of the covenant;* if this was fulfilled, then would the Lord, on his part, fulfil the *promise of the covenant*, and be the God of this people.

But, not only did the people break that condition from the very

first ; they had never the power to fulfil a command in which even an evil desire was forbidden. Hence God had never given this law to the end that it should be fulfilled, but to the end that the people should by this testimony (עֵדוּת) be led to the knowledge of their sinfulness. And this is not an idea to be found first in the New Testament, in the writings of Paul, but one which had been, in the clearest manner, expressed in *the ceremonial law and worship*.

The "words of the testimony" (*i. e.* the decalogue) must needs be *covered* (כָּפַר), so that the eye of the God who was present in the holy of holies might not fall upon these words, which were an *act of accusation* against the people. (From this is to be explained the frequent form of expression "to cover sin.") A golden *cover* the כַּפֹּרֶת, was to be laid upon the ark ; this dead cover, however, did not suffice of itself to turn away the eye of Divine penal justice from the record which testified of the guilt of the people. For this there was necessary an *actual atonement for this guilt*. Therefore the high priest must, once every year, on the great day of atonement, slay the great sacrifice of atonement, and carry the blood into the holiest of all, and sprinkle it on the cover or lid of the ark, that the eye of God might fall upon this witness of the accomplished atonetonement. (Of course this atonement was, in like manner, only symbolical and typical, as was the representation of the presence of God, and the beholding of God.) Thus, then, there was represented in the holy of holies the *absolute* relation of the *absolutely holy God* to the sinful people. It will appear from what has been said, how very superficial is the view of those who would place the decalogue in the same category with the ceremonial law, and regard it as given only for the Jews. The whole ceremonial law had rather a significance only on the supposition, that the decalogue was not a relative thing suited to the capacity and development of the time when it was given, but the *purely absolute* representation of the *eternal, independent* will of God.

Let us now look at the cultus of the holy place, the *πρώτη σκηνή*. After the decalogue God gave, at the same time, to the Israelites (Ex. xx. 22, 23), a *second law*, which did not require absolute holiness, but rather, on the contrary, was suited to an unholy sinful people, and which presupposed the non-fulfilment of the decalogue. In the decalogue it is said : thou shalt not kill ; in chap. xxi. 12, seq. it is taken for granted that, notwithstanding this, murder would occur, and ordinances were given how this should be punished. In the decalogue it is said : thou shalt not steal ; in chap. xxii. 1, it is presupposed, that still, thefts would be committed, and the civil punishment for the thief is specified, and so forth. In short, the decalogue was a law which could not be kept by a sinful people ; the law, on the other hand, chap. xx. 22, seq. was instituted precisely

to meet the capacity of observance belonging to a sinful people. The decalogue required *absolute holiness;* the second (the civil) law required merely *civil* propriety of conduct, therefore only a holiness of a very relative kind, only a justitia civilis.—*Now, just as this civil law stands related to the decalogue, so does the cultus of the holy place to that of the holy of holies.* While, in the one, the absolute will of God as accusing the people needed to be, as it were, hid from the eye of God by the *lid* sprinkled with the blood of the sacrifice, so, in the other, the people brought before God the temporary fruits of the land,—bread and oil,—as symbols of their relative services, their relative holiness—they did not, however, present these immediately before the eye of God, but only in the fore-chamber of his house. The shew-bread was no *lectisternium*, no meat for God (but as already the name לֶחֶם־פָּנִים intimates), was intended only to be looked upon by God ; in like manner, in the candlestick which was filled with the other chief produce of the land, oil, the people made, as it were, their light to shine before God. In the holy place, therefore, were represented the symbols of the *temporary relative piety, which the Lord, in the meanwhile, until the people should become entirely and inwardly holy, graciously accepted,* and which he could graciously accept only because, at the same time, in the holiest of all, the sins against God's *absolute* requirements were, from time to time, covered by the sacrifices. Thus, then, we see how this *twofold* character of the cultus, really pointed to a future removal of the difference between the absolute requirements of the covenant and the merely relative services of the covenant.

The fore-court was the place for the sinful people. Here the sacrifices, namely, the atoning sacrifices, were slain and burnt. This slaying and burning was a symbol of the death and the condemnation which the sinner properly had deserved, which, however, was transferred from him to the victim. Of course, therefore, neither the holy place nor the holy of holies was the fitting place for these acts of judicial punishment (the great sacrifice of atonement was therefore commanded to be burnt without the fore-court, nay, without the camp) ; only the *blood* of the slain sacrifice of atonement was brought before the eye of God, *i.e.*, into the holy of holies, as a testimony that the atoning vicarious act of punishment had been executed. The general mutual relation between God and his people *resulting* from the sacred rites of the holy of holies, from those of the holy place and of the fore-court,—the result, that God in general still accepted the homage and worship of this people, was symbolically represented in the *incense-offering.* The incense-offering was burnt in the fore-court, in the fire of the altar of burnt-offering—only in virtue of this connexion with the expiatory side of the cultus was it acceptable—it was not carried into the holy of holies it-

self, but (just because it represented only the *temporary, relative* peace that subsisted between God and his people) into the *holy place;* but the altar of incense on which it was placed stood (Ex. xxx. 6) just before the entrance to the holy of holies "over against the ark of the covenant," and thus, the incense-offering referred to the God who was present in the holy of holies; the smoke of the incense was to penetrate into the holy of holies itself, and, because it belonged to the cultus of the holy of holies, it was offered not by the priests but by the *high priests.*

With this explanation of the symbolical meaning of the tabernacle and its worship in general, the question is already solved, why the author in vers. 2–5 names and enumerates these pieces of furniture (a question which, moreover, is answered by himself in ver. 6, seq.) But, at the same time also, a *difficulty* is thus by anticipation removed, which Calmet has declared to be the maxima totius epistolæ difficultas. If, however, there existed no greater difficulties in it than this, then would the epistle to the Hebrews belong to the easiest books of the New Testament! It is the difficulty arising from the fact, that the *author in ver.* 4 *reckons the golden altar of incense as belonging to the holy of holies, while it stood undoubtedly in the holy place.*

Commentators have had recourse to a threefold solution of this difficulty.

First, some have directly expressed their opinion, that the author *was mistaken.* This, however, is too gross to be for a moment conceivable. The position of the altars must have been known to every Israelite from the book of Exodus, much more must he have known it, who set himself to reason from this against the Jewish Christians. This view has therefore been supported by *auxiliary conjectures.* Some say, the author may perhaps have lived and written in Alexandria, and therefore not have had an exact knowledge of the arrangements of the temple in Jerusalem. But the question, whether one lived in Jerusalem or elsewhere, is here altogether irrelevant, as, even in Jerusalem, the layman could not enter into the temple, and could only become acquainted with the internal arrangements of the temple from what he read *in the Pentateuch or in* 1 *Kings.* This information could be obtained, however, quite as easily in Alexandria as in Jerusalem, by a layman or a non-layman. Moreover, it is not the temple that is here spoken of, but the tabernacle, and especially *those* arrangements which found place *only* in the old tabernacle (thus in ver 4, Aaron's rod and the pot of manna are mentioned, both of which, according to 1 Kings viii. 6, even at the time of the building of Solomon's Temple were no longer to be found).—And this will, at the same time, afford an answer to a second auxiliary conjecture (that of a reviewer in Rheinwald's Repert.

1842 vol. 9. p. 193), according to which, the author had in his mind, and before his eye, the arrangements of that temple which the Egyptian Jews, under Onias 150 B.C. built at Leontopolis. This conjecture is the more untenable when we find that Onias built his temple with *great exactness* after the pattern of that at Jerusalem, so that, at Leontopolis, the altar of incense assuredly stood nowhere else than it did at Jerusalem.

Side by side with the first solution is to be placed also that of Bleek, according to which, the altar of incense did really stand in the holy place, but the author allowed himself to be led into the mistake of placing it in the holy of holies by the passages Ex. xxx. 6 and 26 ; Lev. iv. 7, seq. (where it is said the altar of incense stands "over against the ark of the covenant"). This hypothesis is, however, simply refuted by the 7th verse of our chapter, where the author expressly and definitely says that the high priest entered into the δευτέρα σκηνή *only once in the year*, which he could not have said if, in his opinion, the *daily* offering of incense had been brought into the holiest of all.

With this also is refuted a second hypothesis (which has been put forth by Tholuck, only problematically, however, on the alleged ground of 1 Kings vi. 22 ; Ex. xxvi. 35), that, in reality, the altar of incense may have stood in the holy of holies. We are not under the necessity of having recourse to Ex. xxx. 6 ("thou shalt place it before the vail") in order to prove, that the altar of incense really stood in the holy place, and by no means in the holy of holies,* as it clearly appears from the 7th verse of our chapter that, in the opinion too of our author, it stood in the holy place and not in the holy of holies. The question, now, is no longer one of a contradiction between our author and the Pentateuch, but of a kind of contradiction into which he seems to have fallen with himself.

But how much the less conceivable such a contradiction of the author with himself is, by so much the more might the third principal solution seem, on a superficial view of the question, to recommend itself, the solution, namely, of those (as the Peshito, Vulg., Theophylact, Luther, Calov, de Dieu, Reland, Deyling, J. G. Michaelis, Böhme, Kuinoel, Stuart, Klee, etc.), who would translate θυμιατήριον here by *censer*. That θυμιατήριον may actually mean *censer* is proved (from Thucyd. vi. 46 ; Diod. Sic. xiii. 3 ; LXX. Ex. viii. 11 ; 2 Chron. xxvi. 19 ; Joseph. Ant. iv. 2, 4). It has even been maintained that it must be rendered here by censer ; for the altar of incense is never denoted in the LXX. by θυμιατήριον, but

* For the opposite opinion it has been contended, that Origen also (hom. 8 in Exod., 9 in Levit.), Œcumenius and Augustine (qu. 177, in Exod.) assigned the altar of incense to the holy of holies. But none of these three Fathers saw the temple themselves; they, all of them, drew their information solely from our passage, Heb. ix. 4, so that their testimony here is entirely without weight.

always by *θυσιαστήριον θυμιάματος*. But this ground is not conclusive, as in Josephus, Philo, Clemens Alex., and Origen, the altar of incense, in spite of the usage of the LXX., is very often called *θυμιατήριον*. Moreover, our author, in the designation of the parts and vessels of the sanctuary, does not at all confine himself to the terms of the LXX.; he calls the holy place for example not *τὸ ἅγιον* (as LXX. Ex. xxvi. 33, etc.), but *ἡ πρώτη σκηνή*, while he uses *τὸ ἅγιον* (ver. 1) in a far wider sense to designate the *entire* sanctuary; to designate the holy of holies he uses, besides the expression of the LXX. *ἅγια ἁγίων*, also the expressions *ἡ δευτέρα σκηνή* (ver. 7) *τὰ ἅγια* (ver. 8), etc. It is thus quite *possible* that in the designation of the altar of incense he may have departed from the circumstantial term of the LXX., and followed the usage of Josephus and Philo. The word *θυμιατήριον*, therefore, in itself determines nothing.

Just as little is determined by the predicate *χρυσοῦν*. Some have understood this as a differentia specifica distinguishing a golden censer from a silver one, and in support of this, have appealed to a passage of the Talmud, according to which, there were many silver censers and only a single golden one—at the same time also, to the omission of the article at *χρυσοῦν θυμιατήριον*. But if the author had intended to distinguish that one particular censer from the many, he must precisely then have used the article. But the epithet *χρυσοῦν* can, just as little, be a differentia specifica as is the parallel epithet *περικεκαλυμμένην πάντοθεν χρυσίῳ*. Or, will the author distinguish the gilt lid of the covenant from a number of others, namely, of covenant lids not gilt!

The two following considerations are unfavourable to this third solution of the difficulty. In the first place, the holy of holies was no store-room in which all possible vessels were kept; though it were granted, then, that there was a particular golden censer which was specially set apart for the incense on the day of atonement in the holy of holies (Lev. xvi. 12, seq.), this censer would still not be kept, the whole year through, in the holy of holies, as in that case, the high priest must needs have entered into the holy of holies *before* the formal presentation of the sacrifice in order to bring out the censer. But, in the second place, it is purely inconceivable that our author should have passed over the *altar* of incense, this *essential* part of the sacred furniture, and have mentioned, instead of it, any kind of incense vessel whatever! Tholuck, it is true, observes that Josephus, in describing the entrance of Pompey into the temple (ant. xiv. 4, 4) mentions, among the objects which Pompey saw in the holy place, merely the table, the candlestick, and *censers;* these, however, were certainly not placed upon the ground, but standing on the altar of incense, so that, from this passage of Jose-

phus, it can in nowise be inferred, that at the time of Pompey there was no longer any altar of incense. But granted even, that there was then, in reality, no altar of incense, still our author speaks not of the temple, least of all of the temple as it existed after the captivity, but of the tabernacle. Aaron's rod and the pot of manna were no longer in the temple (they were not there since the time of Solomon, 1 Kings viii. 9), and yet the author does not omit to mention them!

We need, in fact, to have recourse to none of these artificial expedients. The solution is exceedingly simple. The altar of incense *stood*, indeed, in the holy place, but *referred* to the holy of holies. (So, substantially, already Mynster and Olshausen). The smoke of the incense was not intended to spread backwards, in order to dim the light of the candlestick, or to impart an aromatic flavour to the shew-bread, but was intended to penetrate into the holy of holies, as a symbol of worship and homage. Now, our author, as has already been observed, mentions all these things, not with the aim of giving a local description, but in order to shew (ver. 6, seq.) how the entire cultus of the tabernacle divided itself into *two parts*, which pointed to a future union and reconciliation. Regarded from this point of view, the *table of shewbread and the candlestick*, the cultus of which consisted in their being symbolical of the relative covenant services of the people—belonged to the holy place; the altar of incense, however, the smoke of which referred to the God present in the holy of holies, and in which the *total result* of the *entire* cultus of the tabernacle was represented, belonged most properly to the *holiest of all*, although it stood before the entrance to it (just as the sign-board of a shop, although outside the shop door, yet belongs not to the street, but to the shop). Nor was this a refinement first invented by the author of this epistle, for in Ex. xxx. 6, it had already been expressly said, that the altar of incense, although without the vail, was yet to stand "before the ark of the covenant," (לִפְנֵי הַכַּפֹּרֶת); nay, in 1 Kings vi. 22, this connexion of the altar of incense with the holy of holies is yet more strongly expressed in the words הַמִּזְבֵּחַ אֲשֶׁר לַדְּבִיר. By what other word could the author render this לְ than by ἔχειν? We are under no necessity to understand ἔχειν in a *local* sense. Being in a place locally, the author everywhere expresses, vers. 2–4, by the preposition ἐν (ἐν ᾗ); while ἔχειν is used in a local sense just as little in ver. 1 as in ver. 4. We therefore render the words thus: "the holy of holies, *to which* the golden altar of incense belonged." The author had the less reason to shrink from this use of the ἔχειν, as he might well take it for granted that the *local* position of those vessels was familiar to *all* his readers; and, moreover, ver. 7 shewed that it was not unknown to himself.

Ἐν ᾗ στάμνος χρυσῆ, etc. It will be necessary to inquire here, first, whether the pot of manna together with Aaron's rod, really stood in the ark of the covenant, and then, why these two objects, which had no significance in respect to the cultus of the tabernacle, are here mentioned.

With regard to the first of these questions, the passages Ex. xvi. 33; Numb. xvii. 10; and 1 Kings, viii. 9, have been strangely referred to in support of the view, that those two things had their place not *in*, but *before*, or *beside* the ark of the covenant. The two first of these passages, it is said, expressly affirm that they were placed *before* the ark; the third as expressly denies that they were placed *in* the ark. But the very opposite of this is true. In Ex. xvi. 33, it is said, quite generally, that Jehovah commanded Moses to lay up לִפְנֵי־יְהוָה a pot full of manna for a memorial. Now, so much, certainly, is true, that *this expression* does not positively affirm that the pot of manna was to be laid precisely in the ark of the covenant, for לפני־יהוה is often used of any one who enters into the holy of holies, nay, even into the tabernacle and its fore-court; and so, when it is said of Moses, he came לפני־יהוה, it is assuredly not meant that he went into the ark of the covenant. But neither does that expression *forbid* our associating it with the holy of holies, and the ark of the covenant. And, if the pot of manna was kept at all in the holy of holies, it must have been kept in the ark of the covenant; for, placed on the ground, it would soon have been spoiled (it is not to be forgotten that the tabernacle was daily moved from place to place), and there was no niche in the wall, as the wall consisted of hangings. Now, as the ark was the only vessel in the holy of holies, it is reasonable to suppose, that the pot of manna would have its place nowhere else than in it.

If we are led to this conclusion already, a priori from Ex. xvi. 33, it is expressly confirmed, with respect to the pot of manna by ver. 34, and with respect to Aaron's rod, by Numb. xvii. 10. For it is said there, of both these objects, that they were laid לִפְנֵי הָעֵדֻת "before the testimony." Expositors have yet to produce a passage in which the *ark* was designated by עדת. The ark is called אָרוֹן or אֲרוֹן־הָעֵדֻת, אֲרוֹן־בְּרִית; on the other hand, עֵדֻת is always, and everywhere, used to designate the *decalogue* or the *tables of the law*, which, as is well known, lay in the ark. If now, for example, I have a microscope standing in a press, and I were to say, I have laid some article before the microscope, no rational man would understand me to say that I had laid it upon the ground, before the press in which the microscope stands, but every one would understand that I have laid it in the press, and before the microscope there. Just so is it with the pot of manna and Aaron's rod. If they were laid before the tables of the law then must they have been placed on the

same level with these, therefore on the bottom of the ark, not on the ground before the ark. Bleek himself admits it to be possible (ii. p. 458) that Ex. xxx. 6 may have the meaning, that the altar of incense, because it was לִפְנֵי הַכַּפֹּרֶת, stood in the holy of holies, notwithstanding its being expressly said shortly before that it stood "before the vail," and yet, he all at once repudiates the very natural interpretation of Ex. xvi. 34, that the pot of manna and Aaron's rod, because לִפְנֵי הָעֵדֻת, had their place in the ark.

We have still to look at the passage in 1 Kings viii. 9. It is here said, certainly, that "there was nothing in the ark except the two tables," but what time is it that is here spoken of? The time of Solomon! Now, that in the time of Solomon the golden pot of manna and Aaron's rod should have been lost will not seriously surprise any one. Had not the ark been long in the hands of the Philistines, and carried about from place to place? Might not the Philistines have thrown aside the seemingly worthless rod of Aaron, and taken away the more valuable pot of manna? Let us now, however, inquire finally, why then in general the circumstance is mentioned in 1 Kings viii. 9, that in Solomon's time, when the ark was brought into the temple, "*nothing* was in it save the two tables." Certainly not for the purpose of obviating any idea that there might, perhaps, be in the ark, besides these, some bowls, plates, caps, etc., etc. It is quite evident that the statement has then only a meaning when it is supposed, that there was something else besides the tables *belonging properly to the ark*, which one might justly and reasonably *expect* to find in it. Now, let any one search through the whole of the Old Testament, and he will be able to discover no other objects that could be expected in the ark besides the tables, except the pot of manna and Aaron's rod mentioned in Ex. xvi. and Num. xvii. Thus, then, the passage 1 Kings viii. 9 speaks not of what belonged to the ark in Moses' time, but of what was found in it in the time of Solomon. With an emphasis expressive of surprise, it is observed, that "the tables only were found in it," *i. e.*, that the pot of manna and Aaron's rod had been lost. This very passage, therefore, contains a decided testimony, that both of these objects, so long as they yet existed, had their place in the ark of the covenant.—The second question is, why the author, *in general*, *mentions* these objects which, in reference to the cultus, had no special significance? In ver. 5 he says expressly, that, in so far as his object was concerned, he might pass over the more particular description of the cherubim; surely then, he must have had a special reason for not passing over the pot of manna and Aaron's rod. This reason consisted, on the one hand, perhaps in this, that he wished to shew how, in the innermost sanctuary, there were not merely

the tables of the law but also memorials of Divine miracles of mercy ;* on the other hand, however, and chiefly, in this, that the manna which fell from heaven, and the miraculous budding almond branch of Aaron formed a contrast with the ordinary earthly products of the land which were daily and weekly brought to the holy place.

The cherubic forms mentioned in ver. 5, which (two in number) were brought to the mercy-lid, have no independent symbolical signification. They served only the aesthetical purpose of mediating between the accusing testimony which lay beneath them, and the cloud that hovered above them, in which God at times manifested himself. Thus, below, they formed, as it were, the guardians who kept watch over the records of the law, and, above, with their wings they formed, as it were, the throne upon which the cloud of revelation moved when it appeared. Hence, as Tholuck rightly observes, God is spoken of in the Psalms now, as "he who sitteth on the cherubim ;" again, "a throne of the glory of the Lord" is spoken of, *i. e.*, a throne of that cloud,—from which it is evident that the cloud, when it appeared, appeared over the cherubim. (The rabbinical doctrine of the "Shekinah" is fabulous only in so far as they considered this cloud to hover *permanently* over the cherubim. In opposition to this comp. 1 Kings viii. 10, but on the other side also Ex. xxv. 22 ; Num. vii. 89 ; 1 Sam. iv. 4, and 22 ; 2 Sam. vi. 2). The genitive *δόξης* is, therefore, also (with Hammond, Deyling, Braun, Schöttgen, Michaelis, Böhme, Tholuck, Bleek, etc.), to be explained of the cloud which, indeed, is in the Old Testament frequently called הַכָּבוֹד. They are called "cherubim of glory," because they bore "the glory of the Lord." Beza, Kuinoel, Olshausen, and others, have taken *δόξης* as the gen. expressive of quality ("glorious cherubim"), but to what purpose would be such a predicate here, as in its vague generality would not even be parallel with the descriptive epithets *golden, overlaid with gold*, ver. 4 ?

Vers. 6, 7.—The author having thus noticed the construction of the tabernacle, proceeds to consider the significance and designation of its two compartments. And in vers. 6, 7, he simply notices the acts of worship which were performed in each. Ἡ *πρώτη σκηνή*, as at ver. 2 the holy place. Διαπαντός is explained by the antithesis *ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ*, and signifies, therefore, not continually, absolutely without interruption, but without *such* interruptions as, according to ver. 7, characterised the worship in the holy of holies, which was

* Olshausen finds in the pot of manna a symbol of the heavenly spiritual bread of life, in Aaron's rod (less happily) a symbol of regeneration. Comp. on this our remarks on the words *τελειοτέρας σκηνῆς* infra ver. 11.

performed only once in the year. The acts of worship in the holy place were performed, in part, daily, and, in part, weekly. Daily the high priest presented the offering of incense on the altar of incense, daily was the candlestick supplied with the oil: while the show-bread was laid out weekly. The pres. *εἰσίασιν* (comp. ver. 9, *καιρὸς ἐνεστώς, προσφέρονται*) can be explained only by the supposition, that when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, the Old Testament temple worship was still in existence, consequently, that this epistle was written before the destruction of Jerusalem. In the description of the *construction* of the sanctuary, the author, for a very intelligible reason, has not had in view the Herodian temple, but has adhered to the description given in the Pentateuch of the original sanctuary, the tabernacle; here, however, when he speaks of the acts of worship, he describes them, with equal reason, *as still continuing;* for the acts had remained the same, and also the distinction between the holy place and the holy of holies, changed only in its outward form, had been maintained unaltered in the temples of Solomon, Zerubbabel, and Herod.*

The high priest went *once every year* into the holy of holies. It is needlessly asked, whether the high priest, on the great day of atonement, did not enter *twice in succession* into the holy of holies. He certainly did this, as we learn, not merely from Philo, but also from Lev. xvi. 12–14, and ver. 15;† but this is not in contradiction to our passage. Our author himself indicates in the words, *for his own sins and the sins of the people*, that this act, which was done once in the year, consisted of two parts.—On *ἀγνοημάτων* comp. what is said at chap. v. 2.

Ver. 8–10. From the fact that the worship of the tabernacle consisted of two parts, as described in ver. 6–7, the author *infers*, in ver. 8, that the *division of the tabernacle into two parts*, as described in ver. 1–5, implied an imperfection. This inference, however, finds its link of connexion and its explanation in the relative sentence ver. 9, 10. The connexion of the thought as a whole is very subtle, and can be apparent and intelligible only to those who have understood all that lies in ver. 6, 7. For ver. 6, 7 has a twofold reference. In it, first of all (as is quite evident), the section v. 1–10 on the construction of the tabernacle is brought to a close, and an inference drawn backwards from the service of the taber-

* Bleek infers on the contrary, from the connection of the pres. with the words *τούτων δὲ οὕτως*, etc., that the author must have believed that all the things which he names were still to be found in the temple! Why does Bleek not go just a step farther, and charge the author with believing that there was as yet no temple, but that the old tabernacle was still standing?

† The statement of the later Maimonides, that the high priest entered into the holy of holies *four times* on that day, is of no value against the testimony of Philo.

nacle to its construction and destination. But in this verse, also, the way is prepared, at the same time, for the idea which follows, that the Old Testament sanctuary as a whole was merely of a *relative* character. In ver. 6, 7 then, first of all, notice is taken of the difference between the (relatively) *holy place* and (absolutely) *holy of holies*, and then it is at the same time also indicated, that, just on account of this distinction, the *tabernacle as a whole* was of a merely relative character in comparison with the New Testament fulfilment. First, notice is taken of the distinction between the (relatively) holy place and the (absolutely) holy of holies. In the one place there was a daily service; this service is not more particularly described here, but its general character appears from the anthithetical expression in ver. 7, *not without blood*. The service in the holy place was *without blood;* the priest brought oil and bread, never an offering of blood. No atoning act was ever performed in the holy place, but always only a representation of the occasional relative holiness or conformity to the law.

But what follows from this distinction? That the people were *relatively* holy, but regarded from an *absolute* point of view, were *unholy*, and remained so in spite of the atonement which was repeated every year. (Comp. the preceding general observations on ver. 2.) It followed, therefore, in other words, from the continued existence of a holy place (a symbol of relative holiness) side by side with the holy of holies, the place of atonement, that *the atonement itself was as yet merely relative*, that the true place of atonement had not yet been opened, or that "the place of atonement had not yet been truly opened."

What is subjoined to this by means of the gen. absolute ("inasmuch as the Holy Ghost thereby showed,") is easy and intelligible. That Holy Ghost, according to whose eternal plan (comp. chap. viii. 5), the tabernacle was built, intended to indicate by the separation between the holy place and the holy of holies, a *second*, a *further* truth (besides the distinction of relative holiness and absolute atonement), namely, that *here, in the tabernacle, the absolute also was as yet relative.*

This is the idea in ver. 8. Ἅγια (comp. ver. 3), the holy of holies; the genitive is the genitive of direction (as in Matt. x. 5; LXX., 2 Sam. xviii. 23.) The way into the holiest of all was not opened (literally, not yet shown, revealed*), the holiest of all was

* The author seems here to allude to the event, recorded in Matt. xxvii. 51. Otherwise, he would have said simply: *μήπω ἀνεῳχθῆναι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδόν.* But, in the manner in which he expresses himself, he points to a time when an event had not yet taken place, which, again, only emblematically indicated the opening up of the way. "At that time," he says, "it had not yet been shown by God (as has now been done) that the way into the holiest of all is open."

still shut ; consequently the access to fellowship with God still prevented, the separation still subsisting, *man not yet truly reconciled.* Why so? How does this follow from what is said in ver. 6, 7? Various conjectures have been made in reply to this, instead of attention being directed to the fact, that the idea which is presupposed as the connecting link between the major proposition and the conclusion is first expressed in ver. 9. Some have found the vis conclusionis in this, that the existence of a holy place separate from the holy of holies pointed to the distinction between priests and the laity, (but the existence of a holy of holies, as distinguished merely from the fore-court, would have pointed to the same distinction, even had there been no *πρώτη σκηνή* between.) Others sought the vis conclusionis in this, that a chamber which has an antechamber, cannot be said to be an open chamber! or in this, that it was not open, because the high priest alone might enter into it (but the question still recurs, whether this had any connection with the existence of a *πρώτη σκηνή*.) Others, again, sought the vis conclusionis in the vail which separated the holy place from the holy of holies, (but this vail is only the manifest separation itself between the two *σκηναῖς* ; nothing, therefore, is thereby explained.) The true reason is given by the author himself in ver. 9. *The holy place stands locally related to the holiest of all, just as, in respect of time, the tabernacle as a whole is related to the priestly service of Christ :*

πρώτη σκηνή : *ἅγια ἁγίων* = [*πρώτη σκηνή* + *ἅγια ἁγίων*] : Christ.

The holy place was a symbolical representation of relative holiness, outward conformity to the law, while the holy of holies was a symbolical representation of the re-establishment of the absolute relation between the merely sinful people and the absolutely holy God. If, now, the holy of holies had been a *true* holy of holies, if it had truly answered its purpose and *truly* opened the way of access to a real and true fellowship with God, then the people had been a *truly redeemed and sanctified* people, nor would there have been any state of merely relative, outward, typical holiness which needed to *be represented* in the holy place. From the fact, therefore, that there was still a state of typical, relative holiness to *be represented*, *i. e., that there was such a state*, the author is fully warranted in drawing the inference, that the absolute restoration of the relation to God (the place of which was the holy of holies) had not yet been *really* and *truly* attained and wrought out, but that this absolute relation to God was even in the holy of holies *only represented*, only typically shadowed forth. Or, as he expresses it in ver. 8, the entrance to the presence and fellowship of God *was not yet truly open.*

The connexion of the ideas may very simply be made evident in the following way :

Πρώτη σκηνή	ἅγια ἁγίων
Representation of *relative* holiness.	Representation of *absolute* perfection.

Mere representation : New Test. fulfilment.

Or : because, in the holiest of all, the restoration of the absolute relation to God was merely *represented* (for the *relative* conformity to the law still subsisted *side by side with it*, and was still the object of representation *side by side with it*, namely, in the *πρώτη σκηνή*), the holiest of all itself was therefore not yet of an *absolute* but of a *relative* character. As the holy place, in a local respect, stands related, to the holy of holies, so does the latter stand related, in respect of time, to the fulfilment in Christ.

Let us now see whether the author has really adduced this argument in ver. 9, 10.

In ver. 9 he says plainly and pointedly, the *πρώτη σκηνή* is a *παραβολή*—(*i. e.*, likeness, comp. chap. xi. 19, denoting, however, as well the figurative representation of a thing in words as in things)—*παραβολή* of the present time, in which the Old Testament sacrifices are still presented. That *ἥτις* refers to *πρώτη σκηνή* should never have been doubted.* What the author means by the "present time" is made plain by the relative clause *καθ' ὃν δῶρα*, etc. A, B, and D, it is true, have the reading *καθ' ἣν* (scil. *παραβολήν*), and Lachmann, Olshausen, and Bleek, give the preference to this reading. But how forced would be the idea thus obtained : "the anterior tent which was a figure of the present time, according to which figure sacrifices were brought !" In what sense was the presentation of the sacrifices performed in accordance with the figure which was represented in the *πρώτη σκηνή ?* There were no sacrifices at all offered in the *πρώτη σκηνή* ! Moreover, the reading *ἣν* would deprive the expression *ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐνεστώς* of all its clearness and definiteness ; for, separated from its relative clause, this expression might denote, as well the New Testament, as the Old Testament time. We may, therefore confidently suppose that the reading *ἣν* owes its existence to an error in the writing, or a misunderstanding. We therefore adhere to the reading *καθ' ὅν*, and thus get the necessary determination of the idea *ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐνεστώς*. The author might have called the time of the Old Testament tem-

* Erasmus and others, among whom is Bengel, have explained the *ἥτις* as connected by attraction with *παραβολή*, so that *ἥτις* would stand for *ὅ, τι*. The existence of a *πρώτη σκηνή* before the holy of holies is a figure of the time when the author wrote, in so far, namely, as at that time the Israelitish theocracy, which still subsisted, formed as it were the outward space for the Christianity that had arisen in its bosom. Ingenious but artificial !

ple worship also "the past," and he would doubtless have so designated it had he intended to speak from *his own* point of view, but, with practical wisdom, he here speaks from the stand-point of his readers who still joined in the temple worship, and for whom, therefore, the period of the sacrifices did not yet belong to the past. In another antithesis *ὁ αἰὼν ὁ ἐνεστώς* (Gal. i. 4) is used.

Thus, then, the holy place is called a figure of the Old Testament time, the time of the imperfect sacrifices of animals which could not make man perfect *κατά συνείδησιν*. *Συνείδησις* is used here in the widest sense; it denotes the inner part of man, his consciousness (including certainly the conscience specially so called), and finds its best explanation in the antithesis ver. 10.

At *μόνον ἐπὶ βρώμασι*, etc., it is simplest to supply the words, *δυνάμεναι τελειῶσαι*. *Ἐπί* c. dat. denotes (as at Acts v. 35, and in our chapter ver. 15) the object on which, or in *reference to* which, the act in question is performed.* Those sacrifices could make the man complete and perfect, only in that which concerned meat, drink, and washing; *i. e.*, the purity which was thereby obtained was no other than that Levitical, that typical outward purity which was acquired and maintained by observing the laws and ordinances about meats and washings.

Hence, those *δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι* are called also *δικαιώματα σαρκός* (comp. what is said at ver. 1) ordinances of the flesh, of the old natural man, the *ἔξω ἄνθρωπος* (Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 16). That the reading *δικαιώματα*, authorised by all the versions (only cod. D reads *δικαίωμα*), deserves the preference before the received reading *καὶ δικαιώμασι* (so Olshausen reads), is already established on external grounds. (So also Mill, Bengel, Griesbach, Tholuck, Knapp, Lachmann, Schulz. How easily may the reading *δικαιώμασι* have arisen from a copier mechanically and carelessly putting it in the same case with the preceding words.) On external grounds, also, the reading *δικαιώματα* is the more suitable; for *δικαιώματα* is much too general an idea to form a fourth co-ordinate class along with *meats*, *drinks*, and *washings*. Besides, no one knew how *ἐπικείμενα* was to be construed; this nom. plur. neuter must be taken as an apposition to the nom. plur. fem. *μὴ δυνάμεναι!* If, now, we read *δικαιώματα*, the simplest way will be to understand this word as in apposition to *δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι*. (It is unnecessary to take it as an anacolouthic apposition to the datives). *Ἐπικείμενα μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως*, the ordinances of sacrifice were enjoined until the time of a better state of things. This time forms the antithesis to

* Grotius, Bengel, Olshausen, Bleek, De Wette, and others, give to *ἐπί* the signification *together with*, which it nowhere has. It signifies *in addition to this and that*, but not *together with this and that*. And what could be meant by the *μόνον*? "The sacrifices which could not make inwardly perfect only in addition to meats, drinks and washings" —what does that mean?

καιρὸς ἐνεστώς. The expression διορθώσεως explains itself from chap. viii. 8, s.; it is the time when God had promised to make a *better* covenant.

If now we look back on the connexion of the thought in ver. 9, 10, and, tracing it backwards, resolve it into its particular parts, we find them to be as follows:

1. In the Old Testament time sacrifices and gifts were brought which do not make the inner man perfect, righteous, and holy, but produce only that Levitical purity, that state of outward conformity to the law, which is especially shewn also in the observance of the laws and commandments respecting meats and washings (ver. 10).

2. The πρώτη σκηνή with its service is a figure of this *relative*, because typical, holiness (while, in the holiest of all, the restoration of the *absolute* relation to God is represented)—(ver. 9).

3. The fact, however, of there being such a relative holiness to represent (consequently, that the absolute is not yet in existence, but is only *typically represented* even in the holy of holies), involves the inference (ver. 8), that the true way of access to God does not yet stand open, that the holy of holies itself still belongs to the category of the relative and the typical. Thus, we find that reason in proof of the proposition in ver. 8, which we mentioned above as the right one, actually expressed and developed by the author.

But, it having thus been made out, that the holy of holies itself also was merely relative and typical, this idea leads, forthwith, to a new theme, to the comparison of the New Testament *act* of atonement with the Old Testament *acts* of atonement.

SECTION THIRD.

THE SERVICE OF THE TABERNACLE. THE BLOOD OF THE BULLOCKS AND THE BLOOD OF CHRIST.

(ix. 11–x. 18.)

IN this section the author, first of all, lays down the *principal theme*, ver. 11, 12, namely, that Christ has offered *his own blood*.

From this it follows 1, vers. 13, 14, that his sacrifice was of an *internal, spiritual* character; 2, vers. 15–24, a sacrifice by which the new covenant promised, chap. viii. 8, seq., was ratified; 3, ver. 25–chap. x. 10, one which needed not to be repeated. In chap. x. 11–18 all the fundamental ideas of the whole part are recapitulated.

Vers. 11, 12. By means of the particle δέ the idea in ver. 11

forms an antithesis, first of all, certainly, to the immediately preceding train of thought ver. 7, seq.,—Christ is introduced in opposition to the high priest,—but thereby, at the same time, also an antithesis to the whole preceding section, vers. 1–10. Nay this δέ points not exactly to the 7th verse, where there is no μέν to correspond with it, but to the μέν of the *first* verse which logically corresponds to it. True, the old covenant *also* had a sanctuary; but, (as was shewn in ver. 1–10), even the holy of holies in this sanctuary was no true holy of holies. Christ, on the contrary, as the true high priest, has entered into the true holy of holies through a better tabernacle, in order to effect a not merely relative, and typical, but an eternal redemption.

This idea forms, however, only the *transition* to the new theme. This new theme lies in the words of the 12th verse: *by his own blood;* for it is this idea which is afterwards further developed, and which forms the proper subject of the section.

Three points are contained in the period ver. 11, 12: *a*, Christ is the *present* high priest of *existing* good things; *b*, Christ has entered *through the perfect tabernacle* into the holy of holies, and that, *c*, by *his own blood.* The two first points form the transition.

Let us consider the first. Παραγενόμενος ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν forms an apposition to the subject Χριστός. Critics are not, indeed, agreed upon this construction. Tholuck, Bleek, and others place παραγενόμενος in apposition to the predicate εἰσῆλθεν, and resolve παραγενόμενος εἰσῆλθεν into παρεγένετο καὶ εἰσῆλθεν: "But Christ has appeared as a high priest of . . . good things and entered, etc." Meanwhile, not to say that such an emphatic announcement is more of a modern cast than in accordance with the plain and homely style of the New Testament, even in a grammatical point of view it is to be objected to this construction, that the παραγενόμενος would then have to stand first, and the sentence to run thus: Παραγενόμενος δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ ἀρχιερεύς, etc. It will therefore be better, even on this ground, to connect παραγενόμενος with ἀρχιερεύς as an adjectival attribute, and to bring this again into apposition with the subject of the sentence. Still stronger reasons than this, however, are furnished by the sentiment itself. But before we can attend to these, we must first determine the reading. The reading wavers between τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν and τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν. The former reading is found in cod. B and D, in Lat. D. E., in the Peshito, the Philoxen., and in Chrysostom and Œcumenius. It is certainly also a very ancient reading, which soon gave place generally to the easier reading μελλόντων. Bleek thinks that γενομένων may have easily arisen from a mistake of the transcriber, on account of the παραγενόμενος preceding, but would such a mistake have spread through so many families of MSS. (Peshito, B, D, Philoxen.)?

It is far more comprehensible that the more difficult *γενομένων* should have been misunderstood, and the copier have confidently put *μελλόντων* in its stead, because, in chap. x. 1 also, "future good things" are spoken of. But in chap. x. 1 *μελλόντων* is suitable; here, however, it is by no means suitable. In chap. x. 1 it is said of the Old Testament that this and that were types of the New Testament good things; here, on the contrary, it is meant to be said of *Christ* that he did not, like the holy of holies in the tabernacle, point *merely typically* to a *future* salvation, but that he brought about the *fulfilment* of this salvation. Μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν as said in reference to Christ would only then be tolerable, if here (as for example at chap. vi. 5) the antithesis were between the present sufferings of the church and its future glory, or between the present faith and the future vision. But nothing of this is said, even in the remotest degree, in the passage before us. The author does not speak here (as in chap. iv. 1 and 9) of this, that it is the privilege of the Christian to *hope* also for something *future*, but he mentions in vers. 12 and 14 only such good things belonging to the Christian as *had already been*, once for all, obtained for him. In one word, he places the true high priest who has in his hand the already *secured* and *existing* good things of grace, in opposition to the Old Testament high priest who had only to fulfil the emblems and types of *future* good things. We therefore give the decided preference (with Lachmann) to the reading *γενομένων*, and then it will be self-evident that we must connect *παραγενόμενος* with *ἀρχιερεύς* as its adjective. The Old Testament high priest was not present as regards the salvation to which his service referred, and as little was he present in regard to those for whom he was to make atonement; but he performed the duties of his office—separated, in respect of place, from the people, in respect of time, from the salvation—alone in the holy of holies. Nor was he present as regards God, but represented the people only in the place where God was symbolically present. Christ, on the contrary, is, in every respect, a *present* high priest, present, as regards his Father, to whom he has entered into the true heavenly holy of holies; present, as regards his people, with whom he is always, even unto the end of the world, after having once appeared on the earth for their salvation; present, as regards the salvation, which he does not need to look for from the future.

The second idea lies in the words "through the greater and more perfect tabernacle," etc. We have here that use of the article which might best be termed the *proleptical;* the idea is properly this: by a tabernacle which (of the two) is the better. Similarly Acts ii. 47, *προσετίθει τοὺς σωζομένους*, "the Lord added *such* to the church as (then and on this account) belonged to the saved." John iii. 10, *σὺ εἶ ὁ διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*, "thou art *one* (such a one) who stands

here before us as *the* teacher of Israel." Compare also Heb. xii. 25. The import of the clause is this: Christ entered into the holy of holies by a more perfect tabernacle than that was by which the Old Testament high priests entered into the holy of holies. (By the σκηνή is, of course, to be understood *specially* the πρώτη σκηνή, as it is distinguished from the holy of holies.) In what respects that holy place by which Christ entered into the holy of holies was better than the holy place of the Mosaic tabernacle, is now shewn in the words *not made with hands, that is, not belonging to this creation.* In opposition to the Mosaic, typical first tabernacle is placed a real first tabernacle, which bears the same analogous relation to the Mosaic as the New Testament holy of holies into which Christ entered, bears to the Mosaic holy of holies. This πρώτη σκηνή, is not described positively, but negatively, namely, as one "not made with hands, that is, not belonging to this creation." If this last clause. *that is, not belonging*, etc., were not there, one might be contented to understand this τελειοτέρα σκηνή (with Zuingle, Bucer, Tholuck, Bleek, and the most of commentators) of the *canopy of heaven* (the sidereal heavens) through which Christ passed into the upper heaven, into the sphere of glorified corporality, subject to no death or change.* But that clause which is added renders every explanation of this kind impossible. Moreover the parallel itself between the heavens and the Mosaic πρώτη σκηνή would be altogether without significance or meaning. In what would the analogy between the two σκηναί consist? At most it might be said, that there is an analogy in the *outward* circumstance, that the Mosaic πρώτη σκηνή stood *locally outside* of the Mosaic holy of holies, and the visible heavens are outside of the heavenly holy of holies! But such frigid parallelisms are not in accordance with our author's manner. We must rather seek the key to the solution of ver. 11 in the profound and subtle thoughts of vers. 8–10. It was there shown that the Mosaic holy of holies was itself *only typical; the antithesis between the Mosaic and the heavenly holy of holies, is essentially not so much one of place, as rather of time and quality;* it is not the heaven viewed as a place that makes the true holy of holies, but the heaven and throne of God as the *scene* of the *finished* true atonement and reconciliation of God with man. *The true and proper antithesis between the Mosaic and the heavenly holy of holies is that between the prophetic type of an atonement and the actual fulfilment of it.* Now the opposition between the Mosaic πρώτη σκηνή and the τελειοτέρα (πρώτη) σκηνή must be analogous to this. We have here, as it were, a question in proportion to solve

* Calov, Vriemont, and others explain it most unsuitably of the *New Testament church.* This was rather first founded by Christ's entrance into the holy of holies. How then can he have gone thither through it?

(Mos. holy of holies : heavenly holy of holies. = Mos. holy place : X.)

The Mosaic holy place symbolically represented that relative, temporary, outward, purity, conformity to the law and holiness which was described in ver. 10. The true, moral, inward holiness must form the antithesis to the *symbolically holy place*—the *thing* to its *emblem*. Is the holy of holies into which Christ entered not the *place* in heaven viewed as a place, but the *act* of his exaltation and the *time* of his being exalted, then will also the πρώτη σκηνή, through which he passed into his state of exaltation, be not a *place* but an *act* and a *time*. In ver. 9 the Mosaic holy place was actually called a *figure of the time of the old covenant*. Through that *time* in which the old covenant with its ordinances still subsisted Christ has passed, inasmuch as he was made under the law; his *act* of passing through this state, his *act* of living in a state of humiliation, *i. e.*, therefore, *his perfect inward fulfilment of the law*, or his *holy life*, was the τελειοτέρα σκηνή through which he passed into his state of exaltation.* The *real* fact of holiness (in the life of Jesus upon earth) stands opposed to the *symbolical representation* of holiness in the Mosaic πρώτη σκηνή. All that was *emblematically represented* in the Mosaic holy place has by him been *actually accomplished*. Was the earthly shewbread laid out there—he was the bread of life that came down from heaven; did the candlestick burn there with earthly oil—*he was* the light of the world. Nay, we can now, for the first time, rightly understand why the author at ver. 4 has not omitted to mention also the pot of manna and Aaron's rod. Did the pot of manna in the holy of holies point to a better bread than the earthly shewbread, to a bread from heaven—Christ was this better bread from heaven. Did Aaron's rod reviving again from a state of death point to a new life out of death—Christ brought, and was, this life which arose out of death, and gave life again to dead humanity.

The third idea, *not by blood*, etc., does not need here a more detailed explanation, as the author himself developes it, in the form of a new theme, in the verses which follow. The following points only, are briefly to be noticed. Side by side with the absolutely holy *life* of Christ as the passage through the τελειοτέρα πρώτη σκηνή stands the holy *death* of Christ (together with his resurrection and ascension) as the entrance into the eternal *holy of holies*. The διά is, of course, not to be taken in a *local* sense here (as if Christ had passed to the Father through his blood poured out, and then everywhere diffused, as certain old Lutheran theologians have explained); this is inadmissible, already on the ground, that in the words δι' αἵματος τράγων καὶ μόσχων the διά cannot evidently be so understood. The διά is to be understood in an *instrumental* sense. Αἷμα stands

* Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Bengel, and others, *approximate* the true explanation when by the τελειοτέρα σκηνή they understand the body of Christ.

by metonyme for "death" (as the Heb. דָּם); the death of the victim was the condition, and, in so far, the means, of being permitted to enter into the holy of holies.—The adverb ἐφάπαξ introduces a natural consequence of what has been said. Types must, from their nature, be ever repeated until their fulfilment. The fulfilment itself needs no repetition, just because it is the fulfilment, *i. e.*, the adequate satisfaction of the existing need. An explanation of ἐφάπαξ lies in the words αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος. Εὑράμενος is a part. aor. 2 formed after the analogy of aor. 1; an Alexandrine peculiarity of dialect which had already passed into the LXX., and had thence been imparted to the idiom of the Hellenists (Jews and Jewish Christians who spoke Greek). Εὑρίσκω in the sense of "to discover, to bring to pass," occurs also at Rom. vii. 18. Λύτρωσις signifies literally ransoming, used of a slave who has no money wherewith to redeem himself, and for whom, therefore, another pays the ransom in his stead (hence substitution is the principal idea in λύτρωσις).

Vers. 13, 14.—The third of the ideas contained in vers. 11, 12, namely, that Christ has *by his own blood* opened the true entrance to the holy of holies, is now further explained. What is said in vers. 13, 14 is mainly substantially this: *The animal sacrifices give outward purity; the moral sacrifice of Christ purifies the conscience.* These two members, however, are not simply placed antithetically to each other, but in the form of an inference a minori ad majus (εἰ—πόσῳ μᾶλλον). The form of this inference is confirmed by this, that the Levitical symbolical purity followed from the sprinkling of the blood of animals *by an internal necessity far inferior* to that with which the real cleansing of the inner man results from the sacrifice of Christ. The causal connexion between the means of purification and the purification is, in the one case, much more loose, more arbitrary, because it is symbolical, while the cleansing of the *conscience* from dead works by the sacrifice of Christ is effected by a necessity of the inmost and strongest kind.

Pass we, now, to the particular parts of the first member of the sentence. Τράγοι, goats, were offered by the high priest for the people, ταῦροι, bulls, for himself (Lev. xvi. 6–11). Besides these, also, the ashes of the (reddish) cow are mentioned (Num. xix.), by the sprinkling of which such as had contracted uncleanness by contact with dead bodies were made Levitically clean. One reason why the author particularizes this ordinance was, that it afforded a special and manifest example of the *external* character of the relation subsisting between the means and the result. A deeper reason will appear from the antithesis in ver. 14. Of Christ it is said, ver. 14, that *he cleanses the conscience from dead works to serve the living God.* The idea expressed by συνείδησις finds its explanation in ver.

9, and the remarks there made. The opposition is that between what is really experienced in the consciousness, and what is only outwardly and in the outward man symbolically pourtrayed. The inmost religious consciousness is cleansed by Christ, and that *from dead works.* Many have all at once understood by these, sinful and evil works, and have explained this, either of the cleansing from the guilt of these evil works (justification), or of the cleansing from the sins themselves (sanctification). Others, on the contrary, as Bleek, understood by the dead works the outward works prescribed by the Mosaic law, and by the cleansing from these works conversion to Christianity. I think that both of these explanations are too narrow and too scholastic. The idea involved in the expression comprehends these two things, first, that in the state of mind of the person to be cleansed the whole question with him is one of *works* (therefore of a righteousness of the law), and, secondly, that all those works which a man does in order to acquire merit before God are *dead* (*i. e.*, not merely "outwardly and symbolically," but "inwardly dead," "not proceeding from love," and therefore "tainted with sin"). By the concise expression *ἔργα νεκρά* is denoted, *a*, not subjective sinfulness or guilt as such, *b*, nor the objective deficiency of the ceremonial law, but *c*, the *state of heart in general* of him who, as yet, knows no other way to righteousness than that of works, and who, therefore, as a natural unregenerate man, is able to perform only *dead* works, *i. e.*, works which are viewed separately from the disposition of the heart, works each of which by itself is considered as an objectively valuable legal tender to God, while, in reality, it is not only imperfect and tainted with sin, but also, on account of its standing isolated and by itself, a dead and worthless thing. The opposite of this state of heart is that of him, who does not at all imagine that he is able to pay God or to earn a reward from God by particular works and meritorious acts, but who seeks to become righteous only through Christ—who has died for him and now lives in him and whose member he now is—and who, *thereby*, receives the power to consecrate his whole self, his whole personal *life*, to God; and to let himself be penetrated and sanctified by the spirit of Christ. This state of heart includes both justification and sanctification in their organic combination. It is denoted by the words *λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι. Λατρεύειν* is used in the Sept. of the holy service of the priests and Levites, and denotes, therefore, in the New Testament the *priestly consecration and offering up of the whole man to the service of God.* The idea expressed by *λατρεύειν* is therefore quite different from that of *δουλεύειν*; the latter signifies *δοῦλος εἶναι* and denotes simply subjection, obedience, be it slavish or willing; *λατρεύειν*, on the contrary, the willing priestly offering of oneself to God. The expression *living God* forms a logically proper

antithesis to *dead works*. The unregenerate legally righteous man *sets not God before him*, but rather the *requirements and services of the law;* his eye is not directed immediately to the living God; he does not compare himself, his whole person, with the person of the living God, he sees not his personal organic corruption in the mirror of the Divine holiness; but he measures and compares himself only with the particular isolated requirements of the law, and directs his regard and attention only to his particular, falsely supposed meritorious, works, and feels perfectly satisfied if he only has performed a certain number of such *works*. The regenerate man; on the contrary gives up his own *personality* to the *person* of the living God.

It will now, moreover, be evident why the author has in ver. 13 mentioned particularly the ashes of the heifer. There, it was a (Levitically outward) cleansing that was effected from contamination caused by contact with the dead bodies *of others;* here, it is an inward and real cleansing from *one's own inner death* that takes place, and a consecration of oneself to the living God.

What that act of Christ was, by which he has rendered this inward purification possible, we are now told in the relative clause, *who through the eternal spirit offered himself without spot to God.* Instead of *αἰωνίου*, the reading *ἁγίου* is to be found in D, Copt., Basn., Vulg., Slav., and Lat. D, E, and in Chrysostom. But there is still stronger external authority for *αἰωνίου* in A, B, Peshito, Philoxen., Armen., Ambrosius, Theodoret, and Theophylact; for, besides the Alexandrine and Byzantine families, there is here the oldest authority, the Peshito, against the Italian family. Besides, it is easy to understand how the reading *ἁγίου* may have arisen, through a gloss or correction, in place of the more difficult *αἰωνίου*.—But what, now, does this mean: Christ has offered himself through the eternal spirit as a spotless sacrifice to God? These words have received some very strange interpretations; Nösselt has rendered *πνεῦμα* by victima.; Doederlein by status beatissimus; Storr and Olshausen understand by *πνεῦμα αἰώνιον* the heavenly life of Christ, the holy moving principle of love in Christ; Welcker has declared the whole passage to be inexplicable, and supposed that the author did not know himself what he would say, upon which Tholuck well observes: "It is bad, indeed, when the conceit of an interpreter leads him to impute the product of his own fancy to his author." But many, also, of the most judicious critics, go too hastily to work, when (as Bleek, Tholuck, and others) they all at once explain *πνεῦμα αἰώνιον* as synonymous with *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. Bleek thinks that the Holy Spirit has here the designation of eternal spirit, "because he imparts to him in whom he dwells an eternal imperishable existence." But in ver. 14 it is not the eternal life with God as the *result* of the

sacrifice of Christ that is spoken of; it is Christ offering himself to death that is there spoken of. Tholuck and others think that the Holy Spirit is here designated as the impelling power which constrained Christ to offer himself to the death. But surely the author must have had a reason for not saying *διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου*! We shall most safely escape the necessity of having recourse to such guesses and conjectures by explaining the words in question from their own context, *i. e.*, from the antithesis to ver. 13. Let us, first of all, suppose that the adjective *αἰωνίου* is not there, then *διὰ πνεύματος* forms the simple antithesis to *διὰ σαρκός*. The ashes of the heifer produced the *cleansing of the flesh*, because this heifer (so is the sentence to be extended) was offered *διὰ σαρκός*. In this sacrificial act it was merely the *σάρξ* of the priest, *i. e.*, the natural man, that took part. A particular disposition or state of heart, a *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, was not at all necessary in order to bring that offering. Whatever the priest's internal state might be, it was enough if he outwardly performed the prescribed ceremony. Christ, on the contrary, cleanses the conscience, because he has offered himself *διὰ πνεύματος*. He was not slain through mechanical compliance with a carnal ordinance, *i. e.*, an ordinance which every natural man is capable of fulfilling, he was not struck down by any priest, stabbed with a knife and burned; that which performed the sacrificial act in him was his spirit (*πνεῦμα*). His making himself by his holy life an object of aversion and hatred to the sinful and obdurate rulers, his patiently bearing this hatred, his not allowing himself to swerve—through fear of the persecution which threatened him on account of this hatred—from his fidelity to the will of his father, and from the fulfilment of the work committed to him; all this was that through which he offered himself; consequently, it was by a moral act, an act of his *πνεῦμα* (where *πνεῦμα* is to be taken in the New Testament sense, in which it denotes not the understanding, but the disposition of mind or heart). And hence, in the sacrifice of Christ, the most important element, and that in which the atoning virtue lies, is not the outward physical shedding of that substance which we call blood, but it is that *inward act* by which Christ *willingly endured* unmerited *sufferings*. For the death of Christ is a holy death, precisely in virtue of its being *pure suffering*. Christ *did nothing directly* towards his own death, he did nothing *actively to bring this about;* he did not kill himself either directly or indirectly, *he merely forbore to withdraw himself from suffering by disobedience to his Father's will*. He did not offer himself as a fanatic does who, under the influence of some illusion, lets himself be nailed to a cross—this would indeed have been to offer himself *διὰ σαρκός*—but he offered himself as, for example, a faithful minister of the gospel does who faithfully declares the truth, notwithstanding that he

thereby exposes himself to suffering and persecution, or as a martyr when he is reduced to the choice between martyrdom and denial, and will not choose denial.

But, thus far, Christ is not the only one who has offered himself *through the spirit.* When a Codrus, a Leonidas, an Arnold of Winkleried will rather give up life than prove unfaithful to his country ; when a Socrates does not choose to ward off the threatened cup of poison by denying that measure of truth to the knowledge of which he had attained,—these are likewise offerings *διὰ πνεύματος.* And yet there is an immense difference between Christ and all those, and also between Christ and the Christian martyrs. *This difference the author expresses by the adjective αἰωνίου.* Others, too, have offered themselves "through the spirit," but only in the struggle for good things of a *relative* nature ; the triumph or downfall of a country, a relative knowledge of the truth was at stake in their case. In Christ, it was *the absolute salvation of the world,* it was *eternity itself* that was at stake. Hence, a *relative πνεῦμα* was sufficient for those others, the spirit of patriotism, or of the love of truth, etc. ; but the sacrifice of Christ could only be offered in the power of *eternal* spirit. Only the eternal spirit of *absolute* love, holiness, wisdom, and compassion was capable of enduring that sacrificial death. Because, then, Christ's giving himself up to death was a moral act, and not a moral act of relative value and significance, but the absolute moral act, the act of all acts, the angle of the world's history, the finished manifestation of the fullness of the eternal being of God in time, the absolute fulfilment of the eternal decree of God—therefore, says the author, Christ has offered himself to God, *διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου.*

And he offered himself "as one who was faultless," *ἄμωμον.* The animal sacrifices under the law behoved also to be faultless, and so it may be said, there lies in *ἄμωμον* first of all, only a *similarity* between Christ and the animal sacrifices. But the words, *he has offered himself without spot,* cannot of course be separated here from *through the eternal spirit.* Has Christ offered himself without fault through the eternal spirit, he thereby obtains another and higher faultlessness, in comparison with which those animal sacrifices were *οὐκ ἄμεμπτοι.* (Comp. chap. viii. 7.)

The 14th verse is, in a practical point of view, one of the most important in the whole New Testament. For, as directed against the doctrine here taught concerning the value of Christ's sacrifice, all that calumnious talk of old Rationalists and new German Catholics about a theology of blood and wounds, and a tyrannical God, who "would look only on blood," is put to a shameful silence. The main thing in the sacrifice of Christ is not the blood, this red substance—for then might the blood of the animals under the first cov-

enant have sufficed,—as little is it "the spirit" alone, if by the spirit be understood an abstraction, a misty ideal of virtue, or freedom, or of man-deification (in which case, it is too often the mere σάρξ that falsely boasts of possessing "the spirit of Christ")—but it is that *eternal spirit* of absolute eternal holiness and eternal love which has efficaciously manifested itself in time, inasmuch as it endured the real bloody death for the sinful world.

Thus much our author says, *in general*, on the opposition between the sacrifice of Christ and the Old Testament animal sacrifices. From ver. 15 onwards, he developes particular sides of this comparison.

In Ver. 15–23 he shews how, by the atoning death of Christ, *a new* διαθήκη also has been ratified. Thus this section points back, at the same time, to chap. viii. For, there, it was said, in general, that God has promised to make a new covenant, and that by this new covenant the old must be annulled. This, too, had already been said in chap. viii., that the priestly service (λειτουργία) of Christ bears the same relation to the Levitical priestly service as the new covenant bears to the old. The author, then, in chap. ix. entered more at large into the consideration of the *old* covenant, and had shewn how the structure (vers. 1–10) as well as the service (vers. 11–14) of the tabernacle pointed to something future and more perfect; in vers. 11–14 he has shewn how, in the death of Christ, the *more perfect* λειτουργία consists; now in vers. 15–23 he shews, that by this very death of Christ, *also the* (*promised*) *more perfect* covenant has been ratified.

Διὰ τοῦτο, in ver. 15, does not point backwards to ver. 14, but forwards to the clause beginning with ὅπως (although this final clause itself certainly involves substantially a repetition of the former idea. This final clause is, however, differently construed.) First, it must be asked, whether the words εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν belong to θανάτου γενομένου or to λάβωσιν. The former is the more natural according to the position of the words, and has also been acknowledged as the right construction by almost all critics. But, secondly, there is the question, whether the genitive τῆς αἰωνίου κληρονομίας is dependent on ἐπαγγελίαν or on κεκλημένοι. In the latter construction (Tholuck and others) not only must a strong hyperbaton be presupposed, but also the idea which it yields ("that those who are called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance") is not quite suitable, seeing that this promise *as* a promise had already, according to chap. viii. 8, seq., been given to the members of the old covenant. It is better, with the majority of commentators, to take that genitive as dependent on κεκλημένοι. Those who are called to the *eternal* inheritance are, accordingly, those members of the old covenant who, according to chap. iv. 1 and 9, had hitherto only attained to a *tem-*

porary rest. Τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν denotes not the act of promising but (as at chap. x. 36 ; chap. xi. 13 and 39) *the promised object*, the thing promised to them. The sentiment then is this : that those who are called to the *eternal* inheritance might receive the thing promised to them (the fulfilment of the promise.)

How this was done is shewn in the words θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων. According to ver. 13, seq., the animal sacrifices under the old covenant had not the power to redeem the sinner from transgressions (*i. e.*, from the guilt of these.) They procured for him, not righteousness before God, but that relative outward purity or conformity to the law, which itself was only an emblem and symbol of the *righteousness of God.* In order truly to redeem from sins committed under the old covenant, a *death must be undergone* (a different one of course from that of bulls and goats.)

Now the entire sentiment becomes clear. *In order that* by a death—through which, at the same time, the sins committed under the *old* covenant first found their true atonement—those members of the old covenant who are called to the eternal inheritance might be enabled to receive the thing promised to them (namely, the eternal inheritance itself) : Christ must establish a *new* covenant. The internal ground of this connexion of ideas is manifest. It had already been shewn in chap. viii. and ix. of the old covenant, that its *priestly service* could not blot out the guilt of sin. If the old covenant still continued to subsist, then its priestly service also continued, and thus, so long as it continued, there could be no *redemption*, no possibility of at length truly entering into the long promised *inheritance. There is here, therefore, an inference drawn backwards from the necessity of a new priestly service* (λειτουργία) *to the necessity of a new* διαθήκη.

But closely connected with these principal points is the second idea of the passage before us, θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν, that it was possible to accomplish this *only by an atoning sacrificial death.*

This second point is further developed in ver. 16, seq. A covenant cannot be made without death ; the sinner cannot enter into a covenant with the holy God without dying ; hence, also, in the making of the first covenant, substitutionary burnt-offerings must needs be brought by the Israelites who entered into covenant with God.

This passage in itself so easy—easy whenever one has patience to read to the end of it, that is to ver. 22—has by most critics been regarded as a real *crux.* Many have been led by what seems to be said in ver. 16, to suppose that the signification *covenant* here is by no means suitable, and thus have rendered διαθήκη either, already at ver. 15, by *testament* (thus completely breaking the connection

between chap. viii. and ix.), or they supposed *a play upon the word** in ver. 16, as if *διαθήκη* meant covenant in vers. 15 and 18, and *testament* in vers. 16 and 17; in other words, they here again imputed the product of their own fancy to the author. We will show that the signification *testament* is throughout the whole passage, not only *not necessary*, but even *unsuitable*.

Already, at chap. vii. 22, we found that *διαθήκη*, in the sense of the Heb. בְּרִית, was a *long-established religious idea* among the Jews and Jewish Christians. It is very doubtful, on the other hand, whether the Hebrews knew anything in general of testaments (comp. the 1760 of Rau's disput. de testamenti factione Hebraeis veteribus ignota). The passage Deut. xxi. 16, affords an argument against the possibility of there having been voluntary dispositions of inheritances, and the whole Mosaic right of inheritance was, in its nature and basis, an intestate right of inheritance. The most that can be said is, that, under the influence of the Romans, testaments may have come to be used here and there among the Jews, but it is still prima facie very improbable that the author should have selected a thing so foreign and so little known, with which to compare God's highest act of atonement. Now it is, moreover, a fact, that in that passage from Jer. xxxi. 31, seq., cited in chap. viii. 8, seq., which forms the foundation of the whole of this part of the epistle, *διαθήκη* is the translation of the Hebrew בְּרִית. It is also a fact, that chap. ix. 15 connects closely with the ideas of chap. viii.; and, besides, that in chap. ix. 15, a mediator of the *διαθήκη* is spoken of, while in a testament there cannot, from the nature of the thing, be a mediator; there may be such, however, in a covenant which two separated parties make. From all this, so much, at least, is evident, *that so long as the signification covenant can be shown to be suitable, we are not at liberty to depart from it.*

And why should this signification not suit in ver. 16? "Where a covenant is, there must, of necessity, be demonstrated the death of the person making the covenant." (*Φέρεσθαι* never signifies existere, as Schulz and Böhme would have it; it certainly signifies versari, for example, *ἐν τεταραγμένοις πράγμασι φέρεσθαι, to find one's self in troubled circumstances;* but, when it stands by itself, it never has the independent substantial signification: to exist. Quite as little does it ever signify intercedere, as Beza understood it. But either: sermone ferri, fama divulgari, *i. e.*, to be generally known; or, what suits still better here, afferi coram judicibus, to be proved, authenticated.) Therefore: where a *διαθήκη* is, there must the

* The rendering "testament" is given to *διαθήκη* throughout by Chrysostom, Vulg., Luther, and the older Lutheran theologians; that of "covenant" by the most of the Greek fathers, the most of the reformed theologians, especially Grotius, then by Michaelis, Tholuck, and others; a change in the signification, or a paronomasia, is supposed by Bleek, Olshausen, and several of the more recent commentators.

death of the διαθέμενος be proved. What had these commentators to do but to conclude, all at once, that it is evidently a testament that is here spoken of? But is it true, after all, that a testament cannot exist until the testator is dead? Would this inference be just: *where a testament is* (!), there must the death of the testator be shown?" It would be so if the author had said: where a testament is to be *opened* or *implemented!* The signification testament therefore is not at all appropriate. Let us try how it goes with the signification *covenant*. "Where a covenant is, there must of necessity the death of him who makes the covenant be proved." This idea is certainly not so self-evident as that of the testament *seemed* to be on a superficial consideration of it. This idea is rather enigmatical, obscure, almost paradoxical. But should we shrink from it on this account? Was it not also paradoxical, when the author, ver. 8, from the fact that the high priest entered once every year into the holy of holies, all at once inferred, that so long as there was a holy place, the holy of holies would be inaccessible? Was it not also paradoxical, when in chap. vii. 15, from the statement that the Messianic high priesthood was to be after the order of Melchisedec, he inferred that the Messiah must proceed from the tribe of Judah? He has not failed to explain the former paradox in chap. ix., ver. 9–10, and the latter in chap. vii. 16, 17. He is fond of making at once a bold leap from the major proposition to the conclusion (or, as here, from the conclusion to the major proposition), and to bring in afterwards the connecting ideas. Why should he not be allowed the same privilege here? "Where a covenant is, there the covenant-maker must be dead"—certainly an enigmatical statement; but patience only for a few verses, and the author will not fail to explain it.

In ver. 17 he again repeats the idea. "A covenant is valid in the case of persons who are dead, since it never has force if he who makes the covenant be alive." Again very enigmatical, and again have the commentators, without delay, had recourse to the testamenti factio. A testament *may*, indeed, be overturned or revoked so long as the testator lives. But it would be too much to affirm that a testament is *never* (μήποτε) valid so long as the testator lives. And so, to favour the explanation "testament" the signification of μήποτε has been here actually changed into that of μήπω!

In ver. 18, seq., the author gives the solution of all these enigmas. "The first covenant also was not consecrated without blood," (ἐγκαινίζειν not "to renew," but literally, to bring a new thing into existence, into use, hence to consecrate.) Did ever any one hear of the consecration of a testament? and does not the author speak of the first διαθήκη as a thing well known? But does the expression "first testament," or "testament" in general, anywhere occur in

the Old Testament? Is it not rather quite evident, that in the passage Ex. xxiv. 6–8, *to which the author here refers*, it is the consecration of a בְּרִית that is spoken of? "For, after Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the law, he took the blood of the calves and goats, with water and scarlet wool and hyssop, and sprinkled the book of the law itself, and all the people, saying: this is the blood of the *covenant* (בְּרִית) which God hath enjoined (upon me to ratify) in relation to you. Moreover, he sprinkled likewise with blood both the tabernacle and all the vessels of the ministry. And all things are by the law purged only with blood, *and without shedding of blood is no forgiveness.*"

Three things are here to be observed. The first is of an antiquarian character, namely, that particulars are here mentioned (as the mixing of the blood with water, the scarlet wool on the stalk of hyssop) which are not to be found in Exodus, but only in Josephus. Josephus followed in this doubtless an ancient and general tradition, and our author too might, without hesitation, follow this tradition, especially as nothing depended here on archæological exactness in the statement of the event referred to, his object being only to bring that event to the minds of his readers in the way in which it was familiar to them, and to call it up vividly before them by a picturesque description of it.

Secondly, We are here perfectly satisfied that the signification "testament" for *διαθήκη* will not do. In ver. 18, *διαθήκη* is to be supplied at *ἡ πρώτη*. If *διαθήκη* meant "testament," then the author would have had to show at ver. 19, seq., *that already in Moses' time also the testator, God, was dead*, or, at least, he must have regarded these burnt-offerings mentioned in ver. 19 as sacrifices which had been slain *in place of God!*

Thirdly, what seemed obscure and paradoxical in vers. 16–17 is now fully explained. "Without shedding of blood there is *no forgiveness.*" The author, therefore, has considered that covenant sacrifice described in Ex. xxiv. 6–8 to have been one of an *expiatory, atoning* kind. Some, indeed, have thought that they knew better, and have raised the objection that that sacrifice consisted of עוֹלוֹת "burnt-offerings," and that burnt-offerings had no atoning significance. But while this may be true of the burnt-offering generally, it is not true specially of the burnt-offering used in ratifying the covenant. This could not but be evident to the native Israelite who was familiar with his Old Testament. It is chiefly apparent from Gen. i. 15, where God for the first time ratifies his covenant with Abraham. Abraham there receives the command to bring sacrifices; he offers the animals in sacrifice, and falls then into a deep sleep, and while he sleeps, birds of prey come down and seek to consume the sacrifice; but now fire falls from heaven and

licks up the sacrifice. Upon this it is shewn to him, that as it happened to the sacrifice, so will it happen to his seed : it too will be afflicted and disquieted for a time, but will then be led into glory by God himself. Thus was that burnt-offering an emblem of *Abraham and his seed with whom* God made the covenant. We have here, therefore, the symbolical meaning of the burnt-offering. As the sacrificer slays the substitutionary victim and commits it wholly to the flames, so ought he to give *himself* to God as one dead to his former life. Thus the עוֹלָה was, in reality, quite as expiatory as the "sin-offering" and "guilt-offering," the only difference being this, that by these latter *only certain particular sins* were atoned for, while in the former the atonement extended to the *sinner's whole person.* How much also the element of atonement belonged to the burnt-offering appears in this, that, according to Lev. xvi. 24, on the great day of atonement a burnt-offering formed the conclusion of the services "to atone for his own sins and the sins of the people." This is perfectly evident in the case of the covenant burnt-offering. The man who will enter into a covenant with God is a sinner, and as such incapable of entering into fellowship with the holy God, nay even of appearing before God's presence (Deut. v. 26). He must die *on account of his guilt*, if a substitutionary sacrifice be not offered for him. But he must also die to his former life, in order to begin a new life in covenant with God. In short, from a simple view of the symbolical import of the covenant-burnt-offering described in vers. 18–22, the following may be stated as the result : "Where a sinful man will enter into covenant with the holy God, the man must first die—must first atone for his guilt by a death (or he must produce a substitutionary burnt-offering"). But this is precisely the idea which the author has expressed in vers. 16, seq., and which there appeared so obscure and paradoxical.

This is altogether different in the case of a *testament.* There, the testator dies and gives place to the heir. Here, it is rather the *heir*, the man that is called to the possession of the heavenly good things who must die, in order to be able, as a pardoned and purified man, to enter into the new life with God. From this it is clear, that the author could have used the comparison of a testament, only if it had been his object to represent the death of Christ on the cross as the "death of God, the testator." But this would, in the first place, have been in itself absurd ; secondly, there is not the slightest trace of any such reference to the death of Christ as the testator ; thirdly, the author could not then have said that, already in the time of Moses, the rule expressed in ver. 16, seq., had found its application.

On all sides, then, the interpretation of the word διαθήκη by *covenant* is confirmed. The only circumstance which in ver. 16

might lead the commentators astray is, that the author there lays down the principle not in the limited (form "where any one will enter into a covenant with God"), but generally ("where a covenant is"), seeing that an atoning death is necessary, not to *every* covenant, but only when a *sinner* will enter into a covenant with *God*. But this limitation, according to which it is only religio-theocratical covenants that are here spoken of, is evident enough from the context ver. 15.*

Ver. 23 now forms the conclusion. That the old covenant could not be ratified without shedding of blood, without substitutionary sacrifices, was shewn in vers. 18–22. That the same law is applicable also to the new covenant, is shewn in ver. 23. "It was necessary, therefore, that the symbols of the heavenly things should be purged by this (by the *goats* and *calves* mentioned in ver. 19), but the heavenly things themselves by better sacrifices than these." Those sacrifices by which the old covenant was ratified, belonged to the category described in ver. 13, of those acts by which the *conscience* was not expiated and purified. The fulfilment, the new covenant, as the heavenly archetype whose symbol was the Mosaic tabernacle (for, here also, as at chap. viii. 5, there is no heavenly σκηνή placed in opposition to the Mosaic σκηνή), required for its form-

* Ebrard's objections to the transition in meaning from "covenant" to "testament" are not without weight, but can scarcely countervail the opposing considerations:—

1. His objection to the rendering "testament," that it is not absolutely true that a testament is *never* valid during the life of the testator, has almost the air of an evasion. It is essential to the idea of a testament that it goes into effect upon the death of the testator; while he lives it is a mere nullity.

2. As the same Greek word (διαθήκη, disposition, arrangement), denotes both "covenant" and "testament," it was not at all unnatural that the one meaning should slide over into the other. The transition was probably occasioned by the incidental use of the term "inheritance" (κληρονομία), ver. 14.

3. This transition was all the easier, as the blessings of the Old Testament dispensation fluctuate between the idea of covenant blessings and an inheritance. Looked upon *formally*, the Old Testament economy was a covenant, a contract between two parties. God condescending to enter into this relation to men. But as it was a contract only in name, while the blessings were in reality all on one side, estowed by God, the infinite possessor, upon men, by the Father upon the children of his adoption, these blessings are under a profounder view, an inheritance, and the terms "heirs, inheritance," prevail throughout the Old Testament, and are transferred to the New.

4. The argument is not invalidated by this change, as death may be predicated as a like necessity in the case both of the covenant and the testament. In the old covenant there was needed the death of animals that mediated the covenant, that stood as substitutes for man, and types of the great atoning sacrifice of the new covenant. In the case of a testament the argument comes nearly to the same result, God, the original διαθέμενος, disposer, testator, has put all things into the hands of Christ (Luke xxii. 29), who yet cannot bestow them without previously undergoing death. Of course the peculiar ground of the necessity of Christ's death, as distinguished from that of the death of ordinary testators, need not here be dwelt upon. The argument is stated in general terms, but derives its proper force and colouring from the peculiar character and relations of the parties to whom it refers.—[K.

ation and consecration *also a death*, but a *death of a different kind. A death;* for here as in the old covenant man comes before God as sinful, laden with guilt, and can, in that state, enter into no covenant with God ; here, as in that covenant, the past guilt must be expiated by an actual death, and the sinful life must be judicially destroyed ere a new life with God can be begun, a life in which God can manifest his love positively to men, *i. e.*, as grace ; here, as in that covenant, if the man does not undergo that death himself, he needs a substitutionary sacrifice. But here he needs *another sacrifice* than in that covenant, namely, that of Christ, who, as was already shewn at ver. 14—and did not need to be repeated at ver. 23—has offered himself a sacrifice, not *through the flesh*, but through the *spirit*, and through the *eternal spirit.*

At *αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπουράνια κρείττοσι θυσίαις*, the verb *καθαρίζεσθαι* is of course grammatically to be supplied ; but logically this will not be suitable, because the heavenly archetype, in virtue of its being not relative, outward, imperfect, but perfect—needs no purification. With reason, therefore, have Luther, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Clericus, Bleek, and others, supposed that *καθαρίζεσθαι* is used as a kind of logical *zeugma*, and that merely the idea of *ἐγκαινίζεσθαι* is to be taken from *καθαρίζεσθαι*, and supplied at the second member. For, in the new covenant, the act of redemption does not need a purification, but only the men who are to be redeemed.

Thus that second idea contained in ver. 15 : *that the new covenant could be made only by an atoning death* has, in vers. 16–23, been fully proved. Vers. 16, 17 : He who will enter into a covenant with God must first atone for his sins by a death (by his own or that of a substitutionary sacrifice). Vers. 18–22 : Hence it was necessary that the covenant of Moses should be consecrated by atoning sacrifices. Ver. 23 : In like manner, also, the new covenant,—only, that here a better sacrifice was necessary (the death of Christ *διὰ πνεύματος*).

Ver. 24 forms *the transition to the next train of thought.* First of all ver. 24 is connected with ver. 23 by *γάρ* as explanatory of the antithesis between the *symbols* and the *heavenly things themselves.* Christ has not entered into an earthly tabernacle, but into heaven (comp. on this what has been said at chap. i. 3); from this it is evident, that it was not a symbolical purging of outward figures that he had to do with, but the initiation and confirmation of a new relation between God and man. With this idea, however, the author connects a new theme by one of those easy turns which are peculiar to the Epistle to the Hebrews (comp. i. 4, ii. 5, iii. 2, etc).

In vers. 25–28 is shewn how, from the fact that Christ offered *his own blood*, it follows that the sacrifice of Christ was made *only once*, and with this, that other sacrifices besides that of Christ are

superfluous. *In this the author draws a third inference from the old principal theme at ver.* 12. He had laid down at ver. 12, as principal theme of the section, the proposition *that Christ offered his own blood.* In ver. 13, 14, he had drawn *a first inference* from this, namely, the internal and spiritual nature of Christ's sacrifice. In ver. 15–23 is a *second inference:* that through Christ's self-sacrifice, that long promised new covenant mentioned in chap. viii. 8, seq. had been founded. In ver. 25 he now brings in a *third inference,* that of the *once offering of Christ's sacrifice,* which likewise follows from the proposition, that Christ entered into the presence of the Father, not with the blood *of another,* but with *his own* blood.

"He entered, not that he might offer *frequently* as the high priest who entered yearly into the holy of holies with the *blood of another.*" The main emphasis lies evidently on the words ἐν αἵματι ἀλλοτρίῳ: hence they are placed after (just as, at chap. vii. 4, ὁ πατριάρχης is placed at the end of the sentence). The reason why the high priest had to offer frequently was, that he offered another's blood. Thus the idea is easily extended: the reason why Christ did *not* offer *frequently* was, that he did *not* offer *another's blood.*

And it is this that is now proved in ver. 26. This verse is not intended to prove, that Christ has offered himself only once (for then it would be mere reasoning in a circle thus: Christ has offered himself only once. For otherwise he must have offered himself repeatedly. But he has not offered himself repeatedly, ergo, etc.). In ver. 26 it is rather intended to be proved that Christ *needed* not to offer himself repeatedly, *because* he has offered *himself.* How, from his having offered *his own* blood, the *once offering* of his sacrifice follows—it is this which is to be proved in ver. 26. The words ἐπεὶ —κόσμου are not a parenthesis (Mill, De Wette, etc.), but belong to the substance of the reasoning; "for, otherwise (if he had not offered *his own* blood), he must often have suffered from the foundation of the world onwards." We should rather have expected: "then he must often have offered sacrifice." That the sacrificial act is here denoted by suffering is logically inaccurate, as, on the supposition that Christ had *not* offered his own blood but *another's,* his sacrifice would not then have consisted of *suffering.* The author has therefore put παθεῖν here, unconsciously, because he was *in the habit* of using παθεῖν and προσφέρειν promiscuously of Christ. The reason why Christ, if he had offered another's blood, must have done this repeatedly—as the Levitical high priest: from of old ever and ever again—lies in what is said at ver. 13.—"But now he has appeared once in the end of the time (*i. e.,* in the time of the fulfilment, the Messianic time, in opposition to the time of expectation and prophecy, comp. i. 2 and 1 Pet. i. 20), to take away sin by his own sacrifice." As the sacrifice of Christ was not a *typical* sacrifice, but

the *fulfilment itself* (for the time of the Messiah *was to be* the συντέλεια τῆς αἰῶνος, the final fulfilment), it needs not to be repeated.

In ver. 26, then, from the fact that Christ has offered his own blood, it is inferred, that he *needed* not to repeat this sacrifice: in ver. 27, 28, it is inferred from the same thing, that he *could* not repeat it. A man can offer the blood of another repeatedly, *his own blood he can offer*—in other words, *die—only once.* This is the main point in ver. 27, 28. "As it is appointed to every man once to die, so was Christ also once offered for our sins." With this principal idea, however, is entwined a subordinate idea which has no close connexion with the argument, but is added only parenthetically, namely, that, after death, the *judicari* awaits the rest of men, but the *judicare* awaits Christ.—The expression *without sin* is explained by the antithesis, *to bear the sins of many.* Irving, therefore, had no reason to infer from the *without sin* that Christ, at his first coming in humiliation, was not without sin but partook of the sinful ἐπιθυμία. It is rather only the first coming *to bear the sins of others, i. e.* the guilt of sin, that is here opposed to the second appearing *without sin.* When he comes again *he has no more to do with sin;* he comes then not as the bearer of others' guilt, but as the holy judge of others' guilt, as a consuming fire, which stands in a hostile and negative relation to all that is called sin.

In CHAP. X. 1–4 the author recurs to what is said in chap. ix. 13, 14, in order to deduce from it also, that the sacrifice of Christ was offered *only once.* Thus vers. 1–3 contains an explanation of ver. 26 of the foregoing chapter.—The subject of ver. 1 is ὁ νόμος; this subject has however the appositional clause σκιὰν ἔχων τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων. Εἰκών does not signify precisely "substance" (Luther, Peshito) much less does it denote the "mere image" in opposition to the "thing" (Œcumenius, Gregory of Nazianzum, Calvin, Tholuck), as if it were meant to be said that the law is the shadow of the gospel, the gospel itself again, however, only an image of the *good things to come;* εἰκών denotes here simply the *form* in opposition to the mere *shadow.* The genitive τῶν πραγμάτων is genitive of the substance. The form of the things themselves=the form, namely, the things themselves. The whole of this apposition is designed to shew, how far it was possible and allowable to speak unfavourably of the Old Testament, and that this was done not from contempt of the Old Testament, but because, according to its divine destination, it was to be, and must be, imperfect. Comp. the remarks on chap. iv. 2, and especially the passages chap. vii. 18; viii. 7, seq.

What now is affirmed of this νόμος? It was not able, year by year, with the same sacrifices which were continually offered, to make the comers thereunto perfect. Κατ' ἐνιαυτόν belongs of course to the verb. Year by year (the author here in the word θυσίαις has evi-

dently in his mind, chiefly the yearly sacrifice of atonement) the *law* remained incapable of making the comers thereunto perfect by its sacrifices, how uninterruptedly soever these also were offered. (Lachmann and Paulus join *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές* with *τελειῶσαι*; but then the remaining part of the relative clause becomes meaningless. Besides, the author says in ver. 3 also, not merely that those sacrifices were not able *permanently* to make perfect, but that they effected *no* atonement *whatever*, that they rather only pointed to the need of such an atonement). Instead of *δύναται* A, C, many versions and the Peshito (here, however, giving generally a free translation) read *δύνανται*. Then *σκιὰν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος* must either be an independent clause with the partic. pro verbo finito, (which, however, is altogether foreign to the style of our author), or we must suppose an anacolouthon; the author began the sentence with *ὁ νόμος* and intended originally to write *δύναται*; in writing, however, he inverted the idea, and made the subject of the relative clause also the subject of the principal clause. But it is far more probable that some transcriber is to be charged with this carelessness, than our author who usually writes so correctly.

In Ver. 2 the reading wavers between *ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄν* and *ἐπεὶ ἄν*; *οὐκ* is, however, already externally better attested (by A, C, D, E, Copt., Arab., Ital. Also a reading *ἐπεὶ κἄν* is explicable only from the matrix ΕΠΕΙΟΥΚΑΝ.) It is, besides, easy to see how transcribers might come to omit the *οὐκ*. The whole sentence (with *οὐκ*) has meaning only when taken as a *question* ("would they not then have ceased to be offered? as the worshippers once purged would have had no more consciousness of sin.") But if a transcriber overlooked this, and read the sentence as a thetical proposition, he must then, certainly, have held it necessary to cancel the *οὐκ*.—The idea is easily understood. The Old Testament sacrifices did *not* take away the *consciousness of sin*, but only *brought to remembrance* (ver. 3) year by year the *presence* of sin and guilt, and, therewith, the (continual, still unsatisfied) need of a real propitiation.

That the Old Testament sacrifices could not really atone for sin is, in ver. 2, inferred from the fact of their repetition; it would have been a meaningless ordinance if God had enjoined the repetition of a sacrifice which had already, the first time it was offered, really taken away the guilt of sin from man or from Israel. In ver. 4 the same thing, namely, the inefficacy of the Old Testament sacrifices to make real atonement is inferred from the very nature of these sacrifices. The blood of irrational animals cannot possibly take away moral guilt. (Comp. chap. ix. 14). There is wanting in these the two things which are necessary to a true substitution. A sacrifice which shall truly take upon itself the punishment of another's guilt must, first, be able to bear the *same* sufferings as ought to have been borne by the guilty person, therefore, not a *merely*

bodily pain or death, but an inward suffering of the man endowed with a rational soul. A true sacrifice must, secondly, after having as a substitute endured the suffering, be able to remove again the element of substitution, *i. e.*, to place itself in a relation of internal oneness with the party represented ; it is thus that the merit of Christ's suffering is appropriated by us, inasmuch as, although we stood *beside* him as other and different persons when he suffered (so that he did all that was necessary for us *without* our assistance and co-operation), we now no longer *continue* to stand *beside* him, but, by his spirit on his part, and by faith on ours, become *members* of him, to whom all now really belongs that belongs to him. For we become righteous, not as *individuals*, the descendants of the first Adam, but as those who by faith have given up themselves, who have given themselves to the death, and are now willing to have any merit before God only in so far as they *belong to Christ* and he belongs to them. Both these conditions were impossible in the animal sacrifices.

Vers. 5–10. The writer in these verses shews, that *already also in the Old Testament itself*, there are intimations of the necessity of another, a better sacrifice than that of animals. In the citation from Ps. xl. 7–9 the author follows the Sept. As the Sept., however, deviates from the original, the question arises whether it has at least rendered substantially the sense of the passage.—After enumerating the wonderful and gracious acts of God, the Psalmist says: "Sacrifice and offering thou hast not desired ; אָזְנַיִם כָּרִיתָ לִי; burnt-offering and sin-offerings thou hast not required." He evidently in these words אזנים intends to place in opposition to the external sacrifices one of an internal and better kind, and some sacrifice or other of this kind must at least implicitly be designated by those words, "mine ears hast thou digged out." The older commentators, as also Olshausen, referred this digging of the ears in general to that *boring through the lap of the ear* of which we read in Ex. xxi. 6. When, namely, a servant had it in his power to become free, but preferred of his own accord to continue for the rest of his life in the service of the master with whom he had hitherto been, he was, in token of this, to let (רצע) his ear (the lap of the ear) be bored through by his master. The majority of the more recent commentators (Hengstenberg, Stier, Hitzig, Tholuck, Bleek), on the other hand, take כרה in the sense of גלה. To say that God has "digged out the ears" of a man, is equivalent to saying that he has *given* him ears, *made* ears for him." The creation or formation of an ear in the head is figuratively denoted as the digging out of an ear. And, indeed, the verb, כרה (used generally of the digging of a well, a pit, and the like) would suit this representation. The meaning then would be : "Thou willest not sacrifice, but thou hast given me an ear, a capacity to hear thy commands, and thus hast

pointed out what sacrifices are acceptable to thee." Meanwhile, I am doubtful after all whether the author has not had in his mind that command in Ex. xxi. 6 ; the boring through the lap of the ear might poetically be denoted as *a digging* through it, and then the sentiment : "I have let my ear be bored through by thee, *i. e.* I have freely given myself to be thy servant for the whole of my life," forms, certainly, a finer and fuller antithesis to the words : "burnt-offering, etc., thou willest not," than that somewhat vague idea : "thou hast made ears for me." But, be this as it may, one thing evidently lies in the words—the Psalmist places *obedience*, as the true sacrifice, in opposition to the animal sacrifices.

The reading in the Sept., according to Bleek's opinion, was originally *ὦτα* or *ὦτια* ; *σῶμα* is said to have first slipped in as a different reading, because the expression *ὦτα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι* was not understood. But the oldest authorities for the reading *ὦτα* reach only to the time of Irenæus, while Bleek himself must acknowledge that our author read *σῶμα* in his copy of the Sept. Indeed, it is much easier to understand how, if the free translation *σῶμα* were the original one, the reading *ὦτα* might arise at a later period, in the time of Origen, from aiming at conformity with the Hebrew text, than that, vice versa, from an original reading *ὦτα* the reading *σῶμα* should have arisen. We consider, therefore, the reading *σῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι* as the genuine reading of the Sept. The Septuagint translator might easily take the expression as it stood to be unintelligible, and substitute for it the more general idea: "thou hast prepared my body (myself) for sacrifice." The meaning remains substantially the same: "Thou wilt not have animals for sacrifices, but myself." But Bleek is certainly in error when he thinks, that our author cites the entire passage on account of this word *σῶμα* (in the opinion that this points prophetically to the bodily death of Christ). We have seen at chap. ix. 14 that our author does *not* lay the principal emphasis on the bodily side of the sufferings of Christ; his aim is rather precisely to shew, that with the blood, as blood, nothing has as yet been accomplished. And indeed at ver. 9, where he makes use of and applies the citation Ps. xl. 7–9, he entirely drops the words *σῶμα*, etc., and lays all the emphasis on the words *ἥκω τοῦ ποιῆσαι τὸ θέλημά σου.*

The eighth verse of the psalm begins with the emphatic words אָז אָמַרְתִּי "then I spake." What follows are the words which the Psalmist spake. "Lo, I am come" (הִנֵּה בָאתִי, not "Lo, I come," הִנְנִי בָא); in the roll of the book it is written of me; to do thy will, my God, is my delight !" That the author omits the verb *ἐβουλήθην*, so that now *τοῦ ποιῆσαι* is dependent on *ἥκω* and the words *ἐν κεφαλίδι*, etc., become parenthetical, is, as respects the sense, quite an inconsiderable deviation. More important is the question, how the words

ἐν κεφαλίδι are to be explained. Hitzig, Ewald, Bleek, and others, render in the Hebrew the preposition ב *with*, the preposition ל *for* ("I come with the roll of the book which was written for me"). This idea would not only be unpoetical but ridiculous. The Sept. has certainly given a more correct rendering: "I come; in the roll of the book it is written of me;" although, instead of ἥκω it would be more correct to say ἐλήλυθα "I am come." The simplest explanation certainly is this, that the psalm, as the superscription says, is one of David's; only, that it was written not *after* the prophecy of Nathan pointing to the future, 2 Sam. vii., but *before* it, nay before David's ascent to the throne, but after his anointing by Samuel—during his persecution by Saul (with Ps. xl. 2–4 comp. ver. 14–18) David could and must at that time have combined the old patriarchial blessing that the Prince over Israel should come out of Judah with the fact, that God had rejected Saul and chosen him; in him was the old prophecy fulfilled. "Lo, I am come," he says, "in the book (Pentateuch) it is written of me" = in me is that prophecy fulfilled. And now he declares that, as opposed to *Saul*, it is *his* delight to do the will of the Lord. In this way of obedience towards God he hopes to fulfil that prophecy.

But David as an individual did not carry out the full import of this his promise; he did not wholly and purely offer his person as a sacrifice to God in unbroken obedience, but sinned grievously and in many ways. Hence the patriarchial blessing found in him only a preliminary, not a final fulfilment, as, indeed, this was afterwards (2 Sam. vii.) revealed to David himself, and was acknowledged by himself (Ps. ii. and cx.). That, however, which David did typically and imperfectly, the second David was to do perfectly. But that passage in the Psalms remained true, although it did not come to be absolute truth in the individual David. This individual spake, however, even there not from himself, not from his own sinful humanity or from chance, but from his office, and from the idea of the theocratical King, and therefore under the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Hence it is not the individual David that is the true author of those words of the psalm, but the true heavenly Anointed made use of David as an organ, in order to express a truth which applies in its fulness not to the first, but only to the second David. Hence our author has sufficient reason for saying: the Son of God, when he entered into the world to become man, spake these words. That Jesus was not the author of the 40th Psalm, the author knew as well as we. As little does he indicate that he regarded the psalm as a direct prophecy of David concerning Christ (Ps. ii. and cx. were such direct prophecies); but his meaning evidently is, that in David the Son of God spake by his Spirit. The psalm was not a direct word-prophecy pointing to Christ, but the Psalmist David was a fact-prophecy pointing to the second David, and what David prom-

ised in order to fulfil it imperfectly, that has Christ promised by David in order to keep it perfectly.

If now, according to Ps. xl., it belongs to the theocratical Anointed that he regards not animal sacrifices, but the sacrifice of obedience, as suitable to him, this expresses just what our author had laid down in ver. 1–4.

Ver. 8, 9. The author here simply shews, that obedience was put *in the place* of the animal sacrifices, and thereby, also, declared to be *a sacrifice*, and, indeed, the true sacrifice.

At *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, ver. 6 and 8, *θυσίαι* is to be supplied. There was no Greek noun for "sin-offering;" the idea must be rendered by the circumlocution : (*θυσία*) *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*.

Ver. 10.—By the *θέλημα* here, as at ver. 9, we may understand either the *special* will of the Father, that Christ should suffer and make atonement for the world, or the *general* will of God, as, for example, it is expressed in the decalogue. Either : Christ came to fulfil that special decree of redemption, and in this will (*i. e.* by the fulfilment of it on the part of Christ) we are sanctified. Or : Christ came in general to live conformably to the will and law of God, *i. e.* to live a holy life, and through this will of God (fulfilled by Christ, *i. e.* : by the fulfilment of this will on the part of Christ) we are sanctified. But as ver. 9 belongs to the citation from the psalm, in which there was no mention of the special decree respecting the *suffering* of the Messiah, the second explanation is preferable. (That the fulfilment of the general will of God already involved the accomplishment of the special degree is, of course, self-evident. If Jesus was obedient to the Father *in general*, he was so also in that special point.)

Ἡγιασμένοι here in the widest sense "to make *ἅγιοι*," to take them from the profane world sunk in death, and to place them in the kingdom of God. Thus *ἁγιάζειν* here involves both justification and sanctification ; that the former is not excluded appears already from the additional clause *διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς*, etc.

Ver. 11–18.—The author here again sums up with all precision the proper quod erat demonstrandum (ver. 12, 13), and, inasmuch as he represents the one sacrifice as, at the same time, the fulfilment of the promise of a new covenant (Jer. xxxi. 32, seq.) cited in chap. viii. 8, seq., he derives from this still another and concluding proof of the *once offering* of this sacrifice, and therewith of the *superfluousness and dispensableness of the Levitical ritual* beside this one sacrifice.

Ver. 11.—The *καί* is not to be rendered "namely" (Tholuck), a signification which it never can have, and, moreover, cannot have here, as ver. 11 stands related to the foregoing not as an argument but as an inference. It means "and," "and so."—Instead of *ἱερεύς* A. C., Peshito, and several Fathers read *ἀρχιερεύς* (so also Grotius, Limborch, Lachmann, Bleek). But it is not likely that a transcriber

would have changed an original *ἀρχιερεύς* by way of correction into *ἱερεύς* on the ground that the high priest performed no daily service; in chap. vii. 27 mention is even made of the daily sacrifice of the high priest, and yet no transcriber has thought of substituting *ἱερεύς* for *ἀρχιερεύς* there by way of correction. It is much more probable, that in order to bring our passage into conformity with that, an original *ἱερεύς* was changed into *ἀρχιερεύς*. (Especially might a *translator*, as that of the Peshito, be easily led to do so). Internal grounds are also in favor of the reading *ἱερεύς*. Bleek, indeed, thinks "the treatise of the writer is entirely occupied with the comparison between the high priest of the new covenant and that of the old;" we have seen, however, that only the third part chap. v. 7 is taken up with this. There, at chap. vii. 27, it was quite in order to speak specially of the high priest as the highest representative of the Levitical priesthood, in opposition to the Messiah, the high priest after the order of Melchisedec. Now, however, when the author has already spoken in particular of the ritual of the old covenant and of all its parts—the ministration of the priests, ix. 6, and high priests, ix. 6—the sacrifice of atonement, ix. 7, and the oblations of the holy place, ix. 6—the covenant-burnt-offering, ix. 19, seq., and the various meat and sin-offerings, x. 6 and 8—it was more suitable to speak of the Levitical "priest" quite generally. Especially is the attribute *πᾶς* agreeable to the reading *ἱερεύς*. The author places the single offering of the individual Christ in opposition to all priests with all their different sacrifices.

Ver. 11. Here the idea is recapitulated which was developed in chap. ix. 13, 14 and 25; chap. x. 1–4; in ver. 12 the principal idea of chap. ix. 25–28 is recapitulated in the words *μίαν ὑπέρ*, etc., and the idea of chap. ix. 24 (compare i. 3) in the words *he set down forever*, etc. On *δεξιὰ θεοῦ* compare what is said on chap. i. 3. By the mention of the second coming of Christ in judgment, ver. 13 (recapitulation of chap. ix. 28), the author prepares the way for the sentiments of a hortatory kind from ver. 19, seq., to the effect that now the choice lies before them between salvation and destruction. (On ver. 13, comp. Ps. ii. and chap. ii. 8, seq.)—In ver. 13 the *inferences* are recapitulated, in ver. 14 the *reason*; in ver. 14, namely, he expresses once more the *central idea* of this whole part. Ἁγιαζόμενος is used in the same wide sense as *ἡγιασμένος*, ver. 10.

Ver. 15–18. In these verses he infers yet again, and finally, the *once offering of the sacrifice of Christ*—laid down in ver. 14, and already proved in chap. ix. 10—from the passage Jer. xxxi., and thereby brings together the ideas of the three portions, chap. viii. 8–13; chap. ix. 15–23; chap. ix. 25–28. God has promised *a new covenant*, in which he will write the law on men's hearts by the forgiveness of sins (chap. viii. 8, seq.); this new covenant is rati-

fied, this forgiveness wrought out, by the sacrifice of Christ (chap. ix. 15, seq.) ; but where this forgiveness is, there there is no need of a repeated sacrifice (chap. ix. 25, seq). The first of these ideas is repeated in vers. 15–17, and, with it mention is made of the second ; the third is stated in ver. 18. Thus does the conclusion of this fourth principal part unite itself again with the beginning of chap. viii.

Thus has the writer reached the *innermost kernel of the Christian doctrine.* Immediately from the *consciousness of the forgiveness of sin on account of Christ's sacrifice*—the point in which the subjective consciousness harmonizes with the objective fact of the restored relation to God—he infers in ver. 18 the superfluousness of those symbolical sacrifices which had only a subjective value, and could awaken only the subjective knowledge of the *need* of an atonement (comp. ver. 3). (This is entirely the fundamental idea of the Pauline system). Let us now look back from this the highest point in the argumentation, to the way by which we have been conducted to it. In all the principal parts and particular sections, the author begins with the most outward and apparently accidental points of comparison and differences which offer themselves to view between the Messiah and the angels, the Messiah and Moses, the Messiah and the high priest (for example, that God calls none of the angels his son ; that Moses was a servant, the Messiah the son of the house ; that Melchisedec's descent is left unknown, etc.) But he everywhere shows how, in these apparently accidental things, essential relations lying deep beneath them are expressed ; he follows out these relations, and reaches more universal points of comparison ; it is as if one were to follow brooks which lead him to rivers, and in the end to a wide stream. The Messiah must be *the perfect messenger of God to men*, because in him the holiness of God and not merely his omnipotence are manifest, because in him the Godhead is to *become* man, and humanity is to be raised to union with God. The Messiah must be *the perfect representative of men before God*, because he is to be the Son of God himself, not merely a servant, and is truly to conduct man to his true rest. The Messiah must be *a high priest, and indeed the promised, true eternal high priest after the order of Melchisedec*, who represents man eternally and without change before God. This discloses itself *in the manner of his priestly ministration ;* the sacrifice which he offered is a spiritual, moral, and therefore more than a symbolical sacrifice ; it is the fulfilment of the typical things of which the tabernacle consisted, and of the typical actions of which the service of the tabernacle consisted. Thus the author comes to the *doctrine of the atonement*, and, with this, to that of the appropriation of the atonement which he handles in the concluding part.

PART FIFTH.

THE LAYING HOLD ON THE NEW TESTAMENT SALVATION.

(chap. x. 19—xiii. 25.)

THAT portion of the epistle which consists of speculative reasoning has now reached its conclusion. What the author has now further to say, is intended not so much to be comprehended, as rather to be apprehended. The innermost experience of the innermost life is the *cognoscens*. To lay hold on the salvation is not an act of the head and the understanding, but the *most intensive act of the life*,—that act in which the man has the courage to declare himself bankrupt. Hence the author, from this place onwards, no longer reasons, but addresses himself to the heart and the will of his readers.

Seven lines of thought or sections can without difficulty be distinguished in this part.

1. In chap. ix. 15–25, the author lays down the proper theme of the admonition, that *to which* he admonishes.

2. In chap. ix. 26–31, he enforces this admonition by a *first* motive, namely, by calling to mind the *greatness of the danger of falling away*, and the *fearful consequences of this.*

3. In chap. x. 32, xi. 1, he adduces a *second motive*, inasmuch as he reminds the readers of *their former faith.*

4. In chap. xi. 2, xii. 3, a *third motive*, inasmuch as the author shows how all the illustrious and celebrated achievements, even under the *old covenant*, proceeded solely from this principle of *faith.*

5. In chap. xii. 4–17—a *fourth motive*, inasmuch as the writer shows that every thing which now terrifies his readers, *the suffering that threatens them*, brings only *blessing.*

6. In chap. xii. 18–29 a *fifth motive.* The choice between Christianity and Judaism is simply identical with that *between salvation and condemnation.*

7. Chap. xiii. forms the conclusion, containing special exhortations and references of a personal kind.

SECTION FIRST.

THEME OF THE EXHORTATION.

(x. 19–25.)

Vers. 19–25.—In a long and finely constructed period, the author developes the particular points in the practical application of what has been now theoretically proved. The particle *οὖν* is used in the conclusive sense. The admonition, vers. 19–25, flows as an inference from the result of the whole previous reasoning, recapitulated and concentrated in vers. 11–18. The words *ἔχοντες . . . πονηρᾶς* form the *first member of the exhortation.* The apposition *ἔχοντες παῤῥησίαν*, etc., belonging to the latent subject, forms, logically considered, a kind of protasis to the verb *προσερχώμεθα* (as we have boldness, etc., so let us, etc.). Let us look first of all at this protasis.

Two objects depend on *ἔχοντες*. First, we have joyful confidence for the access into the holiest of all in the blood of Jesus. The words *ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ* may, grammatically, be referred to the verbal idea lying in the noun *εἴσοδος* (Storr, Klee, Paulus, Olshausen, Bleek), according to the analogy of the passage ix. 25. Others (many of the older expositors) make *ἐν τῷ αἵματι*, etc. dependent on *ἔχοντες*; in which case, however, the determining idea expressed in *ἐν τῷ αἵματι* can, according to the sense and the position of the words, belong only to the first member: *ἔχοντες παῤῥησίαν*, and not also to the second: *καὶ (ἔχοντες) ἱερέα.* The meaning in both constructions remains substantially the same. Still the latter construction, as will immediately appear, yields a finer sense. Ἐν is not to be explained as a Hebraism, and taken in an instrumental sense, but in its own proper signification "in." The style of conception and expression, as a whole, is figurative, borrowed from the Old Testament ritual of the atonement festival. In that festival the high priest must have died, if he had entered into the presence of God in the holiest of all without the sacrifice of blood; only when sprinkled with the blood, and thus as it were covered with it, could he dare to enter in, and even then only with fear and trembling, and no one dared follow him. We, on the contrary, because covered with the *blood of Christ* (*ἐν αἵματι* therefore at *ἔχοντες*) have *all of us* full joyful confidence to enter into the, not figurative but, real holiest of all, *i. e.*, to the opened paternal heart of God, after our high priest who has gone before us on this way, a way which is everlastingly fresh and living. Ἐγκαινίζειν, as at ix. 18 in the signification "to consecrate," "to bring into use for the first time." This *entrance which he has consecrated for us* is called a *ὁδὸς πρόσφατος.* This word is formed from the rad. inus. Φ A Ω, and signifies literally "fresh

slaughtered," then "new," "fresh." (So also Olshausen). The signification "bloody" (Tholuck) belongs to it here just as little as elsewhere; nor would this signification be even suitable here, as then there would be no difference in this respect between the new covenant and the old, seeing that the Levitical high priest also might not enter into the holiest of all "without blood" (chap. ix. 7). Πρόσφατος rather signifies "fresh," which, however, is not the same as *new*, novus, καινός, as if it were intended to designate the way opened up by Christ as a new, a later, in opposition to the Old Testament way; nor is it equivalent to *recens*, in the sense of this way being *now* as yet new, but one which would afterwards become old and obsolete; the idea is precisely the reverse, namely, that while the Old Testament atonement festivals were effectual only for a year, the entrance to God opened up by Christ is still always *new* and *fresh*, notwithstanding the decades that have since elapsed, consequently, that in general, it *remains everlastingly fresh*.—That way, however, is called *living* in opposition to the way by which the Levitical high priest had to pass to the holiest of all, which was an earthly local way, a *place* of dead earth or stones which the feet trod, while the way to God upon which Christ has gone before us, and by which we must follow him, consists for him and for us in a *living act*; (others, as for example Olshausen, explain *living* = *life-giving*, which is contrary to the usage as well as to the context).

Christ has gone this way before us *through the vail*,*—an evident allusion to the fact that, at the death of Christ, the vail was rent in twain, and the holiest of all laid open (Matth. xxvii. 51, comp. also our remarks on πεφανερῶσθαι, chap. ix. 8). Still, it is not to be thought that Christ entered to the Father through that vail of the Old Testament sanctuary which was then rent, for the author adds the explanatory words: *that is to say his flesh*. By this is, of course, not meant that the body of Christ was that which had separated us from God (Schulz and others); but that the *fact* of the violent killing of the body of Christ corresponded to the *symbolical* fact of the rending of the symbolical vail. Throughout, then, we find that what corresponds to the local earthly σκηνή is not a σκηνή in heaven *in like manner local*, but that *acts* and *relations* correspond to the *localities*; the act of the spiritual entrance to the paternal heart of God corresponds to the local entrance into the holiest of all, the internal blotting out of guilt through the atoning death of Christ corresponds to the local rending of the vail.

The second object belonging to ἔχοντες, the second thing which

* This *local* signification of διά c. gen. (comp. Luke iv. 30; Rom. xv. 28) should never have been doubted in our passage. Olshausen takes διά as instrumental, and σάρξ in the sense of "suffering." But, granted that the latter were allowed, still the words διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος remain unexplained.

we possess is "a great priest over the house of God." Ἱερεὺς μέγας frequently occurs in the Sept. as synonymous with ἀρχιερεύς, and hence many (Klee, Tholuck) have here also rendered it by "high priest." But as our author elsewhere uniformly expresses this latter idea by ἀρχιερεύς, he must certainly have had a reason for using another expression here; he must have meant to say here, not that we have an high priest, but that we have "a *great* priest." And, indeed, there is nothing said here of the high priests as opposed to the ordinary priests, but Christ appears as the one, great, exalted priest in whom the entire idea of all priesthood finds its realization, in opposition to the Levitical priests as a whole, the high as well as the ordinary priests.

In ver. 23 the exhortation itself now follows: προσερχώμεθα scil. εἰς τὰ ἅγια. Does the true holiest of all stand open, it is criminal not to make use of this entrance. But how that entrance is to be made, we are told in the words *with true heart*, etc. First and above all, *a true heart* is required. This is the first condition and the ground of all faith, *that the heart be true;* that it be not biassed by self-deception regarding its wretched state by reason of sin, nor by self-deception also regarding all its endeavours, its inclinations, its plans. It is not that painful self-examination in order to search out sins which one has not that is required, as the victims of certain fanatical and morbid tendencies would demand, who make the very greatness of the corruption of which they *speak*, a merit, or a ground of self-elation. No! it is enough if the man truly knows the sins which he has, and thereby comes to the knowledge that he has not merely *sins*, but *sin*, and that he is encompassed with it even in his best works. Where this knowledge takes root, it will dispel the delusive fancy that God needs no atonement, that God is only a dead idol who knows not the anger of holy love. It will dispel, too, all confidence in false self-made atonements, all merit of works, it will destroy all self-deception about an atonement through other sacrifices than the sacrifice of Christ, in like manner, also, the self-deception which leads a man to regard as meritorious, and to rest his hope on, faith itself, or an institution of faith, a church confession, etc. A true heart is such a heart as regards itself, *the person* in its totality, in the mirror, not of a means of grace or an institution of grace, but in the mirror of *the person of Jesus Christ*, and asks itself whether it loves the Saviour above all things.

Secondly, the πληροφορία πίστεως is required, the *full undivided* faith, not a faith such as the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews had, who to the questions: "Is Jesus the Messiah? Is he the Son of God?" etc., replied in the affirmative indeed with head and mouth, but yet were not satisfied with the sacrifice of Christ, and thought it necessary still to lean on the crutches of the Levitical

sacrifices, and on these crutches would limp into heaven. In like manner, we find still a *half* faith, when one belongs to the Church and attends divine service, and on a death-bed desires the word of Christ and the consolations of his grace, but yet only measures off for Christ a certain *portion* of his time and his activity, instead of having Christ at all times before his eyes and in his heart, and letting his whole being and life be penetrated by him. Christianity and the business of the present life are regarded as two things which, in respect of quantity, must be weighed against each other, lest by giving too much to the one (Christianity) the other (the earthly condition, honour, pleasure, etc.) should suffer and be prejudiced; instead of its being remembered, that what we are and do as men on the earth, we should be and do as *Christians*. But wherever there is such incompleteness of faith, such shrinking from a complete and entire devotedness to Christ, such earthly feeling and reliance upon something else, as if happiness were to come from this quarter or from that, only from some other source than from Christ, there also, the danger is great of becoming the prey of error, unbelief, and apostacy.

Thirdly, the *fruit* and *effect* of faith is required, viz. *the consciousness of sin being pardoned:* Ἐῤῥαντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς. The expression, again, is figurative, and finds its explanation partly, in chap. ix. 19 (in which is the figure of the ῥαντίζειν), partly in chap. ix. 13, x. 2 (where we find the opposition between the symbolical cleansing of the body and the real cleansing of the συνείδησις or καρδία). Ἀπό depends on the idea of "cleansing" which is implied in the (pregnant) ῥαντίζειν. Συνείδησις πονηρά is the opposite of συνείδησις ἀγαθή, Acts xxiii. 1; 1 Pet. iii. 16 and 21; 1 Tim. i. 5 and 19. Taken exactly, however, it does not signify "evil (rebuking) conscience," but "evil consciousness," where, indeed, πονηρά is to be resolved into a genitive of the object ("consciousness of evil," consciousness of being evil).

The words καὶ λελουμένοι . . . . κατέχωμεν, etc., form a *second member of the exhortation.* Καὶ λελουμένοι cannot, of course, be any longer dependent on προσερχώμεθα, as otherwise, an intolerable *asyndeton* at κατέχωμεν would be the result. This participle, then, rather corresponds, in the place which it occupies, to the ἔχοντες, ver. 1. ("Seeing that we have an entrance . . . . and a priest . . . . let us enter with true heart, in full faith, cleansed from the evil conscience. And if we are now washed . . . . let us hold fast," etc.) If λελουμένοι were grammatically connected with ἐῤῥαντισμένοι (as Olshausen and others suppose), and connected, moreover, by a τοῦτ' ἐστι, then might we be justified in taking λελουμένοι τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι καθαρῷ as the explanation of the figure ἐῤῥαντισμένοι, and in understanding it in the proper sense of a *washing of the body with water,*

i. e. of *baptism.* ("And, as we are baptized, let us," etc.) So Bleek and others. But as λελουμένοι is quite parallel with the figurative expression ἔχοντες παῤῥησίαν εἰς τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν ἁγίων, and ἐῤῥαντισμένοι also was to be taken figuratively, it is better (with Calvin, Beza, Ernesti, Limborch, etc.) to understand this λελουμένοι also figuratively (with reference to Ezek. xxxvi. 25), so that the meaning is: "And if we are now thus washed from our sins." Thus it contains that which connects it with the concluding word of the first member.

The exhortation itself is: κατέχωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν τῆς ἐλπίδος ἀκλινῆ, let us hold fast the profession of the hope unmoved. The profession, that in Christ, and in him alone, is forgiveness of sins to be obtained, which the readers were steadfastly to maintain before the Jews, is here called a profession of the *hope*, a designation which finds its full explanation in chap. iv. 1. It is the profession that the Christian also, nay the Christian alone, has the hope of the promised *rest;* that he, although cast out from the theocracy and the temple, persecuted, destitute of all earthly good, of all carnal hope of a Messiah, yet has the assured hope of inheriting the kingdom. To such a profession of hope belongs now, as it did then, the faith which regards an unseen and as yet unfulfilled word of God as a much surer and more certain possession (why? the parenthesis πιστός, etc., shews) than all the visible and attainable glory of the present world. But in our own day, that *profession of the hope* has again become one of the highest and most important duties, inasmuch as now οἱ κύνες (Rev. xxii. 15), both among Jews and Gentiles, as then among Jews (Phil. iii. 2) are crying out, that "man by being amused with fair promises for another world, is losing his happiness in this."

The author, in the first member of the exhortation, has said how the Christian is to conduct himself towards God, in the second, towards the world without, and now in the *third member of the exhortation*, ver. 24, 25, he says how he is to conduct himself towards the brethren, the Church. There is a false *considering of one another* which proceeds from selfishness and pride, and is forbidden by the apostle Paul, Gal. vi. 4. But there is also a true considering of one another, which, as it proceeds from love, has the tendency only to call forth "emulation in love and in good works," and this is recommended in the verse before us.—To this general duty, however, the special one is added, not to neglect attendance on the Christian assemblies, as many of the readers had already done through the fear of man. Ἐπισυναγωγή, formed from ἐπισυνάγειν to assemble, is distinguished from συναγωγή, inasmuch as, according to the *usus linguæ*, it was not a designation for the Jewish religious assemblies which are still called "synagogues," but had always preserved the

more general signification "assembly" (2 Macc. ii. 7; 2 Thess. ii. 1), so that it might therefore be applied to the designation of the Christian assemblies. Calvin, Hunnius, J. Capellus, Kuinoel, and others, falsely explain it of the "society of Christians," so that *ἐγκαταλείπειν τὴν ἐπισυναγωγήν* would be equivalent to "fall away from Christianity," "to become Jews." The great majority of commentators understand it rightly in a more special sense, namely, of becoming careless and shy in their attendance on the Christian congregational assemblies. To this remaining away from the assemblies is now opposed the *παρακαλεῖν*. At *παρακαλοῦντες* it is simplest to supply *ἑαυτούς*, and the object of the *παρακαλεῖν* may be supposed to be chiefly the attendance on the assemblies. ("But incite one another to attendance on these assemblies.")—As a special motive to this, the *visible* approach of the day is adduced. Ἡμέρα does not denote the final judgment, but the well-known *Old Testament* idea of the day of the Lord (יום יהוה). The prophets (from Joel onwards) had predicted, that the Lord would, at one time, come to judge Israel and all the nations of the earth. Jesus had explained to his disciples that this *day of the Lord* had divided itself into *two epochs* or acts, into a judgment upon Jerusalem, which was to be destroyed and to continue trodden down, and a judgment on the Gentiles, when their season of grace was past (Luke xxi. and Matth. xxiv.; Matthew, however, in his account of this address has regard principally to the points that relate to *Israel*, comp. my critique of the evangelical history, p. 502–513). Here the author speaks to Israelites, and therefore of the *day of the Lord* in so far as it concerned the people Israel. That the predicted judgment upon Israel was approaching with rapid strides, every one must in the beginning of the 60th year have "seen" (*βλέπειν*), who was not as an obdurate Jew already stupefied by the intoxicating cup which preceded the judgment. A people torn asunder by raging factions would resist the Roman power which extended over the world!

SECTION SECOND.

FIRST MOTIVE. DANGER AND CONSEQUENCES OF FALLING AWAY.

(Chap. x. 26–31.)

Vers. 26, 27. The expression *sin voluntarily* does not, according to the *context*, denote every kind of particular known sinful acts which a Christian commits even after regeneration (the 27th verse speaks definitely of *adversaries*, and in the passage from Deut. xvii. 6,

cited in ver. 28, it is blasphemers of the law that are spoken of!), but neither, as regards the *meaning of the word*, does it denote the special sin of apostasy itself. The former explanation is too general, the latter too narrow. The author has rather in his mind, as regards the general character of the expression, many various *kinds* or *forms* of the ἁμαρτάνειν, as regards the context, however, only *such* kinds and forms as *lead to apostasy*, or which already involve a degree of apostasy. He, therefore, sinned ἑκουσίως in the sense of ver. 26, who, from the fear of man, absented himself from the assemblies, or who, through any kind of denial of the truth, rendered it possible for him still to be allowed to take part in the worship of the temple, etc.—Now, whoever, after having known the truth, commits such sins, therefore against better knowledge and against conscience, and thus implicitly contemns the one sacrifice of Christ, for him there exists no second atoning sacrifice, by which he can be cleansed from the guilt of this new and highly aggravated sin ; but his portion is *a*, subjectively in himself, "a fearful expectation of a judgment," *b*, on the part of God, corresponding to that expectation, "the heat of a fire which is already about to consume the adversaries (of God)." Φοβερὰ ἐκδοχὴ κρίσεως is not by *hypallage* for ἐκδοχὴ κρίσεως φοβερᾶς (J. Capellus), but is to be taken literally. He who acts thus, has before him the certainty of being judged, and this certainty is fearful, it is already in itself a punishment.

As the *expectation of judgment* forms the antithesis to the existence of an atoning *sacrifice*, we shall therefore have to understand the *judgment* not of the destruction of Jerusalem, but of the *being judged* on the day of the second coming of Christ mentioned in chap. ix. 27, seq. The Scripture speaks of a threefold destiny after death. (Comp. our remarks on chap. xi. 39). He who, as one born again, as a member of Christ, has fallen asleep in Jesus, comes not into judgment (John v. 24), but goes to Christ in heaven (2 Tim. iv. 18 ; Phil. i. 23). He who has died without being born again, but yet without positive unbelief, consequently without having had the opportunity of believing, goes into the place of the dead, into Hades ; he belongs not, however, to those whose sins are forgiven neither in this life nor in the life to come (Matth. xii. 31, seq.) but is judged on the last day according to his works, and if (Rom. ii. 7) he has perseveringly *striven* in well-doing after immortality, he will be reckoned among the number of those *sick* ones, for whose *healing* (θεραπεία), after the final judgment, are the leaves of the tree of life (Rev. xxii. 2). There is for him, therefore, in the interval between death and the resurrection, no fearful looking for of judgment. But he who has had the opportunity of attaining to faith, and yet with persevering obstinacy has put this opportunity away from him (Matth. xii. 31, seq.), and further, he who has attained to

faith and yet has fallen away (Heb. vi. 1 ; x. 26–31), goes into Sheol, but with the certain consciousness that the κρίσις, judgment and condemnation, awaits him, and that that eternal fire is prepared for him which is to consume the adversaries of God (according to Is. lxvi. 24).

Most unjustly, therefore, do Roman theologians appeal to this passage, as a proof of that purgatory which is to purge away the guilt of *all the particular sins* which are committed *by the regenerate.* Nothing is said here either of every kind of particular sins, or of people who are still in a regenerate state and have the hope of being saved, or of a purging away of those sins. On the contrary, what is not atoned for by the one sacrifice of Christ remains, according to ver. 26, still unexpiated.

That the author in ver. 26, 27 was not speaking of every particular known sin committed by regenerate persons, but only of such sins as led to or involved apostacy, is confirmed chiefly by ver. 28 ; for in the passage here cited from Deut. xvii. 6, it is not said that every one who had transgressed any command of God is to be punished with death, but he only who was convicted by two or three witnesses of having *apostatized from God*, served false Gods, and *broken the covenant.* If, then, the falling away from the old covenant was so severely punished, how much more the falling away from Christianity. This is denoted by the words trample on the Son of God (used in Hom. Il. 4, 157, as a figure expressive of the most insolent contempt and rejection), further, as counting unholy (κοινός, as at chap. ix. 13) the blood of the covenant (chap. ix. 15–23)—for he who, not from error, but, against better knowledge, falls away from faith in the atoning death of Christ, thereby declares the death of Christ to be the just punishment of a malefactor and a blasphemer ; —finally, this falling away from Christ is said to be a ὕβρις against the Holy Ghost, a wanton presumptuous thrusting out of this spirit, consequently an aggravated "sin against the Holy Ghost" (Matth. xii. 31, seq.)

For such, God has prepared punishment, vers. 30, 31. The passage, Deut. xxxii. 35, is wont to be adduced as a prohibition of revenge being exercised by the injured person himself ("vengeance is mine, saith the Lord, I will repay"), but this is not its original sense. In the context it is not the sins of men against men that are spoken of, but the future hardening of Israel against the saving and redeeming work of God, and thus God speaks : "*Vengeance* and *requital* are mine (לִי נָקָם וְשִׁלֵּם)=I know to requite, I have the will and the power to do so ; so that the emphasis lies not on ἐμοί but on the word ἐκδίκησις, and our author has applied the passage quite correctly. The other passage, Ps. cxxxv. 14, needs no explanation, and as little does the exclamation, ver. 31, which closes the section.

SECTION THIRD.

SECOND MOTIVE. CALLING TO MIND THEIR FORMER FAITH. (x. 32—xi. 1.).

Ver. 32, 33. The transition is similar to that at chap. vi. 10. The readers have already at an earlier period endured manifold trials for their faith; in this lies a double motive for them not to fall away from their faith now; first, because thereby all their former sufferings would be rendered vain; and, secondly, that suffering itself was an experimental testimony to the power of faith.—Φωτισθέντες denotes here, as at chap. vi. 4, the first step in conversion (see the remarks there made). Ἄθλησις a later Greek word for the classic ἆθλος. The struggles they had passed through were twofold; partly, they had already themselves become to the mass of unbelievers and enemies a spectacle (of malicious pleasure, of contempt, of delight in cruelty), inasmuch as they had endured shame and ignominy of all kinds (ὀνειδισμοί), nay, even actual afflictions (θλίψεις); partly, they had become *companions* of those who were so circumstanced (ἀναστρέφεσθαι, not pass. but mid. se gerere, versari). By this is generally understood, that the readers must have seen many *individuals* of their acquaintance enduring contempt and affliction; but the expression κοινωνοὶ γενηθέντες (not γενόμενοι) rather indicates, that they *in the act of their conversion had*, once for all, *become* members of *the society*, of which they knew that such things happen and are wont to happen to it.

Vers. 34. Instead of δεσμίοις (A.D., Peshito, Philoxen., Armen., Vulgate, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius) many versions and the lectio recepta read δεσμοῖς μου. The latter reading, however, has less of external testimony in its favour, and, besides, might more easily take its rise out of δεσμίοις (from regard to conformity with 2 Tim. i. 16, and its being taken for granted that Paul was the author) than vice versa. Moreover, δεσμοῖς μου is not even suitable; for granted that Paul was the author of the epistle, the Jewish Christians of Jerusalem were not, like Timothy, with the apostle in Rome, or in Caesarea, and, therefore, could only very indirectly be called *companions* of his bonds; συμπαθήσατε is, however, by all means to be taken as explanatory of κοινωνοὶ γενηθέντες; this is evident from the καὶ γάρ. We therefore adopt the reading δεσμίοις (with Grotius, Bengel, Semler, Michaelis, Griesbach, Lachmann, Knapp, Bleek, and almost all the modern expositors). Now, as καὶ γὰρ . . . συμπαθήσατε is explanatory of κοινωνοὶ γενηθέντες, so is καὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν, etc., explanatory of θεατριζόμενοι. By the spoiling of their goods, we are to understand what we find still at this day taking place in the sphere of the Jewish mission; when a Jew

shows himself determined to become a Christian, he is disinherited by his relations, his share in the property is withheld from him, his credit and every source of gain withdrawn; he falls into a state of complete destitution. But in our own day there is not wanting, any more than there was then, that state of mind which is expressed in the words "knowing that ye have in heaven a better property and an abiding." How do such newly converted Jews put to shame those Christians who, for example, week after week, desecrate the Lord's day by manual labor and worldly business, rather than make up their minds to suffer a trifling loss of earthly gain. There is wanting in them faith in the divine *blessing* and in that *better wealth!*

In ver. 35 the readers are exhorted still to maintain that *joyful confidence* with which, assured of the *better wealth*, they had boldly encountered losses and sufferings; for this *confidence* will not put them to shame, the *recompense* of the hoped-for possession in heaven will assuredly be theirs. Here, of course, it is not a reward of meritorious works that is spoken of; the sole basis of that *confidence* consists in the *faith* which trusts in Christ, and only in him. He, again, who regards this *faith* and *confidence* itself as a meritorious work, only shows by this, that he has not the true *faith*, and has not attained to the true *confidence*.

Ver. 36. The continuance of that joyful confidence is indispensable, because the readers are so situated as that, in order to be able to inherit the promised possession, they will still have need of great and long *patience and steadfastness in suffering*. But that patience and perseverance in suffering can grow out of no other root than out of *confidence*, is clear. He who, from the first, encounters suffering with the bold assurance that his enemies can kill only the body but not the soul, and that they can spoil him only of the worthless earthly goods but not of the *abiding property*, will from the first be prepared for a cheerful endurance of suffering, and will not fail of perseverance. But he who meets suffering without that *confidence*, full of fear and full of sorrow for the losses that threaten him, will become more comfortless and more impatient under every new trial. Thus the necessity of *patience* (the fruit) is a proof of the necessity of *confidence* (the root).—By the *will of God*, in this context, is to be understood his will that we should confess Christ's name before men. If we do this, we shall obtain as the fruit of it the fulfilment of the promise, that he also will confess us before his heavenly Father.—Ἐπαγγελία is used here as at chap. ix. 15, xi. 13, to denote that which is promised.

In ver. 37, 38, the author shows more particularly why the readers have need of patience, because, namely, the judgment upon Jerusalem, from which only faith can save them, is now near at hand. He expresses this idea in the words in which formerly

Habakkuk had spoken (ii. 3, seq.) of the then impending judgment through the Chaldeans. The passage Habakkuk ii. 3, seq. is therefore by no means *cited* as a proof that now the judgment is impending* over Jerusalem; but the words of Habakkuk are only *applied to an analogous case* (as if, for example, a preacher in a farewell discourse to a thoroughly hardened congregation should exclaim: "How often would I have gathered you as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not").—The first words *ἔτι γὰρ μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον* are a free introduction of the subject by our author (perhaps a recollection of Sept. Is. xxvi. 20). *Ὅσον*, here in the adverbial signification of "only." The repetition of a word to strengthen the idea is rare in Greek.—"He who comes is nigh and delays not; but the just will have life *from faith;* if, however, he *yields to fear* my soul shall have no pleasure in him." In the context of the passage in Habakkuk, people are spoken of who do not believe in the threatenings of the prophets, but carelessly pursue their course; on the contrary the term אֱמוּנָה denotes the state of mind belonging to those who believe the prophet, and expect from Jehovah alone the punishment of the ungodly, and the deliverance of the godly from the judgments. (Altogether against the context is the explanation of the words of Habakkuk: The just will remain alive because of his well doing, because of his good works.) The Sept. has therefore rightly translated באמונתו by *ἐκ πίστεως*.—The words *ἐὰν ὑποστείληται*, again, are a free translation; in the Heb. it is הִנֵּה עֻפְּלָה לֹא יָשְׁרָה נַפְשׁוֹ בּוֹ, "behold, he is puffed up, his soul is not upright in him" (denoting the pride of unbelief); the Sept. has rendered it by *ὑποστέλλειν*; this means "to let down" (namely the sail), hence to be timorous, afraid. The Sept. has also put faintheartedness in place of proud defiance. But precisely in this form the idea was doubly suitable to the object of our author, and as he does not apply the passage as an argument, but simply makes use of and applies the words in his own name, so he might, with all the less hesitation, follow the Sept. which was familiar to his readers.

In ver. 39 he expresses the idea: "We would surely not go to destruction but save our souls; consequently, we must not be afraid, but must believe," by concisely *blending the two members of the sentiment* (just as at chap. viii. 6, etc., where also he has united the two members in one sentence) thus: "We belong not to those who are afraid unto destruction, but who believe to the saving of the soul." *Ψυχή* is used here in the Old Testament sense for *life*. According to the context, it is the bodily preservation from the judgment impending over Jerusalem that is here spoken of.

* Falsely Theophylact; the author will prove, that if the judgment was already near in the time of Habakkuk, it must now be so much nearer (!)—This idea is indicated by nothing in the text.

CHAP. xi. 1.—The thought closes here. Ver. 35: You must hold fast the confidence; ver. 36: for ye have need of the patience which springs from it; ver. 36–38: for the judgment upon Judea is near from which only the believing, not the fearful, are preserved; chap. xi. 1: but faith shows itself in that feeling (of confidence) which holds fast the future promised good.

Several commentators indeed (Erasmus, Böhme, Winer) would put a comma after *πίστις*, take *ἔστι* as verb. substantivum, and *ὑπόστασις* and *ἔλεγχος* as apposition to *πίστις*. But the sentiment: "Faith, however, really exists" would be altogether remarkable. Who had ever doubted that faith really exists in the world? And when, in support of this construction, it is affirmed that *ἔστι* as *copula* cannot stand at the beginning of the sentence, such passages are forgotten as Luke viii. 11: *ἔστι δὲ αὕτη ἡ παραβολή*. In the preceding context of that passage it is said that the understanding of the parables is important, and then the transition is made to the explanation of the parables themselves. Just so here. In ver. 38 it was said that *faith* is *necessary;* in chap. xi. 1 the question is answered, what then is this *faith*.

We take *ἔστι*, therefore, with the great majority of commentators, as copula. Ver. 1, however, does not contain a *definition* of faith (as ver. 1 does not form the superscription of a new section, but the conclusion of the foregoing), but a *description* of faith from a particular point of view given in the context (x. 34–38). It is to be shewn, in how far *it is faith* which gives that *confidence* described in ver. 34. Faith is therefore viewed here not *as opposed to works*, but *as opposed to sight*, and therefore so generally as to belong not only to the *sinner* who hopes for pardon for the sake of *Christ*, but to *every one* who rests more on the unseen and the future than on the seen and present, hence also to the Old Testament believers (chap. xi. 2—xii. 1), hence also to *Christ himself* (chap. xii. 2, seq.).

Now faith is a *ὑπόστασις ἐλπιζομένων*. On *ὑπόστασις* compare what is said at chap. iii. 14. Here it is, of course, to be taken in the sense of fiducia, *firmly grounded confidence*. All faith refers to the future, and has for its basis a present *capability and necessity of further development*. The perfect man has no longer need of faith (1 Cor. xiii. 8, seq.), nor does the Son of God as eternal, or Christ as exalted, need faith. On the other hand, as he walked in lowliness on our account, and was partaker of the yet unglorified human nature, he needed faith in the glorious issue of his work, over which a heavy cloud then hung (comp. below on chap. xii.); and in like manner, the Christian needs faith, as, at present, he has nothing more of the victory over sin and death than the *unseen ground of it*, namely, Christ; everything else lies as yet in the future.

As faith refers to the future, so also from its nature does it refer

to the invisible, or more exactly: *to good things, which are not seen* ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων. Ἔλεγχος does not, however (as Olshausen thinks), signify "persuasion," "the state of being persuaded," but "demonstration," "actual proof." Faith is, therefore, not merely a *subjective persuasion* that those possessions although unseen are yet present; but it is an *act* which itself gives the *knowledge and proof* of the existence of those things *not seen*. The *fact of faith* is *itself* the proof of the *reality of its object*. In faith the actual *power* of the thing believed is already manifest. Thus the author has had a reason for using in the first member, precisely the word ὑπόστασις, "grounding," "state of being grounded." He will represent faith not as a theory but as a *life-power*, which, inasmuch as it actually grasps at the future and unseen possessions, is thereby actually *assured* of them. (And so Thomas Aquinas is, although not exegetically, yet substantially right when he explains ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις from this, that faith is "the subsistence of the things hoped for themselves, the beginning of their possession already entered upon." Ὑπόστασις does not signify "subsistence," but the idea of Thomas Aquinas is quite the correct one.) For that is just the nature and characteristic quality of faith, that it begins not with theories and arguments, but with acts. Credo ut intelligam. As the new-born child does not first receive instruction on the necessity of breathing, and then resolve to breathe, but first breathes, and then grows to the youth who learns to understand the process of breathing, so also must that which is born of the spirit in us first inhale in deep inspirations the heavenly breath of life, ere it can grow up to full knowledge. And as the drawing of the breath is itself the surest proof of the existence of a life-bringing atmosphere which we breathe, so is the act of that faith which *lays hold* on the future and unseen possessions, and draws *strength* from them, the most satisfactory proof of the fact that these possessions are more than mere fancies and chimeras.

SECTION FOURTH.

THIRD MOTIVE. THE HISTORICALLY DEMONSTRATED POWER OF FAITH.

(xi. 2—xii. 3).

In ver. 2 the theme of a new train of thought is connected by γάρ with the concluding ideas of the foregoing. Ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐμαρτυρήθησαν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι. Μαρτυρεῖσθαι occurs in an absolute sense in Acts vi. 3 and other passages, in the signification "to have for oneself a good witness," "to stand in good repute." Almost all com-

mentators would therefore, here also, take μαρτυρεῖσθαι absolutely, and ἐν ταύτῃ as indicating the ground of it, either by making ἐν stand for διά ("on account of their faith the ancients received a good report"), or by supposing it necessary to supply an ὄντες ("as being in the faith they received a good report"). The former supposition is inadmissible as being not consistent with the good Greek style of our author; if, however, ὄντες must be supplied, it would be much better to take ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες as expressing the import of the μαρτύριον. "They are testified of as being in the faith" = "it is testified of them that they were in the faith." And the particulars which follow would correspond much more to this idea. For, in the examples, ver. 3, seq., nowhere are eulogies mentioned which had been made upon the ancients on account of their faith, but it is merely shewn how it appears from their history, that in no other state of mind can they have found the requisite strength for their achievements, but in that described in ver. 1 (and in chap. x. 35—xi. 1, enjoined on the readers).

And thus the sentiment: "in *this* state of mind the fathers also stood and acted" connects simply, by means of γάρ, with the exhortation x. 35—xi. 1 as a further motive.

There can also be no doubt as to what the examples ver. 3 are properly meant to shew. It certainly is not meant merely to *repeat* in concrete examples the affirmation made generally in ver. 2 *as such*, as a mere *affirmation*. Still less can it be the purpose of the author to prove some such proposition as that faith has expressed itself differently at different times, and thus to justify the *general* character of the definition in ver. 1. This is evident, already, because the first verse is neither a definition nor a superscription to the section (it rather, as we saw, forms the conclusion of the foregoing section). These examples are plainly intended *to prove* the thesis laid down in ver. 2, to demonstrate its truth. The author had said: Of the ancients also it is witnessed that they had the *faith* described in ver. 1. This is now proved, however, not directly, for the word אֱמוּנָה is, in the Old Testament, applied only in very rare cases to Old Testament persons. The author must therefore shew that the *thing* is true; that indirectly at least, the state of mind which distinguished the ancients is described to be such as is represented in ver. 1 and denoted by the name πίστις, namely, a firm reliance on the future and the unseen. And this the author fully demonstrates.

In ver. 3 he shews that all religion, as such, the worship of a living God, an invisible Creator, is in itself nothing less than a rising above the visible to the invisible. "By faith (not: by means of faith, not: in faith, but = by an act of that πίστις, that disposition of mind described in ver. 1) we perceive that the worlds were

framed by a word of God." In *νοοῦμεν* there lies a kind of oxymoron; *νόησις* generally forms the antithesis to *πίστις*; *νόησις* is perception obtained through the medium of vision. The idea therefore is, that that state of mind denoted by *πίστις* (the demonstration of the power of the unseen in man) qualifies the man to *perceive* something which is properly *not perceptible*, namely, not perceptible *by the senses;* that therefore a higher sensorium above the sensual sensorium is opened up in the man.—The worlds are created by God's word, "so that that which is seen (*τὸ βλεπόμενον* according to A.D.E. Copt., Clem. Al. etc.) was made of that which does not appear." Beza, Bengel, Schulz, Böhme, Winer, de Sacy, Martin, Osterwald, the Port Royalists, Bleek, Olshausen, etc., refer *μή* as respects the position of the words, to *γεγονέναι*, and render: "So that that which is seen was not (again) made of that which is visible." But if this were the idea which was meant to be expressed, then the author would not have used the two words *βλεπόμενον* and *φαινόμενα*, but must necessarily have used *βλέπεσθαι* both times, or *φαίνεσθαι* both times, in order by the repetition of the same word to express what in German has to be expressed by "wieder." Besides this, the sentiment in this negative form would in general be unsuitable. That the visible cannot again have proceeded from what is visible, would be no affirmation of faith, but one of speculation, a philosopheme.—The translators of the Peshito and Vulgate, then Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Gerhard, Tholuck, and a great number of other commentators, have therefore more properly supposed a transposition (*μὴ ἐκ* for *ἐκ μή*), and with all the more reason as examples of analogous transpositions, precisely in the case of the preposition *ἐκ*, are not wanting. (Especially comp. the example adduced by Tholuck from Arist. Phys. (v. 1: *τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴν . . . ἡ γὰρ μὴ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἔστι μεταβολή*). It is wrong, however (with Luther, J. Capellus, Calov, Bretschneider, etc.), to explain *τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα* by *τὰ οὐκ ὄντα*, "nothing," and quite as wrong to understand by it *chaos* (Limborch, etc.). The explanation of *μή φαινόμενα* which refers it to the ideas in God (in the Platonic sense) is heterogeneous, although an approximation to the truth. The expression must rather of necessity be explained (with Tholuck) from the antithesis laid down in ver. 1. Most will depend, however, on our keeping in view the distinction between *μή* and *οὐκ*. *Οὐ* denies the *existence*, *μή* the *quality; οὐ* says that a thing *is not* objectively, *μή* denies a thing as conceived or conceivable. *Οὐκ ὄν* denotes that which does not exist, which is not; *μὴ ὄν* that whose existence, in respect of its quality, is a nonexistence, a thing unreal. In short, *οὐ* before adjectives is generally rendered by "not," *μή* before adjectives generally by "un-." Thus the *οὐ βλεπόμενα* are things which

are not *at present* seen ; *μή βλεπόμενα* would be things which, under no condition, and at no time, *could* be seen. *Οὐ φαινόμενα* would be things which (at the time or in the circumstances spoken of in the context) do not *come* into appearance ; *μὴ φαινόμενα* are things which, from their nature, *cannot* come into appearance. By the plural *μὴ φαινόμενα* cannot, however, of course, be denoted blank nothing, and just as little can chaos be denoted, which is dark and confused, indeed, but by no means lying beyond the sphere of appearance. The *μὴ φαινόμενα* must rather be *qualitatively-invisible* things or powers, to the *νόησις* of which the man raises himself in faith, from looking upon that which is *seen*. If, too, we are not at liberty to understand by this precisely the ideas in the Platonic sense, we are yet led by the expression *word of God* to think of the invisible creative powers which form as it were the import of his *word*.

In vers. 4–7 *follow examples taken from the time before Abraham*.— Through the disposition of mind denoted by *πίστις* Abel offered a better sacrifice than Cain. Cain offered fruits of the field, which in themselves were not adapted for sacrifice, for the atoning עולה (comp. what is said on chap. ix. 19, seq.), and were also not so valuable as animals. Abel offered the firstlings and fattest beasts of his flock. He willingly gave up, therefore, a dear and valuable *earthly* possession for the invisible possession of the consciousness of reconciliation, and the manifestation of gratitude to God. He thus gave evidence that he had that state of mind which in ver. 1 was called *faith*. Therefore (*δι' ἧς* refers to *πίστις*, as also *δι' αὐτῆς*, in respect of the sense, must refer to *πίστις*) it was testified to him that he was righteous ; for, inasmuch as God was well pleased with his offering (fire from heaven consumed it), he testified to Abel that he was justified. And therefore, also, does Abel still speak after his death. *Λαλεῖ* is præs. hist. referring to Gen. iv. 10 (" thy brother's blood cries to me from the ground"); as appears evident also from Heb. xii. 24. Therefore did God take it upon himself to be the avenger of the murdered one, because he had died in faith, nay, on account of his faith ; for Cain had envied him just on account of God's being well pleased with him. (The reading *λαλεῖται* " he is still spoken of after his death" is but ill-confirmed by external proofs, and yields a most unsuitable sense ; Cain is still spoken of too ! Even the passage chap. xii. 24 proves that *λαλεῖ* must be the reading).

Vers. 5–6 is a kind of sorites. *By faith* Enoch was snatched away so that he did not see death (Gen. v. 24). Wherefore by faith ? He was taken away, because he led a life well-pleasing to God ; but God can be pleased only by *faith*. In this form, however, the reasoning is still incomplete, because built upon a very general axiom ; hence the author in the words *πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ . . . ὅτι . . .* mentions that in the case of Enoch also, it was that *faith* which was

spoken of, and in how far it was so. Precisely the faith that there is a God, and one who will reward those who seek after him, found place in Enoch, and could find place in him. Far from intending to ascribe to Enoch the *New Testament* faith, the author defines the πίστις here in its general form as it applied to the time of Enoch. Enoch lived in that time when the descendants of Cain were improving earthly life by inventions (Gen. iv. 20, seq.), but amid the pleasures of the earthly life entirely forgot God, and when, already, the Sethites also were infected with the prevalent corruption (Gen. vi. 1, seq.). In that time Enoch led a godly life. He forgot not the invisible God amid the things and enjoyments that were seen; he longed for that blessedness which God is ready to give to those who seek him.

Ver. 7.—Πίστει belongs, of course, again to the principal verb κατεσκεύασε. In how far the building of the ark was an *act of faith*, we are told in the apposition χρηματισθείς. Noah saw as yet nothing of the flood, when he began to build the ark; he acted with respect to a mere *prophecy;* but God's word was to him more sure and certain than the supposition which had become habitual by sight—that the course of nature would continue ever the same,—and more important to him than all the scorn and mockery of an unbelieving world.—Εὐλαβηθείς not = εὐλαβὴς γενόμενος (compare Luke ii. 25; Acts ii. 5, viii. 2; Heb. v. 7, xii. 28) but = "in wise foresight" (namely, in that which sprung from his obedience of faith). Prudence is not named as the source but as the reward of his conduct. By his believing obedience he came to be at last the one who was truly prudent. A truth of great practical importance! He who, like a child, blindly follows the will of God regardless of all consequences, is the one who is truly prudent; for he builds on the Eternal, and he will never allow his own to come to shame. He, on the contrary, who, in the fear of man and from a wish to please man, *reckons* when it will be profitable to follow the Lord, he who first anxiously weighs the consequences, will with his false wisdom assuredly come to shame. How many Christians would there be now who, by the building of an ark (should God command this), would take upon themselves the contempt of the whole world? We would not seek them among those who already shrink with fear from the charge of "pietism."—By his faith "Noah judged the world." Noah by his faith (*i. e.* by the building of the ark) saved himself, and thereby left the world to the destruction it deserved.

Ver. 8–19.—A series of *examples* follows taken from the *lifetime of Abraham.* If Abraham, at the call of God, left his home without even knowing whither God would lead him, he rested more on things promised of God than on things present, more on the invisible faith-

fulness and power of the Lord than on what was visible; he shewed, therefore, that he had that state of mind which the author in the foregoing section had required of his readers, and which, in respect of its main substance, he had called *faith*.—It was a demonstration of the same state of mind when Abraham, as well as Isaac and Jacob (ver. 9), went into the land which was promised to him as into a *strange land*, so that he had to dwell in tents (wander through it nomad-like), just where he found sufferance. He (as well as Isaac and Jacob) might have gone back, and dwelt in Mesopotamia as a settled home (as is shewn at length ver. 15). From what other motive did the patriarchs prefer wandering in a strange land to dwelling in their native land, than that, believing in the promise of God, they obeyed the command of God? Their eye was directed (ver. 10) not to the present and momentary, but to the future and heavenly, to the *blessing* which God had promised to the seed of Abraham, and through him to man, to the promised restoration of the relation of God to man which sin had disturbed. This promised blessing our author now designates as "the city having settled foundations whose builder and maker is God." The expression must, first of all, be explained from the antithesis to the *tents* in which Abraham lived. That which gave him strength to renounce a present and earthly home, and to pass his life in light unfixed tents, was the expectation of a future settled city. Many erroneously explain this city of the heavenly blessedness which Abraham (for his own person) hoped to find after his death. This is altogether unhistorical; Abraham expected after his death to be gathered to his fathers in Sheol. Grotius, Clericus, and others somewhat better refer the πόλις to the (earthly) city of Jerusalem. This, doubtless, is the idea of ver. 10, that Abraham—on account of the *glory promised to his seed* (for ἐξεδέχετο γάρ is epexegetical of τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, ver. 9), not, however, on account of the individual blessedness subjectively hoped for by him—underwent the inconveniences of a life-long pilgrimage. But Grotius and Clericus err, when they *limit* this objective promise to the earthly building of the earthly Jerusalem. Our author, *even for the sake of his readers*, who clung with a false tenacity to the earthly Jerusalem, would certainly not have said that the earthly Jerusalem was that, on account of which Abraham renounced a settled dwelling-place. He rather denotes by that "settled city founded by God himself," which he places in opposition to Abraham's transitory tents, the *entire and total import of the theocratical promise*, and he does this, so as that in the form of the designation, he does not confine himself to the *undeveloped* intuition which Abraham had in his lifetime of the future blessing and salvation (for Abraham had as yet, in general, heard nothing of a "city," of the earthly Jerusalem, as little as of the

heavenly), but takes up at the same time the *development* of the promise which followed from the time of Abraham to that of Christ. In David, the promise given to Abraham had found a fulfilment, preliminarily and symbolically in the founding of the kingdom and that of its principal city in splendour ; but that David was not the true, last, and proper Messiah, that a second David must come, was known to the readers from 2 Sam. vii. ; Ps. ii. ; Ps. cx., and finally, from the history of Jesus Christ himself. Abraham was not, of course, aware of the distinction between the first and second Anointed, the first and second Jerusalem—nor does the author mean at all to say that he was ; but Abraham *at all events* looked for a future settled kingdom, for a state of things in which his posterity would no longer wander in tents from place to place (Gen. xvii. 6 and 8), and on account of this hope, he bore the difficulties of a life-long state of pilgrimage. He looked therefore, in reality, for a settled city which God would found for his seed. *The Christian knows* that the future Jerusalem in the future kingdom of Christ when he has come again, will form the true, full, and final fulfilment of this hope. The words of ver. 10 are, however, not *to be interpreted:* "Abraham looked for the future Jerusalem," but the words mean only : "Abraham looked for this, that God himself would found a settled city for his seed."

Ver. 11, 12.—By faith Sarah received strength for the founding of a posterity : if she had not overcome that paroxysm of doubt of which we have an account in Gen. xviii. 12, (she was immediately ashamed of it, ver. 15), she would, of course, not have yielded herself to the act of generation.—Ver. 13, seq. It was also an act of faith when the patriarchs died, one after another, without having received the promise (ἐπαγγελία as below ver. 39 and chap. ix. 15, x. 36), and notwithstanding, clung to the promise, nay as it were, already *saw* from afar and *welcomed* the promised blessing. This latter they did, inasmuch as they called themselves *pilgrims* (Gen. xlvii. 9, comp. Ps. xxxix. 12). This was an expression of their longing for a country, not in any way for the earthly country which lay behind them—Mesopotamia (ver. 15) ; for had such a longing taken possession of their hearts (μνημονεύειν to remember anything, here in a pregnant sense as at 2 Tim. ii. 8), they might at any moment have returned thither. That they did *not* do so, that in spite of the feeling that they were strangers they yet kept themselves from seeking again that earthly country, is to be explained simply from their believing obedience to the instructions of God, and their believing hope of the future possession of Canaan promised by God. In ver. 16 this promised future country is again called by the author a heavenly country, just as, at ver. 10, he brings *the kind of fulfilment* known to the *Christians* at the same time into the *prophetical hope.*

Here, too, he will obviate the false application of the words on the part of his readers, that the earthly Canaan *as such* was the aim of the theocratical hope. That which the fathers hoped for their posterity was not the ordinary earthly possession of an earthly land or kingdom, but the *setting up of the kingdom of God upon earth*, which was to take place in Canaan. (Just as little as in ver. 10, however, is it in ver. 16 the individual blessedness after death that is spoken of.)

Ver. 17–19.—*Abraham's readiness* to offer up *Isaac* is mentioned along with the rest of the acts of faith taken from the life of Abraham. Abraham, who had received the promises when God tried him, offered up his only son, him in whose person the promise rested (ver. 18, comp. Gen. xxi. 12). As Abraham cannot himself have given up hope in the promises, although he was ready to offer as a burnt-offering the son through whom, according to God's express declaration, they were to be fulfilled, nothing remains to account for this but the supposition which our author expresses, ver. 19 (and in like manner Paul, Rom. iv. 17), that God would call the dead back again to life. And, on account of this faith which held the infinite power of God to be surer than the power of death, and which, therefore, blindly surrendered itself to the incomprehensible leading of God, he received as a reward his son alive ἐν παραβολῇ. These words ἐν παραβολῇ are particularly difficult. Calvin, Castellio, Beza, Schlichting, Grotius, Limborch, Kuinoel, Bleek, etc., take παραβολή in the well-known signification *figure*, but then refer ἐν παραβολῇ to ὅθεν, and obtain the sense: "*thence* as it were, namely, as it were, ἐκ νεκρῶν, as it were from the grave, he received him back." This explanation is the harshest. For, in the first place, if παραβολή signifies "figure," it cannot then signify "as it were;" "figuratively," and "as it were" or "not properly, in a certain way," are surely very different ideas. Secondly, it is very harsh to refer back ὅθεν to ἐκ νεκρῶν, instead of taking it as a causal particle "wherefore" (comp. Acts xxvi. 19), as the author assuredly intends to mention here, as at vers. 4, 7, 14, 16, the *recompense* which the believer obtained *on account of his faith*. Thirdly, however, it is besides impossible to refer ἐν παραβολῇ to this ὅθεν; the idea that Abraham received back Isaac "as it were from the dead," no one would ever express thus: "whence he as it were received him;" the pregnant idea which is intended to be in ὅθεν must have been *expressed*, at least by a καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, and the author must have said: καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐκομίσατο αὐτόν.—Others, as Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Calov, Böhme, Olshausen, take παραβολή likewise in the signification "figure," but in reality leave to it this signification and explain: "wherefore he received him back *as a symbol* (or in symbol). This idea is much more suitable; the author shows

that that *remaining*-alive of Isaac, that deliverance from the *danger* of death, was a symbol or type of the *resurrection of Christ* the *only begotten* of God, whom God gave up as a sacrifice for the world; that resurrection through which the faith of Abraham, *that God was able to raise from the dead*, found its confirmation, and was crowned with its highest fulfilment. The only thing in this explanation at which we might stumble is, that, according to it, we should have expected rather εἰς παραβολήν; but the ἐν also yields a good sense. In a figurative act Abraham received Isaac, that is, the act of the κομίζειν was a figure and type of a later and more perfect act. The idea resulting from this explanation harmonizes with the words λογισάμενος ὅτι, etc., so admirably, and with such internal necessity, and at the same time the way is so prepared for it by the designation of Isaac as the *only begotten*, that we hold this explanation to be decidedly the true one, and therefore have no need with a *third* class of commentators (Camerarius, Ernesti, Tholuck, etc.) to take ἐν παραβολῇ = παραβόλως or "against expectation" (comp. Rom. iv. 18 παρ' ἐλπίδα), a signification which does not belong to the noun παραβολή. Παραβολή does signify "bold venture," but the signification "in bold venture," would not at all correspond to ἐκομίσατο.

Ver. 20–22.—Several examples follow in which the patriarchs, by the act of blessing their sons and descendants, declared that they participated in the hope of the future fulfilment, or, by giving commandment that their bones should be carried along with their descendants from Egypt to Canaan, proved that they expected with certainty the promised return (Gen. xv.). The first instance is that of Jacob, who blessed the sons of Joseph (Gen. xlviii. 15, seq.), by which he (ver. 21) distinctly expressed his hope of the return to Canaan. With this are connected the somewhat enigmatic words καὶ προσεκύνησαν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον τῆς ῥάβδου αὐτοῦ. We have here to inquire, first of all, why these words are cited along with the rest, and then whether the Sept. has here given the right translation. Assuredly the author did not cite these words along with the rest, merely because he went on mechanically with the quotation of the passage; for the words in question do not occur at all in that passage, Gen. xlviii. 15, seq., but are to be found in an earlier chapter (xlvii. 31). The author, therefore, had certainly a definite object in view when he quoted these words. What then was this object?—In the Masoretic text, the words run thus: וַיִּשְׁתַּחוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל־רֹאשׁ הַמִּטָּה "and Israel leant (back again) on the head of the bed (pillow)," and this reading is not only very old (Onkelos, Jonathan, Symmachus, Aquila, Peshito), but is also plainly the more natural. The LXX read מַטֶּה, and rendered just as our author cites. But it can hardly be supposed, that in the

word προσεκύνησεν, which is peculiar to the LXX., there lay the idea which induced our author to cite the passage ; he would hardly have cited the passage on account of the circumstance that Jacob "prayed" (as if in his habit of praying there lay a special proof of that faith described in ver. 1). I rather think that he quoted the words in order to call to the minds of his readers, who were familiar with the Pentateuch, the *context* of the passage. In the context of that passage, Gen. xlvii., it is recorded how Jacob gave orders to carry his bones to Canaan ; thus, then, these words lead quite naturally to the analogous command of Joseph mentioned in ver. 22.

In ver. 23–31, follow *examples of faith from the time of Moses and Joshua.* Ver. 23. The whole existence of Moses became possible through the faith of his parents, who laid the child in the basket of reeds, confident that the infant which appeared to them as ἀστεῖον would be an object of care to the paternal eye of God which looks into the smallest things, and that God's power is superior to all, even the most evident, dangers, and is stronger than the frown of Pharaoh. Ver. 24–26. Moses himself had the choice, either to remain at the court as an Egyptian prince, and to enjoy all the splendour of Egypt—but then he must renounce his faith which his mother as his nurse had implanted in his heart, and his connection with his people ;—or to remain true to the God of his fathers—but then he must bid farewell to the court, and share in the difficulties of his people. His God and his theocratical hope were dearer and more precious to him than all present earthly fortune. He preferred the συγκακουχεῖσθαι to the "enjoyment of sin ;" the "reproach of the Messiah" was dearer to him than all the riches of Egypt. In the expression "reproach of Christ," the author again puts into the germ the *development* known to the *Christian.* Moses had as yet received no revelation of the "Anointed ;" he knew only the theocratical promise in the simple form in which it was given to the patriarchs. But the New Testament believer knows, that that simple hope was destined to find its fulfilment in the "Anointed of God." And thus the reproach which Moses endured, because it was a theocratical was also a Messianic reproach—such as has received (Matth. xvii. 1.), and will yet farther receive, its honourable reward through the Messiah.

Ver. 27 does not refer to Moses' wandering to Midian (Ex. ii. 15), where he indeed "feared," but to the departure from Egypt (Ex. xiv. 13). That the two *parts* of which this departure consisted, namely, the Passover, and the passage through the Red Sea, are afterwards specially mentioned, is no reason why the event *as a whole* might not also be mentioned first. The resolution, in general, to undertake the dangerous work of delivering Israel from

Egypt, was a strong act of faith (comp. Ex. iii. 11, seq.). Moses had steadfastly before his eyes God, the invisible, just as if he saw him. Τὸν ἀόρατον is here, according to the position of the words, the *object* to ἐκαρτέρησε. Καρτερεῖν as transit. "to bear any thing steadfastly, or to do any thing steadfastly," hence generally in reference to any person or thing, to conduct oneself steadfastly. It is a pregnant idea to be explained here thus: τὸν ἀόρατον τιμῶν ἐκαρτέρησε. (So also substantially Olshausen. The construction adopted by Bleek, Tholuck, etc., is forced: ἐκαρτέρησε γὰρ, ὡς τὸν ἀόρατον ὁρῶν).

Ver. 28 is clear. Had the Israelites not believed that God would really slay the first born,* or had they had no faith in the atoning power of the lambs, they would not have marked their door-posts with the blood of the Passover lambs. In like manner, it was plainly a manifestation of faith (ver. 29), when they ventured into the bed of the Red Sea, between the masses of water standing wall-high on either side, which, physically considered, seemed every moment as if they must close in upon them, as they afterwards in reality did upon the Egyptians. Not less was it an act of that faith which holds the command of God to be surer than any appearance of sense, when the Israelites marched round the walls of Jericho (ver. 30) with the blowing of trumpets instead of laying siege to it (Josh. vi.). And Rahab, too, was saved by her faith, she who trembled before the mighty God,—"who is a God both above in heaven, and beneath on the earth,"—and saved the messengers of his people, and was therefore preserved from the destruction of the city (in the power of this faith, however, also changed her conduct, comp. Matth. i. 5).

Ver. 32–34.—The author, by means of the rhetorical formula of transition, now breaks off from adducing particular examples in detail, and passes to a summary enumeration of *names* (ver. 32) and *actions* (ver. 33, 34). The opinion of Bengel and others, that the particular acts correspond to those particular names (so that κατηγωνίσαντο βασιλείας refers to Gideon, εἰργάσαντο δικαιοσύνην to Barak, ἔφραξαν στόματα λεόντων to Samson) is fanciful, and, in reference to ver. 35, not capable of being carried out. The relation of ver. 32 to vers. 33, 34 is rather to be understood thus:—The author, *first of all*, passes from the detailed description of particular *examples* of faith to a (consecutive) enumeration of *heroes* of faith, then, however, as a longer continuation of the mere catalogue of names would have been dry, he breaks off from this also, and now (ver. 33, seq.) he groups together mere general *classes* of acts resulting from faith. Of

* The simplest way of construing ver. 28, is: ἵνα μὴ ὁ ὀλοθρεύων θίγῃ τὰ πρωτότοκα αὐτῶν. Others make τὰ πρωτότοκα dependent on ὀλοθρεύων and αὐτῶν on θίγῃ, in which, however, this αὐτῶν would be by far too vague.

course, the particular examples of these *genera* may be pointed out in the Old Testament history, but not so as that only one example always corresponds to each genus. Thus, the *subduing of kingdoms* was an act of which there were frequent examples. Certainly Gideon, also, subdued the power of a kingdom, that of Midian, and he did so by that faith in which, trusting more to God's promise than to horses and chariots, he dismissed the greatest part of his army (Judges vi. vii.). But Jonathan, too, when alone with his armour-bearer, he climbed up the rock Seneh, and drove the enemies' host to flight, in the strength of the faith that it is easy for the Lord to help by many or by few (1 Sam. xiv. 6, seq.),—and David, when in the power of faith he slew the giant (1 Sam. xvii. 25),—and Samson, and many others, might here be adduced as examples. *Wrought righteousness* in their official station: this did all the judges, chiefly Samuel, in like manner the pious kings; and, in their private relations, all the righteous persons of the Old Testament; still the author must have had the first especially in view. This administration of justice was also not possible without that state of mind which, apart from all regard to earthly advantage, has respect only to the will of God, nor is it possible yet, in our own day, without this "faith," hence, neither in the private nor in the public administration of justice can a people be happy, if in the one case, as in the other, it be not administered by God-fearing persons. *Obtained promises:*—chiefly of David was this true (2 Sam. vii.), then, of course, also of the entire series of the *prophets* briefly mentioned in ver. 32. (Ἐπαγγελίαι denotes here not, as at ver. 13 and 39, the promised thing, *i. e.*, the fulfilment, but the prophecies themselves. The proof lies precisely in ver. 39.) *Stopped the mouths of lions:*—Daniel did this (Dan. vi. 17, comp. ver. 23); less direct is the reference to Samson (Judges xiv. 6) and David (2 Sam. xvii. 34, seq.). *Quenched the violence of fire:*—this did the friends of Daniel (Dan. iii.); they, like Daniel himself, steadfastly maintained the profession of the invisible true God, and held his almighty power to be greater than the might of the Babylonian and Median kings (Dan. iii. 17, vi. 10 and 20). *Escaped the sword:*—David did so (1 Sam. xviii. 11, xix. 10, seq., etc.), Elias (1Kings xix. 1 and 10), and Elisha (2 Kings vi. 14, seq., and 31, seq.), but only in the case of Elisha was the escape a positive act of faith, brought about by faith, hence the reference may be properly limited to him (namely, the incident recorded in 2 Kings vi. 14, seq., where he is represented as *seeing* the *invisible* hosts of God). *Out of weakness were made strong:*—such was Hezekiah (Is. xxxviii. 3 and 5), and that in consequence of a believing prayer. Others, with less propriety, refer this to Samson (Judges 15, 16), whose strength returned to him unconsciously and without an act of faith on his part. *Waxed valiant in fight:*—almost

all the Judges were heroes in battle, then Jonathan, David, etc. Κλίνειν παρεμβολὰς ἀλλοτρίων (aciem inclinare)—the reference is, here, again, to Gideon and Jonathan.

In ver. 35 the author places over against each other two kinds of manifestations of faith—the faith of those women (1 Kings xvii. 17, seq.; 2 Kings iv. 17, seq.) whose sons were restored to *bodily* life by the prophets, and the still greater faith of the martyrs (of the time of the Maccabees), who sacrificed the bodily life in faith, and on account of faith, for the sake of the *future* resurrection to the *glorified* life. Hence he does not merely say: "Not accepting deliverance that they might obtain a better *deliverance;*" but, referring back to the first clause of the verse, he speaks of a *better resurrection.*—Τυμπανίζειν comes from τύμπανον, which signifies originally a kettle-drum, 2 Macc. vi. 19 and 28, but occurs as the designation of an instrument of torture (probably in the form of a wheel), upon which the sufferers were stretched in order then to be beaten to death. They accepted not the ἀπολύτρωσις, *ransom*, namely, that deliverance which they might have bought at the price of denying their faith. At ἐξ ἀναστάσεως in the beginning of the verse, ἐξ is so to be explained as that ἀνάστασις denotes the *act* of rising again. They received them from the resurrection, *i. e.*, as those who had just been raised up.

Ver. 36–38.—The writer returns in ver. 36 to the mention of less violent sufferings, in order from these, to rise again in a new climax, ver. 37, to the greatest tortures. Then, at the end of ver. 37 and in ver. 38, he sets over against the cruel *death* of some martyrs, the destitute *life* of others. *Mockings*, and these of a public and most abusive kind, were endured in the Maccabean persecutions (1 Macc. ix. 26; 2 Macc. vii. 7); *scourgings* in the same persecutions (2 Macc. vi. 30, vii. 1); *imprisonments* in the same persecutions (1 Macc. xiii. 12), and also in the Old Testament (1 Kings xxii. 27; Jerem. xxxvii. 18).—Death by *stoning*, 2 Chron. xxiv. 20, seq., comp. Matth. xxiii. 35. The torture consisting in being bound between two boards and sawn alive in two, is said, according to a tradition common to Christians and Jews, consequently an old Jewish tradition, to have been undergone by the prophet Jeremiah under Manasseh. Now follows ἐπειράσθησαν. The cursive manuscript 17 places this word before ἐπρίσθησαν; it is omitted altogether in the Peshito, Æthiop., Eusebius, and Theophylact; but these inconsiderable deviations are easily to be accounted for by the internal difficulty which lies in the word. For it is difficult to see what this jejune and general expression, "they were tempted," can have to do in this connexion,* and as sure as *some word* must have originally stood in

* Olshausen thinks, that the temptation to apostatize from the faith is represented as the acme of all the suffering that can befall the Christian. But then ἐπειράσθησαν ought to form the conclusion, and stand at the end of ver. 38.

this place, so sure is it that *this* cannot have been the word. Of all the conjectures which have been made, that of Sykes is the best: *ἐπυρίσθησαν* "they were burned" (comp. 2 Macc. vi. 11, vii. 4, seq.; Dan. xi. 33). This, first of all, explains the early appearance of the reading *ἐπειράσθησαν*; but it accounts also for the omission of the word in the Peshito, Æthiop., etc. For one transcriber might easily put for *ἐπυρίσθησαν* the synonymous word *ἐπρήσθησαν*, which a second might confound with *ἐπρίσθησαν*, or might even read it so, and therefore omit it.—*In sheepskins and goatskins*, suffering, want, affliction, and every kind of evil, lived such men as Elijah (1 Kings xix. 13 and 19; 2 Kings i. 8, ii. 8, seq.), and other prophets (Zech. xiii. 4).—"Men of whom the world was not worthy, wandered about in deserts and in caves" (comp. 1 Kings, xviii. 4 and 13; xix. 8 and 13; 1 Macc. ii. 28, seq.; 2 Macc. v. 27, vi. 11). Two ideas are indicated in these words; on the one hand the greatness of the world's guilt, in rejecting men of whom they had reason to be proud; on the other, the heavenly consolation, that this world is also in reality unworthy of such souls. Let not any one who has to suffer for his faith forget this consolation, when his displeasure arises at that guilt, and his suffering appears to him as a wicked injustice on the part of the world; let him bear in mind what *honour* those are counted worthy to receive from *the Lord*, who, on the Lord's account are reckoned unworthy by the world.

Ver. 39, 40.—And yet all these (those adduced in ver. 4–38) had not (aor. for the pluperf.) obtained the promise *ἐπαγγελία*, as at ix. 15, x. 36, xi. 13), and nevertheless, were so strong in faith. To the *Christian* readers who had already received so much, and for whom, therefore, the hope in reference to the future was so much easier, what an humbling motive was presented in this strength of faith shown by the *Old Testament* saints, who had to walk almost entirely in the dark, and had to look for almost everything from the future!—*Μαρτυρηθέντες διὰ τῆς πίστεως*—this expression has in itself (*διά*), and, according to the context, a different sense, of course, from ver. 2. In ver. 2 it was said by way of *intimation:* Already it was testified to the ancients that they were believers. Here, mention is made *retrospectively* of "all those who through the faith (which they displayed) have gained a testimony (to their praise)."—In ver. 40 the reverse side of the motive is presented. Do those Old Testament believers present an example fitted to shame the Christian readers, inasmuch as faith was made so difficult to them and *yet* they believed, and does there already lie in this humbling example a motive for the readers to strive after that strength of faith,—so does a further motive lie in this, that the Christians have before them a glory so much the greater.

In order, however, rightly to understand these words of the 40th verse :—" that God in regard to us has provided something better in order that they should not be made perfect without us,"—we must keep in view the doctrine of the Holy Scripture on the state after death (which in the evangelical system of doctrine has not been fully developed). The Scripture does not teach, that in the case of all men the last and final decision takes place immediately after death, but very plainly teaches the contrary. The consequence and punishment of sin is, according to the Holy Scripture, not eternal condemnation (this is mentioned for the first time in Is. lxvi. 24, and as the punishment of an obstinate rejection of the Messianic salvation, consequently a positive unbelief, and, in perfect consistency with this, the New Testament teaches that the punishment of the eternal second death stands connected with the positive rejection of the known and offered salvation, or the falling away from the salvation which had once been accepted. Comp. our remarks on chap. vi. 4, seq., and on chap. x. 27). The punishment of sin simply considered is death, *i. e.*, the separation of the man from God, and of nature from the man, and the body from the soul (which unhappy separation *would* indeed last forever, and would increase, if no redemption had been offered ; now, however, it lasts forever only in the case of those who despise this offered salvation). The punishment of sin simply considered is that the soul goes into Sheol, into the kingdom of the dead ; and thither go and have gone *all* who are born only of *woman*, who are only descendants of the first Adam, consequently all heathens who had not opportunity to hear of the salvation, and, in like manner, all *Israelites who lived before Christ* (with the exception of Enoch and Elijah). It is not thereby denied, that, in this Sheol, there may be a difference between the state of the penitent and pious who longed for the salvation, and that of the bold and hardened sinner. David hopes, that even in the valley of the shadow of death, God will still be with him and comfort him (Ps. xxiii. 4), and the second David has evidently taught us in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, that there is a gulf fixed between those who suffer torment and those who are comforted with Ahraham (Luke xvi. 25, 26), and, accordingly, when he himself was about to enter into Sheol, he promised to the penitent thief that to-day he would be with him " in paradise." The entrance into the heavenly holy of holies, on the other hand (Heb. x. 19, seq., etc.), *i. e.*, into the sphere of *glorification* and of *glorified* nature, was first opened up by Christ's going before as the first-fruits through his resurrection and ascension, and opened for those who are, not men together with Christ, side by side with him, but, members of " the one who is in heaven" (John iii. 13)— not the posterity of the first Adam, but, by regeneration, sons of

the second Adam. This the Old Testament believers were *not.* They had the subjective longing for the promised salvation, and subjective faith in it: but the real objective regeneration, the germ of new life, proceeding from the exalted Christ, which is implanted in us by baptism, and is nourished in the holy sacrament of the supper —this they had not; and we must be on our guard against losing sight of the distinction which the Holy Scripture makes in this respect between the old and new covenant. *First with us* were they to be made perfect, and were they made perfect. Christ came to them to set open for them the gates of the place of the dead (Rev. i. 18), and to lead them forth along with him (Matth. xxvii. 53; comp. John viii. 56). From that time the souls of all who die as living members of Christ go to him in heaven (Phil. i. 23; John xiv. 20), in order, at his second coming, to be united again to their bodies (Rev. xx. 4), and then to reign with Christ in glorified body over the rest of mankind, finally, however, to take not a passive (John v. 24), but an active part (1 Cor. vi. 3), in the judgment of the world. Those who are then still in Sheol are, in like manner, awaked at the judgment, and judged "according to their works," according to the rule laid down in Rom. ii. 6–8; Matth. xxv. 31, seq., *i. e,* those who by patient continuance in well-doing have striven after an imperishable existence will now be made acquainted with the salvation in Christ (for in their case, too, the words will hold good that there is salvation in no other than in Christ), and will become whole through the leaves of the tree of life (Rev. xxii. 2), the others, however, will fall into everlasting perdition.—It is time, indeed, that this *biblical* doctrine of the state after death were again preached to *congregations;* for the common hard and truly unscriptural doctrine which knows nothing further after death than happiness or condemnation, is in its practical effects equally mischievous with the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purgatory, in which a trace of the doctrine of Sheol, but only a caricatured trace of it, is contained.

CHAP. xii. 1–3.—An *exhortation* is here drawn from all that has been said in chap. xi. Τοιγαροῦν occurs seldom in the New Testament, as it expresses a fine emphasis more proper to classic Greek. Τοιγάρ serves, like the German "doch," to strengthen the οὖν. The New Testament authors, in the simplicity of their style, generally use instead of this a mere ἄρα or οὖν or διό.—Καὶ ἡμεῖς are the members of the *new* covenant in opposition to the members of the *old* covenant, mentioned in the 11th chapter. Ἡμεῖς has for its apposition the words τοσοῦτον ἔχοντες περικειμένον ἡμῖν νέφος μαρτύρων; νέφος is used also by profane writers as the poetic-figurative designation of a crowd.—The exhortation itself: *let us run with patience,* etc., is expressed in a figure taken from those prize contests which, being of Gentile origin, were transplanted among the Jews also by the

Herodians, and which must have made a strong impression on the imagination of that people, as Paul too makes frequent use of them as comparisons.

In order, however, to be able to come off well in the race, one must lay aside ὄγκον πάντα, "everything that encumbers." It is insipid to explain this figure of *corpulence*, which indeed cannot be laid aside. Equally unsuitable is the interpretation by "ballast;" it is not a race of ships, but a prize race of men that is here spoken of! The expression rather refers to the practice among racers of laying aside whatever they had with them or on them that was heavy, or might be a hindrance, even their very garments, in order to be able to run without impediment. If, however, it be asked what is meant by this figurative expression, the author cannot have understood by the ὄγκος, *sin*, as he immediately afterwards names this as a special principal kind of ὄγκος. Hindrances in the struggle of faith and a public profession with the fear of persecution lie not *merely* in sin, but may also lie in things which are themselves indifferent and allowed. Intercourse and friendship with old Jewish acquaintances, the relations formed by trade and merchandise, might be hindrances of this kind for the readers, and, in such a case, it was right and is still right to break entirely away from such relations, and to get rid of the fetters which they impose as soon as they threaten to become a snare, even though in themselves they should be innocent. We, too, have many and various customs of life which in themselves are quite innocent, but which through habit may become bonds that threaten to fasten themselves round the heart. It is required of us also that we be watchful and keep ourselves unencumbered, in order that in the event of the profession of our faith becoming again a thing for which we must pay dear, we may not feel fettered by trifles, but may be able freely to sacrifice all for our Lord.

Sin, however, is by all means the greatest hindrance in that contest. Every bosom sin which we cherish is a handle by which the tempter can lay hold on us, a price for which we are saleable. Hence our author gives to sin the predicate εὐπερίστατος, "encircling us, wrapping us round." (The readings of two codices: ἀπερίστατον and εὐπερίσπαστον are in a critical point of view of no significance). The word is a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, and has been variously explained. Some derived it from περίστημι in the signification "to draw from a purpose," and rendered: "the sin from which one can be easily converted," a sense which is here altogether unsuitable. Others, as Chrysostom, derived it from περίστημι in the signification "to encircle," but as an adj. verb. with passive sense, and rendered: "the sin which can easily be encircled," which is just as unsuitable. Kuster, Böhme, and others appealed to the signification of ἀπερίσ-

τατος, "destitute of spectators," and rendered: the sin which has many spectators and admirers. It would thus be represented as a false ornament on the racer, which attracted the admiration of the spectators, but was an incumbrance to himself in the race. But this, too, would be an artificial and far-fetched idea. Still more artificially does Wetstein, following the same etymology, render, εὐπερίστατος by "seen of many" = "which does not remain hid, but comes at length to light." The only two suitable explanations are —that of Salmasius and Kypke, who take it as denom. from περίστασις, "complication," and render "most complicated," and the still simpler one of Œcumenius, Theodoret, Erasmus, Vatable, Castellio, Tholuck, Bleek, etc., who derive it from the middle περιίστασθαι, "to surround," as adj. verb. with *active* (middle) sense, and render by insidiosus, "subtly encircling us."

Ver. 2.—In that prize race we are to "look to Jesus, the leader and perfecter of the faith." Ἀφορᾶν, like ἀποβλέπειν, denotes the looking away from the nearest object upon which we unconsciously look, to an object upon which the eye is consciously fastened. Jesus is mentioned here as that object, and he is here further called ὁ ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτὴς τῆς πίστεως. Ἀρχηγός signifies not "beginner," does not therefore form an antithesis to τελειωτής (as if it were intended to designate Jesus as the beginning and end of faith). He who does not, as an expositor, practice that ἀφορᾶν in a wrong way, who does not falsely look away from what lies nearest, the simple sense of the words, and seek in the distance what lies quite at hand, will have little difficulty in finding out the signification of ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτής. A long series of "witnesses" had been adduced in chap. xi., beginning with Abel. The author and his readers along with him look back into the past, and see, at the extremity furthest back, Abel with his faith in the future and invisible as yet quite undeveloped. This faith becomes ever clearer and more definite in Abraham, Moses, and the subsequent individuals in the series; but the foremost in the line is Jesus, the *leader* who stands at the head, and in whom that faith appears in full and *perfected* glory. In that he renounced all the glory which he might have had if he had been disobedient to his Father and had followed the seducer, and chose rather the shame of the cross—gave up the peace and joy of life, gave up his little band of disciples to the danger of being scattered and led astray—and, seeing before him the apparent *destruction* of his person and cause, still remained faithful to the wonderful will of his Father, followed his leading in the dark, and steadfastly maintained, in spite of hell, the sure expectation of faith that the Father would *raise him up*, and through death destroy death—in all this, he has displayed the *perfected faith*, and leads in royal majesty the line of those *witnesses*. That which is required in chap. xi. 1,

Christ has perfectly fulfilled. Nay, he not merely *had* but *was* the *substance of things hoped for!*

Instead, however, of understanding this idea of the πίστις in the general way in which it is spoken of in the context of this section, a number of commentators have known no other meaning to give to πίστις than that dogmatically defined idea of "faith in justification through Christ," an idea which has its place in the epistle to the Romans, but not here. They understand by it, therefore, that *special form and manifestation which the general state of mind denoted by* πίστις *takes in the penitent sinner, in relation to his Saviour.* According to this explanation it must appear incomprehensible how faith can be ascribed to Christ the Saviour himself, as he neither required, nor was in a condition, to believe in the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake. In order now to escape this absurdity, some (Schleusner, Knapp, Kuinoel) explained, that Christ is the "beginner" of faith, because, by his redemption-work, he has made faith possible for us and for him; others (as Chrysostom) that he is called ἀρχηγός, because he himself, by his spirit, works the beginnings of faith in us. In a similar way it was attempted to explain τελειωτής. (Schulz, Tholuck, and Bleek, who take ἀρχηχός = exemplar [for us] approximate to the true explanation; Olshausen, too, who indeed allows that Christ receives those predicates in reference to his own faith, but renders ἀρχηγός by "beginner," and, instead of referring both to the series of *witnesses*, rather finds in them a reference to this,—that it was necessary even for Christ himself, to struggle on from the beginnings of faith to its completion.)

The relative sentence ὃς ἀντὶ τῆς, etc., serves most fully to confirm the explanation we have given of ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτής. As in the case of all those individual examples of faith in chap. xi. 4–31, there was always specified some visible possession which they renounced, or some earthly privation and affliction which they endured, but, on the other hand, a future reward which they saw before them—so also was it with Christ. He has endured the cross, and counted small and light the shame of this kind of death; for this, however, he has sat down on the right hand of God. In him the deepest ignominy was united with the highest absolute exaltation. —The only question here is, how the words ἀντὶ τῆς προκειμένης χαρᾶς are to be explained. Either (with the Peshito, Luther, Calvin, Calov, etc.) ἀντί is taken in the sense of "instead of," and by χαρά is understood the earthly joy which Christ renounced, or (with Itala, Aeth., Beza, Bengel, Hunnius, Grotius, and the most of recent commentators) ἀντί is taken in the sense of "for the sake of, for," and by χαρά is understood the heavenly joy for the gaining of which he endured the cross. But as χαρά has the attribute προκειμένη, and this is the usual term for designating that which was "set be-

fore" the runners in a race (and such are spoken of in ver. 1-3), *i. e.* the prize set up at the goal, the second explanation is on this ground to be preferred.

In ver. 3 γάρ, because standing beside an imperative, is not argumentative, but explicative: another side of that in which the *looking to Jesus* consists is here described. Ver. 3 indeed contains also an argument, namely, the idea which forms the *connecting link* between vers. 1 and 2. "Let us run with patience—while we look to Jesus the leader of the witnesses of faith (in what respects he is so we are told in the relative sentence *who for the joy, etc.*)—remember, namely, that he had to endure *so great* a contradiction." This third idea serves to shew plainly, *in how far the looking to Jesus is necessary and beneficial for them in their own race.* This was not as yet shewn in ver. 2; in ver. 2 Jesus was only compared with the *witnesses*, chap. xi., and the fact that he *endured the cross and has sat down on the right hand of God* was stated only objectively, to demonstrate that Jesus has had the most perfect faith. On the other hand, it is now shewn in ver. 3 how the *looking to* this *faith* (of the great leader of those witnesses, chap. xi.) stimulates us *also* to a like faith. The expression *who endured such contradiction* is no longer purely objective, but involves an implicit comparison of that which *Christ* had to suffer, with what *the readers* had to suffer. These (according to ver. 4, compared with chap. xi. 33, seq.) had not yet been persecuted unto blood. They had at most endured nothing further than *contradiction;* they had been denied the right of fellowship with the Israelitish theocracy and of worshipping in the temple: they had been in various ways spoiled of their goods and insulted. By means of a litotes, the author now exhorts them to remember *that* Jesus who has endured *such* contradiction (as was described in ver. 2), a severer contradiction, therefore, than they have endured. The train of thought, therefore, is this: Run with steadfast patience. To the end of the course you must look to Jesus, who, in his death on the cross, has proved himself to be the absolute champion of faith. And if you are required to look to him, then you are required to consider that man who has endured *such* a contradiction—truly a greater and severer *than you* have been called to endure. Of this *looking* to Jesus and *considering* him, the consequence (and therewith also its aim) will be, that the readers do not become wearied through the flagging of their spirits. As κάμνειν is generally used absolutely, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν will therefore be dependent, not on κάμητε, but on ἐκλυόμενοι. Κάμνειν and ἐκλύεσθαι, however, form no tautology. Κάμνειν denotes the state of being passively wearied and *unable* to do anything more, as the *effect* of the ἐκλύεσθαι; ἐκλύεσθαι denotes the being relaxed and careless as a culpable act and cause of the κάμνειν. Ἐκλύεσθαι is not passive but middle.

SECTION FIFTH.

FOURTH MOTIVE. THE BLESSING OF CHASTISEMENT.

(xii. 4—17.)

Affliction and persecution have a twofold character; on the one hand, they may be regarded as *trials of faith*, as trials shewing how much of the *new man* there is in the Christian, and how strong that new man is; on the other hand, however, they are also *chastisements* and means of purification, which serve entirely to destroy the *old man*—the latter, indeed, only when the trial of faith is overcome, when there is an invigorated new man already present, who by bearing those trials, *acquires new strength* and gains thereby new conquests over the old Adam. From this point of view, the author regards the threatening persecutions in this fifth section. He shews that that suffering has, at the same time, the quality of a means of purification and discipline, but shews also that it only then becomes a *παιδεία* when the Christian bears it in faith (ver. 4–11). He then (in ver. 12–17) repeats the old exhortations (chap. x. 19–25, comp. chap. xii. 1–3), so, however, as that he gives prominence to certain special points.

Ver. 4 forms the transition. The words *πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* are dependent on *ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι*, not on *ἀντικατέστητε*, as the latter is already determined by the accompanying expression *μέχρις αἵματος*, while the former would otherwise stand quite alone, and be an aimless repetition of the idea already implied in *ἀντικατέστητε*. We have, therefore, to render thus: You have not yet in the struggle with sin resisted even to blood.—First of all, the question presents itself what is meant here by *sin*, whether the sin of the readers which was spoken of in ver. 1—in which case, the author in ver. 4 imputes it as a *fault* to the readers that they were remiss in the *internal* struggle for sanctification, and the expression *unto blood* must be understood *figuratively* = "you have not yet striven to the uttermost against your sins." Or, whether the objective power of sin is here meant, —sin as the enmity of the world against the gospel and its professors,—consequently, the *contradiction of sinners* mentioned in ver. 3 —in which case ver. 4 contains a simple *statement of the fact*, and the expression *unto blood* can be taken in the proper sense = "you have not yet needed to resist unto blood in the contest with sinners." The words do not determine which of these interpretations is the right one. The former would certainly also be suitable to the context. The author would, in this case, set over against the *exhortation*, given in ver. 1, to cast away all sin from them, the *statement by way of reproof*, that the readers had as yet not rightly done this.

But then, we should have expected a somewhat more detailed and pointed statement of *what* sins they were, to which especially they as yet gave place. Instead of this, the fault which he imputes to them in ver. 5, is not one having reference to particular sins (as the *hindrances* in the struggle connected with their profession), but only to their indolence in this struggle itself (consequently, to the *effect* of these hindrances), namely, the fault that they did not consider the persecutions as a blessing and a benefit. Moreover, in ver. 1 the laying aside of sin did not form the kernel of the exhortation—this lies in the words *run with patience*. On these grounds it appears to me more probable, that the *second* explanation of ver. 4 is the right one. "You have not yet needed to resist unto blood in the struggle against the power of sin, and (already) you have forgotten," etc. This, at all events, is a less violent transition. That the author says here *against sin*, and not as in ver. 3, *against sinners*, may be simply explained by this, that men collectively might as "sinners" (the *class* sinners) be placed in opposition *to Christ*, while *vice versâ*, the enemies of Christianity could not be placed as "sinners" in opposition to the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who were themselves sinners (ἁμαρτωλοί).

In vers. 5, 6 the author complains that his readers, although as yet by no means persecuted unto blood (comp. chap. x. 33, seq.), nevertheless already shrunk back with fear from every suffering, and must therefore have forgotten the truth (expressed in Prov. iii. 11, 12) that to endure suffering and persecution is not inconsistent with standing in the relation of a child of God, and is no token of the want of fatherly love on the part of God, but on the contrary, is a proof of his fatherly love. (The trifling deviations of the LXX. from the original text make no substantial alteration in the sense).

In vers. 7, 8 the author now expresses, first of all, the important truth, that one must *bear* the suffering *in order that* it may bring blessing, and have the quality of being a means of instruction. Εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένετε. *Only when* it is borne in a Christian spirit as coming from the hand of God, does it produce the effect for which it is intended, *i. e.*, the destruction of the old man. "Be patient in order to your instruction."

Misunderstanding this fine sentiment, many commentators have, however, rejected the genuine and fully authenticated reading εἰς, found in the three uncial manuscripts A, D, E, which are generally collated for the Epistle to the Hebrews, in thirty other codd., in the Peshito, Vulgate, the Latin versions of the codd. D, E, the Kopt., Sahid., Æthiop., Armen., etc., and have preferred to it the entirely unauthenticated reading of some versions εἰ, which, it is held, yields a better sense. It gives a more jejune and easier sense, and this ac-

counts for its origin. A really apposite sense, however, it does *not* give. For what sort of sense is this : if ye patiently bear your discipline (or chastisement), then God deals with you as sons ?" Surely God already *deals with them* as sons in *sending* suffering, and not first when man *patiently bears* the suffering ; hence Grotius, Limborch, Kuinoel, Bleek, etc., have in reality felt necessitated to give *ὑπομένειν* here the weakened signification " to have to suffer" (" if ye have chastisement to suffer," etc.), but this is contradicted by the context, in which *ὑπομένειν* and *ὑπομονή* is everywhere quite properly used as *terminus technicus* for the idea of patience in suffering.

And what positive reasons can be adduced against the authorized reading *εἰς* ? Bleek asserts that discipline is not the end of patience, but the object of it. He confounds here, however, the idea of *παιδεία* with that of *πειρασμός* or *θλίψις*. Suffering certainly becomes then, and only then, a *means of instruction and sanctification*, when the Christian receives it with patience, and submits to it without resistance. This is precisely what the author intends to say. The fact that suffering may become *παιδεία* to them, he mentions as a *new motive* which should stimulate the readers to exercise *ὑπομονή*.— It is said, further, that if the words *εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένετε* are taken as an independent clause, there arises, between this and the following clause, an *asyndeton* so harsh as to be inconsistent with the usual style of our author. But what is there to necessitate our taking *ὡς* here as an adverb, and referring it to the noun *υἱοῖς* ? We take *ὡς* as a conjunction either in the sense of " as" (as at Luke iii. 23 ; Rom. i. 9 : Heb. iii. 11)—" endure patiently in order to discipline, as God then treats you as sons"—or, better still, in the sense of time, " when," " so long as" (as at Luke iv. 25 ; Gal. vi. 10)—" endure patiently in order to discipline, when God treats you as sons."

The latter idea needs now an explanation, and this is given in the words *τίς γὰρ . . . . καὶ οὐχ υἱοί.* " Every son needs discipline ; he who enjoys no discipline is no genuine son."—*Υἱοί*, as at chap. ii. 10, is here used of *Christians* instead of the common expression *τέκνα*. Comp. what is said in chap. i. 5.

Vers. 9, 10.—The author now proceeds to consider the subject from a new point of view. We must be patient under the divine discipline, and let it become indeed discipline to us, all the more that this discipline is for our highest good, and to train us for heaven.—*Εἶτα* cannot be connected with the question *πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὑποταγησόμεθα*, so as to make *εἴχομεν καὶ ἐνετρεπόμεθα* a parenthesis ; this is inadmissible, partly, on account of the harshness of the construction, partly, because *εἶτα* only occurs in the questions of wonder or irony. *Εἶτα* must rather be taken in the signification " further," and referred to *εἴχομεν*. Further, we had our fleshly fathers as in-

structors and obeyed them; ought we not now rather to be in subjection to the Father of Spirits, and (thereby) live. In the expression *καὶ ζήσομεν* the writer thought in Hebrew. *Σάρξ* does not here, any more than elsewhere, denote the *body* (hence Creatianism appeals unjustly to this passage in support of the doctrine that the body alone is begotten by the parents, while the soul is created by God); but *σάρξ* denotes there, as always, the natural life produced by *creature* powers, in opposition to the life which is produced by the *saving gracious act* of God in regeneration. By the natural generation we become *ἄνθρωποί σαρκικοί*; it is God who, by his Holy Spirit, causes our *ψυχαί* to be developed into sanctified *πνεύματα*. (Comp. on chap. iv. 12). True *every soul*, even that of the ungodly, developes itself into a spirit, inasmuch as it unfolds itself to a personality with a fixed character and being; but as, in our passage, it is not ungodly persons, but Christians that are spoken of, whose *ψυχαί* have, through the influence of God, developed themselves into *πνεύματα*, the author can *here*, with perfect propriety, name *God* as the father of the *πνεύματα*. At all events, the expression *πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων* here is to be explained from the antithesis *οἱ πατέρες τῆς σαρκός*, and is therefore not to be explained from the Old Testament expression אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחוֹת לְכָל־בָּשָׂר (Num. xvi. 22) (Bleek), with which it has nothing at all to do. (In that expression the principal idea "Father" is wanting, and רוּחוֹת, as the additional words לְכָל בָּשָׂר shew, stands in a much wider sense, and does not as here form an antithesis to בָּשָׂר.). It is, in like manner, a mistake to give to *πατήρ* (with Bretschneider, Kuinoel) the signification "preserver," by which the parallel with *πατέρες τῆς σαρκός* would be entirely destroyed.

In ver. 10 follows the idea which forms, as it were, the minor proposition between the major *εἴχομεν*, etc., and the conclusion *πόσῳ μᾶλλον*, etc., a peculiarity which we have already often had occasion to remark in the Epistle to the Hebrews (for example, chap. vii. 15, seq., ix. 15–23, etc.) The *vis conclusionis* in the inference, ver. 9, drawn *a minori ad majus*, lies in these two ideas, first, that earthly parents too often educate their children *according to their blind judgment*—without wisdom, from blind partiality, to gratify their vanity, for the sake of their gains—while God, who is love, has in view only the real profit of his children; and secondly, that the earthly fleshly fathers (of sanctified Christian fathers nothing is here said) bring up their children only for a *period* which is soon to pass away, *i. e.*, for this earthly life, and the earthly calling, while God educates his children for the eternal life, for "participation in his own holiness."

Ver. 11 is a precious verse to which properly *experience* alone can furnish the true commentary. All discipline seems, during the time of its continuance, to be an object not of joy but of grief;

afterwards, however, it yields a peaceable fruit to those who are exercised thereby, a fruit of righteousness. The gen. δικαιοσύνης does not depend directly on καρπὸν εἰρηνικόν ("peaceable fruit of righteousness"), but another καρπόν is to be supplied after ἀποδίδωσι as apposition to the first καρπόν. Thus the idea "fruit of righteousness" is epexegetical of the idea "peaceable fruit." Εἰρηνικός, however, is not to be explained from the Hebrew usage of שָׁלוֹם = "health," so that εἰρηνικός is = "wholesome" (Luther, Castellio, Michaelis, Ernesti, Bretschneider, Kuinoel), but it is to be explained (with Calvin and Tholuck) from its antithesis to the idea of the γυμνασμένον εἶναι. Exercise in hard bitter *conflict* brings *peace* as its fruit. From this, also, the idea of the δικαιοσύνη explains itself. The righteousness of which the Christian first becomes a partaker in consequence of the *finished* conflict *of purification and sanctification*, cannot be the δικαιοσύνη in the Pauline sense, the *justification before God;* this *we* have not to gain; it is already gained (comp. chap. x. 19, seq.); it is not the reward of the struggle, but the coat of mail, which we must put on before the struggle, and which qualifies us for the conflict. On the other hand, however, δικαιοσύνη does not denote merely the *perfected subjective sanctification* as such —just because our righteousness does not lie in this—but the perfect sanctification, *in so far as* it leads to the perfect undisturbed *appropriation* of justification; *i. e.*, the (future) state of the new man completely purified from the old Adam, who is *therefore* free from all self-righteousness, and *therefore* rests entirely on the merits of *Christ, because* he is now entirely free from the old Adam, from sin. For it is not to be forgotten, *that it is not our holiness but our sin that makes us self-righteous.* The more disturbed the mirror is, the less do we see in it the spots which cleave to us; the purer the mirror of conscience, the clearer does the smallest stain appear in it. The man whose conscience is asleep and benumbed by sin, will rudely repel the charge that he is a poor sinner as an affront; the more earnestly and successfully a man strives against his sin, so much the more clear does his misery become to him, so much the more does pride and self-righteousness vanish, so much the more heartily does he lay hold on the merit of Christ; and when once we shall have finished the struggle, and, free from the last motion of sinful inclination, shall enter into the Holy of Holies of our Lord and Saviour, we shall then entirely acknowledge and glory in this, that we are righteous before God *only through him and through him alone*; *i. e.*, we shall reap that "fruit of peace," that "fruit of righteousness," the now entirely appropriated *righteousness in Christ*, because we shall then stand and be willing to stand entirely in Christ, and no longer out of Christ.

In ver. 12, 13, the exhortation of ver. 2 and 3 is repeated. The

readers, formerly strong in the conflict, and zealous in the race, had now become feeble in the hands and slack in the knees; it was their duty to collect their strength anew. The words *τροχίας ὀρθὰς ποιήσατε τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμων* form, as is well known, a hexameter, certainly an unintentional one. The author rather intended only an imitation of the passage in Proverbs iv. 26. *Τοῖς ποσίν* cannot be taken as *instrumental* "(describe straight tracks with your feet"), as this figure would have no reality to rest upon, inasmuch as the feet describe no tracks, and even although *τροχίαι* be taken in the wider sense (= footstep), the footsteps do not properly make a line. *Τοῖς ποσίν* is rather the dative proper, and *τροχίαι* stands in the sense of "pathways." Prepare straight, *i. e.*, *even* paths for your feet. The opposition is not between straight and roundabout, but between even and rough ways, as appears from the clause *ἵνα μὴ τὸ χωλόν*, etc., which expresses the end that is sought to be gained. The readers are not themselves to throw hindrances (stones as it were) on the way, "that that which is already lame may not be quite dislocated." By the *χωλόν* the readers themselves, of course, are meant, in so far as they had already grown slack in the race, and were thus (speaking figuratively) lamed. They are to take care not to break entirely or to dislocate their limbs, *i. e.*, to become entirely incapable of going on in the race; they are rather to strive to recover their original strength and vigour. (To render *ἐκτρέπεσθαι* by "turn aside from the way" would give no sense).

Vers. 14, 15.—The exhortation in ver. 14, to strive after peace with all men, is referred by many to the relation of the readers *to the Jews*. Böhme seriously thinks that the author warns his readers against falling out with the Jews, so that they may not have to expect persecutions from them! The explanation of Grotius is more tolerable: Debetis quidem vobis, a Judaismo cavere, attamen non odisse Judaeos; but, in this case, a more distinct and explicit warning against Judaism must have gone before in ver. 13, and even then the author could scarcely have laid down so absolutely the injunction, *follow peace with all*. It would be still better to understand *διώκετε εἰρήνην* as a concession ("you may indeed strive after peace with all, but only strive also, etc.); we should then, however, expect a *μέν . . . δέ . . .*, and not *holiness* but faithfulness in their profession of the truth, must have been specified as the antithesis to *peace*. It is better, therefore, with Michaelis, Zachariä, Storr, Tholuck, and Bleek, to refer the whole exhortation to the relation of the readers to *their fellow Christians*, which is also spoken of in ver. 15. They are to guard against *differences among themselves*, they are not to quarrel with one another, but every one is to be earnestly intent on his own sanctification. It has appeared from the observations we have made above at ver. 11, how indis-

pensable this sanctification is in order to attain to happiness, in order to see the Lord. In the 15th verse the two exhortations of the 14th verse are repeated, only in the inverse order. They are carefully to see (each one for himself, and also the one for the other, by means of that παράκλησις described in chap. x. 24, seq.) "that no one remains behind the grace of God" (an expression which is still to be explained from the allusion of a race towards a goal). And they are likewise to take care "that no springing root of bitterness cause disturbance, and thereby many be defiled." For, in times when the Church is threatened and assailed *from without*, nothing is more dangerous than those internal divisions and factions, which usually arise from obstinately giving to minor differences of a merely relative value the importance of absolute differences, as, for example, is done, when in times in which the fabric of the Christian Church is everywhere in flames, and people come with the fire-engines of the home mission to set about extinguishing the fire, others appear, calling out that the Lutheran engines must not be placed among the United and Reformed engines, in order that the Lutheran jets of water may not mingle with the United and Reformed, and thus occasion a union of works. Each party is rather to work according to its own plan of operation, although these plans should even cross each other, although an incalculable amount of power and success should thereby be lost, although the house should burn down. The opposition of confessions is regarded as absolute, and treated as of greater importance than the opposition between Christ and Belial. Those Jewish Christians, also, to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews was addressed, in their relation to other Jewish Christians and to Gentile Christians, may not have been free from this disease. They, too, may have had their hearts and their heads so filled and carried away with some difference, *which reaches not into the future life*, that they had eyes only for this, and cared not for the trouble and danger which they were preparing for the Church. They considered not that it is always a subtle idolatry, which leads a man to treat a relative thing as if it were the absolute. The purity of a creed even may be made an εἴδωλον.—But wherever such perversity has found place, it becomes a *root of bitterness*; alienation, strife, bitterness, and confusion grow out from it; even those who stand on freer ground, and are opposed to the divisions, are yet easily offended and led to take a side and contend for it; but wo to him who *gives* the offence.

In vers. 16, 17 the author turns back to the principal question, whether the earthly or the heavenly is most loved. Πόρνος, *fornicator*, in this context is, of course, to be taken in that familiar symbolical sense in which it so often occurs in the Old Testament (especially Hosea i.–iii.; Ez. xvi. and xxiii.), and also in the New Testament (James iv. 4), to designate those who violate the spiritual marriage-

covenant with their God. Βέβηλος, as antithetical to ἅγιος, designates the same men in respect of their *profane, unspiritual* character. A warning example of this character is presented in Esau, who cared so little for the blessing of the first-born that he sold his birth-right for a savory dish, and in doing so frivolously exclaimed: "what profit then shall the blessing do to me?" (Gen. xxv. 32.) Not until God in his righteous providence brought it about, that Jacob cheated him out of the blessing, did he "cry aloud and was exceedingly grieved," and wished to have the blessing which Jacob had received. To this our 17th verse refers. Many commentators (Beza, Gerhard, Carpzov, Storr, Michaelis, Böhme, Klee, Tholuck, etc.) rightly understand, therefore, by the μετάνοια here, *the changing of Isaac's mind* (Esau found no possibility of changing Isaac's resolution). Against this it cannot (with Bleek) be objected, that Isaac did really change his mind, for in what did this change shew itself? He perceived his *error*, but he adhered to the resolution that Jacob should keep the blessing which had been given to him, and Esau could in reality move him to no change in his purpose. To this also the words τόπον μετανοίας οὐχ εὗρε are quite suitable. He found no more room (in his father's heart), where a change of mind might have taken place. Nor was there any need of a πατρός at μετανοίας, as, already at the verb ἀπεδοκιμάσθη, a ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός must be supplied. Only according to this explanation also do the words *although seeking it with tears* (scil. τὴν μετάνοιαν) obtain a meaning. These words contain a reference to Gen. xxvii. 34.—If, on the other hand, we understand by μετάνοια Esau's own inward sorrow and repentance, then the last words are meaningless and untrue; meaningless, because he who seeks repentance with tears thereby already manifests repentance; untrue, because in Gen. xxxiii. Esau shews a changed heart, emptied of revenge and reconciled. There then remains no other way than (with Calvin, Bengel, Bleek, etc.) to take the words μετανοίας γὰρ τόπον οὐχ εὗρε as a parenthesis (but even then they give no tolerable sense), and to refer the αὐτήν which depend son ἐκζητήσας to εὐλογίαν—a construction utterly unnatural!

SECTION SIXTH.

FIFTH MOTIVE. THE CHOICE BETWEEN GRACE AND LAW; A CHOICE BETWEEN SALVATION AND JUDGMENT.

(xii. 18–29.)

The author here, once more, states in bold poetical language the substance of what has been said, and again presents the distinction

between the law as preparatory, and the fulfilment in Christ, in all its sharpness, but at the same time in all its greatness and majesty. Both are divine, but the law is terrible; does it only terrify and shake into repentance the slumbering deaf conscience,—it is intended for nothing else; it is not given to confer blessedness, it is terrible; the new covenant with its redemption is lovely and attractive. We have here quite the ground-idea of the Pauline system of doctrine, only, that Paul has developed this psychologically from the subjective experience, while our author, on the contrary, has developed it historically from the objective facts.—He shews, however (ver. 18–24), not merely how attractive and glorious the new covenant is, but also (vers. 25–29) how much more terrible it is to despise the grace of this new covenant, and how much more terrible Christ will be when he shall come again as judge, to those who have preferred the law to grace and have provoked judgment upon themselves.

Ver. 18–24 is also remarkable in respect of its form, on account of the exceedingly elegant (paratactic) structure of the period. *For ye are not come . . . but are come . . .* are the two main pillars upon which the other members of the sentiment rest. The idea expressed in *προσέρχεσθε* is explained, on the one hand, from Deut. iv. 11, on the other, from Heb. iv. 16 and 22. The Christians are not come to the place where a law is given, but to the city or the kingdom of reconciliation.—The description of the giving of the law from Sinai follows not the more concise account in Ex. xx., but the more detailed in Deut. iv.–v. With respect to the reading, *ὄρει*, ver. 18, is certainly spurious; it is wanting in A, C, in the versions 17 and 47, in Chrysostom, in the Peshito, Copt., Æthiop., Latin D and Vulgate. It is at once evident, how easily it might find its way as a conjecture into those authorities which read *ὄρει*; the sentiment requires an *ὄρει* on two grounds, partly an antithesis to the words *Σιὼν ὄρει*, ver 22, partly, as noun to *ψηλαφωμένῳ*, which in respect of its signification, cannot possibly belong to *πυρί*. Those transcribers who have inserted *ὄρει* by way of correction, were thus quite right; they have just rectified an *original* mistake in the autograph. The author certainly had the word *ὄρει in his mind*, but neglected to *write* it. (For only thus is the omission of the word in all the old authorites to be explained.) We have thus here the rare case of a reading externally spurious and yet internally genuine.—*Ψηλαφωμένῳ*, touched, *i. e.*, tangible (= *ψηλαφητός*) designates the mount (Sinai) as an earthly mount, consisting of masses of rock, in opposition to the *heavenly Jerusalem*, ver. 22, the "mount Zion," by which is meant not the earthly geographical hill Zion, but the *Kingdom of Christ* symbolically called Zion.—*Κεκαυμένῳ* cannot be the attribute to *πυρί*; for, to designate a fire as one that is "burning" is superfluous, unless it were intended to oppose a burning fire to a painted

one, which is not the case here. *Κεκαυμένῳ* is rather the second attribute to *ὄρει*, and *πυρί* is dependent on *κεκαυμένῳ*: "to the mount that could be touched and that burned with fire." *Γνόφῳ*, etc., depends, of course, again on *προσεληλύθατε* and not on *κεκαυμένῳ*. In addition to these sensibly terrible appearances, blackness, darkness, tempest, sound of trumpets, there was "the voice of words, which (voice) they that heard refused that any word more should be added," *i. e.* the voice of words which was so fearful in its sound and import, that the Israelites wished to hear no word further (Deut. v. 24–26). True, the ten commandments, themselves, had not yet been spoken (comp. Deut. v. 26, seq., with Ex. xix. 17 and 20), but already the command (Ex. xix. 12, 13), that even no beast should touch the mountain, put the people in terror. The words *κἂν θήριον*, etc., form the import of the *διαστελλόμενον*. The *καί* which follows must belong to *Μωϋσῆς εἶπεν*, and the words *οὕτω φοβερὸν ἦν τὸ φανταζόμενον* must be parenthetical; otherwise there would be an inexplicable asyndeton between *φανταζόμενον* and *Μωϋσῆς*. The circumstance here stated, that Moses also said, "I exceedingly fear and quake," can hardly have proceeded from oral tradition (Erasmus, Beza, etc.), but is taken from the passage Deut. ix. 19 (LXX.). True, in that place it is not the moment *before* the giving of the law that is spoken of, but a point of time *during* the giving of the law, when Moses was made aware of the golden calf (and this our author, who is so much at home in the Old Testament, must have perfectly well known); but his design, here, is not to speak particularly of what belonged to the giving of the law, but in general of the severity and fearfulness of God as he appeared on Mount Sinai. So terrible were the appearances, so fearfully did God manifest his severity, that even Moses himself—not on account of his own trespass, but on account of the sin of the people—was thrown into fear and trembling. (Knapp, Tholuck, etc.)—The Christians are not come to that *earthly* mount, where the *severity* of God was manifested, but to mount Zion symbolically so called, which is the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem. The kingdom of Christ is so designated also at Gal. iv. 26. This (already present) heavenly Jerusalem is different from the New Jerusalem in the Apocalypse of John, which is not to be set up on *the earth* till after the second coming of Christ.—The words which follow are variously construed. Beza, Calov, Carpzov, Storr, etc., make *ἀγγέλων* dependent on *μυριάσιν*, and take *πανηγύρει* together with *ἐκκλησίᾳ*, so that *πρωτοτόκων* depends on these two substantives ("to hosts of angels, to the assembly and church of the first born.") But, in this case, it is strange that the *καί* which unites all the other members is wanting before *πανηγύρει*. Œcumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, etc., likewise, take *ἀγγέλων* as dependent on *μυριάσιν*, but

understand πανηγύρει as apposition to μυριάσιν ("to hosts of angels, an assembly, and to the church," etc.); but we have only to hear this rendering, in order to be convinced of what a frigid sense such an apposition would have. The only right construction is that of Wolf, Rambach, Griesbach, Knapp, Böhme, Kuinoel, Tholuck, Bengel, Lachmann, De Wette, Bleek, etc., which makes ἀγγέλων dependent on πανηγύρει. It is then most natural to take the two members: ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει and ἐκκλησίᾳ πρωτοτόκων as epexegetical of μυριάσιν. ("And to entire hosts: to the host of angels and to the church of the first born.") The πρωτοτόκοι are the first fruits of the regenerate, the members of the new covenant. As they are not described as "*being* in heaven," but "written down in heaven" (Luke x. 20; Phil. iii. 20; also Ex. xxxii. 32, seq.; Dan. xii. 1; Phil. iv. 3; Rev. iii. 5, xiii. 8, xvii. 8, xxi. 27, xxii. 19), we are to understand here not those Christians alone who were already dead, but those also who were yet alive, and the μυριάδες comprehends both, the ecclesia pressa or militans, and the ecclesia triumphans. In the new covenant heaven and earth are united and reconciled (Eph. i. 10), while in the giving of the law from Sinai, a gulf was fixed between the trembling people and the terrifying *ministering spirits*. (Heb. ii. 14.)

Καὶ κριτῇ θεῷ πάντων,—Primasius, Theophylact, etc., have understood these words of Christ, which is altogether inadmissible, as Christ is afterwards specially named. God the Father is certainly meant. In no case, however, can we (with Erasmus, Michaelis, Knapp, Bleek, etc.) take κριτῇ as a predicate idea ("and to the God of all *as* the Judge"), for the Christians do *not* come to God as their *Judge*, but as their reconciled Father. We must rather either (with Peshito, Vulgate, Luther, Kuinoel, De Wette, etc.) take πάντων as dependent on κριτῇ ("and to God, the Judge of all"), or connect κριτῇ as an adjectival idea with θεῷ ("and to the judging God of all"), which yields sustantially the same sense. The nerve of the idea lies in this, that the believers of the new covenant may come near with boldness to the Judge of the *world*, while the Israelites would not come nigh to him, although he was *their own special lawgiver*.—The Christians can come nigh to him, for they find with him already the spirits of the just made perfect (through Christ), and the Mediator himself through whom these were made just. Τελειοῦσθαι does not denote *death*, as if in it the being made perfect consists (Calvin, Kuinoel, etc.), but is used, as at chap. vii. 11–19, x. 14, xi. 40, to denote the *accomplished realized* reconciliation. Perhaps the author in these "just made perfect" has had specially in his mind that host of Old Testament believers described in chap. xi.—The culminating point in the glory of the heavenly Jerusalem is *Jesus, the Mediator himself*, with his *blood of reconciliation*, which

speaks better than the blood of Abel (comp. chap. xi. 4). Abel's blood cries for vengeance ; Christ's blood cries for grace.

Ver. 25. With this is connected the exhortation not to refuse this Jesus who by his blood cries for grace to us. When the Israelites at Sinai (ver. 19) refused to hear God's voice and to fulfil his commands, they were punished. He, moreover, who refuses to hear the voice of grace is lost.—Εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἔφυγον,—to this must be supplied τὴν τιμωρίαν ; true, it is nowhere said in the Pentateuch that the Israelites had been punished because they *dared not to hear the words of God ;* they are rather commended for this (Deut. v. 28, 29). But the idea of the παραιτεῖν involves here not merely that *praiseworthy* fear, but also the subsequent *actual transgression* of the commands of God (Ex. xxxii.), which was already noticed in ver. 21. At πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς is to be supplied, of course, οὐ φευξόμεθα. The expression ὁ ἀπ' οὐρανῶν scil. λαλῶν finds a simple explanation in the λαλοῦντα at the beginning of our verse, and this, again, is explained from ver. 24. It is Christ, who in heaven cries for grace to us, and thus offers us grace from heaven. (Not : Christ in so far as he descended from heaven and became man, not God the Father.) As now, it is said of him (Christ) in ver. 26, that he shook the earth in the time of Moses (for οὗ can of course be referred only to τὸν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ), we must also understand by the ἐπὶ γῆς χρηματίζων *Christ* (as God the Son, God as revealing himself, comp. 1 Cor. x. 1, seq.), not Moses, nor God the Father.

Ver. 26, 27. The same Christ who has already revealed himself on Sinai as the *Lawgiver*, and who now speaks from heaven as *Mediator*, will come again as *Judge*. In proof of this the passage, Hag. ii. 6, is adduced, which, in its original import, really refers to the coming of Christ to set up his kingdom in glory. Our author plainly lays emphasis on two points in the passage, first on this, that at the second coming of the Messiah, not merely are local appearances of nature to take place on a part of the earth, but *heaven and earth*, the whole visible created world, is to be shaken and unhinged ; secondly, on this, that the shaking is to take place ἔτι ἅπαξ, consequently, is to be such a shaking as makes any repetition superfluous, such therefore, as is to unhinge and change everything that, generally speaking, is in its nature changeable. The ἔτι ἅπαξ is, indeed, not so explicitly expressed in the original text as in the LXX. ; but it is quite clear that the prophet meant a last final shaking of the world, which was at one time to take place, so that the LXX. has substantially rendered the sense quite correctly.

Ver. 28, 29. That which cannot be shaken, which does not go down in the universal change, is the kingdom of Christ. For this is no ποιούμενον, does not belong to the creature, but is the organic assemblage of those who are born of, and filled with, the Son of

God and the Spirit of God. The Kingdom of God is the body of Christ.—*Παραλαμβάνειν* signifies not *to take actively*, but *to receive passively*. As we have received such a kingdom, as we have become partakers of it, let us "have gratitude" (not "hold fast the grace," this must have been expressed by *κατέχωμεν τὴν χάριν*), and serve God acceptably with reverence and awe. (A, C, D, and versions read *μετ' εὐλαβείας καὶ δέους*, others *μετὰ δέους καὶ εὐλαβείας*. The readings *μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ εὐλαβείας* and *μετ' εὐλαβείας καὶ φοβοῦ* have very little authority on their side). On ver. 29 comp. chap. x. 31.

SECTION SEVENTH.

CONCLUDING EXHORTATIONS.

(Chap. xiii.)

THESE exhortations are not abrupt and unconnected, but are most closely related to each other, and to the import and aim of the entire epistle. They are also of such a kind, as to cause us no perplexity in the view we have taken, that the epistle is not for a church, but for a circle of catechumens ; for they all refer to the individual, not to the church life.

First, in ver. 1–6 we have exhortations respecting the individual life as such, then, in ver. 7–17, respecting the relation of the individual to the doctrine and the profession, and finally, in ver. 18–25, the conclusion of the writing.

Ver. 1–6. The first virtue which is required is brotherly love, by which is not meant the common Christian love of *man* in the relations of the natural life, at least not it alone, but chiefly, that love of the Christian to the Christian as a member with him of the body of Christ, which forms the antithesis to the *root of bitterness*, chap. xii. 15. That brotherly love which does not in the first place inquire : "Art thou a Jewish Christian ? art thou a Gentile Christian ? art thou Roman or Grecian ? United or Lutheran ? Anglican or Presbyterian ? what *doctrine* and *view* dost thou hold of the sacrament ?"—but which first and foremost asks : "Art thou become by the *act* of the sacrament a member of the body of Christ ? (for the church rests on the Sacrament, and not on the doctrine of the Sacrament ; on the latter rests merely the *confession*)—and dost thou stand as a member of Christ in the *life* of Christ and in his *love ?*" He who can answer this in the affirmative is a *brother*, a brother by regeneration, although I may have a purer *knowledge* on many points than he !—An essential manifestation of that phila-

delphian feeling is *hospitality* (ver. 2), of which we have still, in these days, the finest illustration in the piladelphian practice. The motive, for *thereby*, etc., is explained from Gen. xviii.–xix., and its applicability from Matth. xxv. 44, 45. If the Christian is to exercise love even towards brethren who are *strangers*, how much more towards *suffering and persecuted brethren*, ver. 3. Such exercise of brotherly love the readers required, in order most firmly to settle them in *Christianity*—more firmly than by arguments. Chiefly must they, although not yet persecuted themselves, exercise themselves and prepare for the future persecution, by actively receiving those who were already persecuted. He who was afraid of doing so shewed by this act that he would shrink with still more cowardice from his own persecution. This admonition the Christians of our own day may well lay specially to heart. For, in our day, it has become quite the fashion, even among believers, to *disown* every brother, who by taking a firm and determined stand, has brought inconvenience upon himself, and carefully to inquire whether something not quite prudent or quite justifiable may not be discovered in the way in which he has conducted himself, and then to exclaim : "Yes, but he has not done right in this and that."

When the pastors of Waadtland would not acknowledge as "bishop" a college of state councillors which tolerated and encouraged the most blasphemous abominations, there were not wanting wise people who demonstrated to a nicety, that those men had committed a mistake, that they ought to have delayed for some days. May God grant us all the grace to commit *such mistakes!*— Ver. 4 cannot be understood as a warning against an ascetical rejection of marriage (for then he must at least have said : τίμιος ὁ γαμὸς, ἀλλ' ἀμίαντος ἡ κοίτη), but the author exhorts that marriage be maintained in honour (and thus *honourable*), and the marriage bed undefiled. He warns against those sins which, according to John viii. 1, seq., were at that time so fearfully prevalent among the Jewish people, that all idea of punishing them had to be given up. The same corruption of the national life has spread through all Europe. The members of Christ are not to be led by such a state of things to think lightly of, and easily to excuse, such sins ; for let him who has one member belonging to hell take care lest he do not altogether belong to it. He is like a bird whose foot the fowler has bound with a thread ; he can fly about apparently free, but still he is in the fowler's power, and if he does not break the thread while it is yet time, the fowler draws him to himself by means of it at the fitting moment, catches him and kills him. Every bosom sin plays into the hands of the devil ; is a poison which, chiefly in times of persecution, paralyses the strength of faith. Nor is it otherwise in respect *to avarice*, ver. 5, that national sin of the Jewish people,

the disposition to traffic which they have inherited from the natural life of their ancestor Jacob (comp. Gen. xxv. 31, seq.; xxx. 31–43). He whose heart cleaves to earthly possessions, will be faint-hearted in persecutions. And, in general, a family whose chief concern it is *to do the will of God*, and which commits the care for daily bread to him who will not leave nor forsake us, will lead a very different life (for example, in the sanctification of the Sabbath) from a family whose chief impelling motive is the striving after earthly possessions and wealth, and which goes along with Christianity only in so far as it will not interfere with worldly convenience.

Vers. 7–9.—According to ver. 7, *ἡγούμενοι* (not teachers but overseers—presbyters or apostles—of the Church at Jerusalem to which the readers belonged) had already suffered martyrdom (for the readers are to consider their *ἔκβασις* and the *faith* thereby attested). However, during the period subsequent to the conversion of the readers no more bloody persecutions had taken place, according to chap. xii. 4. We shall therefore have to understand a reference to such men as Stephen, James the son of Zebedee, and James the younger who was stoned in a tumult in the year 62, men whose death was known to the readers, and whom they even *now* doubtless acknowledged as *ἡγούμενοι*. Wieseler thinks, there is a reference to the deaths of the two apostles, Paul and Peter, which followed close on each other in the year 64. These two events had certainly made a great impression on the whole society of Christians, and if Paul, although not labouring in the Church of Jerusalem, was yet reckoned among the *ἡγουμένοις ὑμῶν*, this is to be explained partly, from his universal *apostolical* authority, partly, from the sympathy with which the Christians of Jerusalem must have regarded his imprisonment in Jerusalem and Cæsarea, partly, from his close connexion with Peter in Rome during the period immediately preceding his death.

Ver. 8 is not to be connected with ver. 7 by placing a colon after *πίστιν*, and supposing that ver. 8 states what is the *import* of the *πίστις*; for, by *πίστις* is meant, in the whole hortatory portion of the epistle, not faith as an acceptance of definite doctrinal propositions, but faith as that *disposition* of mind which holds fast on the future, and in this aspect alone can faith be spoken of in ver. 7 when it is said that the *ἡγούμενοι* had attested their *πίστις* in their death. Ver. 8 is rather to be understood as an explanation of the author's, intended as a *motive* to enforce the exhortation in ver. 7. "Imitate their faith; (for) Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." (Ὁ *αὐτός* is predicate). The same Christ, trusting in whom those died, still lives to-day, and is also our consolation (Calvin). Such explanations as the following are wrong: the Christian *religion* is everlasting, and will not be abolished in favour of the Jewish (Vat-

able, Michaelis, Kuinoel, etc.), or: the eternity of the λόγος as such is here spoken of (Ambrose, etc).

To the statement that Christ in whom those men died still lives, and that the readers are to place their entire confidence in him, corresponds the warning in ver. 9 not to let themselves be led away by various and foreign doctrines. From the clause, *for it is good*, etc., we perceive that the author must especially have had in his mind casuistic external doctrines regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of meats. These doctrines were ποικίλαι; one maintained that in the Christian freedom and deliverance from the ceremonial law they might go so far, another, somewhat farther, a third, not so far; every one drew a different line of limitation. The being occupied in general with *such* investigations, the fixing of the attention and interest on *such* questions, was, however, injurious and dangerous; for those doctrines were also "foreign;" they related to a point which was irrelevant to Christianity, and led away from the main concern to things of secondary moment, which ought to be entirely beyond the care of the Christian. "For it is good, if the heart be established in *grace*, not in *meats*." Thus and only thus are the datives χάριτι and βρώμασι to be understood (this use of the dative in answer to the question *in what* or *in reference to what* an act takes place, occurs frequently, for example, 1 Cor. xiv. 20; Rom. iv. 20; Acts ii. 37, etc.; comp. Winer's Gr., § 31, 6). By taking these datives, as is generally done, in an instrumental signification ("by grace not by meats"), all logical connexion with the first member of the sentence is destroyed.

Vers. 10–14.—The sentiment is expressed in a much higher form in these verses. Hitherto, it was shewn in the entire epistle, that the Levitical worship and the Levitical purity obtained by it, is *dispensable;* that it is no *misfortune* to be without it; and, accordingly, it had just been shewn at ver. 9 that the care of the Christian is to be directed to this, that he be settled as regards grace, not as regards ordinances about meats, which *profit nothing*. The author now rises higher; he leaps, as it were, from the defensive to the offensive; he says: it is not ill with us in this respect, but with the Jews; not we but they are the excommunicated party; we eat of the true sacrificial meat on which everything depends, and from this the *true*, the *Messianic*, *our* piacular meal, the Jews are excluded. This is the simple and clear statement in ver. 10. "We have an altar, of which they are not at liberty to eat, who still perform their worship in the tabernacle (the Old Testament sanctuary"). The author evidently has in his mind the holy supper, the meal of spiritual life-fellowship and union with the for us dead and now exalted Saviour. It is now shewn in vers. 11, 12, how that very Jesus who was rejected of the Jews, *notwithstanding* that he was rejected, nay,

because he was rejected, is the *true* sacrifice, and in ver. 13, seq., that consequently, that very company of believers in him which is rejected of the Jews, *notwithstanding that*, nay, *because*, it is so rejected, is the true Israel. The confirmation of this is profound, yet clear throughout. According to Lev. xvi. 27, the victim on the day of expiation, because it was (symbolically) laden with the uncleanness and guilt of the whole people, and was consequently *unclean*—not in itself, but by that transference of the guilt of others—must be *taken without the camp, and there burned.* This was done to the victim, *although* it was the same animal whose blood had atoning efficacy, and was carried into the holiest of all! Nay, still more, *because* this was done to it, *because* this animal *was regarded as unclean* on account of the guilt of others, and as unclean was cast outside the camp, *it had* atoning power. Now the same thing, only not symbolically, but really, is true also of Christ. With respect to him also, we are not at liberty to infer from his having been regarded as unclean and cast out as a malefactor, and killed at the place of execution, that he can be no true sacrifice, and that his blood cannot be the true blood of atonement. But just as that goat, Lev. xvi., was the true symbolical atoning sacrifice, *although* it was regarded and treated as unclean, nay, *because* it was reckoned unclean on account of the guilt of others, so is Christ the true substantial atoning sacrifice, *although*, nay, *because*, he was led without the gate as a criminal, and cast out and killed by the Jews.—From this, now, it follows, ver. 13, that those who are his have not to seek the true sacrifice in the camp of the Jews, but on Golgotha ; that they are not to mourn, and be cast down with sorrow and anguish, although, like their Lord they should be cast out and treated as unclean ; their hope, ver. 14, is not directed towards an earthly citizenship in the earthly Jerusalem, but towards the heavenly citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem (chap. xii. 22), the everlasting city.

And accordingly it follows from this, lastly, that the Christians do not need, as the Jews, to continue to offer animal sacrifices ; they are not to bring Levitical sacrifices *along with* the sacrifices of Christ, but are only *spiritually to reproduce*, in the manner described at ver. 13, the sacrifice of Christ, by which they have once for all received atonement. Hence there remains no other sacrifice for the Christian to offer, but the *sacrifices of thanksgiving and praise.*

Ver. 15–17. This idea is further developed in ver. 15, 16. The sacrifice of *praise* and of *steadfast profession* (just that reproduction of the sacrifice of Christ described in ver. 13), in addition to this, *beneficence* and communication of gifts, are the sacrifices with which God is well pleased. Κοινωνία in this usage (which first arose in the sphere of the Christian literature) occurs also at Rom.

SAN JOSE BIBLE COLLEGE LIBRARY

xv. 26 ; 2 Cor. ix. 13 ; Phil. i. 5.—With love to the brethren is connected by a natural association of ideas, ver. 17, obedience to the leaders of the Church. Thus the ideas from ver. 7 to ver. 17, describe in their succession a complete circle. The author at ver. 7 began with the *ἡγούμενοι*, and he returns to them again at ver. 17. He began with the mention of those leaders of the Church who had suffered martyrdom ; he had brought them forward as an example of faith, from them he passed to *faith* itself, as opposed to foreign doctrines, then to the obligation above all to be established in grace, to the grand development of the idea that the Jew is the excommunicated party, while the Christian, precisely when he is excommunicated, then first truly enters into the true Holy of Holies, finally, to the doctrine, that the internal reproduction of the sacrifice of Christ —the bearing the reproach of Christ—together with love to the brethren, are the only sacrifices which God desires from the Christian (not as atoning sacrifices but as thank-offerings), and love to the brethren leads him back, at last, to the duty towards the *ἡγούμενοι*, those, namely, who are *still living*.—Directly, ver. 17 contains the truth, that the member of the church, if he has a faithful shepherd, and does not follow him, is lost through his own fault. Indirectly, there lies in it also the other truth, that it is the duty of the shepherd to *watch* over the souls committed to his care, and that he must render an *account* of them all, of those also who have been lost through his fault. This is a solemn word. Let every minister of the word consider, that he has *voluntarily* undertaken this awfully responsible office. No one can excuse his indolence and negligence in this office by saying, that he has been *compelled* to undertake it. How, moreover, will the thieves (John x. 10) justify themselves before God, who have undertaken and forced themselves into the office of those who are called to administer the means of grace in Christ's stead, and have not as messengers of Christ preached His word and gospel, but their own conceits, or what might tickle the ears of the people.

Ver. 18, 19 forms the transition to the conclusion. "Pray for me." This should be done at all times ; the pastors should be borne upon the prayers of their people ; and it is well when the people are on the Sundays reminded of this duty, as is done for example in the Liturgy of Zurich, before imparting the blessing in the words : "Pray for us, as we do also for you."—"For we think that we have a good conscience, as we endeavour to walk uprightly in all things." He who possesses a good conscience in such a manner, has a right to demand intercessions on his behalf. But the author has special occasion for desiring these intercessions, inasmuch as he is in a situation which makes it not a matter depending on his will whether he will return to his readers again. His hoping "to be restored"

to the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem points to an earlier personal relation to them. We do not need to suppose, on this account, that the author must have had the official charge of a congregation in Jerusalem; it needs only to be supposed, that the author had been in Jerusalem during the first conversion of these people; so that the authorship of *Paul* would not be excluded by *this* verse.

Ver. 20, 21.—The epistle proper closes with the *invocation of a blessing* upon the readers. "The God of peace," he is such to the Christian, who, by faith in the sin-forgiving grace of the Saviour, has attained to peace with God. "Who has brought back from the dead the Shepherd of the sheep, the great one, in the blood of an everlasting covenant." The words ἐν αἵματι do not belong to ἀναγαγών; for the raising of Christ from the dead was not done in the blood of the everlasting covenant; nor does the position of the words suit this; the words in question rather belong plainly to τὸν μέγαν; Christ is the great, true, chief and superior shepherd, inasmuch as he has made an *everlasting* covenant by his blood (comp. chap. ix. 11, seq.). The best commentary on these words is found in John x. He is the good shepherd, because he has given his life for the sheep.—Now the God who has raised up this chief shepherd, and has crowned his *faith* (chap. xii. 1–3), has also power, strength, and will to make the members of Christ's body perfect. He is to make them exercised in every good thing to the doing of his will. This, however, is not effected by God's giving us new commandments which we must now fulfil without him, but by himself fulfilling his will *in us* through Christ. Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis. In the new man, his own doing and the working of God are not to be separated; Christ himself living within us is identical with our sanctification. A hateful caricature of this truth is presented in Pantheism, in which the will of the natural sinful man is identified with the administration of God, and the unsanctified energy of nature is viewed as the manifestation of the absolute energy of God.

Vers. 22–25 is a postscript. It comes, at all events, from the same hand that wrote the epistle; the question, however, is, whether only from the same *hand* (so that perhaps the amanuensis to whom the epistle had been *dictated* now added the postscript in his own name, and no longer in the name of the proper author, as Tertius, Rom. xvi. 21–24), or whether from the same *subject and author*. The one as well as the other might say, ver. 22, that he had *made use of few words* in the epistle; the amanuensis might also say this, provided we suppose that the epistle was not *verbally dictated* to him, but that it was *left* to him to carry out the ideas. On account of this brevity he hopes that the readers would take his exhortations in good part; not as if a short epistle would be

more welcome on account of its *smaller quantity of matter as such*, but because in condensed diction the author is entitled to reckon on being excused for many a harshness in the exhortations, which would not so easily have been committed if he had time and leisure to be more full. But the writing is indeed concise and compressed, even in its theoretical parts. The saying truly applies to it: quot verba tot pondera. Every little sentence, every member of a sentence, contains an exponent which might be developed into an entire series. Even in the choice of the themes and sections the strictest measure is observed. The author has purposely omitted much that he might have brought within the scope of his consideration. How well, for example, might he have carried out a comparison of Christ also with the Passover. But this he has only faintly indicated in chap. xiii. 10. He was evidently pressed by time and circumstances. Accordingly, he was obliged also in the hortatory pieces (chiefly in chap. vi. and x.) often to lay down solemn warnings shortly and almost unconnectedly. For this he begs to be excused in ver. 22; he could not do otherwise; he wrote *shortly*, and could not but write so.

In ver. 23 he notices that Timothy had been set free. Timothy then had been imprisoned. When? on this see the appendix. When now he says, that in case (ἐάν) Timothy shall come *soon* he will see the readers together with Timothy, this seems to imply, that *he himself* was *not* in prison, and that the hindrance to his return (ver. 19), for the removal of which he asks his readers to pray, cannot have consisted in an *imprisonment*. For had he been in prison, he must first have waited for his release, and then it had not depended on Timothy's coming soon, whether he would see his readers with Timothy or without him.—The 23d verse, therefore, leads us to the supposition that the author was free, was already about to set out on a journey, and would have taken Timothy, who had just been released from imprisonment along with him, on condition that he would come soon enough to his house, and fetch him away.

Nevertheless, a number of difficulties open themselves here. How then could the author exhort the readers in ver. 19 to pray for him that he might be restored to them, if he was so free and ready for a journey?—Further: why in general does he write at all, if he intends to come himself to them?—I find that the commentators, hitherto, have passed too easily over this difficulty. I can see only two solutions of it. *Either* we must suppose, that the author wrote the postscript at a time somewhat later than the epistle; when he wrote the epistle he was still in prison; not till after his release did he add the postscript. But then, we should certainly have expected that, in this postscript, he would make

grateful mention of his own lately and unexpectedly obtained deliverance. (Such as: But God be thanked who has done above what we ask or think, and has delivered me). *Or* better, we suppose that the proper author of the epistle was really in prison (yet according to ver. 19 not without hope of obtaining his freedom), but that the appendix, vers. 22–25, proceeds not from him, but from that *helper*, to whom he did not, perhaps dictate the epistle, but gave him only the ideas, with whom he had talked over the substance of it, leaving the conception to him. This helper had then, indeed, reason to ask excuse for himself (ver. 22) on account of certain harsh expressions. This helper relates the deliverance of Timothy. This helper is free and prepared for a journey—still, neither he nor Timothy can have gone *direct to Jerusalem*, in order to carry the epistle; otherwise, the entire postscript or (if Timothy was the bearer) at least the notice respecting him had been superfluous. But that helper hoped indeed to come soon to Jerusalem with Timothy, went, however, somewhere else before this, so that the epistle was transmitted through some other person.

From Ver. 24 it appears, that the helper was in *Italy;* for he writes salutations from the Christians of Italy. The explanation "those who have fled from Italy" (Bleek, etc.) cannot well be admitted, because then it had been strange that *only* these and not also the other Christians who lived in the place where the epistle was written, should have sent by the writer salutations to the readers. The *ἀπό* is easily explained; with less propriety could he have said *ἐν*, if he himself was in Italy; if he had said "the saints in Italy," he would thus have designated these so *objectively*, as to make it appear *that he himself was not also in Italy.* Hence he chooses the preposition *ἀπό*. "The saints of Italy salute you;" those who are natives of Italy, those who are there *at home*, as opposed to himself, who indeed was in Italy, but was not of Italy. Thus the Greek says (comp. Tholuck on the passage) *οἱ ἀπὸ γῆς* and *οἱ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης*, "the travellers by land, the travellers by sea," so Polyb. 5, 86, 10, *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας βασιλεῖς*, the Alexandrian kings. Comp. also Acts xvii. 3. Tholuck, indeed, has still a difficulty. Why does the author not say *ἀπὸ Ῥώμης*? First, because he would write salutations from *all* the churches of Italy; secondly, because he himself, as we shall afterwards see, was by no means at Rome.

The concluding verses of the Epistle lead us naturally to the critical inquiry respecting its *date*, *aim*, and *author*, which inquiry having now made ourselves familiar with the *contents* of the Epistle, we propose to conduct in an appendix.

APPENDIX.

ON THE DATE, DESTINATION, AND AUTHOR OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE CIRCLE OF READERS.

In the *want of a superscription* or address, in the *highly systematic distribution of the matter* into very distinctly defined sections, the themes of which are in every case formally intimated, as well as in the marked separation of the hortatory sections from the theoretical, finally, in the *difficulty of the diction*, the terseness of the sentiments, and the subtlety of argumentation in which much is really only indicated, and connecting links are left to be supplied by the reader's reflection (and his diligent comparison of the Old Testament with the epistle)—in all these respects the Epistle to the Hebrews is distinguished from all the other New Testament epistles, and considering all these peculiarities we may well say (what Berger* has said with substantial truth, although in a wrong way), *that the Epistle to the Hebrews is no epistle in the true and proper sense, or at least is no epistle in the ordinary sense.* The author on his part has not surrendered himself to the free and unrestrained effusion of his thoughts, cares, wishes, and feelings in this writing (as Paul does even in the most systematic of his epistles, that to the Romans), but he has worked out and *elaborated* it according to a well-considered plan, so that he evidently subordinates the subjective flow of his thoughts and feelings to this objective plan. The strict order of his argumentation is never broken in upon by overflowing emotions (as is done for example in Rom. i. 22, seq.; ii. 1 and 3 seq., and 24; iii. 5 and 9; vii. 24; xi. 33, etc.). The readers on their part could not possibly have understood the Epistle to the Hebrews if, like the rest of the New Testament epistles, it had been read a single time before an assembly of the Church; the Epistle

* Göttinger Theol. Bibl. part. iii. p. 449, seq.

to the Hebrews, in order to be understood, must be gone through section by section, slowly, carefully, and repeatedly, with continual comparison of the Old Testament passages cited in it and their connexion. Upon this the author has evidently reckoned.

It was then no ordinary epistle ; it was more than an epistle, *it had in reality something of the nature of a theological treatise*, and in so far Berger is certainly right. But he evidently went too far when he thought that the Epistle to the Hebrews was a *mere treatise* written not at all for a *definite* circle of readers, but for the entire Christian, or at least Jewish Christian public (something in the same way as the Gospel of Matthew). He found himself in this case driven to the unnatural supposition, that the appendix chap. xiii. 22–25, was first added supplementarily by one who was sending the treatise on to some other churches. But by this nothing is gained. For not merely in the appendix, but also in the epistle itself (chap. xiii. 19) *personal* relations of the author to the readers are presupposed, and moreover, the style of the exhortation points to a quite definite class of readers. Not only is it a very special error or spiritual malady that is counteracted throughout the entire epistle, not only must an exact acquaintance with the spiritual state of the readers be presupposed in the hortatory parts, but in the passage chap. v. 12 it is even indicated that the readers collectively had passed over to Christianity together at one and the same time, and in chap. vi. 10 and chap. x. 32, seq., reference is made to their former conduct, their former fortitude in the faith as contrasted with their present faintheartedness,—limitations of so definite a kind that we cannot suppose *a whole church* to be addressed, but only a very narrow and definite *circle of individuals.*

The Epistle to the Hebrews, then, deviates from the nature of an epistle, in so far as relates to the *manner in which its contents are represented;* but it is an epistle in so far as it relates to *the destination for a definite circle of readers.*

That we are to seek for this circle of readers among the Jewish Christians is, in the main, self-evident from the contents of the epistle ; nay more, we are at liberty to seek these Jewish Christians only in Jerusalem. The import of the epistle as a whole, and in its particular parts, has indeed the one practical aim of convincing the readers that it was no misfortune, and in no way dangerous as regards the salvation of their soul, *to be excluded from the temple and the temple worship*, and to make it clear to them that the central point for the Israelite who believes in the Messiah does not lie in Israelitism or Leviticism, but in Messiaism. The readers, therefore, did not only participate with many Jewish Christians living out of Jerusalem in the common erroneous notion that the Jewish theocracy with its ritual was the main concern, and that the Mes-

siah was sent only on account of it, and therefore for those who have part in it, not indeed as a secondary thing, but still only, so to speak, as a reward and a gift testifying complacency with this theocracy. Not only had they not yet comprehended that the Jewish theocracy was rather established on account of the Messiah, and the Messiah sent on account of the whole world. But to this theoretically erroneous view there was added, in their case, the practical danger of being really and truly shut out from the temple-worship; nay, it was this danger, evidently, that first awakened and called out the theoretical error. For the whole polemical aim of the epistle is directed not against conscious heretics and blameable heresy (as, for example, that of the Epistle to the Galatians), but against an aberration which had its root in weakness (*ἀσθένεια*).—The readers were too weak, too undeveloped in faith and knowledge to be able to bear and to overcome the *terrible feeling of being shut out from the old theocratical sanctuary.* Hence the theoretical statements of the epistle have an altogether unpolemical thetical form, they are milk for the weak (chap. v. 12); what of polemical is in it is directed solely against the sin of faintheartedness, never against intentional error.—But that *practical* danger could exist in this form only with such Jewish Christians as lived *in Jerusalem itself.* Elsewhere in Palestine and among the dispersion errors might arise similar to that in the Galatian Church, but never could those circumstances exist out of which such an *involuntary fear of exclusion* might spring. For where no temple was, there the fear of exclusion from the temple could not practically be felt. To be excluded from a local synagogue could in itself be regarded as no misfortune, as the constitution of synagogues was entirely a matter of freedom (they arose in Jerusalem between 460 and 480), and the Jewish Christians very soon everywhere separated themselves from the synagogal communion; besides, nothing is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews of an excommunication from the Jewish synagogues, but of exclusion from the temple and altar and the Israelitish theocratic church as a whole. Such could be practically felt only in Jerusalem itself. (Comp. Bleek i. p. 29).

True, in one respect the excommunication from the temple might affect Jewish Christians *out of* Jerusalem, namely, when they came to Jerusalem to any of the three great festivals and then found the temple closed against them. But if the author had had such Christians in view, he would certainly have given more prominence in the epistle to the feast of the Passover, of Pentecost, and of Tabernacles, and have shewn that these were dispensable, while he rather puts the ritual of those feasts quite in the background, and places in the foreground only the sacrifice of atonement. The readers, then, are certainly to be sought for in Jerusalem.

But again, it cannot have been the entire church in Jerusalem for which the epistle was intended. Already do the passages chap. vi. 10 and chap. x. 32, seq. forbid this; for it is scarcely conceivable that a church, the number of whose members extended at all events to thousands, should formerly have been together as one man bold and true to their profession, and should afterwards have collectively as one man become weak and fainthearted. Besides, the passage chap. ii. 3 leads us to think only of such readers as had been converted subsequent to the time of Christ's ascension, who in general, lived at a later period, and who therefore had not themselves been witnesses of the public labours of Jesus. Moreover, the passage chap. v. 12, in particular, forbids our supposing that the epistle was addressed to that entire church which was the mother church of all, which numbered among its members at all events many who had grown grey in Christianity, many who had been the personal disciples of Jesus, and again many who had been added at a later period from year to year. How could it be said to such a church: "According to the time ye ought already to be teachers, but yourselves need again to be instructed?" As regards the time, the members of this church were not like each other in respect to the time of their conversion, but different to the extent of perhaps thirty years; then it could not be presupposed of several thousands that they ought to be teachers; still less would this be said of a church in whose bosom there existed in reality many teachers; least of all can it be supposed, that such a church should as a body have so retrograded that it again needed milk. All these circumstances, taken together with the whole style of representation which characterizes the epistle, must induce us to understand the words chap. v. 12, *ye have need that one teach you*, as implying that the readers *were in reality again taken under instruction*,* *i. e.*, that the epistle *was intended for a limited circle of neophytes in Jerusalem, who had become timorous lest they should be excluded from the temple worship, threatened to withdraw themselves from Christianity* (chap. x. 25), *therefore were taken anew under instruction, and for whose instruction the Epistle to the Hebrews was to form a sort of guide.*

CHAPTER SECOND.

TIME OF COMPOSITION.

When this epistle was written can be determined only indirectly and by approximation, and this too only by the most careful con-

* This *teaching* cannot be referred to the doctrines contained *in the Epistle to the Hebrews itself*. For it has for its object the στοιχεῖα, which are *not* taught in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

sideration both of the import of the epistle as a whole, and of its particular intimations. The import of the epistle as a whole leads, as has been already shewn, to the conclusion, that access to the temple worship was either rendered difficult or altogether forbidden to the readers. This circumstance, however, yields a pretty certain *terminus a quo*, a point of time *before* which the epistle can certainly not have been written. We learn from Acts xxi. 28, 29 that in May, 58, when Paul came to Jerusalem from his third mission tour, the Jews charged him with having taken into the temple along with him a *Greek*, an uncircumcised person, namely, the *Gentile Christian* Trophimus, and thereby having profaned the holy place. Now, whether this was an intentional pretext, or, as appears, from ver. 29 (ἐνόμιζον), a mere mistake, so much, at all events, may be inferred from the nature of the accusation, as also chiefly from ver. 24, that at that time *Jewish Christians*, as circumcised and as native Israelites, were not prohibited from going into the temple. *The Epistle to the Hebrews must therefore have been written after the year* 58, but it cannot have been written very soon after the event recorded in Acts xxi. There must have been an interval during which the hatred of the Jews against Christianity rose to a degree considerably higher.

As the extreme *terminus ad quem*, the year 66 offers itself, which was the first year of the Jewish war. That the Epistle to the Hebrews was written before the destruction of Jerusalem appears not only from those particular passages in which the Levitical ritual is spoken of as still subsisting (chap. ix. 8, x. 1), but, even if we had not those passages, might be inferred, with undoubted certainty, from the import and the practical aim of the epistle. We must evidently come down a series of years from that extreme *terminus ad quem;* it is not probable that the epistle was written immediately before the beginning of the war, when the external fermentation and decomposition of the Israelitish national life had already come to a height. The circumstances presupposed in the epistle resemble much more the first beginning of that fermentation than its completion.

Certain ἡγούμενοι had already, we know, suffered martyrdom (chap. xiii. 7); the readers themselves, also, had already suffered loss in their earthly possessions (chap. x. 34), and many of their fellow-believers had been imprisoned ; they themselves, however, had not yet needed to strive even unto blood (chap. xii. 4, comp. our remarks on the passage). On the other hand, it is taken for granted everywhere in the hortatory portions, that severer persecutions may come, nay, will come ; the readers are systematically prepared for these, and exhorted to submit to the sufferings that were before them as a discipline from God (xii. 5, seq.), not to become fainthearted (x. 38, seq.), to persevere in patience (x. 36), to imitate the faith of the

martyrs (xiii. 7), and, like Christ and all the Old Testament saints, to keep fixedly and alone before their eye the future goal, the entrance into the holiest of all (chap. xi. and chap. xii. 1–3). Do we find, now, traces of the condition of the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem growing worse after the year 58? First of all, the *persecution under Nero in July* 64 may be mentioned, which, although it did not extend over the orbis terrarum, must yet have reacted also on Palestine. Were the Jews already full of bitterness against the Christians, and was their fury restrained from arbitrary outbreaks only by the power of the Romans, then the Neronic persecution would certainly be a signal for them which would not require to be given a second time. To persecute these Christians who were now held to be criminals against Cæsar, was no longer wrong, and would bring with it no danger. These Christians, whose leaders, Peter and Paul, had been murdered so shortly after each other as criminals and rebels, had no claim to, and no hope of, protection on the part of the Romans. Certainly, then, there began in the summer or harvest of the year 64 a season of aggravated persecution for the Christians of Jerusalem.

But this aggravation was not the first since the year 58. Already, under the procuratorship of Porcius Festus (60–62), according to the accounts of that period which Josephus has left behind him, the unbridled spirit of the Jews rose to a height hitherto unknown. Already in the year 57 (comp. Wieseler's Chron. d. Apgsch. p. 79) a first attempt at insurrection on a large scale was made, that of the Sicarii, but was put down (Acts xxi. 38; Jos. Antiq., xx. 8, 5, seq.; Bell. Jud. ii. 13, 3, seq.); under Festus, again, arose the multitude of deceivers and false Messiahs; the fever of false Maccabeism raged widely, and ate into the vitals of a people become inwardly corrupt and morally dissolute. The Roman scourge came down with ever increasing heaviness on the subdued rebels (Jos. Antiq. xxiv. 5, xxv. 8). We can easily see now, how the Christians as "adherents of a Messiah" must have been exposed to the suspicion of the Gentile magistrates, who it can hardly be supposed would investigate with any great care into the nature and character of each particular Messiah, but in whose eyes all hope of a Messiah and all speaking of a Messiah must soon have been stamped as unlawful, and scouted as a Jewish association for treasonable purposes, after some dozen of Messiahs had, one after another, put themselves forth as agitators and rebels. How easy in these circumstances must it have become for the Jews to blacken the Christians in the eyes of the Romans, or to obtain a bill of indemnity for any arbitrary persecutions of the Christians! It is certain, then, that the year 60 or 61 formed an epoch of increased trouble to the Christians, and Josephus expressly relates (Antiq. xx., ix. 1) that after the depar-

ture of Festus, and before the arrival of his successor Albinus, the Apostle James, the son of Alphaeus, was stoned at the instigation of the high priest, Annas the younger. This murder was certainly the signal for something further.

Accordingly in the year 62, the difficulties of the Christians in Jerusalem began to increase, and in the harvest of 64 there was a second and still greater aggravation of them. We can suppose, therefore, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was written *either* late in the summer of 64—in which case the passage chap. xiii. 7 will refer to the death of the Apostles Peter and Paul, which, as we have seen, is not absolutely impossible,—or it might have been written in the year 62 or 63, after the death of James the son of Alphaeus—in which case the passage chap. xiii. 7 would have to be referred chiefly to James the son of Alphaeus, whose mere name must of itself, however, have reminded the readers of the earlier death of James the son of Zebedee. We may, in the meantime, choose either of these two dates, although the passage chap. xiii. 7 is certainly capable of a simpler explanation according to the *latter* supposition, for then the author would allude to the martyrdom of men who had actually suffered death *before the eyes* of the readers, and were therefore *patterns* to them of faith in the proper sense of the term, and who also in the strictest sense had been leaders (*ἡγούμενοι*) in the church at Jerusalem. (The readers might thus have witnessed the death even of James *the son of Zebedee*, although they were still at that time Jews. And he, too, might be reckoned among the *ἡγούμενοι ὑμῶν* because he had laboured in the church with which the readers had since become connected, and as one of the Apostles whose divine calling they acknowledged since their conversion).

Let us see, now, whether the passage chap. xiii. 23 gives any more definite information as to the time when the epistle to the Hebrews was written. Timothy had been in prison, and had just recovered his freedom when the Epistle was written, or at least when it was sent off. At the same time we have gathered from the passage chap. xiii. 23, 24 that the person who *wrote* or *worked out* the Epistle was free, was in Italy, in a different place, however, from Timothy (if Timothy, who has just been set free, comes to him soon he will set out with him to the east), that, on the other hand, the proper *author* of the epistle from whom the *material* (but not the diction, comp. chap. xiii. 22) emanates, and in whose name the epistle on to chap. xiii. 21 is written, was by no means so independent as to be able to set out as soon as he might please to Jerusalem, but was so restrained by the circumstances of some kind or other in which he was involuntarily placed, that he exhorted his readers (chap. xiii. 19) to pray God that he might be again restored to them.

Now, when could Timothy have been in prison in Italy?—During the imprisonment of the Apostle Paul at Rome, several of his helpers were involved in the judicial procedure against him and detained for a while in custody; so Aristarchus (Col. iv. 10) and Epaphras (Philem. 23). It is not impossible that Timothy, also, might have been kept in confinement at that time. When the Apostle Paul wrote the Epistles to the Colossians and Philippians Timothy was actually with him (Col. i. 1; Phil. i. 1, ii. 19). True, the Apostle does not precisely *designate* him as his fellow-prisoner, and makes no precise mention of an imprisonment of Timothy; but even the circumstances that the Epistle to the Philippians was written precisely in the name of Paul and *Timothy* (i. 1), and that Timothy, thereby, joins in the thanksgiving for the *gift* which was sent εἰς χρείαν—this circumstance almost warrants the inference, that Timothy was *imprisoned* together with Paul. Just because the Apostle throughout the whole Epistle speaks in *his own* person, addresses his exhortations in his own name, speaks chap. iii. 4, seq., of his own—exclusively of his own—former circumstances, because in a word Timothy has no part in the *contents* of the writing,—that superscription *Paul and Timothy servants of Jesus Christ* would properly have had no meaning if it did not point to this, that the *occasion* of the Epistle—the gift which had been received—equally concerned Timothy and Paul,* and this, indeed, is only conceivable on the supposition that Timothy shared in the fate of Paul as a prisoner. The analogous passage Col. i. 1 would then have a similar explanation. This supposition is confirmed, however, by the passage Phil. ii. 19. Paul *hopes* that he will be able soon to send Timothy into the East. Why is this an object of *hope* to him? If Timothy was free, then he might simply have *determined* to send him thither. He *hopes* to send him so soon as he knows how it may go with his own case (ver. 23), and, in the same way, he *hopes* or "trusts" (ver. 24) that the Lord will soon procure freedom for himself "also." These words, *that I also myself shall come shortly*, are so parallel with the words *I hope to send Timothy shortly unto you*, that it is not too bold to suppose that Timothy also, who "as a son with the father hath served with me" (ver. 22), and who alone of all has not sought his own (ver. 20, 21), was involved in the procedure against Paul and imprisoned. If Timothy had been free, why did not Paul send him at once with Epaphroditus, or rather why did he not send him *instead* of Epaphroditus, who (ver. 27) had just recovered from a deadly disease?

It is not to be supposed that we adduce these passages as afford-

* The circumstance that Timothy may, perhaps, have written the Epistle to the Philippians as ταχύγραφος, does not suffice to explain the superscription Phil. i. 1. The tachygraphist never wrote his name in the *superscription* along with that of Paul.

ing a *conclusive* proof that Timothy was at that time in prison with Paul, but we think we have only shown from them the possibility that he *may* have been at that time in prison. The Epistle to the Philippians was written in the year 62, at all events before the third year of Paul's imprisonment at Rome, in which his situation became worse. Now, if the setting at liberty of Timothy recorded in Heb. xiii. 23 is identical with that which Paul *hopes* for in Phil. ii. 19, then the Epistle to the Hebrews was written somewhere towards the end of the year 62, therefore just after the death of James the son of Alphaeus.

If this were the only time when an imprisonment of Timothy in Italy is conceivable, then would the choice which was left open above, between the year 62 and the year 64, be thereby already determined. But Timothy, after having been actually sent by Paul into the East, was urgently entreated by Paul (2 Tim. iv. 21), whose case in the meanwhile (during the first half of the year 63) had taken a very serious turn, to come back to him before the harvest of 63. We may be sure that he complied with this request of his "father." Then, however, it is possible that he himself was involved in the procedure against Paul,—possible also, that after Paul's death he was taken prisoner in the persecution under Nero (July, 64.) *In short, an imprisonment of Timothy in Italy may likewise be conceived of as possible in the year* 64 ; only, that his being again set at liberty is less probable on this occasion than in the year 62.

We have therefore not yet got beyond the alternative between the harvest of 62 and late in the summer of 64. The Epistle to the Hebrews might have been written at either of these two points of time. The inquiry as to the author will, perhaps, be the first thing to throw a clearer light on the question.

CHAPTER THIRD.

WHETHER WRITTEN ORIGINALLY IN GREEK.

Before we can proceed to the inquiry respecting the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews there is still a preliminary question which must be settled, namely, whether this epistle was really *written originally in Greek*, or whether it is not merely a translation or a reproduction of an *Aramaic original*. There is nothing in the epistle itself that could lead to the raising of such a question ; but a series of Church Fathers speak of an original Aramaic writing, and therefore we are not at liberty entirely to evade the question.

The most ancient of these Fathers is Clemens of Alexandria, of whom Eusebius relates (vi. 14), that in his Hypotyposes he has undertaken *ἐπιτετμημένας διηγήσεις* (investigations) respecting all the books of the Holy Scripture, and in regard to the Epistle to the Hebrews has come to the conclusion: *Παύλου μὲν εἶναι, γεγράφθαι δὲ Ἑβραίοις Ἑβραϊκῇ φωνῇ, Λουκᾶν δὲ φιλοτίμως αὐτὴν μεθερμηνεύσαντα ἐκδοῦναι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ὅθεν τὸν αὐτὸν χρῶτα εὑρίσκεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ταύτης τε τῆς ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῶν πράξεων. That Paul was its author, and that it was written to the Hebrews in the Hebrew language, but that Luke carefully translated it for circulation among the Greeks; whence the resemblance in style between this and the Acts.* But the last words of this citation show clearly enough how Clement arrived at this view. It is not a *tradition* which he follows, but a scientific conjecture which he raises. The dissimilarity in style between this epistle and the epistles of Paul, and its similarity to the writings of Luke, struck him (justly); he perceived that the epistle cannot have come from Paul in this form; but as the general tradition of the East (as we shall see in the following chapter) named Paul as the author, Clement was led to ask: May not the epistle in its present form in reality, perhaps, have proceeded from another—from Luke? Wherefore not, he thought; how very possible it is that Paul wrote* to those Aramaic speaking Jewish Christians in their own language, and that a disciple of Paul (for example Luke himself, whose style so much resembles that of the Epistle to the Hebrews) afterwards worked out the epistle for a wider circle of readers.—But that Clement here in reality gives only a subjective conjecture, and not an ecclesiastical tradition, appears most clearly from this, that his disciple Origen departs from the supposition of an originally Aramaic writing, although he retains the substance of Clement's view. He, too, notices (in Euseb. vi. 25) the difference in style between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Pauline epistles; he, too, does not venture to carry back that epistle in its present form directly to Paul; but he can explain this phenomenon by a *simpler* (and indeed a far more probable) conjecture, namely, by the supposition that Paul *did not verbally dictate this epistle*, but only delivered in free oral discourse the thoughts and the development of the thoughts, the composition and elaboration of which he left over to one of his disciples (*τὰ μὲν νοήματα τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ φράσις καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις ἀπομνημονεύσαντός τινος τὰ ἀποστολικὰ καὶ ὡσπερεὶ σχολιογραφήσαντος τὰ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου.*) Origen would certainly not have fallen upon this method of solving the question, if there had been in existence a *tradition* in any degree to be depended on in favour of an originally Aramaic

* *Ἑβραϊκὴ φωνή* denotes here of course not the ancient Hebrew, which, indeed, was intelligible only to the learned Jews, but the Aramaic. Comp. Acts xxii. 2.

writing ; for then he would not have at all needed this new conjecture. That he thought it necessary to modify the opinion of Clement can be explained only on the ground that this was only an opinion, only a subjective supposition. We certainly meet this supposition also in later Church Fathers. Eusebius himself also repeats it (iii. 38) ; he speaks, however, so entirely in the same way as Clement—in like manner adducing the internal grounds which are in its favour—that it is apparent he is there only stating the conjectures of others. (Ἑβραίοις γὰρ διὰ τῆς πατρίου γλώττης ἐγγράφως ὡμιληκότος τοῦ Παύλου, οἱ μὲν τὸν εὐαγγελίστην Λουκᾶν, οἱ δὲ τὸν Κλήμεντα—Clement of Rome—ἑρμηνεῦσαι λέγουσι τὴν γραφήν· ὃ καὶ μᾶλλον εἴη ἂν ἀληθὲς τῷ τὸν ὅμοιον τῆς φράσεως χαρακτῆρα τήν τε τοῦ Κλήμεντος ἐπιστολὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἀποσώζειν κ. τ. α.) That this conjecture was one which he had adopted from others and not the one which was familiar to Eusebius, Bleek has already justly inferred from the fact that Eusebius elsewhere speaks as if the *Greek* Epistle to the Hebrews comes from Paul. (In his Comm. on Psalm ii. 7 he says that Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, has made use of the LXX., with which as a νομομαθής he was well acquainted).

Jerome, too, (Script. Eccl. 5) says : scripserat Paulus, ut Hebraeus Hebraeis, Hebraice, ut ea quae eloquenter scripta fuerant in Hebraeo, eloquentius verterentur in Graecum ; but Jerome also adds : et hanc causam esse, quod a ceteris Pauli epistolis discrepare videatur. (Later, also, we meet the same view in Œcumenius, Theophylact, and Johannes Damascenus). But it is always evidently the *old conjecture of Clement* which in every case recommended itself on the simple ground, that every one noticed the dissimilarity in style between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Pauline epistles.

The Church Fathers inform us respecting another book of the New Testament that it was written originally in Aramaic, namely, the Gospel of Matthew. But we must beware of placing these two accounts parallel with each other. In the case of Matthew the tradition respecting its Aramaic origin begins with the Presbyter John (comp. my Kritik der evang. Geschichte p. 767, seq.), and continues through the whole series of the Church Fathers without being encumbered by the faintest trace of an opposite tradition ; nay, it is confirmed by the abundant traces of the existence of a " Gospel to the Hebrews" distinct from the Greek one of Matthew, which was still used without hesitation in the first centuries even by the Catholic Church, and only gradually came to be the sole possession of the Nazarites and Ebionites, and in their hands was greatly vitiated ; finally, even the Greek Gospel of Matthew bears, throughout, an Aramaic colouring, and has quite the nature of a reproduction of an Aramaic original (although not of a verbal translation). Thus,

for example, it has only one *paranomasia* (Matt. vi.-16), and this, too, of such a kind as that it may have arisen unconsciously (comp. my Kritik der evang. Geschichte p. 764–766).

It is altogether different with the Epistle to the Hebrews. The scanty series of notices respecting its Aramaic original begins, as we have seen, very late, and begins with an *evident conjecture*, which was afterwards readily adopted by others on *internal grounds*. There is nowhere the faintest trace of an Aramaic original of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and our *Greek* Epistle to the Hebrews is, in fine, so original throughout, so evidently *thought in Greek*, both in form and import, that the supposition of its having arisen from an Aramaic original becomes at once an impossibility.

To begin with what is most external, we would refer to *the multitude of Greek paranomasias and plays upon words*, of which only *some* (for example ὑποτάξαι and ἀνυπότακτον, ii. 8 ; ἀπάτωρ, ἀμήτωρ, vii. 3 ; ἐγγίζομεν, ἔγγυος, vii. 19 and 22 ; παραμένειν, μένειν, vii. 23, 24 ; ἡγησάμενος, ἡγιάσθη, x. 29, etc.) could have arisen unconsciously in the hands of a translator, while the *most* are certainly intended (for example πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως, i. 1 ; ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν, v. 8 ; καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, v. 14 ; βρώμασι καὶ πόμασι, ix. 10 ; ἀόρατον, ὁρῶν, xi. 27 ; μένουσαν, μέλλουσαν, xiii. 14, etc.). All that can be directly inferred, indeed, from this mass of paranomasias is, that our epistle cannot be the *literal translation* of an Aramaic original ; that it may have been a free *reproduction* of such an original is not thereby set aside.

This reproduction, however, must have been executed in so free a manner that, in the form and *structure of the periods*, as well as in the *transference of the ideas*, the writer has not bound himself down to the original; for the construction of the periods is so genuinely Greek, so rich, so elaborate, the language is so select and expresses modifications of ideas so delicate (for example μετριοπαθεῖν, εὐπερίστατος, μισθαποδοσία, etc.), that there are no Aramaic ideas and words whatever to which these Greek ones would correspond. The writer must, therefore, have *entirely recast* his original—and that not merely as regards the form, but also the matter. All the argumentations are so subtly, so closely knit and interwoven with the grammatical form of the subtly constructed period, that if this form was not possible in the Aramaic original, then must also the entire development of the thought have been different. Compare for example Heb., chap. i. 1–3 ; chap. ii. 2–4 and 9, 10, and 14, 15 ; chap. iii. 1, 2, seq. ; chap. iv. 9 and 6, 7 ; chap. v. 7–10 ; chap. vii. 5–12, and seq. Let any one only try to render back these passages into the poor Aramaic language, and he will be convinced that more than the half of the sentiments, but chiefly and entirely their delicate connexion, would be lost.

To this is to be added, finally, the use which is made of the LXX. We have seen in the particular passages that the argumentations based on Old Testament citations are *substantially* correct, and really founded on the sense which those citations have in the original. But we have in like manner seen, that those argumentations, *in respect of form*, correspond to the words and expressions used in the LXX, even in those instances in which the Septuagint, although rightly rendering the sentiment as a whole, yet does not correspond to the most direct *grammatical* sense of the Hebrew original. Thus, for example in chap. vii. 8, the argumentation is based on the word *ὑποτάσσειν*, which does *not* occur at all in the Hebrew original of the psalm. In like manner chap. iv. 5, seq. ; chap. x. 5–7, etc. These argumentations also the writer must have entirely recast.

In short, the entire Epistle to the Hebrews is in form and matter thought out in Greek. Granted that it really had an Aramaic writing for its basis, our Greek Epistle to the Hebrews would still not be a reproduction of this original writing, but an *entirely new and original composition*, to which the Aramaic writing bore the relation of a mere preparatory work, and we should not be at liberty to say : "The Epistle to the Hebrews was originally written in Aramaic," but more correctly would have to say : "The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews made use of another treatise of *similar* import, which happened to be written in Aramaic, as a preparatory work." But herewith the whole conjecture vanishes. For there are no positive grounds for this conjecture, and, thus modified, it would not even serve the end which it was intended to serve by Clement of Alexandria. If Paul had intended to deliver in writing to *the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews* a scheme of contents for the epistle which was to be written, in order that this author might *carry it out*, he would at least not have written this scheme in the Aramaic language. If, however, Paul or any one else had written and sent an Aramaic epistle to the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem, and some other (Luke or any one else) had set himself to translate it into Greek for the more general use of all Christians, he would have really *translated* it, and not have made something quite different out of it.

The conjecture of Clement, therefore, is mere conjecture, and indeed it is *not even fitted* to explain the coincidence of the un-Pauline style and the oriental tradition of the Pauline authorship. In no danger of being misled by this conjecture, we can now pass to the inquiry respecting the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE WRITER. A) EXTERNAL TESTIMONIES.

On directing our view, first of all, to the external testimonies respecting the Epistle to the Hebrews, we encounter the striking phenomenon, that the entire Eastern Church decidedly and from the very first holds the epistle to be *Pauline*, while the *Western* either makes no use of it until the time of the Arian controversy, or, if it uses it, does not reckon it among the Pauline epistles, or, finally, declares it to be decidedly un-Pauline. *The Eastern Church had no other opinion than that Paul was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.* As the first witness Clemens Romanus (A.D. 96) is wont to be adduced, who has certainly a greater number of allusions to the Epistle to the Hebrews than to any other epistle of the New Testament. (In the 36th chapter of his Epistle to the Corinthians he gives pretty large and *literal* extracts from Heb. i. 4, seq.; more than once he repeats the words Heb. iii. 2, etc., etc. See the passages in Kirchhofer's "Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der neutestamentlichen Kanons," p. 233–238). But nowhere does Clement *name* the Epistle to the Hebrews, nowhere does he *name* Paul as its author. Now, as there is no necessity for supposing that his partiality for this epistle was occasioned by his partiality for *the person of its author*, seeing that the contents of the epistle might quite as well account for this partiality—further, as the person of the author might have been especially dear to Clement even although he had not been Paul himself, but one of those *fellow-labourers* mentioned in Phil. iv. 3, it follows that no *certain* conclusion can be drawn from Clement's partiality for the Epistle to the Hebrews, that he recognized this epistle as Pauline. Still less, indeed, can any inference be drawn against its having been written by Paul from the fact that Clement does not name the title and author. For, in his allusions to the Epistle of the Thessalonians (Clem. 1 Cor. xxxviii.), Galatians (1 Cor. xlix.), Romans (chap. xxxiii.—xxxv.—xxxviii.—xlvi.), Colossians (chap. xxi.), Ephesians (chap. xlvi.), Timothy (chap. xxix.), etc., he also names not the title and author; only (in chap. xlvii.) when he cites the first of Paul's epistles to the Corinthians does he remind the Corinthians —having special occasion to do so—of that which Paul had already written to them.

The series of properly Oriental witnesses for the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews begins with Pantaenus. Clement of Alexandria appeals to him, the μακάριος πρεσβύτερος, for the information that Paul had put no inscription to the Epistle to the

Hebrews, because he did not wish to urge his apostolic authority on the Jewish Christians. (Ἤδη δὲ ὡς ὁ μακάριος ἔλεγε πρεσβύτερος, ἐπεὶ, ὁ κύριος ἀπόστολος ὢν τοῦ παντοκράτορος, ἀπεστάλη πρὸς Ἑβραίους, διὰ μετριότητα ὁ Παῦλος, ὡς ἂν εἰς τὰ ἔθνη ἀπεσταλμένος, οὐκ ἐγγράφει ἑαυτὸν Ἑβραίων ἀπόστολον, διά τε τὴν πρὸς τὸν κύριον τιμὴν, διά τε τὸν ἐκ περιουσίας καὶ τοῖς Ἑβραίοις ἐπιστέλλειν ἐθνῶν κήρυκα ὄντα καὶ ἀπόστολον.) In like manner Dionysius of Alexandria (in Euseb. vi. 41 : Ἐξέκλινον δὲ καὶ ὑπανεχώρουν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ καὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις οἷς καὶ Παῦλος ἐμαρτύρησε, μετὰ χαρᾶς προσεδέξαντο, comp. Heb. x. 34). In like manner, Alexander of Alexandria (in Socr. i. 3, Theodoret. h. e. i. 4). Methodius of Lycia (A.D. 290) conviv. decem virginum, oratio 10, pag. 96 and 116, cites the passages Heb. x. 1 and xii. 1 with the words κατὰ τὸν ἀπόστολον and κατὰ τὸν διδάσκαλον Παῦλον. A Synod held in Antioch about the year 264 against Paul of Samosata, cites in its Synodal writing (in Mansi coll. conc. tom. i., pag. 1036) the passage Heb. xi. 26 as the words of Paul. That Clement of Alexandria held Paul to be at least the *original author* of the Epistle to the Hebrews, nay, that it was just the tradition respecting the Pauline authorship that induced him to devise that conjecture about an originally Aramaic writing in order to explain the difference in style, we have seen from the passage already adduced (in Euseb. vi. 14) in which, indeed, he appeals also to Pantaenus in support of its having been written by Paul. In another passage also (Strom. vi. p. 645), he cites the Epistle to the Hebrews as Pauline (Ἐπεὶ καὶ Παῦλος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς οὐ φιλοσοφίαν διαβάλλων φαίνεται. . . . . Ἡ πάλιν, φησὶ, χρείαν ἔχετε τοῦ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς, τίνα τὰ στοιχεῖα, etc. Heb. v. 12— ὡσαύτως καὶ τοῖς ἐξ Ἑλλήνων ἐπιστρέφουσι Κολοσσαεῦσι· βλέπετε, etc.— Col. iv. 8.)—Origen likewise cites the epistle as Pauline (comm. in Joh. opp. iv. p. 60 : καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑβραίους ὁ αὐτὸς Παῦλός φησιν·— then follows Heb. i. 1, 2 ;—in like manner in his comm. in ep. ad Roman. opp. iv. p. 579 and 659). Origen too was driven only by this general tradition of the Pauline authorship to that conjecture which has been formerly mentioned, and which (in Euseb. vi. 25) he expresses in the following words : Ὁ χαρακτὴρ τῆς λέξεως τῆς πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἐπιγεγραμμένης ἐπιστολῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐν λόγῳ ἰδιωτικὸν τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ὁμολογήσαντος αὐτὸν ἰδιώτην εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ, τουτέστι τῇ φράσει· ἀλλά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστολὴ συνθέσει τῆς λέξεως ἑλληνικωτέρα, πᾶς ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κρίνειν φράσεων διαφορὰς ὁμολογήσαι ἄν. Πάλιν δὲ αὖ, ὅτι τὰ νοήματα τῆς ἐπιστολῆς θαυμάσιά ἐστι, καὶ οὐ δεύτερα τῶν ἀποστολικῶν ὁμολογουμένων γραμμάτων, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν συμφήσαι εἶναι ἀληθὲς πᾶς ὁ προσέχων τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῇ ἀποστολικῇ.—Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαινόμενος ἔποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν νοήματα τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ φράσις καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις ἀπομνημονεύσαντός τινος τὰ ἀποστολικὰ, καὶ ὥσπερεὶ σχολιογραφήσαντος τὰ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου. Εἴ τις οὖν ἐκκλησία ἔχει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ὡς Παύλου, αὕτη εὐδοκιμείτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ οἱ

ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες ὡς Παύλου αὐτὴν παραδεδώκασι. All the following Greek Church Fathers name the epistle as Paul's: Eusebius places it in his canon among the Pauline epistles (Euseb. iii. 25, see farther on this below), in like manner Antonius, Athanasius, Didymus, Theophilus of Alexandria, the two Gregories, Basil, Epiphanius, James of Nisibis (in Galland. bibl. patr. tom. 5. p. 16 and 53), Ephraim of Syria, the two Cyrils, Chrysostom, etc.

Nevertheless, some have ventured to call in question the antiquity and unanimity of this oriental tradition. Bleek (i. p. 108) thinks that by the ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες to whom Origen refers might also be meant merely Pantaenus and Clement of Alexandria; not only, however, is it improbable that Origen should have designated these his immediate predecessors and teachers by so vague an expression, but the *usus linguae* is directly against this. (For example, Eusebius ii. 1, where he narrates the death of the *Apostles*, says: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐξ ἀρχαίων ἱστορίας εἰρήσθω; in iii. 24, he says, the Gospel of John has had the fourth place assigned to it rightly by the ἀρχαῖοι.) Chiefly, however, is the context conclusive against that interpretation. For Clement of Alexandria had *not unconditionally* held that Paul was the *immediate* author of the Epistle to the Hebrews; how then can this Clement be brought forward among those to whom those churches might appeal which held the epistle to be *directly Pauline?* The sense of the passage is plainly this: The Alexandrians cannot, indeed, believe that this epistle, with this style, was thus composed by Paul himself; but whosoever will yet hold Paul to be the immediate and proper author (therefore in *opposition* to Clement!) we can do nothing against him, since even the ancients have handed down the epistle to us as one of Paul's."

And, accordingly, a second objection also is herewith refuted (Bleek p. 107). In the words εἴ τις οὖν ἐκκλησία ἔχει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ὡς Παύλου there evidently lies the presupposition, that only *a few churches* at that time held the Epistle to the Hebrews to be a work of Paul. But the question treated of in the context of this passage is not at all whether the epistle was written by Paul or came into existence *without Paul having any thing to do with it.* That the ancient tradition imputed it to Paul was a settled point, and only the certainty of this tradition could induce Clement and Origen to form those two conjectures, by which the un-Pauline style *at variance with* the tradition might be explained.* —The question with Origen is rather, whether the epistle, *precisely as we have it in Greek,* can have come directly from Paul. The old

* How altogether untenable is the opinion of Bertholdt (Einleit. iv. 2914, seq.), that the Alexandrines—those who observed and always so strongly urged the *un-Pauline* character of the style—were the first who raised the *conjecture* of a Pauline authorship and that "on exegetical grounds."

tradition called it Pauline; the un-Pauline style had, however, justly struck the Alexandrians; it had become the settled opinion among them that the epistle in its present form could not be directly from Paul; either it is a translation of an Aramaic original (as Clement wrongly supposed), or, according to the preferable conjecture of Origen, Paul did not dictate the words of it but gave only the *νοήματα* for it. These views, under the influence of the catechist school in Alexandria and the neighbourhood, may have been generally spread; hence Origen carelessly mentions them; but then it may have struck him that this hypothesis might give offence, that there might possibly be churches which would zealously maintain the *immediately* Pauline origin; against these, he says, we can not take any steps as the ancient tradition names the epistle simply as one of Paul's. That the words *holds it as Paul's* according to the context, form the antithesis, only to the view of Origen, and not to an opinion according to which the authorship of Paul would be absolutely denied, is indeed clear as the sun.

Origen, certainly, also presupposes an *absolute denial* of the Pauline authorship as possible, but only as *possible*, when (in Matth. xxiii. 26) he says: Sed *pone*, *aliquem* abdicare epistolam ad Hebraeos, quasi non Pauli . . . sed quid faciat in sermones Stephani, etc.? The learned Father may have heard something of the Western views concerning the epistle to the Hebrews; at all events, he would not have spoken thus (*pone*, *aliquem*) if (as Bleek will have it) there had been around him entire churches and countries which held the Epistle to the Hebrews to be un-Pauline! He there also, as well as in ad Afric. chap. ix., distinctly takes it for granted that some might feel themselves compelled to doubt the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews *on internal grounds*, namely, on account of the passage Heb. xi. 37 (where prophets are spoken of who were *sawn asunder*, while no such case is recorded in the canonical books of the Old Testament).

Again, reference has been made to the fact that Eusebius reckons the Epistle to the Hebrews among the *antilegomena*, inasmuch as he relates of Clement of Alexandria that in his Strom. he made use of proofs also *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων γραφῶν*, namely, from the Wisdom of Solomon, Sirach, *the Epistle to the Hebrews*, and the epistle of Clemens Rom., Barnabas and Judas. But that the Epistle to the Hebrews is here reckoned among the *antilegomena* is very simply explained from this, that Eusebius himself (vi. 25) knew and mentions that some held Luke, others Clement of Rome, to be the *proper and immediate* author of it, and that (Euseb. iii. 3; vi. 20) the whole western church *entirely* denied it to be Paul's. In *this* sense he might call it an *ἀντιλεγόμενον*. But how firmly settled that tradition of the *Pauline authorship in general* was in the east is evi-

dent from this, that Eusebius in his *principal passage on the Canon* (iii. 25) *does not adduce* the Epistle to the Hebrews among the antilegomena, and was therefore conscious of having already included it among the "ἐπιστολαῖς Παύλου ;" accordingly, the same Eusebius cites it as *Pauline* in not less than twenty-seven passages. (Comp. Bleek, p. 149, 150, Anm. 173).

Finally, the learned and extensively read Jerome, who made use of the library of Cæsarea, and therewith of the entire Christian literature of the first centuries, says, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was ascribed to the Apostle Paul *non solum ab ecclesiis orientis, sed ab omnibus retro ecclesiasticis graeci sermonis scriptoribus* (ep. ad. Dard. p. 608).

Thus, then, the thesis is fully confirmed—*that the primitive and general tradition of the East is in favour of the Pauline authorship.* It is also confirmed by the remarkable circumstance, that the Epistle to the Hebrews, as is still evident from the numbering of the Kephalia in the cod. B, originally stood between the Epistle to the Galatians and that to the Ephesians, and was not till a later period in the fourth century placed after the Epistle to the Thessalonians (as in cod. A and C), and still later, after the Pastoral Epistles.

It was altogether different in the *West.* That Bishop of Lyons, Irenaeus, who was among the first to follow the practice of citing the New Testament writings by their titles and authors, has, as is commonly supposed, *not at all* cited the Epistle to the Hebrews, at least not by its title and author ; nay, there is a notice, certainly a very late one, to the effect that Irenaeus held the Epistle to the Hebrews to be un-Pauline. Meanwhile these points would need a special examination. Only the *second*, viz., that Irenaeus never names the Apostle Paul as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is beyond all question true. There are serious doubts, on the other hand, against the *first*, that Irenaeus was not at at all acquainted with the epistle, and did not make use of it. Eusebius (v. 26) notices a writing (now lost) of that Church Father with the express remark, that in it Irenaeus "mentions also the Epistle to the Hebrews." Ἀλλὰ γὰρ πρὸς τοῖς ἀποδοθεῖσιν Εἰρηναίου συγγράμμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς φέρεται καὶ βιβλίον τι διαλέξεων διαφόρων, ἐν ᾧ τῆς πρὸς Ἑβραίους ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῆς λεγομένης σοφίας Σολομῶντος μνημονεύει, ῥητά τινα ἐξ αὐτῶν παραθέμενος. These words may have a twofold sense. Either the apposition παραθέμενος serves to state more precisely *how* and *in how far* he mentions the Epistle to the Hebrews ("he mentions it by adducing passages from it")—and then Irenaeus may not, perhaps, have so much as named the title "ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Ἑβραίους, but only have cited particular passages of the epistle —or παραθέμενος serves to specify the occasion on which he has really "mentioned" the Epistle to the Hebrews, *as such, i. e.*, has named

it ("he mentions it on the occasions on which he adduces passages from it")—and in this case Irenaeus must in these citations have actually called the epistle by its name "Epistle to the Hebrews." In favour of the latter interpretation is the circumstance that a *mere making use* of ῥητά from the Epistle to the Hebrews, *without naming* this epistle, occurs also in the writing adv. haer., and could not be adduced as an exclusive peculiarity of the writing "διαλέξεις;" meanwhile, those mere allusions are so few in number, and, besides, so doubtful, that they may easily have escaped the notice of Eusebius. However this may be, little, on the whole, depends on which of those two interpretations is held to be the correct one. *According to each of the two Irenaeus at least knew the Epistle to the Hebrews;* but from neither can it be inferred that he must have held it to be Pauline. That he *knew* the epistle, is certainly confirmed in some measure by those allusions in the writing adv. haereses. True, indeed, when he describes God as faciens omnia, et visibilia et invisibilia et sensibilia et insensata, et coelestia et terrena, *per verbum virtutis suae*, there might be in this latter designation (certainly a very unusual one) an *accidental* coincidence with the ῥῆμα τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, Heb. i. 3. As little can it be with any certainty inferred from the words: ὅπου γε Ἐνὼχ εὐαρεστήσας τῷ θεῷ ἐν σώματι μετετέθη, τὴν μετάθεσιν τῶν δικαίων προμηνύων (v. 5, 1) that the Bishop of Lyons was acquainted with Heb. xi. 5, as these words might quite as well be explained from our acquaintance with Gen. v. 24 (LXX). On the other hand, in a third passage (iv. 11, 4): Quae (munditiae exteriores) in *figuram futurorum* traditae erant, velut *umbrae cujusdam descriptionem faciente lege*, atque delineante de temporalibus aeterna, *terrenis coelestia*, it would be difficult not to see a recollection of passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews (x. 1; σκιὰν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν; comp. viii. 5, σκιᾷ τῶν ἐπουρανίων; ix. 23, τὰ ὑποδείγματα τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς).

The supposition that the Epistle to the Hebrews was entirely unknown to Irenaeus is therefore quite untenable. On the other hand, *there is not the slightest trace of his having ever declared it to be Pauline.* On the contrary, it is thought that there is *a trace of his having held it to be un-Pauline.* Stephanus Gobarus (living in the sixth century) records (in Photii bibl. cod. 232, ed. Bekk. p. 291) that Irenaeus and Hippolytus held the Epistle to the Hebrews to be un-Pauline. Hippolytus has manifestly (Phot. cod. 121) denied the Pauline origin of the Epistle; but whether this saying of Stephanus *in reference also to Irenaeus* is founded on definite positive statements, may be very much doubted. For had such statements been to be found in the writings of Irenaeus, then Eusebius would assuredly have adduced the substance of these statements, in the passage (v. 8.) in which he brings together all that Irenaeus had expressed

respecting the biblical books. It is therefore far more probable that Stephanus *presumed*, from the rare and scanty use which Irenaeus makes of the Epistle to the Hebrews, from his silence respecting the author, and, finally, from the view entertained by his disciple Hippolytus, that his teacher also, Irenaeus, must have held the Epistle to the Hebrews to be un-Pauline. Was this conjecture right? I believe we shall have to decide this question by a docta ignorantia. It is certainly not impossible that Irenaeus held our epistle to be un-Pauline; but it is quite as possible that he had brought with him from Asia Minor to Lyons the tradition respecting the Pauline origin, *but that he was unwilling to urge this on the Western Church.* He may, therefore, have cautiously avoided citing the Epistle to the Hebrews as Pauline in contradiction to the universal opinion and tradition of the West; for an ecclesiastical tradition so general demanded respect and forbearance, according to Irenaeus' own principles (comp. his second fragment on the Passover controversy in Eusebius, v. 24). As he was, nevertheless, unwilling to deny the tradition which he had brought with him from Asia Minor, he therefore in general avoided making any particularly frequent use of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and he might do so all the more easily as the point of this Epistle was directed against Judaism, whereas the point of his own polemics was directed against Gnosticism, so that the Epistle to the Hebrews was in reality for him not so indispensable.

But that in the West this Epistle, at the time when tradition, even that respecting the canon (*i. e.* respecting the books to be read in the churches), was fixed, *i. e.* shortly after 100, was as yet by no means generally known and spread, is apparent from numerous facts. In the Novatian controversy (from 251 onwards) Novatian could have found in the whole of the New Testament no more convenient proof of his principle, that Christians who in persecution had denied the faith ought not again to be received into the fellowship of the Church, than the passage Heb. vi. 4, seq. As Novatian, notwithstanding, makes no use of this passage in his writings (see these in Galland. bibl. patr. iii. 287, seq.), he must, therefore, either have not at all known the Epistle to the Hebrews or have held it to be no authority. Victorinus (A.D. 303), the Muratorian Canon, and the presbyter Gajus (about 190), count only 13 Pauline epistles. (On Gajus comp. Euseb. 6, 20, seq.) Cyprian says in two passages (adv. Jud. i. 20 and exhort. mart. 11) that Paul wrote to seven churches; besides Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, Colosse, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Galatia, there remains here no place for the "Hebrews." And no weight is to be given to the consideration, that Cyprian may not have counted the Epistle to the Hebrews because its readers (as we saw) formed no *church;* he reckons the *province* of Galatia as a

church! Tertullian, in a passage (de pudic. 20) where everything depended on his being able to confirm the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, with great decision and candour names *Barnabas* as its author. *From the second to the fourth century, then, in Italy as in Africa, the Epistle to the Hebrews was held to be un-Pauline.* As yet at the time of Eusebius, at least in Rome, the doubts as to the Pauline authorship had not entirely disappeared, as Eusebius (iii. 3) records (Ὅτι γε μήν τινες ἠθετήκασι τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους, πρὸς τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίας ὡς μὴ Παύλου οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἀντιλέγεσθαι φήσαντες, οὐ δίκαιον ἀγνοεῖν. Comp. Euseb. vi. 20: ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς δεῦρο παρὰ Ῥωμαίων τισὶν οὐ νομίζεται τοῦ ἀποστόλου εἶναι). For, of *earlier* opponents of the Pauline origin of the Epistle (ἠθετήκασι) he says, that they had appealed to "the Roman Church;" of his own time he says, that *some* in Rome held the Epistle to be un-Pauline.

First in the time of the Arian controversy, then, there took place a revolution of opinion on this question in the West, and *a complete victory over the Western tradition by the Eastern* brought about, doubtless, through the influence of the oriental Nicenes, who now indeed found their most faithful allies and fellow-sufferers in the Western Church, and came into the most active contact with it. Hilary of Poictiers (A.D. 368), Lucifer of Cagliari, Ambrose (398), Philastrius, Gaudentius, Jerome, etc., consider the Epistle to the Hebrews as a work of the Apostle Paul.

Now, just as the attempt has been made to overthrow the fact that the primitive tradition of the East declared the Epistle to be Pauline, so, on the other hand, it has also been attempted to do away with the equally certain fact, that the West in the fourth century held the Epistle to be un-Pauline. Stuart has conjectured that the West was originally at one with the East on this question, and that Marcion, who came to Rome in the time of the presbyter Gajus, first infected the West with his doubts as to the Pauline authorship—a conjecture which needs no refutation. Tertullian, the energetic opponent of Marcion, who in his opposition to the Gnostics, never fails to impute to Marcion as a crime his every doubt respecting the authenticity of a biblical book, does not in a single syllable charge him with holding the Epistle to the Hebrews to be un-Pauline (adv. Marc. v. 20), and he himself declares the Epistle to be a work of Barnabas! Assuredly he would not have adopted this from Marcion!—Hug likewise thinks that the Western Church originally possessed the Epistle to the Hebrews, but when the Montanists appealed to Heb. vi. 4, seq. (Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 3), from opposition to them, it was first ignored (as was done by Irenaeus), and then declared to be spurious. But Tertullian also, who was himself a Montanist, or had been, had no other opinion than that the Epistle proceeded from Barnabas! And how, in general, would

the whole immense Church of the West have declared an epistle to be spurious, which according to tradition was apostolical, merely in order to be able to get rid of a single argument of a sect! It might, on the same principle, have declared the entire New Testament to be spurious, on account of the Gnostics and Ebionites!

These two theses then may be considered as thoroughly confirmed, *that the tradition of the East held the Epistle to be Pauline, that, on the other hand, the West came to know it in general at a later period, and then very decidedly held it to be un-Pauline.* The question now arises, what *critical inferences* are to be drawn from this phenomenon? Not a few draw from it the simple result, that "the external testimonies contradict each other, and, consequently, that the internal reasons alone must decide." Such a procedure, however, deserves to be characterized as hasty and groundless. The eastern and the western traditions are not two equal, but opposite, mathematical quantities which cancel each other and reduce each other to nothing, but they are facts which are to be *weighed,* nay more, which are to be *explained.*

In weighing the two traditions against each other, that of the East is the heavier in the scale. First of all, it is reasonable to expect a surer and more general knowledge concerning the author of an epistle in the district *to which* that epistle was written, than in that *from which* it was written. In Jerusalem, whither the epistle had been sent, it *must* have been known and learned who the author was; for, although he does not name himself in the inscription, the bearer of the epistle would certainly not deliver it with the words: "Here I bring you an epistle out of Italy from *somebody;* who that somebody is however you must not know"—for then had the authority of the epistle been but ill cared for! but the bearer must, in all probability, have brought to the teacher of that circle of readers an additional private writing, and to the circle of readers themselves have mentioned and certified the name of the author. From thence, along with the epistle (which soon indeed came to have a high significance for the whole of oriental Christendom, being, as it were, a divinely authenticated document for the loosing of the band between Christianity and Judaism), the knowledge of its author, too, must have spread—first, and most surely, to Lesser Asia, Syria, Egypt! What we learn there respecting the Epistle to the Hebrews we shall have to consider as the surest information.

It was altogether different in Italy, where the author wrote. True, he writes salutations from the Italian Christians, but this surely does not necessitate the supposition that he first sent round everywhere to the Christian churches of Italy, announced his intention to write to some Jewish Christians in Jerusalem, and obtained

authority from them to send their salutations. The salutation, chap. xiii. 24, is in so vague and general a form as to lead to the supposition, that the author ventured to write it at his own hand. Let it be granted, however, that in the author's immediate neighbourhood the notice would be spread that he was writing to Christians in Jerusalem, this notice would be forgotten in the next months, years, decades. The Western Church did not happen at first to see the epistle itself. Very natural! The epistle, in respect of its import, had an interest only where there were Jewish Christians who from piety observed the Levitical law; such there were in Palestine, Syria, Alexandria, doubtless also in Lesser Asia. In Italy the Jewish Christians were small in point of numbers, and gradually decreasing; there they were from the commencement more mixed with Gentile Christians. The Epistle to the Hebrews came also into the Western Church, but late and slowly; it was not, so to speak, waited for and read with avidity as a practically important writing. It came thither slowly, by means of copies. No Paul had named himself in the inscription; it was therefore not at all imagined that the epistle was Pauline. In the beginning of the second century it was not yet received into the ecclesiastical collection of books prescribed to be read (the canon) of the Western Church; now as from the beginning of the second century, from the death of the last apostle, the Church clung with tenacity to all old tradition, the Western Church also made no change in its canon; the Epistle to the Hebrews indeed gradually spread, but *the old tradition of the West had not reckoned it among the canonical epistles;* consequently it was allowed to stand outside the canon, and, least of all, was there any inclination to acknowledge it as Pauline. Now, that in the fourth century the Western Church followed the oriental tradition so soon as that Church came into more lively contact with it, can only be explained from the fact, that the Eastern Church must have had *weighty positive reasons in support of it.* In general, the Eastern differs from the Western tradition as regards the Epistle to the Hebrews in this, that the former bears a *positive*, the latter a *negative* character. The former starts from the knowledge that the epistle was Pauline, and only afterwards were doubts awakened (in the Alexandrians) on account of the style, which, however, could not overthrow that tradition, but only led to attempts to reconcile them with it. Nor was there any doubt in Alexandria as to who was the first and proper author, but only as to who was the translator, or who had elaborated it, whether Clement of Rome or Luke. It was a settled point, that Paul was the proper author. The tradition of the Western Church, on the contrary, starts from an ignorance of the epistle, an ignorance of the author, and we meet nowhere any positive statement respecting the person of this author,

with the single exception of that of Tertullian. True, when he names Barnabas, Tertullian seems to express not a *subjective conjecture* but a *tradition;* at all events, however, this tradition was only a *local* one, and in all probability rested, in its *first* origin, only on a conjecture. Origen (in Euseb. vii. 25), when he brings together all the opinions respecting the Epistle to the Hebrews, *knows nothing* of that of Tertullian; Jerome (cat. 5) adduces it as "juxta Tertullianum," and has therefore regarded it as entirely a subjective view of this Church Father.

These considerations will suffice to convince us, that the critic—let him, if he will, form an opinion respecting the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews only on internal grounds—is, at all events, not at liberty to set up any hypothesis which leaves it unaccountable, *how the Eastern Church came to the consciousness of having got this epistle as one sent by Paul.*

And now if, in the second chapter, it was left an open question whether the Epistle to the Hebrews was written in the year 62 *before*—or in the year 64 *after* the death of Paul, the decision already inclines to the *first* of these dates. For, let it also be granted, that the Eastern Church had actually erred in considering the apostle Paul as the author, even this error would cease to be explicable, if the Epistle to the Hebrews absolutely came first into the East after the death of the apostle. Think only of Heb. xiii. 19.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

CONTINUATION. B) INTERNAL REASONS.

Let us now look at *the epistle itself;* let us inquire whether it contains any *special intimations* respecting the person of its author; let us consider its *doctrinal import, its diction and style,* that we may see whether the epistle can be Pauline.

A) PARTICULAR INTIMATIONS.

Against the possibility of the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews is generally adduced the passage chap. ii. 3, where the author *distinguishes himself from the Apostles,* while Paul is elsewhere wont studiously to lay stress on his apostolical authority (Gal. i.; 2 Cor. xi.—xii.).—But unjustly. The author, in that passage, does not distinguish himself from the apostles as one who is not an apostle, but, as one who was not an eye-witness he distinguishes himself from the eye-witnesses of the life and labours of

that Son of God who brought the salvation. The author is not addressing those who cast doubts on his authority, and the question in the Epistle to the Hebrews is not whether Paul derives his office as immediately as the twelve from Christ, or whether he has it from men; but the antithesis in that passage is between the word of *the law*, which was spoken by *angels* on Sinai, and the word of the New Testament *salvation*, which has been made known "to us" first by *the Lord himself* and then by *ear-witnesses* (therefore is perfectly sure—comp. ἐβεβαιώθη). Paul himself could not have written otherwise here; he too could and must include himself, along with his readers, among those who had not themselves been witnesses of the life of Jesus. Accordingly, on the supposition of the Pauline authorship, the ἡμεῖς explains itself admirably even when taken as the 1 plur. *communicative* which is *not even necessary*. For ἡμεῖς is said in opposition to the contemporaries of Moses, and only denotes generally the Christians; and if the author, in the course of the period, ver. 3, continues in the 1 plural with which he had begun, he had in view there certainly, as appears from the context, not so much himself as his readers. "How can we escape," etc., is only a milder form of: "How can *ye* escape?" and the 1 plur. is not so much communicative as *insinuatory*. This passage, then, nowise presents any hindrance to the supposition of the Pauline authorship. Quite as little does the passage chap. xiii. 19; comp. our remarks on that passage.

On the other hand, again, no inference can be drawn that the Apostle Paul was not the writer, from the circumstance that in chap. xiii. 23 the author speaks of his "brother Timothy." Paul certainly gives him the same designation in Col. i. 1. But why may not another helper of Paul, for example a Luke, a Mark, have given to Timothy as his fellow-helper the name "brother?" Only so much can be inferred from the postscript chap. xiii. 20, seq., that the author must have been a man *who belonged to the specially-Pauline circle*, and was in Rome either in the year 62 or in the year 64.

b) THE DOCTRINAL IMPORT.

The argument which some have founded on the doctrinal contents of the epistle against the authorship of Paul will not stand the test. It is maintained that *there is no trace of such an allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament in the Pauline epistles*. There is already a mistake here, however, in speaking of an "allegorical" interpretation. That interpretation is called allegorical in which a symbolical sense is *arbitrarily* sought in a passage which is to be understood in the simple natural sense. When, in the account which is given of the feeding of the five thousand men, the twelve

baskets full of the remaining fragments are explained of the twelve apostles whom Christ left over, or left behind to the world, as the twelve bearers of that bread of life which he himself had not yet distributed—this is an allegorical interpretation. Such interpretations are certainly not found in the Pauline epistles, but as little are they to be found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. We must distinguish the objective *type* from the subjective arbitrary allegorical interpretation. Types must arise from this, that preliminary and imperfect fulfilments precede the final perfect fulfilment of the promises of salvation. The deliverance from Egypt was *really* a fulfilment of the promise given in Gen. xv., but it was not yet the true fulfilment; the promise that all nations should be blessed in the seed of Abraham was not yet fulfilled. The kingdom of David was really a higher and more perfect step in the possession of Canaan than the conquests of Joshua, but still not yet the last. Here, then, the preliminary fulfilment is *really* in itself, and objectively, a type of the perfect, *just because both refer to one promise, and correspond to one promise.* Thus, the intercourse between God revealing his presence in the Holiest of all, and the people represented by the Levitical priests and sacrifices, was *really* a type of the perfect reconciliation of God with the New Testament Israel, that divine community into which all nations of the earth were to be received, in order to be blessed in it; but the one was a type of the other, just because, in the former, there was only an imperfect fulfilment of what was perfectly fulfilled in the latter. The supposed "allegorical interpretation" of the Old Testament in the Epistle to the Hebrews, or, more correctly, the *typology* in this Epistle, consists simply in the author's showing, *that the types were only types, i. e.,* in other words, that no prophecy found a *perfect* fulfilment in the old covenant, that all fulfilments rather pointed always again to a further future. It was, for example, no arbitrary allegorizing, but pure objective truth to say, that the state of separation between God and the people under the old covenant, the existence of two compartments in the tabernacle, a Holy of Holies and a first tabernacle (*πρώτη σκηνή,*) the necessity of ever-repeated sacrifices, pointed to a relation of man to God which was not yet established. *This* typology, however, we find also in Paul's writings. When Paul, Gal. iv., sees in the two wives of Abraham and their sons—of whom the one was by nature the elder, and yet was rejected, while the other, as the possessor of the promise of grace, was the heir—a typical foreshadowing of the relation between the natural posterity of Abraham, the legal, righteous, natural Israel, and the New Testament Israel holding fast the promise, this is just such a typology as we find in the Epistle to the Hebrews, nay, a bolder instance of it. But the fact that such typologies occur seldom,

and by the by, in Paul's writings, while in the Epistle to the Hebrews they form the substance of the work, is naturally accounted for by the *aim* and *object* of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is, to consider the Old Testament institutions with the intent to discover whether, and in how far, they point forwards to something more perfect. But a difference which can be explained by considering the *object* of a work, ought not logically to be made a ground from which to infer a different author.

Nor is it otherwise with reference to a second consideration, viz., *that the doctrine of the resurrection, which plays so important a part in Paul's writings, is not treated of in the Epistle to the Hebrews.* It was necessary that Paul should develop this doctrine in detail when writing to the Corinthians, because they disputed it; in like manner to the Thessalonians, because they had false apprehensions of it. But in what part of the Epistle to the Galatians, for example, has Paul even made mention of the resurrection? The objection would only have any force if, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, there was some indication of the non-existence of the resurrection being presupposed. But, indeed, the antithesis between the humiliation and exaltation of Christ, the suffering and glorification of believers, forms rather the *ground tone* upon which the whole symphony of ideas in the Epistle to the Hebrews is built! Comp. Heb. i. 3, ii. 5–9, and 10–15, x. 19, seq., xi. 5, xii. 1–3, and 18–24, and 26–29, xiii. 14.

A third objection is founded on the circumstance of the Pauline doctrine, *that the Gentiles also are called to the gospel*, not being found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Very naturally! This question had been settled in the year 51 in Jerusalem (Acts xv.); and in the year 55, in opposition to the Galatian false teachers. From the fact that this question is not again touched in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is, that the readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews did not doubt the lawfulness of the baptism of uncircumcised persons; only the emancipation of *native Israelites*—of the circumcised, the Jewish Christians—from the ritual of the temple, was not yet clear to them. But that the author, on his part, must have been convinced of the right of the uncircumcised to be received into the Church, follows, as the most necessary consequence, from the whole doctrinal position of this epistle! If even the *Jewish Christians* are to *go out* from the παρεμβολή (xiii. 13), how much less could he expect the *Gentile Christians* to *enter into* this παρεμβολή?—But why does he, in chap. ii. 16, place the "seed of Abraham" in opposition to the angels, and not humanity as a whole? Just because the "seed of Abraham" forms here the antithesis to the *angels*, and not to the *Gentiles*, it follows, that this expression (which is therefore used

there in reality not in the empirico-historical sense, but with evident reference to Gen. xxii. 18, consequently, in the prophetico-ideal sense) must embrace the entire *Messianic Church*, the *spiritual* seed of Abraham,* and *is used therefore quite in the Pauline sense* (Rom. iv. 16).

A fourth objection, *that the opposition between works and faith is not developed*, has more apparent reason. But neither, for example, is this opposition developed, nay it is not even touched, in the Epistle to the Thessalonians. Tholuck, indeed, thinks that we were entitled to expect that antithesis precisely in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as the error of the Hebrews consisted in an unintelligent cleaving to the *works of the law.* But this may be very much doubted. The Levitical ritual *acts* might certainly be designated as *works of the law;* but this could be done properly only in so far as any one considered these to be *meritorious services* on his part. This the Galatian false teachers did. They were proud of their extraordinary perfect fulfilment of the ritual and ceremonial ordinances, and thought that they could thereby acquire righteousness before God, and deserve heaven. The readers to whom this epistle was addressed appear in a quite different position. Their malady was not pride and self-righteousness, but fear and scruples of conscience. They thought not that they *did* and *deserved* something great when they kept the law, but they believed that they *needed* the Old Testament means of atonement in order to be free from guilt. They were not *work-righteous*, on the contrary they were *earnestly desiring atonement* (nowhere does the author find it necessary to prove to them that an atonement is necessary), but they could not yet believe that the *one* sacrifice of Christ was sufficient. Thus, in their case, the opposition could not be that between works of law and faith, but only that between the shadow of the law and the fulfilment. In dealing with such readers Paul also could certainly not write otherwise than is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews. For no one will fail to perceive, that the difference between the doctrinal system of the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of the Epistle to the Romans is only a formal one. The Epistle to the Hebrews represents precisely the same thing in its objective-historical aspect as is treated in the Epistle to the Romans in its subjective-psychological aspect. *Moreover, the latter is not altogether wanting even in the Epistle to the Hebrews.* We refer to chap. iv. "the word which did not mingle itself with faith in those who

* Those are certainly wrong, who think that the idea of a *spiritual* seed of Abraham is there expressed *explicite;* but it would, in like manner, be wrong to understand the word in the *empirical* sense (=people of the *Jews*). The idea is evidently this: God has not given such promises as Gen. xii., xv., xxii., etc., to the *angels*, but to the *seed of Abraham*, therefore to *men.*

heard it," and the "living word with which we have to do" (ver. 2 and ver. 12, 13). Further, comp. our concluding remark at Heb. x. 15–18, and our introductory remark to the section Heb. xii. 18–29.

The last objection rests on this, that Paul always represents Christ only as the *sacrifice*, not as the *priest*, while it is precisely the reverse in the Epistle to the Hebrews. But here also there is no material difference. For if Paul in Eph. v. 2 teaches that Christ *gave himself* an offering and sacrifice (in like manner Gal. ii. 20), and if the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of a priest who *offered himself* (vii. 27, etc.), then Paul certainly considers Christ not merely as the offered but also as the offerer, and the Epistle to the Hebrews considers him not merely as the offerer but also as the offered. One might really suppose that the two propositions: Christus *sacerdos* immolavit *se ipsum*, and: *Hostium* immolavit, Christus sese *ipse*, come pretty much to the same thing! There remains, therefore, at most only the question why Paul does not elsewhere also *designate* Christ as the true "priest," why he has not applied the word ἱερεύς to him, if (as Tholuck says) "he had become conscious of the idea of the Messiah's priesthood in the lofty form in which it appears in our epistle."—But whether or not Paul might use the word ἱερεύς, he at all events opened up the view and the representation of a priesthood of Christ when in Eph. v. 2; Gal. ii. 20, he wrote: Christ offered himself as a sacrifice. Here certainly he did not think of Christ as a *lay* person, who offered *himself* to *another* priest instead of an animal! And in Rom. viii. 34 he ascribes also the priestly work of *intercession* to Christ.—But that *the word* ἱερεύς is used precisely in the Epistle to the Hebrews finds its natural explanation in this, that the point from which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews *started* in his argumentation was the priestly institution, and he proved that *this* institution of the Old Testament also is fulfilled in Christ. In Eph. v. and Gal. ii., on the contrary, he starts from the *work of Christ*, and touches only slightly and casually on the analogy between it and the Old Testament sacrificial ritual—just as much so as, for example in 1 Cor. v. 7, he touches on the analogy between Christ and the Old Testament passover lamb.

There is, therefore, *in the doctrinal system of the Epistle to the Hebrews* no peculiarity which forbids us from ascribing its authorship to the Apostle Paul.

On the contrary, there are in the Epistle to the Hebrews a multitude of most peculiarly Pauline ideas. The designation of God as the one by whom and for whom are all things, is Pauline (with Heb. ii. 10, seq., comp. Rom. xi. 36; 1 Cor. viii. 6); the idea of the Son as the *exact image* of the Father (with Heb. i. 1, seq., comp. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15, seq.); the exaltation of Christ above the angels (with

Heb. ii. 9, comp. Phil. ii. 9, seq.) into heaven (Heb. iv. 14, vii. 26, and Eph. iv. 10), besides, the remarkable and *quite special* idea that God the Father alone is excepted in the subjection of *all things* to Christ (Heb. ii. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xv. 27); that the exalted Christ intercedes with the Father for his own (Heb. vii. 25; Rom. viii. 34); that he has destroyed death and its power (Heb. ii. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 54, seq.: 2 Tim. i. 10); again the *remarkably special* combination of ideas, that Christ, having died once, cannot die again (Heb. ix. 26, seq., x. 12; Rom. vi. 9, seq.); farther, that Christ died for every creature (Heb. ii. 9; Eph. i. 10; Rom. viii. 22); that when he comes again, he will come not as a Saviour but as a Judge (Heb. ix. 27, seq.; Tit. ii. 13; 2 Tim. iv. 1 and 8; Rom. viii. 24, xiii. 11); that, till then, he rules and reigns at the right hand of God (Heb. i. 3, x. 12, 13; 1 Cor. xv. 25).—In like manner that the law cannot save, and is destined to be abrogated (with Heb. iv. 2, vii. 16–19, ix 9–13, viii. 7, x. 14, xiii. 20, comp. Rom. ii. 29; 2 Cor. iii. 6, seq.; Gal. iii. 3, iv. 3 and 9). The designation of the law as a *shadow* (Heb. viii. 5, x. 1; Col. ii. 17). The putting together of the ἐλπίς with the πίστις and with the ἀγάπη (Heb. vi. 10, seq., x. 22, seq.; comp. 1 Thess. v. 8; and 1 Cor. xiii. 13). The request to be interceded for (Heb. xiii. 18, seq.; Phil. i. 25, ii. 24; Philem. 22), and the antithesis between τέλειος and νήπιος (Heb. v. 13, 14; 1 Cor. iii. 1, xiii. 11; Rom. ii. 20; Eph. iv. 14).

Especially remarkable, however, is the agreement of the Epistle to the Hebrews with Paul in the reference to the second psalm (Heb. i. 5, seq.; comp. Acts xiii. 33, seq.), and in the inference, drawn from Abraham's readiness to offer up Isaac, that Abraham believed in the possibility of a resurrection of Isaac.

This Pauline complexion of the doctrinal system does not, indeed, necessitate our coming to the conclusion that Paul was the author of the Epistle, but still leaves room for the possibilty of another author; this other, however, must at all events be sought for among the disciples and helpers of the Apostle Paul; our epistle must have emanated from this circle; only thus can the recurrence of Pauline ideas and combinations of ideas—even in the minutest particulars—be accounted for.

c) WORDS AND PHRASES.

Many *dogmatical expressions* peculiarly Pauline are also found in our epistle. The doctrine that Christ intercedes for us with the Father (Heb. vii. 25; Rom. viii. 34), is expressed by the same word ἐντυγχάνειν, that of his having destroyed death by the same verb καταργεῖν (Heb. ii. 14; 2 Tim. i. 10.) Further, the phrase ὁ θεὸς ζῶν (Heb. x. 31), used elsewhere only by Paul, the expression δίκαιος

κατὰ πίστιν (Heb. xi. 7), the use of καυχᾶσθαι (Heb. iii. 6; otherwise, for example, Jam. iv. 16). Further, comp. Heb. ii. 4 with 1 Cor. xii. 4—Heb. xiii. 20 with Rom. xv. 33, xvi. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Phil. iv. 9; 1 Thess. v. 23—Heb. xii. 1 with 1 Tim. vi. 12; 2 Tim. iv. 7.—Finally, the genuine Pauline expression περισσοτέρως, Heb. xiii. 19, and πέποιθα, Heb. xiii. 18.

There are again indeed dogmatical expressions which do not recur in other Pauline epistles. The frequent use of τελειοῦν can scarcely be adduced as belonging to this class, as the word is also found in Phil. iii. 12; the frequency of its occurrence in the Epistle to the Hebrews is to be explained from the object of the writing, namely, to shew the fulfilment of all the Old Testament types, and does not therefore point to a different writer. In like manner, the designation of Christ as the ἀπόστολος θεοῦ to men (iii. 1) is explained from the context, as we have seen in the interpretation of the passage, and Paul himself would have been able to find no other word to express the appellative idea of מלאך יהוה without, at the same time, expressing the Gentile idea "angel."—On the other hand, reference may justly be made to the use of ὁμολογία (iii. 1, iv. 14, x. 23), ἐγγίζειν τῷ θεῷ (Heb. vii. 19) and the allusion to John x. 1 (Heb. xiii. 20). These, however, are still no conclusive proofs against the Pauline authorship. Particular expressions not occurring elsewhere are found in *every* epistle of Paul, and it must have been a a strange, and not very accountable solicitude on the part of the apostle, if, in any epistle, he had set himself to avoid all such expressions as he had not already used in former epistles.

If, now, we look at the remaining phrases, in a dogmatical point of view indifferent, we are at once struck with a great dissimilarity from the Pauline style consisting in this, that far fewer and weaker *Hebraisms* occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews than elsewhere in the Pauline epistles. Hebraisms are, indeed, not altogether wanting also in our epistle; but they are found, partly, only in those passages in which reference is directly made to Old Testament declarations and expressions* (for example κοπή, vii. 1, peculiar to the usage of the LXX.; ἐν τῇ ὀσφυῖ εἶναι, vii. 10), or they are phrases which were entirely naturalised in the speech of the Christians, and whose foreign origin was no longer felt by any one (γεύεσθαι θανάτου, ἰδεῖν θάνατον, οὐχ εὑρίσκετο, λαλεῖν = דבר, ῥῆμα = prophecy.) Or finally, but only seldom, there are loose connexions of sentences which are indeed *conceived in Hebrew*, but are at the same time also tolerable for the Grecian ear, and cannot be said to be not Greek, as for example chap. xii. 9, καὶ ζήσομεν for ἵνα ζῶμεν. There occur also the expressions Ἀαρών, Χερουβῖμ, Ἰεριχώ used indeclinably; finally,

* Hebraisms in the *citations* properly so called from the LXX. (for example, chap. vi. 14) are, of course, not at all taken into view.

also, genitives of quality, for which the classical Greek would rather have used adjectives. All these single instances, however, are very far from giving to the writing as a whole that *Hebrew colouring* which belongs to the Pauline epistles; in it all is *thought in Greek*, in the writings of Paul the *Semitic connexion of the thouyhts* is everywhere apparent. Now this can certainly indeed be explained by the circumstance, that Paul has, in this composition carefully elaborated a treatise, and not surrendered himself as elsewhere to the impulse of his feelings. It would, in fact, be wrong to deny that a man of the mind of Paul, if he had *made it his aim* to write good Greek, such Greek as that of the Epistle to the Hebrews, might have accomplished it. But it will be all the more difficult to perceive, why he should have studied to attain so elaborate a Greek style in writing precisely to the *Hebrews*.

D)THE STYLE.

This leads us now to the style as a whole. No small portion of the peculiarities which are commonly adduced as arguments against the Pauline authorship may, more correctly considered, be reduced to this, that the Epistle to the Hebrews is written in a *more select style* than the Pauline epistles. To this belongs the use of sonorous compounds as *μισθαποδοσία*, *ὁρκωμοσία*, then such turns as *ὅσον—τοσούτῳ*, *κοινωνεῖν* with the genitive of the thing (while in Rom. v. 17; 1 Tim. v. 22 it is used with the dative), *σκότος* as masculine (while with Paul it is always neuter), farther, the frequent use of the elegantly connecting adverb *ὅθεν* (for which Paul uses *διὸ*, *διὰ τοῦτο*), *ἐάνπερ* (for which Paul uses *εἴγε* and *εἴπερ*), *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, *διὰ παντός* (for which, except in Rom. xi. 10, Paul always uses the more homely *πάντοτε*, while this occurs only once in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. vii. 25). Now, this more select style affords certainly an indirect argument against the Pauline authorship; for, although the circumstance that the Epistle to the Hebrews has the nature of a treatise and was worked out with more scientific composure and care, may *in some measure* account for the author's having paid more attention to the *diction* than he did in other epistles properly so called, it still remains unaccountable, as has been already observed, that Paul should have aimed in so high a degree at an artistic style when writing *precisely to the Jewish Christians in Jerusalem*, while he gives himself free scope in writing to the Ephesians, Corinthians, Romans, etc. That so elegant a structure of period as we find, for example, in chap. i. 1–3; chap. x. 19–25; xi. 32–38; xii. 18–24—that so elegant an arrangement of the words as we find, for example, in Heb. vii. 4 (*θεωρεῖτε δὲ, πηλίκος οὗτος, ᾧ καὶ δεκάτην Ἀβραὰμ ἔδωκεν ἐκ τῶν ἀκροθινίων, ὁ πατριάρχης*) was not *natural* to the

apostle Paul, is but too apparent from the Pauline epistles! In such passages he must not merely have written more composedly and carefully, but must have made the style precisely the subject of artistic study, and that he should have done so is in the least degree credible in the case of a missive intended for the Jewish Christians in Palestine.

In addition to this, there are certain expressions of a more trifling kind, which are all the more important precisely because they cannot be reduced under the general head of style, but have their origin, doubtless, in unconscious habit. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews uses in comparisons *παρά* with the accusative (four times), which never occurs in Paul's writings; he uses the word *μακροθυμία* (vi. 12 and 15) to designate an idea for which Paul always employs the proper favourite expression *ὑπομονή*; he uses *καθίζειν* intransitively, which Paul, with the exception of the single passage 2 Thess. ii. 4, always applies transitively in the sense of "set;" he says in seven passages *Ἰησοῦς* (especially remarkable in chap. xiii. 20), and *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* only in two passages (xiii. 8 and 21), while Paul never says *Ἰησοῦς* alone, but (according to Stuart's enumeration) *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* 68 times, and *Χριστός* 198 times, and *ὁ κύριος* 147 times; finally, he cites Old Testament passages with the words *πνεῦμα λέγει*, or, merely *λέγει*, while Paul usually introduces citations by *γέγραπται* (only in 1 Tim. iv. 1, and Gal. iii. 16 by *πνεῦμα λέγει*). The Rabbinical controversial formulas, too, so common in Paul's writings (for example, when an objection is introduced with the words *ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις*) are entirely wanting in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

That the Epistle to the Hebrews always strictly follows the Sept. in the citations, while Paul often cites freely, is a circumstance to which, considered in itself, no weight can be attached. To account for this it has only to be remembered, that the author of this epistle wrote *with the Sept. in his hand*, and with the intention that his treatise should be *formally studied* by his readers and *compared* with the Sept. It is a circumstance of more importance that the citations of our epistle follow the recension which is contained in the cod. Alex., while those of Paul, when he follows the Sept., for the most part agree with the cod. Vatic. (Bleek, p. 369, seq.).

But what *seems* more significant than all this is the *manner in which the thoughts themselves are arranged and the proofs adduced.* The method of passing, immediately at the conclusion of a section, to the theme of a new section, and in this way intimating that theme, is nowhere to be found in Paul's writings. (With the transitions Heb. i. 4; ii. 5; iii. 2; iv. 1 and 14; v. 10, etc., comp. the abrupt transitions Rom. iii. 1; v. 1; vi. 1; vii. 1; viii. 1 and 12; ix. 1; xii. 1; 1 Cor. v. 1; vi. 1; vii. 1; viii. 1; ix. 1; xii. 1; xv. 1, etc.)

Paul generally adduces his proofs immediately, by appealing to the inner experience (for example Rom. vii.), or when he actually deduces propositions from propositions, he simply makes one proposition follow another with a "because," and carries forward the chain of ideas without logical arrangement, now looking backwards now forwards (comp. for example, Rom. i. 19, 20; ii. 14–16; iii. 4–8), and often interrupts himself by accessory ideas (for example, Rom. v. 13–17). In the Epistle to the Hebrews we find everywhere a strictly syllogistical arrangement of the members composing the proof, and that generally in such a form as that the conclusion is forthwith inferred from one of the two premises, while the other connecting premiss is brought in afterwards (comp. our remarks on Heb. xii. 10).

All these considerations are so forcible and conclusive that we can say nothing else than this: *While the spirit and doctrine of the epistle is Pauline, we yet cannot suppose that this diction should have come from the hand of the Apostle.*

CHAPTER SIXTH.

CONCLUSION. THE PARTICULAR HYPOTHESES.

After having without prejudice ascertained the particular phenomena external and internal, which fall to be considered in the question respecting the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and after having carefully examined every one of them, it will now be an easy matter to test the different opinions which have been put forth concerning the person of its author. We may divide these opinions into *three classes.* First, that of those who hold the apostle Paul to be the immediate and proper author of the epistle (as Gelpke, Hug, Klee, Paulus, Stein); a second class embraces the views of those who exclude the Apostle Paul from all share in the production of the Epistle to the Hebrews; a third class is formed by the conjectures of those who, as already *Origen*, hold that the epistle was written in the name of and by commission from the Apostle Paul, under his authority, nay, under his special influence, but not written with his own hand nor verbally dictated by him.

The view which belongs to the *first class* has commonly been too roughly handled, and set aside as insipid. That no argument against it can be drawn from the external testimonies, we have already seen at the end of the fourth chapter of this inquiry, and have come to the conclusion, that precisely in the supposition of a Pauline authorship does the *positive* tradition of the East, in like manner as the

negative tradition of the West, find its explanation. The inference also which is wont to be drawn from Heb. ii. 3 against the Pauline authorship, has already, chap. v. at the beginning) appeared to us to be of no weight. One argument only remains in full force against that view—viz. the peculiarities of style. Only by a forced process may these peculiarities be broken down, and in this state, one by one, weakened of their effect; in fact, it cannot be proved with mathematical certainty that it was absolutely impossible for the Apostle Paul to throw himself for once, into a different kind of style; but no positive reason can be discovered, by which the Apostle Paul should have been induced to write in a style so different from that to which he was accustomed, and a sound critical mind will be ever and again forced into the conviction, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews another hand than that of Paul held the pen.

The case stands no better with the *second class* of hypotheses, how great soever the number of those whose views are to be ranked under it. Already must reasonable doubts be awakened by the single circumstance, that criticism has arrived at no judgment in any measure certain as to *who* the author can have been if it was not Paul. Criticism has split itself into many hypotheses on this point, against every one of which there are substantial doubts. The most untenable of these is the conjecture which makes *Clement of Rome* the author; it remains untenable even when separated from the auxiliary conjecture with which it appears in ancient times to have been connected (in Euseb. iii. 38), namely that Clement only translated the epistle from an Aramaic original (it is so separated by Eusebius and Calvin, who, besides, expresses himself hesitatingly). This conjecture as a whole evidently rests on the circumstance that many ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews recur in the Epistle to the Corinthians of Clement. But we have already seen (chap. iv.) that the relation between these two epistles does not resemble that between Paul's Epistle to the Romans and his Epistle to the Galatians, or that between the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians—in other words, that it is not one spirit and one doctrinal system from which the two epistles, our Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of Clement, have proceeded with equal originality—but rather that Clement, in *particular passages* of his epistle, *alludes to particular passages* of the Epistle to the Hebrews, *cites* them, and thus places himself in a relation of *dependence* on the Epistle to the Hebrews, just as he places himself in dependence on the particular Epistles of Paul. The *spirit* of Clement's epistle—in so far as Clement does not give citations but writes independently—is altogether different from the spirit of the Epistle to the Hebrews. His relation to it was evidently the relation in which one stands to the writing of another.

In like manner untenable is the opinion that *Mark* was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews; not because Mark, as belonging to Jerusalem (Acts xii. 12), must have been better acquainted with the temple than our author, from a false exegesis of chap. ix., is made out to have been, but because Mark did not belong to the *Pauline* circle* either in the course of his outer life (comp. Acts xv. 37–40; 1 Pet. v. 13), or in his inner character,—because he did not stand in the near relation to Timothy described in Heb. xiii. 23, and moreover, as regards his style, deviates still more than Paul from the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Nor can *Aquila* be thought of as the author, inasmuch as he was not living in Italy in the years 62, seq., but in Ephesus (2 Tim. iv. 19), while the Epistle to the Hebrews was written in Italy (comp. our explanation of xiii. 24).

With greater confidence have J. E. Chr. Schmidt, Twesten, Ullman, and recently Thiersch declared *Barnabas* to have been the author. But, as we have already seen (chap. iv.), appeal must be made in support of this hypothesis to *anything* rather than ancient ecclesiastical tradition, with the exception of Tertullian. On the other hand, it is not to be objected to this hypothesis, that such a *supposed* want of acquaintance with the temple as is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews would not be conceivable in the case of a Levite (Acts iv. 36). Nor can any argument against it be drawn from the so-called "Epistle of Barnabas," which is altogether unlike the Epistle to the Hebrews, as this epistle, although written by a man of the name of Barnabas, can hardly have been written by that Barnabas who is mentioned in the New Testament. With more reason is reference made against this hypothesis to the circumstance, that Barnabas (according to Acts xiv. 12), was inferior even to Paul in the gift of eloquence, while the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews far surpassed Paul in skill in the use of language. To this is to be added, that Barnabas, from the time spoken of in Acts xiv., completely retires from notice, and disappears from history. In the Pauline epistles written from Rome mention is nowhere made of him.

Titus also was at that time in Dalmatia (2 Tim. iv. 10). Even on this account, we are not at liberty to suppose that he can have been the author, nor has any one in reality suggested him.

On the other hand, Luther, Clericus, Semler, Dindorf, Ziegler, De Wette, Tholuck, Olshausen, and Bleek have conjectured that *Apollos* was the author. He was, indeed, an eloquent man and mighty in the Scriptures (Acts xviii. 24; comp. 1 Cor. i. 4), who from the very first was wont to dispute with the Jews (Acts xviii.

* He was, however, for a while in Rome at the same time with Paul, according to Col. iv. 10; Philem. 24.

28). And as exceedingly little is known of him, a number of conjectures are possible in regard to him; he *may* have laboured in Palestine, he *may* have acquired great influence there; he *may* have had in view in the expression *my brother Timothy*, Heb. xiii. 23, merely the general brotherly relation of the Christian to the Christian; *for*, he cannot have stood in a special relation to Timothy before the year 64, which is the latest date that can be supposed for the composition of the Epistle to the Hebrews; nor can he have been in Italy at the time of Paul's imprisonment, as Paul never mentions him. And there are certainly no inconsiderable difficulties which stand in the way of this hypothesis, and which can be obviated only by a very unnatural explanation of the passage Heb. xiii. 24. Besides, it is not very probable that Apollos can have coincided so thoroughly with the Pauline system of doctrine, from the intimations which we find in the Acts of the Apostles and in the Epistle to the Corinthians.

With much more reason may it be supposed that *Silas* or *Luke* was the author. The former view has been defended, although but weakly, by Böhme and Mynster, the latter by Grotius. Against Luke, something has been made of the circumstance that he was a Gentile Christian (Col. iv. 14, comp. with ver. 10, seq.), while the Epistle to the Hebrews must of necessity have been written by a Jewish Christian. This latter is inferred from the fact that the author in chap. i. 1, speaks of the "fathers," where it is evidently the people of Israel that are meant, and that in chap. xi. 2 he calls the believers of the old covenant οἱ πρεσβύτεροι. Had he spoken of "our fathers," then there would be some ground for the inference; but it is difficult to see why an author, writing to Jewish Christians, should not have been able so far to forget himself or his readers as to say: "Beforetime God has spoken to the fathers by the prophets." Surely the Gentile Christians, too, had with Jesus the Messiah, received also the word of prophecy; surely they too, had entered into the right and relation of children among the people of God! And *that same Luke* speaks of the events which happened to Jesus among the *Jewish people* as περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν ἡμῖν πεπληροφορημένων. Such passages, therefore, as Heb. i. 1; xi. 2, cannot be made to bear against the authorship of Luke. On the other hand, the circumstance speaks for Luke, that from the year 62 onwards he was with Paul in Italy, and a fellow helper with Timothy (Philem. 1 and 24); Silas stood in the same relation to Timothy (comp. 1 Thess. i. 1); true, in the year 62, Silas was not in Italy, but he was certainly there with Peter "ἐν Βαβυλῶνι" in the year 64, immediate after the death of Paul (comp. 1 Pet. v. 12). Now, as the Epistle to the Hebrews must have been written either in the year 62 or in the year 64 (see above chap. ii.), in the

former case Luke might be held to be the author, in the latter case Silas.

This hypothesis would certainly, so far as we have gone, be the *most tolerable;* but there is one reason also for rejecting it, the same by which *this entire second class* of hypotheses is overthrown. *The firmness and unanimity of the oriental tradition remains altogether inexplicable, if it be not supposed that the Epistle to the Hebrews came to Jerusalem, under the name and the authority of Paul.* (See above chap. iv. at the end). And thus, indeed, there is not wanting the "occasion" demanded by Bleek (p. 393) for supposing, that "precisely Paul" was, at least, the indirect author of the epistle.

This brings us to the *third class* of conjectures, which, however, has received but small accessions since the time of Origen, so that we are spared the trouble of enumerating various particular hypotheses, and instead of this, can immediately pass to a positive construction of the right view.

The data at which we have arrived in chap. iv.—v. form the starting point:

(1.) The tradition of the East is capable of explanation only on the supposition, that the epistle was handed to the readers under the name of Paul.

(2.) That the Western Church was at first unacquainted with the epistle, is fully accounted for by the circumstance of its having been designed for the Jewish Christians of Palestine, and the ignorance of that Church at a later period, respecting its author, is explained by the want of an inscription, and the un-Pauline style.

(3). The author stood in a near personal relation to Timothy.

(4). The doctrine is Pauline, the diction un-Pauline.

Let us now call to mind a very remarkable circumstance already hinted at in the explanation of chap. xiii. 19 and 22, seq., but which has as yet been entirely unobserved, viz., that chap. xiii. 22–25, cannot have been written *in the name* of the person who wrote chap. i. 1—chap. xiii. 21, nevertheless, that it must have been written *by the same hand.* The postscript is not in the name of him in whose name the epistle is written; for the person in whose name ver. 19 is written was, against his will, so situated as to be prevented from setting out on a journey to the readers. This did not depend on his own will; nor did he by any means hope to be shortly set free, but he admonished the readers to pray that he might be restored to them: he therefore took it for granted that he should be still in confinement when the readers should have received the epistle into their hands. On the other hand, the person in whose name ver. 22–25 is written is already about to set out on a journey, and it depends only on the speedier or later coming of Timothy, who had just been set free, whether he will set out towards the east along with him or alone.

And yet, the postscript is written and composed *by the same hand* that wrote and composed the epistle. For, in ver. 22, the author of the postscript apologizes for several harshnesses in his admonitions, and asks the reader to excuse these on account of the short and compressed character of the writing. The postscript, therefore, does not proceed from an *amanuensis* to whom the epistle had been *verbally dictated*, but from one to whom the *material had been given while the diction was left to himself.*

Who then was the author? who the composer? The composer was a friend or fellow-helper of Timothy (xiii. 23), but was not, precisely at that time, in the same place (xiii. 23), ἐὰν . . . . ἔρχηται) in which Timothy had, up till about that time, been imprisoned. Now, we found (see above, chap. ii.) *in the Epistle to the Philippians*, the clearest traces of an imprisonment of Timothy. Paul would like to send Timothy into the East, but *cannot* yet do so; he *hopes*, however, to be able shortly to send him thither. *When Paul wrote the Epistle to the Philippians, in the year* 62, *Timothy was accordingly in prison, but with the hope of being soon released. At that time Luke was not precisely in Rome itself;* for Paul sends no salutations from him to the Philippians, who were so well known to him. Shortly afterwards, we suppose the Epistle to the Hebrews to have been finished, certainly a few days after the departure of Epaphroditus, (Phil. ii. 25). Paul we suppose, had fully talked over the subject with Luke, perhaps had given him a scheme or preparatory work in writing; he himself was deprived of the leisure necessary for the composition by the legal procedure against him, which precisely at that time (Phil. ii. 23) had passed into a new stage. Luke worked out the epistle for Paul, and as in his name, not however in Rome, where perhaps he himself might have been involved in the procedure against Paul, but in another place in Italy, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Theophilus. When the work was finished, the news reached him that Timothy had been set free in Rome. He himself purposed to set out for the East, though not directly to Palestine (for, in xiii. 23, he takes it for granted that the Epistle to the Hebrews would be in the hands of the readers before he should see them personally); Timothy, too, in company with whom he wishes and hopes to make the journey (ver. 23) was (according to Phil. ii. 23) shortly to direct his course to Lesser Asia. How exactly do the most particular, the most trifling notices harmonize here!

I think I am even warranted in saying that this hypothesis leaves nothing unexplained. First of all, it completely explains the *internal phenomena* of the epistle. Commissioned by the apostle Paul to execute the writing, Luke wrote assuredly *in the name* of Paul (xiii. 19) only in that part where he added the personal

concluding requests (which had possibly been given to him in writing by Paul); nowhere did he *affect* to speak in the name of Paul, or to allude to events in the life of Paul; nowhere, indeed, with the exception of chap. xiii. 19, does a first person singular occur, while the omission of an inscription becomes also perfectly intelligible. On the other hand, it becomes also perfectly intelligible how Luke, writing in virtue of a commission from Paul, might speak of the members of the Old Testament covenant simply as "the fathers," the "elders." This hypothesis explains the combination of thoroughly Pauline ideas and doctrinal forms of expression with the un-Pauline diction; it explains, also, the circumstance that of all the New Testament writings, precisely those of Luke have most similarity in point of style with the Epistle to the Hebrews (in so far, namely, as Luke has not interwoven notices prepared by others into his Gospel and Acts of the Apostles). How similar in style are the two introductions, Luke i. 1–4 and Heb. i. 1–3!

Secondly, the origin of the *ecclesiastical tradition* becomes intelligible on this hypothesis. The bearer of the epistle, who is unknown to us, delivered it to the readers as an "epistle which Paul sends to them," and thereby as a Pauline epistle. Assuredly he did not fail to communicate to them what was necessary respecting the peculiar manner in which it had been prepared, to tell them that the epistle was written by the hand of Luke, and at the same time not verbally dictated to Luke. *Without such a notification none of the readers could have understood the postscript, especially ver.* 22 *and ver.* 23. But, in a way which is easily conceivable, the notification was soon lost.

What the readers found in the epistle was kept and considered, with reason, as the *teaching and the admonitions of the apostle.* And thus the epistle was regarded as one of Paul's; it was written autoritate Pauli, and, in reality also, Paulo autore,—wheresoever the epistle spread, it carried with it the information that Paul was its author. And how highly important did this epistle, designed at first only for a very limited circle of readers, become, even in the course of the next ten years, for the whole of Palestine, Syria, Egypt, for Asia Minor, too, in short, for all quarters where were parties of Jewish Christians who had not yet raised themselves to the Pauline stand-point. This epistle was, indeed, a document which contained a divine warrant for the complete severance of Christendom from the maternal bosom of the temporal Israel! For the Western Church, which from the first was entirely under Pauline influence, the epistle for the same reason did not possess this practical importance; it had long before been rendered superfluous here by the Epistle to the Romans; the state of things as a whole which occasioned the necessity for an Epistle to the Hebrews in the East,

had been obviated long before in Italy by the Epistle to the Romans. What wonder, then, that the Epistle to the Hebrews should have spread there late and slowly; and if it did not spread there until after the Church of the West had closed its canon (in the beginning of the second century), if it did not spread until the period when every Church carefully adhered to ancient tradition, it is then easy to comprehend, how hesitation should have been shown in opening again the closed door of the canon for the Epistle to the Hebrews, till then unknown; it is perfectly conceivable how this epistle, which had no inscription, and was un-Pauline in its style, should not have been acknowledged as Pauline; and if, now, there had actually been preserved, say in Rome, from the time of Clement onwards, a notice of the existence of this epistle, but at the same time also a notice that Paul had not composed it *himself*—does not the opposition of the Western Church to the Pauline authorship become doubly intelligible?

In the third place, the conclusion to which we have come respecting the *circle of readers* for whom this epistle was intended, beautifully harmonizes with our hypothesis, that Paul was, at least indirectly, the author of it. The question indeed has been asked, why precisely the apostle of the Gentiles should have come to write to Jewish Christians in Palestine. We know, however, that the epistle was not written to churches, not even to a church, not to the Church of Jerusalem, but to a *limited circle of individual Jewish Christians in Jerusalem, whose conversion had taken place not very long before.* May it not have been such Jewish Christians as had been converted just about the time when Paul was taken prisoner in Jerusalem (Acts xxi. seq.), who perhaps were first awakened by Paul himself, during those seven days when as yet he went out and in in freedom (Acts xxi. 27), and were brought to embrace Christianity by his powerful address (Acts xxii.)? What a great and profound crisis arose in those days among the Jews themselves, is evident from Acts xxiii. 9; even in the company of Paul's bitterest enemies there were those who sought to frustrate the plot which was formed to murder him, by betraying it to the nephew of Paul (Acts xxiii. 16). But, be this as it may, Paul was from that period so firmly rooted in his love for the Church in Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 17), and he so identifies his cause with that of this Church, that this of itself already suffices to explain, how he may have addressed a treatise to *individuals* among the Jewish Christians of Jerusalem. For, let it be granted, also, that these individuals were not gained over to Christianity precisely through Paul's personal influence, still *Luke* remained those two years in Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 15, seq.; xxvii. 1, seq.; comp. Luke i. 3, *παρηκολουθηκότι πᾶσιν ἀκριβῶς*), and thus the readers were certainly

well enough acquainted at least with him, so that at his suggestion, and through him, Paul might address a writing to them. The notice, too, respecting the former zeal of these readers (Heb. vi. 10; x. 32, seq.) thus obtains a sufficient explanation.

Finally, this hypothesis throws light on the passages which refer to an impending persecution, as well as the reference to the martyrdom of the ἡγούμενοι (xiii. 7). The Epistle to the Philippians had been written in the year 62, and the Epistle to the Hebrews sent soon afterwards to the East. Just at that time the apostle James, son of Alpheus, had been stoned; the news of his death would just have reached Italy when Luke was writing the epistle. Shortly afterwards, Luke, as well as Timothy, set out on a journey eastward, first to Asia Minor, but Luke (Heb. xiii. 23), certainly, also to Palestine. Luke returned back to Paul earlier than Timothy (2 Tim. iv. 11), standing faithfully by his spiritual father even to his death. Timothy also received a pressing charge to return (2 Tim. iv. 21), and would doubtless comply with it. Paul suffered martyrdom in the beginning of 64. Among the revelations of the Holy Spirit, whose instrument he was, and which he had left behind him as an everlasting legacy, the Epistle to the Hebrews occupies a very important place. It is the knife which completely severed and delivered the new-born church of the New Testament Israel from the maternal womb of the Old Testament theocracy. And therefore, it not merely *had* a significance for the Christian Church at the time when the Lord visited with judgment the unbelieving seed of Abraham, but it has a *permanent* significance, as a writing which will be lighted up anew in flaming characters every time the attempt is made again to drive back the Church, which has been perfected forever by one sacrifice, within the limits of a Levitical sacrificial service and a slavish hierarchy, and again to hide behind a veil the access to the sacrifice of Christ, which stands freely and directly open to every individual.

LITERATURE.

In the *Patristic period* we find, in Origen, only fragmentary explanations. The commentary of Theodoret is well known, and in many respects justly celebrated; but Chrysostom, in his 34 homilies, penetrates still deeper into the spirit of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

In the *Reformation period* Erasmus has furnished, in his Annotations (1516) and his Paraphrasis (1522), an excellent preparatory work for the grammatical interpretation of the epistle; Zuingle, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, have, each in his own way handled the Epistle to the Hebrews along with the rest of the New Testament

writings ; there are special commentaries by Oecolompadius (explan. ad. Epist. ad Ebr. 1734) and Breuz (1751). After that, it was especially *Reformed* theologians who applied their exegetical labours to the Epistle to the Hebrews. Chiefly to be named are Hyperius (Zürich, 1587), Junius (1590), Drusius, Ludwig de Dieu, Jac. Capellus the elder, Ludwig Capellus, Cameron (Adnot. in Ep. ad Hebr. 1628, op. posth.), Heinsius, then Cocceius (Leyden 1659), together with a whole series of Federalists, in England Hammond and Whitby, the Arminians Limborch (Rotterd. 1711), Clericus, Wetstein, and Grotius. Of the *Lutheran* theologians only Hunnius (Frankf., 1589), Joh. Gerhard (Jena, 1641), Seb. Schmidt (Strasb., 1680), Sigm. Jac. Baumgarten (Halle, 1763), and Calov (in the Bibl. illustr.), are to be noticed in connexion with the Epistle to the Hebrews.

In the *Rationalistic period:* Morus (Leipzig, 1776), J. D. Michaelis (Frankf. and Leipz., 1780), Zachariä (Gött. 1793), Heinrichs (Gött., 1792), Hezel (Leipz., 1795), Ernesti (Lect. Academ. ed Dindorf, Leipz., 1795).

Belonging to our own century, are Storr (1809), Böhme (Leipz., 1825), Kuinoel (Leipz., 1831), Klee (Mainz, 1833), Paulus (1833), Menken (special commentaries and homilies on Heb. ix.—x., and Heb. xi., 1821 and 1831), Tholuck (Hamb., 1836 [3 Ausg, 1850]), especially, however, the thorough and copious commentary by Bleek (Berlin, 1828–1840. [Lünemann, Gött., 1855. Delitzsch, Eslangen, 1857.]

END OF VOL. VI.

William Jessup University
Library
333 Sunset Blvd.
Rocklin, Ca 95765

SAN JOSE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE LIBRARY NF
225.6 052b 1857 v.IV
Olshausen, Hermann
Biblical commentary on the New Testament
3 SJCC 00012 4778

6539

225.6
052b
1857
V. VI

Olshauen, Herrman D.D.

Biblical Commentary on the New
Testament